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11.  INTRODUCTION1
1.1.  The History of Impunity for International Atrocities and the 
Development of International Criminal Law 
Certain acts, such as murder and rape, are universally recognized as deviant and criminal. 
These acts are hence inherently criminal or mala in se.2 In armed conflicts such acts are, 
however, frequently committed and met with impunity. The reason for this is that the 
deliberate infliction of harm is not socially evaluated in the same way in times of peace 
and in times of war. What in peacetime is perceived as crimes can be regarded as military 
actions or as “politics” in armed conflicts. An alternative moral order is thus in force 
during armed conflicts, which allows “many things that are strictly prohibited under all 
criminal codes.”3 Armed conflicts give rise to both situations of war and institutions of 
war (such as, prisoner-of-war camps), which “change the normal moral situation”.4 
All, however, is not fair in love and war, at least legally speaking. The law of armed 
conflict or international humanitarian law has developed during centuries and it has 
established limits for fighting in armed conflicts.5 As such, it is also criminal to rape in 
armed conflicts and to murder non-combatants. The law of armed conflicts has, however, 
often been plagued by significant enforcement problems. During armed conflicts, 
the conditions are rarely conducive for war crime trials. After the conflicts, trials are 
often hampered by political settlements containing promises of amnesties or simply 
the wish to move on and leave the armed conflict behind. Post-conflict societies also 
often have numerous infrastructural and economic problems to handle. In these difficult 
circumstances, the finding of individual guilt may be of secondary importance for the 
authorities. In the rare cases where there have been war crime trials, the defendants have 
often represented the losing party to the conflict. Many historical examples of war crimes 
trials therefore have an element of victor’s justice in them.  
Armed conflicts are, however, not the only context in which inherently criminal 
acts frequently are met with impunity. In totalitarian or authoritarian States, it is 
common that dissidents and/or members of minority groups face serious violence that 
goes unpunished. In these contexts, the impunity is often due to the State involvement 
in the criminality. Also after the abusive regime has fallen, attempts to address abuses 
are often conspicuous by their absence or modest in comparison to the magnitude of 
1 This study aims at covering legal developments up to mid-December 2012, when the thesis was submitted 
to the preliminary review. A few occasional references to articles/books and case law from 2013 have, 
however, been added.
2 In Black’s Law Dictionary, a mala in se or malum in se crime is defined as a crime that is inherently 
immoral, such as murder, arson, and rape. Another type of crimes is crimes malum prohibitum, which are 
crimes because they are prohibited by statute, although the acts themselves are not necessarily immoral. 
Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th ed. (2009).  
3 G. P. Fletcher, ‘The Law of War and Its Pathologies’, 38 Columbia Human Rights Law Review (2007), at 
522. 
4 L. May, War Crimes and Just War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 11. 
5 On the development of the law of armed conflict, see e.g., L. C. Green, The Contemporary Law of Armed 
Conflict, 2nd ed. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), 15-53.  
2the crimes committed.6 This impunity appears to have the same underlying reasons as 
impunity after armed conflicts: amnesties, lacking political will and scarce resources.  
The difficulty faced by domestic criminal justice systems to − effectively and fairly 
− address crimes committing as part of armed conflicts and totalitarian regimes is 
the background of international criminal law. In this regard, the idea of international 
individual criminal responsibility was for the first time seriously raised after World War 
I: The Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany signed at 
Versailles suggested that the former German emperor and persons accused of having 
committed acts in violence of the laws and customs of war should be prosecuted.7 This 
attempt to establish international individual responsibility, however, ended in a failure.8 
The first successful multinational criminal trials instead took place after World War 
II. In Europe, the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (Nuremberg Tribunal) 
prosecuted leading Nazis for war crimes, crimes against humanity and crimes against 
peace.9 In Asia, the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (Tokyo Tribunal) 
was established to prosecute the major war criminals in the Far East.10 Together these 
tribunals established that “individuals have international duties which transcend the 
national obligations of obedience imposed by the individual state” and that “[c]rimes 
against international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by 
punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international 
law be enforced.”11 The tribunals hence confirmed the existence of individual criminal 
responsibility for certain crimes directly based on public international law. Both tribunals 
had powers to prosecute individuals for war crimes, crimes against humanity and crimes 
against peace. 
The widespread and shocking Nazi criminality had also other consequences for 
the development of public international law. In the late 1940s, international human 
rights law started to develop and many important conventions were adopted. Central 
international instruments dating back to that time period are, for example, the 1948 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),12 the 1948 Convention on the Prevention 
6 E.g., C. S. Nino, Radical Evil on Trial (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 118-127. 
7 The Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany signed at Versailles, 28 June 
1919, Articles 227-230. 
8 See further, e.g., T. Meron, ‘Reflections on the Prosecution of War Crimes by International Tribunals’, 100 
American Journal of International Law (2006), at 554-559, and W. A. Schabas, Genocide in International 
Law – The Crime of Crimes, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) 21-26.
9 Göring et al., Judgment, IMT, 1 October 1946 (also referred to as the ‘Nuremberg Judgement’). See 
further e.g., D. A. Blumenthal & T. L. H. McCormack (eds.), The Legacy of Nuremberg: Civilising Influence 
or Institutionalised Vengeance? (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008) and G. Ginsburgs & V. N. 
Kudriavtsev (eds.), The Nuremberg Trial and International Law (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
1990). Regarding the Nuremberg Tribunal, it has been noted that the tribunal rather was multinational 
than international, as it was established by the four victorious allies. Bulletin of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, No. 5/6 (1996), at 4. As such, the first truly international criminal 
tribunal is the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY).
10 B. V. A. Röling & C. F. Rüter (eds.), The Tokyo Judgment (Amsterdam: University Press Amsterdam, 
1977).
11 Göring et al., Judgment, IMT, 1 October 1946, at 223. 
12 UN Doc. G. A. Res. 217 (III) A of 10 December 1948. 
3and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention)13 and the four 1949 
Geneva Conventions.14 Furthermore, within the United Nations (UN), the International 
Law Commission (ILC) was given the task to study the desirability and possibility to 
establish a permanent international criminal court.15 The period of fruitful international 
cooperation was, however, short. The hostile political atmosphere of the Cold War led 
to the discontinuation of many projects and negotiations. For example, the international 
criminal court project was disrupted as the establishment of a court “whose goals 
included the punishment of aggressive warfare was seen in the context of the cold war 
as a threat to national sovereignty.”16 Some important conventions, however, saw the 
light of day during the Cold War. For example, the 1966 International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR),17 the 1984 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Torture Convention),18 and the two 
1977 additional protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.19 The Cold War period was 
characterized by widespread impunity for crimes committed during armed conflicts and 
by abusive regimes. 
When the Cold War period ended in the late 1980s/early 1990s, the international 
community’s approach to international crimes changed rapidly and drastically. Only 
weeks after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the UN General Assembly revived the 
attempts to establish a permanent international criminal court.20 The central turning-
point against impunity, however, took place in May 1993, when the UN Security 
Council surprised many by creating an ad hoc tribunal to prosecute and punish persons 
responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the 
Balkan Conflict, that is, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY).21 The fact that such a tribunal was established has been explained, besides by 
the new post-Cold War political environment, with the widespread media coverage 
13 UN Doc. G. A. Res. 260 (III) A of 9 December 1948. 
14 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces 
in the Field (GC I), Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and 
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (GC II), Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War (GC III), and Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time 
of War (GC IV).
15 UN Doc. G. A. Res. 260 (III) B of 9 December 1948. See also UN Docs. A/2136(SUPP) and 
A/2645(SUPP). M. P. Scharf, Balkan Justice – The Story behind the First International War Crimes Trial 
since Nuremberg (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 1997), 14-15, and V. Morris & M. P. Scharf, The 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Volume 1 (Irvington-on-Hudson: Transnational Publishers, 
1998), 17-29.
16 Scharf 1997, at 15. The main reason for the interruption of the project was the international community’s 
inability to define aggression. B. B. Ferencz, ‘An International Criminal Code and Court: Where They 
Stand and Where They’Re Going’, 30 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law (1992), at 377. 
17 UN Doc. G. A. Res. 2200 (XXI) A of 16 December 1966. 
18 UN Doc. A/RES/39/46 of 10 December 1984.
19 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims 
of International Armed Conflicts (AP I), and Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (AP II).
20 W. A. Schabas, ‘International Criminal Court: The Secret of Its Success’, 12 Criminal Law Forum (2001), 
at 415. See also Scharf 1997, at 15-17.  
21 UN Doc. S/RES/827 (1993). References to the Statute of the ICTY will hereinafter be made in the form 
“Article X, ICTY Statute”. 
4that focused on the atrocities and the failure of the international community to restore 
peace.22 One year later, the UN Security Council created a similar tribunal to prosecute 
crimes committed in the Rwandan Civil War, namely the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda (ICTR).23 The strong enthusiasm over international criminal law in the 1990s 
was, however, most clearly reflected in the negotiation and adoption of the Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) that in 1998 was adopted in Rome.24 In July 2002, 
the Statute entered into force unusually quickly after having received the required sixty 
ratifications. Today, the ICC Statute has 122 State Parties.25 Nowadays, international 
criminal law is also enforced by so-called hybrid or internationalized criminal tribunals, 
and increasingly by domestic courts.26
1.2.  The Goals of the Study
The development of international criminal law has entailed that the period of almost 
complete impunity for crimes that take place in armed conflicts and abusive States is over. 
The international community has recognized certain crimes as crimes under customary 
international law and it has established international and internationalized criminal 
tribunals to prosecute them. This need to establish special crimes and special institutions 
raises the question to what extent rapes and murders that have a connection to armed 
conflicts or totalitarian regimes are different from rapes and murders committed in 
peactime. A central aim of this study is to elaborate on this special nature of international 
crimes, and indirectly on the difference between international crimes and “ordinary” 
national crimes. The concept of international crimes here refers to war crimes, crimes 
against humanity and genocide. Occasional references will be made to the crime of 
aggression (crime against peace) and terrorism, but these crimes are not investigated 
in detail here due to the controversies that have surrounded their international 
22 V. Morris & M. P. Scharf, An Insider’s Guide to the International Criminal Court for the Former 
Yugoslavia, Volume 1 (Irvington-on-Hudson: Transnational Publishers, 1995), 17. On the establishment 
on ICTY, see e.g., M. C. Bassiouni & P. Manikas, The Law of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (Irvington-on-Hudson: Transnational Publishers, 1996) 202-205, and Scharf 1997, 
at xv and 51-63.  
23 UN Doc. S/RES/955 (1994). References to the Statute of the Rwanda Tribunal will hereinafter be made 
in the form “Article X, ICTR Statute”. On the establishment of the ICTR, see Morris & Scharf 1998, at 
62-72. 
24 UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9. References to the Statute of the International Criminal Court will hereinafter 
be made in the form “Article X, ICC Statute”.
25 http://www.icc-cpi.int (> Assembly of States Parties > States Parties)  (last visited 2 September 2013).
26 The most significant hybrid/internationalized courts are the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL). 
In common these hybrid/internationalized tribunals have that they combine domestic and international 
elements (e.g., judges and applicable law). See further e.g., L. A. Dickinson, ‘The Promise of Hybrid 
Courts’, 97 American Journal of International Law (2003), at 295 ff. and Internationalized Criminal Courts 
– Sierra Leone, East Timor, Kosovo and Cambodia, C. P. R. Romano, A. Nollkaemper, & J. K. Kleffner (eds.) 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). See also W. A. Schabas, ‘The Special Tribunal for Lebanon: Is 
a ‘Tribunal of an International Character’ Equivalent to an ‘International Criminal Court’?’, 21 Leiden 
Journal of International Law (2008), at 513-528.  
5criminality.27 The concept of ordinary crimes, on the other hand, refers to crimes that lack 
a connection to extraordinary social circumstances and which have been criminalized 
in (presumably) all legal systems in the world.28 This crime group most notably includes 
the crimes of murder, rape, and assault.29 The concepts of international criminality and 
ordinary criminality refer to criminality consisting of international crimes respectively 
ordinary crimes. 
It should be noted that the concept of “international criminality” in this study is 
used to refer both to certain crimes and to a certain social phenomenon. Neubacher has 
discussed the relationship between a social phenomenon and its criminalization, and 
argues in line with the so-called labelling theory that both the identification of the social 
problem and the criminalization are definitional processes. The content of concepts thus 
essentially depends on how they have been identified and defined, in contrast to some 
internal nature of the phenomenon.30 Neubacher, however, seems to imply that first a 
social problem is identified and second a legal label is given.31 The present author, however, 
believes that the process is circular, that is, that also the legal label affects how the social 
problem is perceived and what is seen to be part of the social problem. To completely 
disconnect the social problem of international criminality from the legal definitions of 
international crimes appears to be impossible, and is not attempted here. As noted, the 
present author essentially defines the concept of international criminality by referring to 
the legal definition of the international crimes. This is, however, not to say that the content 
of the concept of international criminality is identical throughout the study. When the 
present author discusses international criminality as a social phenomenon, the content of 
the concept is also determined by academic scholars who do not necessarily strictly follow 
legal definitions.32 In the sections of the study where the legal approach to international 
27 In June 2010, the Assembly of State Parties of the ICC, however, adopted a resolution containing a definition 
of the crime of aggression. ICC Doc. RC/Res.6. For the ICC to be able to exercise jurisdiction over the crime, 
a further decision by States Parties is, however, necessary and the Statute amendment also has to be ratified 
by a number of States Parties. In connection to terrorism, on the other hand, the establishment of the STL 
has fortified the idea of the international criminality of terrorism even though the STL Statute refers to the 
Lebanese Criminal Code with regard to applicable criminal law. UN Doc. S/RES/1757 (2007).
28 In German scholarship, a similar difference has been made between Makrokriminalität (macro-
criminality) on the one hand and Alltagskriminalität (everyday criminality) on the other. See e.g., H. Jäger, 
Makrokriminalität – Studien zur Kriminologie kollektiver Gewalt (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1989), 
11, and C. Möller, Völkerstrafrecht und Internationaler Strafgerichtshof – kriminologische, straftheoretische 
und rechtspolitische Aspekte (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2003), 240. 
29 The concept of “ordinary crimes” is problematic in that there are many different types of crimes that 
can be found in most domestic legal systems. As such this narrow definition of the concept conceals the 
fact that domestic legal systems address many different types of crimes with varying typical features. The 
concept is, however, frequently used in international criminal law in this meaning.   
30 F. Neubacher, Kriminologische Grundlagen einer internationalen Strafgerichtsbarkeit – Politische Ideen- 
und Dogmengeschichte, kriminalwissenschaftliche Legitimation, strafrechtliche Perspektiven (Tübingen: 
Mohr Siebeck, 2005), 8.
31 Neubacher 2005, at 8.
32 Some social scientists have explicitly challenged the legal definitions of concepts (such as genocide) and 
given them alternative, but often related, meanings. See e.g., E. Markusen & D. Mirkovic, ‘Understanding 
Genocidal Killing in the Former Yugoslavia: Preliminary Observations’, in C. Summers & E. Markusen 
(eds.), Collective Violence – Harmful Behavior in Groups and Governments (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers Inc., 1999), at 40.
6criminality is discussed, the concepts are defined by the “legislators” and appliers of the law, 
that is, essentially by States and international criminal tribunals. 
The present author believes that an investigation into the differences between 
international and ordinary crimes is important in that criminal law − a coercive instrument 
primarily developed to tackle ordinary crimes − is used to deal with international 
crimes. Another goal of the study is therefore to illuminate how the typical characteristics 
of international crimes have affected the content and functioning of international criminal 
law. An assumption made is that the special nature of international criminality at times 
makes it difficult for international criminal law to adhere to established criminal law 
doctrines and principles. Already here, it should be noted that the goal of the study is not 
to tackle the more general question of whether criminal law is a suitable instrument to 
address international criminality33 or whether international crimes should be dealt with 
by alternative mechanisms, such as truth commissions. These are important questions, 
but to compare the different response mechanisms to international atrocities is not 
possible within the scope of this study. The goal here is therefore more limited, that is, to 
analyze the criminal law that de facto has been adopted and which de facto is applied to 
address international criminality.  
Finally, the study aims at pointing out that international criminal law is not merely 
reflecting what is central in international criminality, but that at the same time the law 
is conveying a certain image of the criminality, which affects general sentiments.34 In 
this regard, Garland has noted that “penality communicates meaning not just about 
crime and punishment but also about power, authority, legitimacy, normality, morality, 
personhood, social relations, and a host of other tangential matters.”35 The choices made 
in the criminalization and adjudication of the crimes are thus of significance, as they 
create a certain framework of meaning. The international community has chosen to 
emphasize certain characteristics of international criminality and to disregard others, 
and this affects perceptions about the criminality. 
1.3.  The Structure of the Study 
This study has been organized into three parts, which have been divided into chapters and 
subsections. In Part I, the typical features of international criminality are investigated. 
More specifically, Chapter 2 establishes the phenomenology of international criminality 
by elaborating on international crimes as a historical and sociological phenomenon. 
International crimes often occur in certain contexts and take a particular form. In 
33 E.g., Drumbl has criticized the use of the same type of criminal law to ordinary domestic criminals 
and the perpetrators of mass atrocities. M. A. Drumbl, ‘A Hard Look at the Soft Theory of International 
Criminal Law’, in L. N. Sadat & M. P. Scharf (eds.), The Theory and Practice of International Criminal Law – 
Essays in Honor of M. Cherif Bassiouni (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008), at 7. Drumbl has also 
observed that many scholars within international criminal law implicitly support the use of international 
criminal law and hence follow the dominant “metanarrative of international criminal law.” M. A. Drumbl, 
‘Pluralizing International Criminal Justice’, 103 Michigan Law Review (2005), at 1297. 
34 Cf. Garland who has noted that penal practices are shaped by changing forms of mentality and sensibility, 
but that at the same time the penal institutions change the general culture. D. Garland, Punishment and 
Modern Society – A Study in Social Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 249-250. 
35 Garland 1990, at 252. 
7Chapter 3, the investigation is continued by turning the focus towards criminology and 
what this branch of science has to offer to the understanding of international crimes. 
In criminology, a central goal is often to increase the understanding of the causes 
behind the criminality.36 Already here, it can, however, be noted that criminology as 
an academic discipline has traditionally not given much attention to international 
crimes. Only a few major studies have been conducted that have a strong relevance for 
understanding international criminality. In this study, attention has, however, not only 
been given to studies that explicitly have elaborated on international criminality (or 
“supranational criminology” as the branch of criminology sometimes is called today).37 
General criminological literature has also been used to some extent. While Chapter 2 
on phenomenology emphasizes the uniqueness or special features of international 
criminality, Chapter 3 on criminology, on the contrary, suggests that there are certain 
similarities between international and ordinary criminality. 
In Part II of the study, the “instrument” addressing the criminality is studied. 
Questions of relevance in this part are, for example, what it means that international 
atrocities are addressed with criminal law, and to what extent international criminal 
law is comparable to ordinary domestic criminal law. In Chapter 4, the attention is on 
the general characteristics of criminal law, whereas Chapter 5 focuses on international 
criminal law. In relation to international criminal law, it has been put forward that it is 
a hybrid branch of law, which simultaneously derives its origin from and continuously 
draws upon: (a) international humanitarian law; (b) international human rights law; 
and (c) national criminal law.38 It is essential to understand the complex nature of 
international criminal law before turning the attention towards the content of the law. 
Part III is the main part of the study, in which the existing international criminal 
law is analyzed. The study focuses on the international criminal law that today is applied 
by the UN ad hoc tribunals (ICTY and ICTR) and the ICC. More concretely, the study 
looks at the law regulating international crimes (Chapter 6), the law affecting attribution 
of responsibility (Chapter 7), the law on factors excluding criminal responsibility 
(Chapter 8), and the law regulating sentencing (Chapter 9). All these chapters start 
with a section on the lex lata, that is, an identification of the existing law. The lex lata 
sections are followed by analysis sections, in which the applicable law is considered from 
a phenomenological and/or criminological perspective. The goal of Chapters 6−9 is to 
illuminate the legal choices made in international criminal law.    
The study ends with a concluding chapter in which the findings that have been 
made during the process are summarized. The concluding chapter also contains a more 
general discussion about the picture of the criminality that the lex lata conveys. 
1.4.  Some Words about the Methodology 
As the previous sections indicate, the study is not a traditional legal study in international 
criminal law, which primary aim is to identify the existing law by analyzing the historical 
36 E.g., J. Sarnecki, Introduktion till kriminologi, 2nd ed. (Lund: Studentlitteratur, 2009), 51. 
37 See, e.g., the network on supranational criminology (http://www.supranationalcriminology.org, last 
visited 14 March 2013).
38 A. Cassese, International Criminal Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 6.
8development of norms from past to present with reference to legal sources. The 
“conventional style of academic research in law”39 (or “legal dogmatics” as this type of 
research often is called) has many excellent representatives in international criminal law, 
and as regards most aspects of international criminal law there are already numerous 
publications that aim at establishing the “correct” interpretation and identification of 
the law.40 The study is neither a representative of another common approach in legal 
research, viz. a more philosophical approach, where the question of what justifies various 
norms and approaches is central. In connection to domestic criminal law, piles of books 
have been written on how the deliberate infliction of pain that criminal law entails can be 
justified, and this approach has spread to international criminal law.41 Finally, the study 
is not a critical legal study, which primary goal would be to deconstruct the law and to 
establish hidden power structures. So how should the chosen approach be characterized? 
The author would call the approach chosen an interdisciplinary approach with a 
legal base, as the primary aim of the study is to attain a better understanding of the law by 
complementing traditional legal analysis with insights from other branches of science.42 
Interdisciplinary studies are often conducted in research teams, where representatives 
of different research traditions look at the same subject from their own perspective. 
Such projects obviously have the benefit that the various scholars perfectly master their 
own research tradition. The drawback, however, is that they rarely result in texts that 
genuinely would be interdisciplinary. Lawyers continue to conduct traditional legal 
analysis, sociologists traditional sociological studies, etc. The spill-over of knowledge 
from one branch of science to another is hence often poor. In this study, the author has 
herself tried to use several different types of material, however, so that the emphasis is on 
legal research material (that is, most notably, international legal instruments, case law, 
and legal scholarship). However, in Chapters 2−3 much non-legal material is used, which 
requires some methodological comments. 
To begin with, it should be noted that in these chapters the author has not tried 
to establish genuinely new facts about international criminality, but to make use of 
the existing research. To obtain fresh historical knowledge would require studies 
into archives etc. which is beyond the scope of this study. Likewise, to make new 
39 I. Tallgren. A Study of the ‘International Criminal Justice System’ – What Everybody Knows? (Helsinki: 
Faculty of Law, University of Helsinki, 2001), 13. 
40 In this connection, it should be noted that K. J. Heller has a book project he refers to as the “genealogy of 
international criminal law”, in which he aims at systematically conducting a “historical-theoretical study of 
the process of international criminalization.” K. J. Heller, ‘New Book Project: A Genealogy of International 
Criminal Law’, Opinio Juris [blog], 22 May 2012.  
41 Many such studies indicate that the use of international criminal law to address international criminality 
is not unproblematic. See further e.g., M. Koskenniemi, ‘Between Impunity and Show Trials’, 6 Max Planck 
Yearbook of United Nations Law (2002), at 1-35, and M. Drumbl, ‘Collective Violence and Individual 
Punishment: The Criminality of Mass Atrocity’, 99 Northwestern University Law Review (2005), at 568 
(‘Although I accept that mass atrocity is manifestly illegal, I argue that its collective nature problematizes 
concepts such as bystander innocence, public responsibility, victim reintegration, reconciliation, 
recidivism, and the moral legitimacy of pronouncements of wrongdoing by international tribunals when 
the international community itself is perceived as having failed to prevent [...] the wrongdoing.’)
42 Cf. J. Gardner, ‘In Defence of Offences and Defences’, 4 Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies (2012), at 112 
(‘For the perspective I took, as I saw it, was already the criminal lawyer’s perspective on the criminal law, 
merely taken up to a higher altitude at which only the larger features of the landscape can be discerned.’)
9criminological insights generally requires empirical research, which also lies outside the 
scope of this study. In relation to the chapter on the phenomenology of international 
crimes, the present author has therefore chosen to rely on books and articles by scholars 
who have conducted historical or sociological research on international criminality or 
who through their professional experience (for example, as judges) have gained insights 
into the nature of the criminality. As regards the criminological chapter, very little 
empirical research has been conducted in connection to international crimes. In respect 
to criminology, the author has therefore relied on basic textbooks in criminology to 
establish a framework, and complemented this with more specific articles and books on 
supranational criminology.43    
Regarding Chapters 6-9, it is important to note that the research project focuses on 
the “rhetoric of judging at the level of law”, 44 that is, what the legal instruments and case 
law say about the content of the law. Hence, the study does not consider the question 
of how the law de facto is applied by the judges in concrete cases (referred to as the 
casuistry of the international criminal law by Cupido).45 Furthermore, as much research 
has already been conducted in which the lex lata is identified, the focus in Chapters 6−9 
is on analyzing the law. A central consideration is which typical features of international 
criminality are reflected in the law and which are not. Important to acknowledge are 
namely also the silences of the law. In this regard, the author concurs with Charlesworth 
who has held that: “All systems of knowledge depend on deeming certain issues 
as irrelevant or of little significance” and that “the silences of [..., the] law may be as 
important as its positive rules and rhetorical structures.”46 By identifying the emphases 
and silences of international criminal law, the thesis hence aims at providing new angles 
on the lex lata of international criminal law. The division of the analysis into chapters on 
crime definitions, attribution, defences and sentencing also aims at highlighting at what 
stage and how different types of factors are considered.  
In summary, the interdisciplinary approach is what distinguishes this study from 
most other studies. Special attention is given to historical and criminological viewpoints, 
and to the nature of criminal law. The underlying idea is that using literature from many 
different academic fields will make the legal analysis of the international criminal law 
more nuanced, as the external perspectives can throw light on weaknesses in the legal 
way of thinking. The author strongly believes that discussions regarding the same topic 
in different academic fields should be brought together. 
1.5.  Relationship to Already Conducted Research
The present author has not come across another study on international criminal law, in 
which exactly the same methodology would have been used. There is, however, some 
43 E.g., A. Smeulers and F. Grünfeld, International Crimes and Other Gross Human Rights Violations – A 
Multi- and Interdisciplinary Textbook (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2011).
44 K. J. Heller, ‘Cupido on the Rhetoric of the Policy Requirement’, Opinio Juris [blog], 4 July 2012.
45 See further ‘Casuistry of the International Criminal Law’, http://www.rechten.vu.nl/en/research/
research-institutes-and-centres/acic/research/ongoing-projects/casuistry-of-international-criminal-law.
asp (last visited 15 March 2013). 
46 H. Charlesworth, ‘Feminist Methods in International Law’, 93 American Journal of International Law 
(1999), at 381. 
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interdisciplinary legal research on international criminal law, which the author finds 
especially inspirational and which she therefore wants to explicitly mention as examples 
of already conducted research. For example, a doctoral study with a title suggesting a 
very similar theme has been conducted by Christina Möller in Germany.47 The way 
in which Möller in practice approaches the research subject, however, clearly diverges 
from the way in which the present author aims at proceeding. Möller’s dissertation, for 
example, begins with a detailed survey of numerous historical examples of international 
crimes beginning from the religious crusades.48 The author does not find it necessary 
to personally try to establish what has happened in different armed conflicts. Instead, 
the author uses conclusions made by historians (and legal scholars such as Möller). The 
historical survey of Möller is followed by a part that is called criminological and legal 
policy considerations. This is the most relevant part of Möller’s thesis for this study, and 
references will be made to Möller’s findings.49 The remaining part of Möller’s study is 
devoted to discussing how international criminal law can be legitimized, for example, the 
role of general prevention in international criminal law.50 As was noted in connection to 
the goals of the study, the question of how international criminal law can be legitimized 
has been defined as something that lies outside the scope of this study. 
A further interesting study has been committed by Frank Neubacher, who after 
an investigation into the criminology of international criminality (or more correctly, 
primarily the criminological labelling theory) discusses the birth and legitimation of 
international criminal law as well as its significance from a criminal policy perspective.51 
The main question for Neubacher is the power relationship between politics and law, or 
to put it another way, between State interests and the protection of the human rights to 
life and physical integrity through criminal law.52 
Thirdly, in Finland, Immi Tallgren has at the University of Helsinki defended a 
doctoral thesis containing articles that to some extent touch upon the same topic as this 
study.53 A central question in that thesis was, however, whether international criminal 
law can be justified with the same arguments as domestic criminal law.54 In her study, 
Tallgren also questioned the idea of a universal basis of international criminal law,55 and 
discussed the relationship between individual and collective responsibility.56 
47 Möller 2003. The title Völkerstrafrecht und Internationaler Strafgerichtshof – kriminologische, 
straftheoretische und rechtspolitische Aspekte can be translated into “International Criminal Law 
and the International Criminal Court – Criminological, Punishment Theory and Legal Politics 
Viewpoints”.
48 Möller 2003, at 17-226.
49 Möller 2003, at 227-412.  
50 Möller 2003, at 413-624. 
51 Neubacher 2005.
52 Neubacher 2005, at 1-2 and 9-10. 
53 The title of the thesis was “A Study of the ‘International Criminal Justice System’ – What Everybody 
Knows?”.
54 Tallgren 2001, at 4-5.
55 Tallgren 2001, at 7-8.
56 I. Tallgren, ‘La Grande Illusion’, 15 Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence (2002), at 304 ff.
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Besides the theses mentioned above, the author has also found the research of 
Alex Alvarez,57 Jose E. Alvarez,58 Mark A. Drumbl,59 George P. Fletcher,60 Herbert Jäger61 
and Mark Osiel62 to be of great inspiration, as these authors have not merely focused 
on studying international criminal law from the typical legal perspective. Also some 
edited books with an interdisciplinary approach should explicitly be mentioned: System 
Criminality in International Law (2009)63 and Collective Violence and International 
Criminal Justice: An Interdisciplinary Approach (2010).64  
Most scholars who have focused on the question of what type of criminality 
international criminality is, have connected that question to the question of whether 
it is justified to use criminal law to address international criminality. As noted above, 
the author finds this to be an important question, which, however, is outside the scope 
of the study. The starting-point of this study is instead that international criminal law 
de facto exists and on a daily basis is used to prosecute individuals. The goal here is 
to identify the structures and choices made in the existing law and to point out some 
problems courts face when dealing with international crimes due to the special nature 
of the criminality. In essence, the present study and the above mentioned research are 
therefore complementary. 
57 E.g., A. Alvarez, Governments, Citizens, and Genocide: A Comparative and Interdisciplinary Approach 
(Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2001). 
58 E.g., J. E. Alvarez, ‘Rush to Closure: Lessons from the Tadić Judgment’, 96 Michigan Law Review (1998), 
at 2031 ff. 
59 E.g., M. A. Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007). 
60 E.g., G. P. Fletcher, The Grammar of Criminal Law: American, Comparative, and International, Volume 
One: Foundations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
61 E.g., Jäger 1989. 
62 E.g., M. J. Osiel, Obeying Orders (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1999), and M. Osiel, Making 
Sense of Mass Atrocity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
63 A. Nollkaemper & H. van der Wilt (eds.), System Criminality in International Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
64 A. Smeulers (ed.), Collective Violence and International Criminal Justice: An Interdisciplinary Approach 
(Antwerp: Intersentia, 2010). 
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2. THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINALITY
2.1. Introduction
Numerous books have been written on armed conflicts and abusive regimes during 
which terrible atrocities have been committed. Most of these books are, however, non-
theoretical in character. Alvarez has, for example, regarding the existing literature on 
genocide noted that: 
The literature that is available on genocide tends to be fragmentary and incomplete, 
resulting in fragmentary and incomplete knowledge of the causes and correlates of 
genocide. Research on genocide has often tended to be autobiographical, journalistic 
[...] or purely historical [...]. While this body of work is often extremely descriptive 
and powerful, it is typically atheoretical and lacks a comparative viewpoint that allows 
for the identification of consistent elements among different examples of genocide.65
When reading the various historical accounts of international atrocities, it, however, 
becomes evident that the crimes often have a certain pattern or common traits.66 These 
traits are now increasingly recognized, and it today possible to find articles and books in 
which some typical features of international criminality are singled out. But how have 
these typical features of international criminality, which are largely independent of the 
time and place of the atrocities,67 been identified? It appears that most scholars deduce 
the typical features from comparative studies of various historical atrocities,68 or from 
personal professional experience in dealing with international crimes.69 A difference in 
this regard can be made between discovering facts through planned empirical studies 
and discovering them through general observation. It appears that the typical features 
of international criminality often have been identified through general observation. As 
regards the question of what the typical features of international criminality are, not 
all scholars stress exactly the same features, but the divergence is not significant. It is, 
for example, often emphasized that international criminality is collective criminality 
and that State involvement in the criminality is common. These and other similar 
65 Alvarez 2001(a), at 14.
66 The question of the uniqueness of certain atrocities, or to put it another way, the question to what extent 
different atrocities can be compared, has been debated especially with respect to the Holocaust. See e.g., 
Möller 2003, at 232-237, and M. J. Osiel, ‘Ever Again: Legal Remembrance of Administrative Massacre’, 144 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review (1995), at 549-553.
67 Some features of the criminality can, however, change over time. Modern armed conflicts, e.g., differ 
from more ancient ones as regards the used weaponry and in the involvement of civilians in the conflicts. 
68 E.g., Möller 2003. 
69 Goldstone has, e.g., put forward that: “Since 1991 I have been at the cutting edge of investigations into 
mass violence – in South Africa, the former Yugoslavia, and Rwanda. What has struck me again and 
again are the similarities in the manner in which perpetrators, victims, and bystanders react to massive 
human rights abuses.” R. J. Goldstone, ‘Foreword’, in M. Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness – 
Facing History after Genocide and Mass Violence (Boston: Beacon Press, 1998), at ix. In the case law of the 
international criminal tribunals, it is also possible to find comments about the nature of the criminality. 
See e.g., Tadić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 15 July 1999, para. 191.   
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often mentioned characteristics will now be examined one by one. In this part of the 
study, the international crimes will thus be studied as a social phenomena and the 
focus will be on the context in which individuals commit their crimes. The individual 
reasons for participation in atrocities and the question of how the social phenomenon 
of international criminality is created are topics that are addressed in Chapter 3 of this 
study.
2.2.  Crimes Committed in Armed Conflicts and during Totalitarian 
Regimes 
Is it “genocide or civil war?” the editor asks. But this is the wrong question. For it is 
often war [...] and genocide. Genocide virtually always occurs within a context of 
war, and sometimes triggers war or the renewal of war.70
International crimes generally occur in societies where social mechanisms that restrict 
the use of violence have been put aside, that is, in situations of social breakdown.71 
Armed conflicts usually represent such breakdown situations. In international criminal 
law, armed conflicts have been defined as situations where there is resort to armed force 
between States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and 
organized armed groups or between such groups.72 Armed conflicts are thus explicitly 
defined by the abnormal use of violence. 
It has been argued that jus in bello or the law of armed conflict represents an 
alternative legal order, which its own internal logic and tradition.73 Fletcher has in this 
regard noted that: “In the alternative legal order of war, the participants are entitled to 
do many things that are strictly prohibited under all criminal codes. They are allowed 
to hurt people – indeed, to kill them – and, less egregiously, to destroy property that is 
related to the war effort.”74 In a similar vein, it has been found that armed conflicts are 
social activity which involves the mobilization and organization of individuals for the 
purpose of inflicting physical violence.75 Killing and hurting the enemy is thus not only 
allowed in armed conflicts, but often socially expected.76 It appears that the alternative 
70 H. Fein, ‘Civil Wars and Genocide: Paths and Circles’, 1 Human Rights Review (2000), at 49. The 
question of whether genocide should be distinguished from warfare has been debated. There is, however, 
a consensus that armed conflicts tend to create conditions conducive for genocide. E. Markusen, 
‘Genocide and Warfare’, in C. B. Strozier & M. Flynn (eds.), Genocide, War, and Human Survival 
(Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1996), at 76-78, and Markusen & Mirkovic 1999, 
at 43-46. 
71 L. E. Fletcher & H. M. Weinstein, ‘Violence and Social Repair: Rethinking the Contribution of Justice to 
Reconciliation’, 24 Human Rights Quarterly (2002), at 617-620. 
72 Article 8, ICC Statute, and Tadić, Decision (jurisdiction), AC, ICTY, 2 October 1995, para. 70.
73 G. P. Fletcher, ‘The Storrs Lectures: Liberals and Romantics at War: The Problem of Collective Guilt’, Yale 
Law Journal (2002), at 1516 and 1518. 
74 Fletcher 2007(b), at 522. See also M. Kaldor, New and Old Wars – Organized Violence in a Global Era 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001), 17.
75 Kaldor 2001, at 13 (referring to Clausewitz). 
76 H. Dumont, ‘La puissance des mots: des maux que l’on doit qualifier de criminels ou le difficile passage 
d’une logique de guerre à une logique de droit pénal’, Cahiers de defense sociale (2005), at 47. 
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moral and legal order of war can affect people’s ability to appreciate what constitutes legal 
respectively criminal behaviour.77
In wars, myths of maleness flourish and soldiers may want to prove to themselves 
and others that they are fearless and merciless.78 In armed conflicts, the violence also 
has a tendency to become more brutal over time, as “each side escalates its wrongdoing 
in retaliation for the enemy’s wrong, real or imagined.”79 Bauman has in this vein noted 
that killings in armed conflicts are not always entrusted to experts or delegated to special 
units, but can be committed by numerous killers in the daylight and in full vision.80 In 
all societies engaged in armed conflicts the brutalization does not go that far, but the 
social toleration of violence, however, appears to grow in all societies engaged in armed 
conflicts.81 
More generally, it may be argued that armed conflicts increase conditions conducive 
for criminality. In armed conflicts, a lot of property is destroyed, many individuals are 
killed, wounded and displaced, unemployment is often high, etc. These typical features 
of armed conflicts entail that many individuals during armed conflict experience both 
concrete loss in the form of, for example, killed relatives and friends, and loss of mastery 
and control over their own life.82 The changed life conditions may make individuals 
behave in new ways and individuals who have not earlier committed crimes may start to 
do so. Armed conflicts hence increase both petty crimes and serious crimes.83 Nikolić-
Ristanović notes that: “[a]ll available data for the First and Second World Wars shows 
that the crime rate increases during and after war.”84 War zones have therefore been 
called “criminogenic social environments par excellence”.85 
77 Cf. R. Jamieson, ‘Towards a Criminology of War in Europe’, in V. Ruggiero, N. South & I. Taylor (eds.), The New 
European Criminology – Crime and Social Order in Europe (London: Routledge, 1998), at 493.
78 See further Smeulers & Grünfeld 2011, at 49.
79 Osiel 1995, at 558. 
80 Z. Bauman, ‘Wars of the Globalization Era’, 4 European Journal of Social Theory (2001), at 24-25.
81 An exception to this may be societies engaged in “non-traditional” wars, such as the American war 
against terrorism. The word “non-traditional” is here used to indicate armed conflicts that are so to say long 
distance and which do not significantly affect the everyday life of most citizens in a country involved in 
the armed conflict. Cf. S. Sheppard, ‘Passion and Nation: War, Crime, and Guilt in the Individual and the 
Collective’, 78 Notre Dame Law Review (2003), at 753. Cf. the related discussion on the brutalization effect 
of the death penalty, viz. that it is possible that the execution of death penalties “sets an example of killing to 
avenge grievances, an example that some private individuals then follow.” J. M. Shepherd, ‘Deterrence versus 
Brutalization: Capital Punishment’s Differing Impacts among States’, 104 Michigan Law Review (2005), at 206. 
82 Cf. Fletcher & Weinstein 2002, at 623. 
83 Smeulers & Grünfeld 2011, at 60. With reference to the research of Kalyvas, they also note that in 
armed conflicts “the distinction between political violence and ordinary crimes becomes blurred”, that is, 
individuals opportunistically take advantage of the conditions of war. Ibid., at 61. 
84 V. Nikolić-Ristanović, ‘War and Crime in the Former Yugoslavia’, in V. Ruggiero, N. South & I. Taylor 
(eds.), The New European Criminology – Crime and Social Order in Europe (London: Routledge, 1998), at 
463.
85 P. Roberts & N. McMillan, ‘For Criminology in International Criminal Justice’, 1 Journal of International 
Criminal Justice (2003), at 324. See also O. S. Liwerant, ‘Mass Murder – Discussing Criminological 
Perspectives’, 5 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2007), at 919 (referring to Kellens). 
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Most international crimes are thus committed in armed conflicts, but there exists 
another typical context for international criminality.86 This context is the context of 
totalitarian societies, or to put it another way, States that do not recognize any limits to 
their authority.87 Many totalitarian States are, however, involved in some sort of armed 
conflicts, so the two typical contexts for international criminality are by no means 
exclusive. In fact, a non-democratic regime significantly appears to increase the risk 
for inter-State wars, violence between the regime and an opposing group (for example, 
internal armed conflict) and the use of violence against own citizens.88 
The connection between non-democratic regimes and international criminality has 
been studied most famously by Rummel who has put forward that whereas democracy 
fosters conciliation and compromise and entails checks and balances of the use of 
power, a non-democratic regime often rules through coercion and force.89 According 
to Rummel, the operating framework of totalitarian States is often “repression, control, 
spies, concentration camps, torture, executions” and the “dynamic of obedience is fear.”90 
Totalitarian States thus primarily use coercive power (that is, the use of threats of pain, 
negative deprivation or some other negative outcome) to make other do as they want, 
whereas bargaining power plays a central role in democratic regimes.91 In the same way 
as armed conflicts, totalitarian regimes therefore increase the amount of violence is 
society. Most international crimes are thus committed in societies that are characterized 
by “criminal normality”92 or “maelstroms of violence”.
Typical for international atrocities is also that they occur at a time of change, for 
example, “during a period of colonization, at the end of colonization, when a regime falls, 
after a military coup d’état or at the rise of a despotic ruler or dictator.”93 As noted above, 
social breakdown is often an important precondition for international crimes.  
86 Jäger identifies even more typical contexts and talks in this regard of “collective exceptional 
circumstances” (kollektiven Ausnahmezuständen). As such exceptional circumstances he mentions wars, 
genocides, mass murders, totalitarian regimes, State suppression, minority persecutions, cultural and 
religious conflicts, guerrilla wars, revolutions, counter-revolutions, and acute political mass situations. 
H. Jäger, ‘Gedanken zur Kriminologie kollektiver Verbrechen’, 63 Monatsschrift für Kriminologie und 
Strafrechtsreform (1980), at 359.
87 R. Conquest, Reflections on a Ravaged Century (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2000) 74. 
Braithwaite has, in this regard, noted that totalitarian states are structurally humiliating and criminogenic. 
J. Braithwaite, ‘Poverty, Power, and White-Collar Crime – Sutherland and the Paradoxes of Criminological 
Theory’, in K. Schlegel & D. Weisburd (eds.), White-Collar Crime Reconsidered (Boston: Northeastern 
University Press, 1992), at 96.
88 R. J. Rummel, Power Kills: Democracy as a Method of Nonviolence (New Brunswick: Transaction 
Publishers, 1997), 44, 85 and 91. Rummel has observed that when a State has been involved in an 
international or non-international armed conflict and has suffered loss, the likelihood of violence against 
own citizens increases. Ibid., at 93. 
89 Rummel 1997, at 6 and 101. 
90 Rummel 1997, at 8. 
91 Rummel 1997, at 118-120. Rummel makes a difference between: (1) coercive power; (2) authoritative power, 
viz. power derived from sources such as tradition, custom and religion, and (3) bargaining power, viz. relations 
based on exchange. Based on what type of power the society principally is ruled with, he categorizes societies 
into totalitarian, authoritarian and democratic. He notes that whereas authoritarian societies are not totalitarian, 
the use of coercion in these societies is generally greater than in democracies. Ibid., at 118-119 and 204-205. 
92 Cf. Koskenniemi 2002, at 12. 
93 Smeulers & Grünfeld 2011, at 171 (regarding genocide).  
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2.3.  Deadly Regimes: The Unusual Role of the State
Systematic persecution arises as wider social and political identities are radicalized, and 
the state gradually withdraws its protection from the intended victims of violence.94
Another usual feature of international criminality is the atypical relationship between 
the State and the criminality. In peaceful democratic societies, the State is usually actively 
engaged in the suppression of criminal behaviour and it does what it can to punish those 
guilty of crimes. In connection to international crimes, the State, is, on the contrary, 
often involved in the criminality or at least condones it. It is not unusual that war crimes, 
crimes against humanity and genocide are committed by police officers, prison guards 
and members of the armed forces who normally act as the guardians of the law and who 
often are perceived as the only legitimate users of force in society.95 International crimes 
are thus often crimes by persons who are supposed to make, defend and/or enforce the 
law. This public official participation opens up the possibility to commit crimes that 
cannot be committed in ordinarily functioning societies. Very large-scale mass atrocities, 
such as nationwide genocides, in fact, only appear to be possible when the State is a 
“criminal State”.96 Due to the special relationship between the criminality and the State, 
international criminality is sometimes referred to as system criminality,97 as governmental 
criminality,98 as sanctioned massacres,99 or as State-enhanced criminality.100 
94 H. M. Hintjens, ‘When Identity Becomes a Knife – Reflecting on the Genocide in Rwanda’, 1 Ethnicities 
(2001), at 45-46.
95 Alvarez 2001(a), at 73-74. Also from the point of view of the individual participant this is significant. 
Alvarez observes that many “perpetrators [of genocide] participate, not because of individual inclination 
or desire, but in their professional roles and as part of their professional responsibilities.” A. Alvarez, 
Genocidal Crimes (London: Routledge, 2010), 4. 
96 Luban defines a criminal State as a State that “turns the world upside down and makes the monstrous the 
centerpiece of civic obligation.” D. Luban, ‘State Criminality and the Ambition of International Criminal 
Law’, in T. Isaacs & R. Vernon (eds.), Accountability for Collective Wrongdoing (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011), at 63. In criminal states, deviance and normality, exceptions and rules, and 
criminality and lawfulness can hence be inverted. Ibid., at 62 (referring to Arendt). 
97 E.g., K. Marxen, ‘Beteiligung an schwerem systematischen Unrecht’, in K. Lüderssen (ed.), Aufgeklärte 
Kriminalpolitik oder Kampf gegen das Böse? Band III: Makrodelinquenz (Baden-Baden: Nomos 
Verlagsgesellschaft, 1998), at 227-228, and A. Nollkaemper, ‘Introduction’, in A. Nollkaemper & H. 
van der Wilt (eds.), System Criminality in International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2009), at 17-18 (Nollkaemper, however, argues that also other types of collective entities than States may 
be involved in system criminality). Lampe has held that States engaged in criminality are a sub-type of 
systems of wrong (Unrechtssysteme). E.-J. Lampe, ‘Systemunrecht und Unrechtssysteme’, 106 Zeitschrift für 
die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft (1994), at 700.
98 E.g., Friedrichs refers to State crime or governmental crime. He defines State crime as crimes committed 
on behalf of a State, and governmental crime as crimes committed within a governmental context on 
any level. E.g., D. O. Friedrichs, ‘Governmental Crime, Hitler and White Collar Crime: A Problematic 
Relationship’, Caribbean Journal of Criminology and Social Psychology (1996), at 47-48, and D. O. 
Friedrichs, ‘State Crime or Governmental Crime: Making Sense of the Conceptual Confusion’, in J. I. Ross 
(ed.), Controlling State Crime, 2nd ed. (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2000), at 53-54. 
99 H. C. Kelman, ‘Violence without Moral Restraint: Reflections on the Dehumanization of Victims and 
Victimizers’, 29 Journal of Social Issues (1973), at 29 and 38. 
100 W. Naucke, Die strafjuristische Privilegierung staatsverstärkter Kriminalität (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio 
Klostermann, 1996), 20. 
20
When State officials are involved in the commission of crimes this generally adds 
to the dangerousness of the criminality. State authorities namely have certain powers, 
which distinguish them from most non-State actors. Power can be defined as the ability to 
concentrate force and to suppress or neutralize dissent.101 A State, for example, generally 
has a well equipped army and access to various public records. A State also has unique 
possibilities to constrain criticism and prevent the diffusion of knowledge,102 that is, 
ideological power.103 Censorship and propaganda are often in extensive use in totalitarian 
regimes and in armed conflicts.104 In situations of abuse of power, the victims of crime are 
furthermore usually in an especially exposed position. In most international crimes, there 
is thus an atypical victim-perpetrator relationship, which is characterized by the special 
vulnerability of the victims and the exceptionally unchecked powers of the perpetrators.105
State participation in the criminality is also problematic from the point of view 
that it is traditionally States that define what is criminal and what is not, and most 
individuals adhere to authorities and want to be law-abiding. State officials thus generally 
have authority, that is, power that individuals and groups accept as legitimate.106 When 
domestic authorities or domestic laws prescribe internationally criminal behaviour, 
an individual may be faced with a domestic duty to obey and an international duty 
to disobey. Some scholars have therefore spoken of “crimes legalized by the State” or 
“crimes of obedience”.107 In fact, some scholars find the whole idea of international or 
global crimes peculiar, in that it is usually the State which is the highest authority in 
criminal law. A common conception is expressed by Bauman who argues that: “There 
is no moral-ethical limit which the state cannot transcend if it wishes to do so, because 
there is no moral-ethical power higher than the state.”108 
The fact that individuals want to adhere to authorities entails that individuals do 
not necessarily have to be forced to obey through, for example, threats of sanctions, but 
may themselves “choose” to act as the authorities want them to act.109 State involvement 
101 Alvarez 2001(a), at 14-15.
102 Nino 1996, at x.   
103 Turk has differentiated between different types of power, and he defines ideological power as control of 
definitions of and access to knowledge, beliefs and values. A. T. Turk, ‘Law as a Weapon in Social Conflict’, 23 
Social Problems (1976), at 280. Gill has noted that ideological power is a central means to establish authority. 
G. Gill, The Nature and Development of the Modern State (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 26.
104 E.g., Markusen 1996, at 78 and Möller 2003, at 252.
105 Möller 2003, at 260. Cf. Charny who has developed an own “generic” definition of genocide and in that 
included the “essential defenselessness and helplessness of the victims” as an element. I. W. Charny, ‘The 
Prospects for a Nongenocidal World: Reflections on Why There Can Still Be Hope’, in C. Summers & E. 
Markusen (eds.), Collective Violence – Harmful Behavior in Groups and Governments (Lanham: Rowman 
& Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1999), at 215. 
106 A. Alvarez, ‘Justifying Genocide: The Role of Professionals in Legitimizing Mass Killings’, 6 Idea (2001). 
107 E.g., H. C. Kelman & V. L. Hamilton, Crimes of Obedience – Toward a Social Psychology of Authority 
and Responsibility (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 46 (crimes of obedience) and H. Arendt, 
Eichmann in Jerusalem – A Report on the Banality of Evil (New York: Penguin Books, 1994 [1963]), 136 
(crimes legalized by the State). 
108 Z. Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989), 86.
109 Katz criticizes the people in his home village who argued that they as “little people” could not stop the 
Nazi State for underestimating their own power and hence downplaying their autonomy to decide how 
to act. F. E. Katz, Ordinary People and Extraordinary Evil: A Report on the Beguilings of Evil (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1993), 42-43.
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in or acceptance of the criminality namely has a significant legitimizing effect. Jäger has 
in connection to torture noted that there is a “legality bonus” in State action, which 
discharges individuals morally.110 
Finally, State involvement in or acceptance of the criminality is problematic in that 
it is usually public officials who are responsible for the investigation and prosecution 
of crimes. When public officials are involved in the criminality there are no national 
authorities willing to secure evidence and to prosecute the crimes. And in the rare cases 
where international officers have a mandate to investigate and prosecute the crimes, State 
unwillingness to cooperate with these investigators can make the prosecution of crimes 
extremely difficult. Bassiouni has, for example, in relation to the ICC investigations in 
Sudan observed that the hostility of the government of Sudan, Darfur’s remote location, 
the continued unrest in the region and lacking resources make the investigations “near 
mission impossible.”111 Criminal trials require access to evidence and uncooperative State 
officials can entail de facto impunity for the crimes.112 
Even though many international crimes are committed by actors who have a State-
connection, it, should, however, be noted that today non-State actors often participate in 
armed conflicts, and that also such actors can commit international crimes. For example, 
in the Balkan Conflict, a UN commission of experts counted eighty-three paramilitary 
groups besides the six regular armies,113 and ICTY has brought charges against members 
of some of these paramilitary groups.114 Before the ICC, many cases have been brought 
against members of rebel groups, such as the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda. This 
ICC prosecutorial strategy has been criticized,115 but it has also been noted that some 
ICC situations have concerned States that at least to some extent can be characterized as 
“failed States” and where rebel groups have gained considerable powers and have been 
able to commit large-scale atrocities.116 The classical assumption that non-State actors are 
in an asymmetrical power relationship to State actors does hence not always hold true. 
110 H. Jäger, ‘Strafrechtsschutz für Menschenrechte? Zur Durchsetzbarkeit des Folterverbots’, Mittelweg 36 
(1992), August/September, at 76.
111 M. C. Bassiouni, ‘The ICC – Quo Vadis?,’ 4 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2006), at 425-426. 
112 The prosecution of crimes committed by State officials has also been hampered by immunities granted 
to State agents and the idea that States should not get involved in the internal affairs of other States. See 
further e.g., Cassese 2008, at 302-314.
113 UN Doc. S/1994/674/Add.2 (Vol. I), Annex III, at 4, and Annex III.A, at 11-12. 
114 E.g., Milan Lukić, who was the leader of the White Eagles, a group of local Bosnian Serb paramilitaries.
115 It has been observed that the ICC’s need to have good working relationships with States is problematic in 
that it may push the Court to focus on non-State actors. E.g., Schabas has put forward that: “The attention 
to non-state actors is closely related to the concept of ‘self-referral’, which has the practical consequence 
of establishing a degree of complicity between the Office of the Prosecutor and the referring state.” W. A. 
Schabas, ‘Prosecutorial Discretion v. Judicial Activism at the International Criminal Court’, 6 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice (2008), at 751.  
116 M. Osiel, ‘Ascribing Individual Liability within a Bureacracy of Murder’, in A. Smeulers (ed.), Collective 
Violence and International Criminal Justice: An Interdisciplinary Approach (Antwerp: Intersentia, 2010), 
at 122. In the ICRC ‘The People on War Report’ it was, in fact, put forward that one major explanation 
to the breakdown of norms and conventions in armed conflicts is “uncertain State authority that has left 
many areas of conflict”, that is, the fact that the lack of a central authority may result in “a society without 
apparent restraints”. Greenberg Research Inc., The People on War Report – ICRC Worldwide Consultation 
on the Rules of War (Geneva: ICRC, 2000) 28. 
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Technical advances (such as the development of weapons of mass destruction) may in 
the future increase the possibility of non-State actors to commit mass atrocities. 
2.4.  Collective Crimes and Collective Action 
War is by its nature a collective enterprise. Organized groups engage in armed conflict 
with each other. [...] War always requires coordinated action, a chain of command, 
a sense of organization and, above all, a consciousness on the part of the individuals 
engaged in military action that they are acting as part of the collective effort.117
A further typical feature of international criminality is that it generally represents 
collective criminality. Regarding some atrocities, the collective nature of the criminality 
has indeed been striking. It is, for example, estimated that around 75,000-150,000 persons 
participated in the Rwandan genocide in 1994.118 The Holocaust, on the other hand, has 
been found to have had between 100,000 and 500,000 hands-on killers and millions of 
other types of participants.119 Mass killings, mass rapes, mass deportations etc. cannot 
generally be committed without numerous perpetrators and accomplices. 
The typical large-scale participation in international crimes has entailed that they 
often are perceived as collective happenings, which is reflected in the way they are named 
and discussed in the public. We, for example, talk about the Rwandan genocide and 
the Srebrenica massacre, that is, geographical place names are often used to identify the 
atrocities.120 Sometimes the atrocities are, however, instead named after the victim group 
(for example, the Armenian genocide).121 As will be discussed in greater detail further 
on in the study, international criminal law is, however, not directly interested in these 
collective happenings or macro-crimes. Rather, the law focuses on the acts of individual 
offenders, that is, on the micro-crimes collectively making up the macro-crimes. The 
legal relationship between the macro- and micro-levels is, however, a complex one.122 
The individualistic perspective of international criminal law has been criticized for 
concealing the structural causes behind the criminality or the “broad institutional logic 
through which the actions by individuals create social effects.”123 At the same time, a 
117 Fletcher 2002(b), at 1514-1515.
118 J. Waller, Becoming Evil – How Ordinary People Commit Genocide and Mass Killing (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002), 14 (referring to Smith). Much higher estimates of the number of perpetrators have 
also been presented. Möller has called the problems caused by the high number of perpetrators (e.g., the 
impossibility to prosecute everyone) the quantitative problem of collective criminality. With the qualitative 
problem of collective criminality she, on the other hand, refers to the question of whether criminal law is a 
suitable means to address individual acts within collective criminality. Möller 2003, at 298 and 315. 
119 D. J. Goldhagen, Hitler’s Willing Executioners – Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1997), 166-167.
120 H. Jäger, ‘Makroverbrechen als Gegenstand des Völkerstrafrechts – Kriminalpolitisch-kriminologische 
Aspekte’, in G. Hankel & G. Stuby (eds.) Strafgerichte gegen Menschheitsverbrechen – Zum Völkerstrafrecht 
50 Jahre nach den Nürnberger Prozessen (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 1995), at 329. 
121 Möller 2003, at 244-245. 
122 Cf. “While national criminal investigations normally focus on a perpetrator, known or unknown, of 
a crime, ICTY and ICTR investigations focus on atrocities in geographic and functional areas.” UN Doc. 
S/2000/597, at 47 (para. 126).
123 Koskenniemi 2002, at 13-14. 
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strong focus on the macro-crimes can hide the role played by individuals in creating 
and implementing the collective action.124 The focus of the law in this regard affects the 
picture of the criminality that is conveyed. 
From a criminal law perspective, the collective nature of international criminality 
often makes the fair attribution of responsibility demanding. The responsibility of 
individuals in international crimes is namely often difficult to establish due to the fact that 
these crimes consist of numerous and connected individual acts that are synchronized into 
a “non-transparent macro-crime”.125 International criminality is furthermore generally 
also collective from another perspective. Many international crimes are committed in 
armed conflicts and in connection to ethnic rivalries, which are characterized by collective 
thinking. Fletcher has in this regard noted that for many people in matters of war “the 
individual culprits are beside the point” and that “war is waged against a collective, 
typically a nation-state”.126 As an example, he mentions the Pearl Harbor attack and notes 
that: “No one cared about the individual Japanese pilots who returned safely from the 
attack [...]. They were not criminals but rather agents of an enemy power.”127 Fletcher 
even argues that war creates “alternative identities” and that a “person who goes to war 
ceases, in part, to be an individual and becomes a soldier in a chain of command.”128 
Likewise Oko has found that in strongly ethnizied societies everything is looked upon 
through a lens of ethnicity, which makes the ethnicity of the perpetrator more important 
than his/her individual actions.129 This collective dimension of international criminality 
has been found to be difficult to combine with the individualistic approach of criminal 
law. For example Fletcher has argued that: 
One of the mysteries in the relationship of war and crime is the way in which war crimes 
break the collective spell of military action. We can make sense of the claim that in 
the course of hostilities the individual soldier merges with the collective military unit. 
But is it possible, then, that the individual reemerges from the collective and becomes 
individually liable for a war crime? If he kills a soldier, he is part of the collective; if he 
intentionally kills a civilian, he is on his own – but not entirely on his own.130
2.5.  Different Types of Collectives131 
International crimes are thus often collective crimes. But to what kinds of collectives do 
the perpetrators generally belong? Some of the typical collectives have already been 
124 Möller has therefore argued that it is wrong to think that an individual perspective only leads to 
concealment of the complex reality, as an individual perspective casts light on the internal structure of the 
collective happening or the particles of the mosaic. Möller 2003, at 329 (see also 348). 
125 Möller 2003, at 245 (in German intransparente Gesamtkörper des Makroverbrechens). 
126 Fletcher 2007(b), at 521. 
127 Fletcher 2007(b), at 521. 
128 Fletcher 2007(a), at 334. 
129 O. Oko, ‘The Challenges of International Criminal Prosecutions in Africa’, 31 Fordham International 
Law Journal (2008), at 377-378. 
130 Fletcher 2007(b), at 538.
131 The term collective is here used to denote “any aggregate of two or more individuals”. Cf. D. R. Forsyth, 
Group Dynamics, 5th ed. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, Cengage Learning, 2010), 13.
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mentioned in this study: international criminality often has a State-connection, which 
means that typical collectives include State agencies, such as the government, the police 
force, and the national army. These large collectives often have sub-groups to which it 
also may be possible to connect an individual. For example, State armies often have corps, 
divisions, brigades, regiments, platoons, patrols, squads, etc.132 An individual offender 
may also have connections to collectives, which are not part of the State machinery, 
such as a guerrilla or paramilitary group, a terrorist organization or network or a private 
military firm.133 Also such collectives often have sub-groups. Also other types of collectives 
may be connected to international criminality. Engelhart has, for example, noted that 
business corporations can be involved in international crimes.134 Möller, on her part, has 
pointed out that during the religious crusades numerous atrocities where committed by 
the Church.135 Furthermore, it is generally possible to divide the international criminals 
into collectives based on identity characteristics or “categories”, such as nationality, 
ethnicity and religion.136 People who participate in international crimes therefore belong 
to many different types of collectives. 
In social sciences, it is common to distinguish between collectives with regard to 
their size and internal structure. A possible distinction is, for example, that between 
groups, networks and crowds. In this regard, a group can be defined as a collective where 
two or more individuals are connected to each other by social relationships.137 Because 
the individuals in the group interact and influence each other, the group develops 
dynamic processes that separate a group from a random collection of individuals.138 A 
random group of individuals who act together, on the other hand, is often called a crowd. 
132 Castano, Leidner and Slawuta have argued that it is “usually small-to-average-sized groups of individuals 
who commit violations” of international humanitarian law. E. Castano, B. Leidner & P. Slawuta, ‘Social 
Identification Processes, Group Dynamics and the Behaviour of Combatants’, 90 International Review of 
the Red Cross (2008), at 260. As such, the group membership in these smaller collectives must also be taken 
into account when considering the phenomenology of international crimes.  
133 Regarding the “units” that nowadays often participate in armed conflicts, Kaldor has differentiated 
between: (1) regular armed forces; (2) paramilitary groups; (3) self-defense units; (4) foreign mercenaries; 
and (5) regular foreign troops generally under international auspices. Kaldor 2001, at 92. The question 
to what extent acts by terrorists should and can be regarded as international crimes (rather as acts of 
terrorism) is, however, a contested one. See further e.g., W. A. Schabas, ‘Is Terrorism a Crime against 
Humanity?’, in H. Langholtz, B. Kondoch & A. Wells (eds.), International Peacekeeping: The Yearbook of 
International Peace Operations (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2004), at 255-261. 
134 M. Engelhart, ‘International Criminal Responsibility of Corporations’, in C. Burchard, O. Triffterer & 
J. Vogel (eds.), The Review Conference and the Future of the International Criminal Court (Alphen aan den 
Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2010), at 176-177. 
135 Möller 2003, at 282. 
136 Forsyth refers to “categories” when he talks of groups that consist of individuals who “are similar to one 
another in some way, such as gender, ethnicity, religion, or nationality”. Forsyth 2010, at 14. 
137 Cf. Forsyth 2010, at 2-3. 
138 E.g., Forsyth 2010, at 18. Stainton Rogers has, on her part, differentiated between different types of 
groups depending on how permanent they are and to which degree individuals are committed to them. 
More specifically, she distinguishes between incidental groups, membership groups and identity reference 
groups (such as, ethnicity and religious communities). W. Stainton Rogers, Social Psychology: Experimental 
and Critical Approaches (Maidenhead: Open University Press, 2003), 264. Crowds and incidental groups 
have in common that in those individuals are “brought together for a relatively short period of time [...] 
with minimal involvement in and commitment to each other”. Cf. Ibid., at 264.
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Crowd-action is characterized by contagion, that is, the spread of behaviours from 
one crowd-member to another.139 Finally, networks are characteristically structured as 
interconnected but decentralized nodes/cells, which learn from each other and support 
each other when it serves them to do so.140 In networks, some individuals know each 
other very well (for example, individuals within a cell), but generally speaking networks 
are characterized by anonymity and the fact that it is the goals/values that direct the 
action rather than common decision-making.141 Different scholars, however, give the 
above defined terms somewhat different meanings. Significant for this study is the 
realization that international criminal law faces very different types of collectives. In 
the Rwandan genocide, it is, for example, possible to identify everything from crowd 
behaviour (individual committing crimes in parallel) to small-group behaviour (people 
committing crimes in cooperation).142
In relation to collectives that engage in international criminality, the role played 
by the bureaucratic organization model has furthermore often been noted. Osiel has, in 
fact, used the term “administrative massacres” to refer to international criminality.143 
The bureaucratic organization model is often connected to the modern State, but also 
other collectives may have such traits. Bureaucracies are characterized by a well-defined 
division of tasks and a strict hierarchy with superiors and subordinates.144 Bureaucratic 
organizations are hence vertical collectives with certain individuals in high-level positions 
and others in low-level positions. From the point of view of this study, the difference 
between vertical collectives and horizontal collectives is central.145 Armed groups namely 
often have a strongly hierarchical structure. The verticality of such collectives is often 
enhanced by a militarist organizational culture, which emphasizes the obligation to 
follow orders. 
139 Social movements have similarities with crowds, but in contrast to crowds social movements often have 
a longer duration. Over time, the structure of social movements often changes from a more crowd-like to 
a more organization like. Forsyth 2010, at 503 and 513.  
140 Networks are characterized by their dynamic structure and the fact that their structure is not 
traditionally hierarchical, but rather based on their common values/goals. E.g., M. Castells, The Rise of 
the Network Society, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2000), 501, and C. J. Borgen, ‘A Tale of Two 
Networks: Terrorism, Transnational Law, and Network Theory’, 33 Oklaholma City University Law Review 
(2008), at 413-414.
141 Borgen has noted that: “Decentralization means that nodes do not generally wait for orders but are 
entrepreneurial in finding targets of opportunity and organizing the resources needed for a particular 
action.” Borgen 2008, at 413-414.  
142 Cf. A. Eser & F. Rettenmaier, ‘Criminality of Organizations: Lessons from Domestic Law – A 
Comparative Perspective’, in A. Nollkaemper & H. van der Wilt (eds.), System Criminality in International 
Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), at 224. 
143 Osiel defines the term “administrative massacre as “large-scale violation of basic human rights to 
life and liberty by the central state in a systematic and organized fashion, often against its own citizens, 
generally in a climate of war – civil or international, real or imagined.” Osiel 1995, at 468. 
144 See further e.g., M. Weber, Economy and Society, Volume 3 (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968) 956-
1005, and L. A. Scaff, ‘Bureaucracy’, Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology (2007). 
145 It should be noted that the division of collectives into vertical respectively horizontal ones does not mean 
that both types of elements cannot coexist. E.g., vertical organizations generally also have horizontal elements, 
viz. individuals in the same hierarchical status. Likewise, horizontal organizations often have individuals who 
are perceived as “leaders” or as otherwise influential persons. 
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As noted above, there has, however, been a certain change in the types of actors and 
collectives that take part in international atrocities and not all collectives participating 
in the crimes are bureaucratic. Some of these “new” collectives have what, in fact, could 
be called post-bureaucratic traits.146 In post-bureaucratic organizations, the hierarchical 
power structures have been replaced by loose clusters of ever-changing, ever-connecting, 
ever-disconnecting networks.147 In these collectives, influence is more important than 
traditional hierarchical power and the organization does not necessarily have a clear 
centre.148 The post-bureaucratic organizations therefore have a more horizontal structure. 
For criminal law, this trend towards more horizontal and network-like organizations 
is not unproblematic. In traditional vertical organizations, it can generally be assumed 
that individuals in certain positions have certain powers, but in horizontal network-type 
organizations the role played by various members is often very obscure for outsiders. 
In relation to international criminality, it should furthermore be noted that the 
coexistence of various vertical and horizontal collectives can make an inquiry into the 
relationship between two or more collectives necessary. It is thus not only individual 
collectives that have a vertical-horizontal dimension, but also the relationship between 
collectives may have it. To give a concrete example, in the Stakić case before the ICTY 
(which concerned the responsibility for a campaign of persecution in the Prijedor 
region) the legal significance of horizontal connections between different vertical 
structures of power became topical. Three organized structures of power co-existed 
in the region, viz. the civil administration, the civilian police and the military, and the 
campaign of persecution required the joint action of all three organized structures of 
power. Stakić controlled the civilian administration, but the individuals committing the 
various physical acts of persecution were members of the police or the military. The 
challenging legal question was therefore whether Stakić could be held responsible for 
the acts of individuals who did not belong to the vertical structure of power he was 
controlling.149 International criminal law does thus not only have to address the question 
of relationships between individuals in collectives, but also the question of relationships 
between collectives. 
146 Cf. M. Osiel, ‘The Banality of Good: Aligning Incentives against Mass Atrocity’, 105 Columbia Law 
Review, at 1834, and Kaldor 2001, at 8 and 95. The same trend has been identified in connection to 
terrorism, as some modern terrorist organizations (e.g., al-Qaeda) have a network structure. 
147 R. Lippens, ‘Rethinking Organizational Crime and Organizational Criminology’, 35 Crime, Law & 
Social Change (2001), at 324. Grey and Garsten, on their part, find that the “principal features of post-
bureaucracy include the reduction of formal levels of hierarchy, an emphasis on flexibility rather than rule-
following and the creation of a more permeable boundary between the inside and outside organizations”. 
C. Grey & C. Garsten, ‘Trust, Control and Post-Bureaucracy’, 22 Organization Studies (2001), at 230. 
148 C. Heckscher, ‘Defining the Post-Bureaucratic Type’, in C. Heckscher & A. Donnellon (eds.), The Post-
Bureaucratic Organization: New Perspectives on Organizational Change (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 
1994), at 25, and Lippens 2001, at 320-323. There are namely other types of power than hierarchical, that 
is, e.g., ideological, economic, and political power. E.g., M. Mann, The Sources of Social Power, Volume 
II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 7-10, and Gill 2003, at 24. The sources of power are 
numerous and include, among other things, expertise, money and charisma.
149 H. Olásolo & A. Pérez Cepeda, ‘The Notion of Control of the Crime and Its Application by the ICTY in 
the Stakić Case’, 4 International Criminal Law Review (2004), at 508-510. How ICTY resolved this will be 
considered in Chapter 7. 
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As regards different types of collectives, two additional categorizations should be 
mentioned, namely the differentiation between: (a) legitimate and illegitimate collectives; 
and (b) collectives where the membership is chosen and collectives to which one is 
born. Regarding the legitimate-illegitimate distinction, it can be observed that many 
international crimes are committed by members of legitimate organizations, such as armies 
and police forces. In fact, many international crimes could be defined as “white-collar 
crimes”, that is, as crimes committed by persons of respectability and high social status in 
the course of their occupation.150 As noted already earlier, State authorities are generally 
not only perceived as legitimate, but their participation in the criminality has a special 
legitimizing effect on the whole criminal behaviour. Not all international crimes are, 
however, committed by members of collectives that have a legitimate image. For example 
in the Balkan conflict, many atrocities were committed by members of paramilitary 
groups that already during the conflict had a bad or questionable reputation.151 Some 
of these entities were even established for the very purpose of committing crimes.152 
Criminologically, the question of legitimate and illegitimate collectives is interesting in 
that the image of the crime-committing entity may affect the willingness of different 
types of people to engage in the criminality. From a criminal law perspective, on the 
other hand, the existence of illegitimate or “criminal” collectives has raised the question 
of whether membership in certain types of collectives per se should be punishable. 
As regards the difference between collectives where membership is chosen and 
collectives where membership is automatic or compulsory, this distinction has in 
international criminal law primarily been debated in relation to the question of what 
collectives are protected by international criminalizations. It has, most notably, been 
asked whether the international criminalization of genocide only protects stable groups 
in which membership is automatic.153 Likewise, it has been questioned whether the 
concept of “gender” in connection to persecution should be equated with the stable 
biological sex or whether the concept rather should be construed broader to include, 
for example, sexual orientation which some regard as chosen.154 The differentiation 
between stable and chosen groups is, however, problematic in that it sometimes is 
difficult to establish whether a certain group-belonging de facto is chosen or not.155 A 
more satisfactory term in this regard is “identity-reference groups”, which indicate that 
there exist collectives to which people belong long-term and which acts as a “reference 
frame for a person to know ‘who’ they are”.156 Identity-reference groups are central in 
connection to international crimes in that such group belonging often affects to what 
150 E. H. Sutherland, White Collar Crime: The Uncut Version (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983 
[1949]), 7.
151 E.g., Kaldor has observed that some of the paramilitary groups appear to have been established more or 
less only to commit atrocities. Kaldor 2001, at 93. 
152 Eser & Rettenmaier 2009, at 225. 
153 See further e.g., Schabas 2009, at 151-153. 
154 See further e.g., V. Oosterveld, ‘Gender, Persecution, and the International Criminal Court: Refugee 
Law’s Relevance to the Crime against Humanity of Gender-Based Persecution’, 17 Duke Journal of 
Comparative & International Law (2006), at 49 ff. 
155 It may also be asked why the question of whether a particular group belonging is chosen or not should 
be legally relevant. 
156 Stainton Rogers 2003, at 264 (bold omitted).  
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camp one belongs in a particular conflict, and sometimes also whether one becomes a 
victim or a perpetrator. Many armed conflicts can today be characterized as “conflicts of 
identity”,157 which indicates the centrality of these types of collectives for international 
criminality.  
2.6.  Individuals with Different Relationships to the Criminality 
In order to fully understand genocide [...], it is necessary to appreciate that the 
killing sites where the murders are carried out only represent the end point of a long 
sequence of steps involving many institutions, agencies, and actors. Genocide is a 
process, not just an event.158
In relation to international crimes, it is commonplace to find perpetrators playing very 
different roles in the crimes. A distinction that is often made is that between those 
individuals who physically execute the crimes (for example, kill) and the non-physical 
participants in the crimes.159 The first category of criminals is sometimes called “hands-
on criminals” and the second type “criminals behind the desk”. Often the different 
roles played by the perpetrators are related to the hierarchical position they have in 
the collective. This is reflected in terms such as “high-level, mid-level, and low-level 
perpetrators”, “leaders and foot soldiers” and “the masterminds behind the crime and 
the followers”.160 It is, for example, usually only low- and mid-level actors who hands-on 
participate in the crimes.161 High-level actors instead more often participate in the crimes 
through other types of “physical” acts (for example, by establishing certain organizations 
or by adopting policies) or by acts of speech and expression (for example, by ordering the 
commission of crimes).162 Due to the fact that high-level and low-level actors often play 
different roles in the crimes, it is in scholarly writings possible to find categorizations 
that proceed from the hierarchical position of the actors. For example, Kelman makes a 
difference between crimes of obedience and crimes of authority.163 It should, however, be 
noted that the question of whether a person is a superior or not partly is context-bound. 
157 Another common term is “ethnic conflicts”. See further e.g., P. Akhavan, ‘Justice in The Hague, Peace 
in the Former Yugoslavia? A Commentary on the United Nations War Crimes Tribunal’, 20 Human Rights 
Quarterly (1998), at 752, and Kaldor 2001, at 77. 
158 Alvarez 2001(a), at 88.
159 In relation to the Rwandan genocide, Prunier, e.g., makes the difference between organizers, intellectual 
inspirators and killers. G. Prunier, The Rwanda Crises – History of a Genocide (London: Hurst & Company, 
1995/1997), 239. 
160 Drumbl makes a combination of the hierarchical and physical-non-physical distinctions, and categorizes 
the perpetrators into: (1) the conflict entrepreneurs; (2) the leaders who remain subject to authority and are 
ordered into ordering others; and (3) the actual killers “most of whom are ordinary folks”. Drumbl 2007, at 25. 
161 Sometimes, however, high-level actors also participate in the physical causing of harm. Del Ponte has, 
e.g., noted that in the Rwandan genocide also high-level actors committed hand-on crimes. C. Del Ponte, 
‘Investigation and Prosecution of Large-Scale Crimes at the International Level – The Experience of the 
ICTY’, 4 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2006), at 548.
162 S. Wallerstein, ‘Criminalising Remote Harm and the Case of Anti-Democratic Activity’, 28 Cardozo Law 
Review (2007), at 2718-2719. 
163 H. C. Kelman, ‘The Policy Context of Torture: A Social-Psychological Analysis’, 87 International Review 
of the Red Cross (2005), at 126. See also Kelman & Hamilton 1989, at 51.
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An individual can be the chief of a prison and superior in relationship to the prison 
guards, at the same time as he/she is a low-level actor when compared to the political 
leaders.164 Except for the very highest leaders and the most low-level foot soldiers, most 
participants in international crimes therefore have both individuals in more superior 
positions above them and individuals in inferior position below them. For international 
criminal law, the hierarchical division of labour often entails a need to be able to prove a 
connection between the participants in the crime, that is, the way in which the crime has 
been accomplished collectively. In relation to high-level actors, the challenge often lies in 
connecting them with the physical acts of violence. In connection to low-level actors, the 
difficulty, on the other hand, often is to establish that they have shared or supported the 
criminal goals promulgated by the leaders.
In relation to international criminality, it is also common to find categorizations 
of the participants in the crimes based on their personality type. Some leaders are, for 
example, portrayed as ideologically obsessed and charismatic.165 Adolf Hitler, Slobodan 
Milosević and Osama Bin Laden are often seen as examples of this type of actor. At 
the mid- and/or low-levels, on the other hand, it is typical to distinguish between the 
bureaucrats who “just do their jobs” without considering the content of the job, the sadists 
who seem to enjoy committing serious violent crimes, and the individuals who have been 
coerced to take part in the crimes.166 These stereotypes are obviously simplifications of 
reality. Not all leaders are ideologically obsessed, not all subordinates sadists etc.167 Many 
participants in international crimes are, in fact, what could be characterized as “ordinary 
people”.168 Already here, it may furthermore be pointed out that research indicates 
that the number of persons who by reason of duress participate in mass atrocities is 
164 Cf. in some cases, the ICTY has commented upon the significance of the accused person taken into 
consideration the overall context. See e.g., the discussion regarding Tadić’s importance in the overall 
campaign in the Opština Prijedor. Tadić, Judgement (sentencing), TC, ICTY, 14 July 1997, para. 60.
165 Cf. Smeulers & Grünfeld 2011, at 320-321. 
166 On the various stereotypes, see e.g., Möller 2003, at 344. 
167 That not all leaders are of the same personality type or play the same role in international atrocities is 
emphasized by the work of some psychologists/psychiatrists who investigated the leading Nazis prosecuted 
by the Nuremberg Tribunal. E.g., Kelley divided the Nazi prisoners into the policy makers, the salesmen, the 
gunmen, the rabble rousers and the businessmen. D. M. Kelley, 22 Cells in Nuremberg: A Psychiatrist Examines 
the Nazi Criminals (New York: Greenberg Publishers, 1947). Gilbert, on the other hand, distinguished 
between, inter alia, the revolutionists, the diplomats, and the militarists. G. M. Gilbert, The Psychology of 
Dictatorship: Based on an Examination of the Leaders of Nazi Germany (New York: Ronald Press, 1950).
168 See e.g., C. R. Browning, Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland 
(New York: HarperPerennial, 1998), and Waller 2002. Mann argues that it is possible to distinguish between 
participants in Nazism depending on their normality/peculiarity and their motives. More specifically, he 
notes the distinctions between two different types of peculiar people taking part in the crimes (“ideological 
killers” and “disturbed killers”) and four different types of ordinary people (“bigoted killers” reflecting the 
prejudices of their time, “fearful/compliant killers”, “bureaucratic killers” and “materialist killers”). Mann 
himself is sceptic towards applying this kind of typologies, as he notes that all participants in Nazism 
“were [...] implicated together in a radicalizing collective project.” At the same time, his study of 1,581 
participants in the Nazi atrocities indicates that many of the leading Nazis were “long-term Nazis” who 
had been pre-war extremists and who had a “career” in violence. As such, his study suggests that many 
Nazis who were prosecuted for their wartime atrocities were “real Nazis” rather than “ordinary men”. M. 
Mann, ‘Were the Perpetrators of Genocide “Ordinary Men” or “Real Nazis”? Results from Fifteen Hundred 
Biographies’, 14 Holocaust and Genocide Studies (2000), at 331-333 and 358-359.
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not great.169 It seems that authority in many cases is enough to persuade individuals to 
participate in mass atrocities. Many participants in international crimes therefore seem 
to lie somewhere between the eager sadists and the coerced individuals. From the point 
of view of the phenomenology of international crimes, the attempts to categorize the 
participants into various personality types, however, emphasize one important point: 
it is not only one type of individuals who participate in international crimes. Rather, in 
international criminality, very different types of personalities often cooperate to produce 
the harmful outcomes.  
Finally, it should be noted that in relation to international criminality, there are 
not just different types of participants in the crimes, but more generally individuals with 
different types of relationships to the criminality. Fletcher and Weinstein have, for example, 
noted that international crimes besides participants often have: (a) community members 
who directly or indirectly profit from the crimes or who limit their “participation” to 
taunting or throwing stones; and (b) bystanders who do nothing to stop the criminal 
behaviour of others.170 Likewise Drumbl has observed that “some of the major conditions 
precedent to mass violence are bystander acquiescence and passive complicity – the 
violence is perpetrated in the name of an organic community for the overall benefit of 
the community.”171 Most international crimes are thus stories with few heroes,172 many 
participants, numerous victims and a large number of bystanders.  This is especially true 
for genocides and certain crimes against humanity (such as large-scale campaigns of 
ethnic cleansing) which by their nature are such that everybody in the society must be 
aware of them. For criminal law, the large number of individuals who passively supports 
the criminality (and who essentially make the criminality of others possible) raises the 
question of a “morally defensible line between legally culpable and inculpable parties”.173 
2.7.  Political and Ideological Crimes? 
In many of them a rebel tells the amputee that his or her injury is a “message” to 
Kabbah, but the message appears to be senseless, never explaining why the war is 
being fought.174
In connection to international crimes it is, furthermore, common to point out 
the ideological or political reasons behind the criminality. Armed conflicts often 
have a political background (such as the wish to gain political control over a certain 
169 E.g., Browning 1998, at 192, and Goldhagen 1997, at 379-381.  
170 Fletcher & Weinstein 2002, at 579-580 and 604. Also Drumbl observes that many bystanders benefit 
in a materialistic way from the crimes of others, that is, e.g., get promotions at work. Drumbl 2007, at 25. 
171 M. Drumbl, ‘Remarks of Mark Drumbl’, in S. R. Ratner & J. L. Bischoff (eds.) International War Crimes 
Trials: Making a Difference? (Austin, Texas: The University of Texas at Austin School of Law, 2004), at 31.
172 Importantly, there are, however, some “heroes”, who refuse to participate in the criminality and who 
instead choose to try to save potential victims.
173 M. J. Osiel, ‘Why Prosecute? Critics of Punishment for Mass Atrocity’, 22 Human Rights Quarterly 
(2000), at 119. Osiel in this context talks of “quasi-accomplices”. Ibid., at 126.  
174 A. D. Haines, ‘Accountability in Sierra Leone: The Role of the Special Court’, in J. E. Stromseth (ed.) 
Accountability for Atrocities – National and International Responses (Ardsley, New York: Transnational 
Publishers, 2003), at 185. 
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geographical area)175 and regimes have ideologies (such as communism). Sometimes, it is 
even asserted that international crimes are committed with a desire “to do good”, that is, 
to “create a better world”.176 Smeulers and Grünfeld have therefore held that international 
crimes have a “political meaning and purpose” and that they are “usually [...] perpetrated 
during a political struggle in order to gain and maintain political power.”177 Alvarez even 
argues that genocide “cannot take place without the appropriate ideological support” and 
that genocide therefore always is “a means to an end.”178 He mentions nationalism, past 
victimization, dehumanization, scapegoating, absolutist worldview and utopianism as 
examples of dangerous “ideological themes”.179 
Even if political/ideological jargon is typical in connection to international 
criminality, it is, however, not evident that what is said publicly reflects the true reasons 
behind the criminality. One reason for the scepticism towards the idea that participants 
in international crimes generally would be motivated by politics or ideology is that 
“[i]deologies are rarely coherent, nor are ideologues consistent.”180 Furthermore, 
criminological studies indicate that crimes that appear to be political or ideological 
can have many different types of underlying motives. It is thus possible to commit a 
racist crime without being motivated by a racist ideology.181 In this regard, for example, 
the idea that the Rwandan genocide was committed with racist motivations has been 
challenged.182 Also Goldhagen’s claim that it was a particular form of racially based 
hatred against the Jews (so-called racial eliminationist anti-Semitism) that was the 
root cause of the Holocaust has been widely criticized in academia.183 Many are, in fact, 
most sceptical to the idea that politics or ideologies criminologically would explain 
international atrocities. This viewpoint is supported by the fact that many participants 
in international crimes do not exhibit political or ideological radicalism. Sometimes 
this is plainly evident, as when members of private military firms (engaging in armed 
conflicts out of purely economical reasons) commit atrocities. Sometimes the macro 
crime committed by the collective has also been clearly non-ideological in nature. 
175 Kaldor has argued that whereas armed conflicts before had geo-political or ideological goals, armed 
conflicts today often are about “identity politics”. She defines identity politics as the claim to power on the 
basis of a particular identity – be it national, clan, religious or linguistic. Kaldor stresses that the goals of 
identity politics are political goals. Kaldor 2001, at 6, 69, 76-86 and 110.    
176 See e.g., Koskenniemi 2002, at 8 (referring to Todorov and Besançon). 
177 Smeulers & Grünfeld 2011, at 20. 
178 Alvarez 2010, at 57. 
179 Alvarez 2010, at 61-73. 
180 Waller 2002, at 120.
181 See e.g., Möller who asks whether the international crimes are hate crimes, and in this connection notes 
that it cannot be excluded that individual acts are committed without motives of hate. Möller 2003, at 288. 
182 Hintjens 2001, at 45-46.
183 Goldhagen 1997, at 417-418 and 479. On Goldhagen’s thesis and the criticism against it, see e.g., A. 
Alvarez, ‘Adjusting to Genocide – The Techniques of Neutralization and the Holocaust’, 21 Social Science 
History (1997), at 147-149, A. Brannigan, ‘Criminology and the Holocaust: Xenophobia, Evolution, and 
Genocide’, 44 Crime & Delinquency (1998), at 268-270, Drumbl 2007, at 28-29, and R. Kamber, ‘Goldhagen 
and Sartre on Eliminationist Anti-Semitism: False Beliefs and Moral Culpability’, 13 Holocaust and 
Genocide Studies (1999), at 252-271. In relation to genocides and many crimes against humanity, where 
a certain population group is targeted for ethnic or similar reasons, it is also sometimes suggested that 
the crimes are crimes of “passion” which arise from “primordial tribal hatred.” Akhavan 1998(b), at 752. 
Akhavan is critical towards such claims.  
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There have, for example, been “utilitarian genocides” during the age of imperialism 
where “colonizers exterminate[d] indigenous people because they want[ed] the land 
and/or resources for material gain.”184
Even though individual participants in international crimes are not necessarily 
motivated by politics or ideology, it should, however, be observed that research has 
clearly indicated that political or ideological indoctrination may lower the threshold to 
engage in international criminality, and that such indoctrination frequently is present 
in connection to international criminality. The “greater good” that the criminality is 
supposed to further can thus act as a factor that justifies/excuses the criminal behaviour 
in the mind of the participant, even though it is not, as such, the factor that makes the 
individual act. It is furthermore today generally accepted that the commission of atrocities 
generally requires the dehumanization of the victims.185 In this regard, Hintjens has noted 
that it is the “human capacity to extend and limit compassion that gives radical ideology 
its fatal power”.186 Leaders wanting their subordinates to commit international crimes 
must therefore ensure that their subordinates lose their sympathy for the victims. Often 
this is achieved through propaganda, indoctrination and/or hate speech. Political and 
ideological polarisation of society is hence often deliberately and artificially created.187 
Akhavan has, in this regard, argued for the need to understand “the non-ethnicity of 
ethnic conflict.”188    
Furthermore, while it can be questioned to what extent individual perpetrators 
have been motivated by politics or ideology, it is, however, evident that most 
international crimes have something that can be called an element of bias and/or 
politics. The victims are often chosen due to the fact that they belong to a certain 
population category. Drumbl has in this vein argued that: “At the very core of the 
extraordinariness of atrocity crimes is conduct [...] that targets large numbers of 
individuals based on their actual or perceived membership in a particular group that 
has become selected as a target on discriminatory grounds.”189 Furthermore, political 
and ideological goals are often pursued through the crimes. International crimes can, 
for example, be committed to compel individuals from a certain population group to 
leave a particular geographical area. International criminality can therefore often be 
characterized as instrumental violence.190 
Due to the political or ideological element in the international criminality, it is 
sometimes asserted that trials regarding international crimes are “political trials”, that 
is, trials that are held only due to the fact that an individual has belonged to the “wrong” 
184 Smeulers & Grünfeld 2011, at 170.
185 E.g., Alvarez 1997, at 166, Alvarez 2001(a), at 125-128, Möller 2003, at 273-274, and M. Minow, 
‘Regulating Hatred: Whose Speech, Whose Crimes, Whose Power? An Essay for Kenneth Karst,’ 47 UCLA 
Law Review (2000), at 1256.
186 Hintjens 2001, at 27.
187 E.g., Akhavan 1998(b), at 752, and Dumont 2005, at 38. 
188 Akhavan 1998(b), at 752.  
189 Drumbl 2007, at 4.  
190 Cf. Zwi, Garfield and Loretti who define collective violence as “the instrumental use of violence by people 
who identify themselves as members of a group [...] against another group or set of individuals, in order to 
achieve political, economic or social objectives.” A. B. Zwi, R. Garfield & A. Loretti, ‘Collective Violence’, in E. 
G. Krug et al. (eds.), World Report on Violence and Health (Geneva: World Health Organization, 2002), at 215. 
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side of the conflict.191 Most notably these kinds of arguments are due to the fact that not 
all individuals who have committed international crimes are prosecuted.192 Also the fact 
that violence that normally is unlawful is lawful during armed conflicts may explain why 
individuals sometimes consider serious criminality as a question of politics. There is 
also a further reason why international trials sometimes are called political: The crime 
elements of most international crimes require that the judges in the trials consider the 
context, in which the crimes are committed. For example, the war crime of grave breaches 
can only be committed in international armed conflicts, which obliges the adjudicator 
to establish the existence of such a conflict, and the relationship between the individual’s 
conduct and the conflict in question. Indirectly, this may entail that the judges are forced 
to decide whose version of what happened during a certain time period they consider 
to be “the truth”. It has therefore been put forward that in relation to international 
criminality, the traditional legal distinction between the individual behaviour (which 
is the object of the criminal trial) and the context (which is not the object of the trial) is 
not maintained.193 
2.8.  Consequences of the Criminality: Mass Victimization and Violations 
of Collective Interests
International criminality is generally not “incidental and episodic”, but rather “conscious, 
deliberate, extending over time and highly damaging.”194 It often results in mass 
victimization. As an example one may mention the recent conflicts in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, where thousands girls and women have been raped. Or the civil war 
in Sierra Leone, where thousands have been mutilated through amputations of limbs. 
These kinds of large-scale atrocities generally require numerous hands-on criminals. 
At the same time, the criminality of a single high-level actor may be connected to the 
suffering of millions of victims.195 For the victims of international crimes, the mass 
191 The answer to the question of whether trials concerning international crimes often are political trials is partly 
dependent on how one defines the concept of a “political trial”. Sometimes the concepts of a “political trial” 
and a “show trial” are used to denote the same thing. Peterson, however, argues that whereas show trials are 
characterized by: (1) a largely predetermined outcome; and (2) a focus on the audience outside the courtroom 
(“the show”), the outcome of political trials is not necessarily predetermined. J. Peterson, ‘Unpacking Show 
Trials: Situating the Trial of Saddam Hussein’, 48 Harvard International Law Journal (2007), at 260 and 269. 
192 The problem of selective prosecutions will be considered further in Chapter 5.
193 Koskenniemi 2002, at 16-17 (including a reference to Leben). The contextual elements of international 
crimes will be considered further in Chapter 6. 
194 Cf. M. Punch, ‘Why Corporations Kill and Get Away with It: The Failure of Law to Cope with Crime 
in Organizations’, in A. Nollkaemper & H. van der Wilt (eds.), System Criminality in International Law 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), at 50. 
195 In relation to one of the leading Nazis – Hermann Göring – Arendt therefore argued that the hanging 
of him was certainly essential but totally inadequate, because his culpability overstepped and shattered any 
and all legal systems. H. Arendt (letter dated 17 August 1946) in L. Kohler & H. Saner (eds.), Hannah Arendt 
Karl Jaspers Correspondence 1926-1969 (New York: Hartcourt Brace Jovanovich Publishers, 1992), at 54. Also 
other scholars have questioned the criminal law’s ability to find punishments that match the suffering of 
the victims of mass atrocities. Koskenniemi 2002, at 2-3. As has been noted before, the question of whether 
criminal law as such should be used is beyond the scope of this study. Significant for this study is instead that 
the mass victimization entails special challenges for international criminal law both procedurally (e.g., victim 
participation in the proceedings) and substantially (e.g., to find a proportionate sentence).  
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victimization often entails that their victimization does not receive the merited legal 
attention. Criminal justice systems namely rarely have sufficient resources to address all 
crimes committed.  
The victimization caused by international criminality is furthermore generally 
characterized by its severity. It has been noted that armed conflicts “produce coercive 
circumstances, which include fear, psychological oppression, imprisonment or 
detention, occupation, generalized terror, abuse of power, duress and deprivation 
of psychological and physical support and comfort”.196 The crimes target the most 
important legal interests or goods (such, as life, health and freedom) and the attacks are 
often cruel and destructive.197 Repeated victimization is common as well as many-layered 
victimization (that is, besides being attacked themselves, it is common that victims 
have experienced loss of relatives and friends, been forced to leave their home, etc).198 
Victims of international crimes are therefore often severely traumatized, if they at all 
have survived the attacks against them. 
From a victimological perspective, it may be noted that international crimes often 
have a lot of so-called ideal victims, that is, individuals who most readily are given the 
complete and legitimate status of being victims.199 An ideal victims has, according to 
Christie, at least five typical attributes: (1) the victim is weak; (2) the victim was carrying 
out a respectable project; (3) the victim was where she could not possibly be blamed 
for being; (4) the offender was “big and bad”; and (5) the offender was unknown and in 
no personal relationship to the victim.200 In genocides, for example, many members of 
the group are targeted even though they do not rebel or offer any threat.201 War crimes 
are regrettably often committed against civilians or prisoners of war who do not pose a 
military threat. This is, of course, largely due to the crime definitions, as many acts of 
violence against combatants do not constitute war crimes.202 The point remains, however, 
that many international crimes are committed against individuals who cannot readily be 
blamed for their own victimization. 
196 D. K. Piragoff, ‘Procedural Justice Related to Crimes of Sexual Violence’, in H. Fischer, C. Kreß & 
S. R. Lüder (eds.), International and National Prosecution of Crimes under International Law – Current 
Developments (Berlin: Berlin Verlag, 2001), at 386. Triffterer has noted that victims of international crimes 
are quite often more at the disposal or mercy of their perpetrators than victims of ordinary crime. According 
to him, everyone can more or less effectively protect himself/herself against “micro-criminality”, such as 
theft. O. Triffterer, ‘The Preventive and the Repressive Function of the International Criminal Court’, in 
M. Politi & G. Nesi (eds.), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court – A Challenge to Impunity 
(Aldershot: Ashgate/Dartmouth, 2001), at 161.
197 Möller 2003, at 238. 
198 V. Folnegovic-Smalc, ‘Psychiatric Aspects of the Rapes in the War against the Republics of Croatia and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina’, in A. Stiglmayer (ed.), Mass Rape: The War against Women in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
(Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1994), at 177 (regarding rape victims). 
199 N. Christie, ‘The Ideal Victim’, in E. A. Fattah (ed.), From Crime Policy to Victim Policy – Reorienting the 
Justice System (London: MacMillan, 1986), at 18. 
200 Christie 1986, at 19.
201 Fein 2000, at 51.
202 In this regard, it is interesting to note that May has asked whether the distinction between combatants 
and non-combatants in international humanitarian law rather should be between those guilty and those 
innocent. May 2007, at 104. See further Section 6.3.5.1.  
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In domestic legal systems, it is common to categorize crimes depending on what 
interests or legal goods (for instance, right to privacy, right to life) they violate.203 This 
reflects the fact that criminalizations are adopted for a reason and that they hence have 
a social function.204 Sometimes it is evident what interest a criminalization protects, 
but the rationale underlying a criminalization can also be debated. The rationale may 
also change over time. For example, while rape earlier often was seen as a violation of 
property (the husband’s/father’s property) or as a violation against family honour, it is 
today usually seen as an act that threatens the victim’s individual honour, as an act of 
violence against the victim, or as an act violating the victim’s sexual integrity. In most 
cases, the holder of the legally protected interest is an individual person, but criminal law 
also protects certain supra-individual interests.205 When considering the harm caused by 
international crimes, it becomes evident that the crimes violate many different types of 
interests belonging to both individuals and collective entities. To begin with, the crimes 
obviously have individual victims, and depending on the underlying offence is question206 
the crimes violate the life, sexual integrity etc. rights of these individuals. International 
crimes, however, also violate interests that go beyond individuals, or to put it another 
way, the harm caused is “greater than the sum of the individual wrongs composing 
it.”207 For example, as the victims often are chosen due to their group belonging,208 the 
criminality can be said to violate the group interests of that group. Often targeted groups 
are ethnic, national and religious groups. Also other social groups may be targeted, such 
as gender or political groups. Typical for international criminality is therefore that it 
203 On criminal law and the protection of legal goods, see further e.g., C. Lernestedt, Kriminalisering 
– Problem och principer (Uppsala: Iustus förlag, 2003), 127-180, K. Nuotio, ‘On the Significance of 
Criminal Justice for a Europe ‘United in Diversity’’, in K. Nuotio (ed.), Europe in Search of “Meaning and 
Purpose (Helsinki: Faculty of Law, University of Helsinki, 2004), at 181-184, and K. Nuotio, ‘Theories of 
Criminalization and the Limits of Criminal Law: A Legal Cultural Approach’, in R. A. Duff et al. (eds.), The 
Boundaries of the Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), at 238-261. It should be noted 
that a difference has been made between, on the one hand, the legal interests the crime violates (e.g., life 
interests) and the object that is violated through the crime (e.g., the life of a particular victim). See further 
Lernestedt 2003, at 128-130. The legal good discussion has been popular in e.g., Germany and the Nordic 
countries. In some other countries, one can find the related discussions about the harm principle and the 
requirement that criminal law should be used to protect public interests. 
204 S. Melander, Kriminalisointiteoria – rangaistavaksi säätämisen oikeudelliset rajoitukset (Helsinki: 
Suomalainen lakimiesyhdistys, 2008) 327 and 334. Note Jareborg who criticizes the idea that the primary 
aim of criminal law is to solve social problems. This being said, criminal law, however, has a social task. 
N. Jareborg, ‘What Kind of Criminal Law Do We Want?’, in A. Snare (ed.) Beware of Punishment – On the 
Utility and Futility of Criminal Law (Oslo: Pax Forlag A/S, 1995), at 23-24. See also P. O. Träskman, ‘The 
Dragon’s Egg – Drugs-Related Crime Control’, in A. Snare (ed.) Beware of Punishment – On the Utility and 
Futility of Criminal Law (Oslo: Pax Forlag A/S, 1995), at 159.
205 Melander argues that the focus of criminal law is on protecting individual interests, which have a 
connection to individual human/fundamental rights. Melander 2008, at 342. 
206 The criminalization technique used in connection with international crimes will be considered further 
in Chapter 6. 
207 Osiel 2000, at 129. See also e.g., A. Marston Danner, ‘Constructing a Hierarchy of Crimes in International 
Criminal Law Sentencing’, 87 Virginia Law Review (2001), at 484-489. 
208 See further e.g., Möller 2003, at 351 and 353. Bassiouni argues that collective victims emerge in 
situations where individual victims are targeted because they belong to a certain group or collective. 
M. C. Bassiouni, ‘The Protection of ‘Collective Victims’ in International Law’, in M. C. Bassiouni (ed.), 
International Protection of Victims (Toulouse: Érès, 1988), at 183. 
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affects the life of many, if not most, members of the targeted community.209 In relation 
to international criminality, it is also common to point out that the crimes have been 
internationally criminalized due to the fact that they violate international interests. More 
specifically, it has been suggested that international crimes can threaten international 
peace and security and shock the conscience of humanity.210 The question of what the 
primary rationale of international criminalizations is (or for the protection of what legal 
goods international criminalizations have been adopted) is beyond the scope of this 
study.211 Here, the central thing to note is rather the plenitude of harm caused. 
2.9.  Concluding Remarks 
An investigation into the phenomenology of international criminality reveals that the 
criminality has certain typical characteristics that often distinguish the criminality from 
ordinary domestic criminality. The criminality is often large-scale collective criminality 
causing severe mass victimization. State involvement in or toleration of the criminality 
is usual and the victims of the crimes are often victimized due to their group belonging. 
Many of the participants in mass atrocities are ordinary citizens who have a strong bond 
to society, that is, persons who cannot be characterized as “deviants” in criminological 
terms or as “disturbed” in psychological terms. 
209 Osiel 1995, at 475. 
210 M. C. Bassiouni, ‘International Crimes: The Ratione Materiae of International Criminal Law’, in M. C. 
Bassiouni (ed.), International Criminal Law, Volume I, 3rd ed. (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008), 
at 133. Hiéramente is, however, critical to the idea of distinct legal goods that would separate international 
crimes from ordinary domestic crimes. He finds that if the category of international crimes is used at 
all, formalistic criteria (e.g., that the crimes have an international law background) must be used to 
separate them from ordinary crimes, as he finds the suggested substantive criteria (e.g., that they threaten 
international peace and security) unsubstantiated. M. Hiéramente, ‘The Myth of “International Crimes”: 
Dialectics and International Criminal Law’, 3 Goettingen Journal of International Law (2011), at 556-557 
and 569-573. Cf. also Nuotio who argues that “[c]ollective goods cannot warrant protection through the 
criminal law if they are too general and diffuse”. He mentions the preservation of law and order as an 
example of a too general interest. Nuotio 2010, at 261. 
211 Attempts to do this have, however, been made by others. E.g., Bassiouni has put forward that international 
crimes, inter alia, affect a significant international interest, constitute an egregious conduct deemed offensive 
to the commonly shared values of the world community or involve more than one State. M. C. Bassiouni, 
‘The Penal Characteristics of Conventional International Criminal Law’, 15 Case Western Reserve Journal of 
International Law (1983), at 28-29, and M. C. Bassiouni, ‘The Sources and Content of International Criminal 
Law: A Theoretical Framework’, in M. C. Bassiouni (ed.), International Criminal Law, Volume I, Crimes, 2nd 
ed. (Ardsley: Transnational Publishers, 1999), at 33. Cassese, on his part, has argued that international crimes 
protect values considered important by the whole international community and that there is a universal 
interest in repressing them. Cassese 2008, at 11. Due to the way in which international criminalizations are 
brought about (see further Chapter 5, the process rarely results in documentary evidence clearly revealing the 
legislator’s will) these attempts, however, often consist of: (a) discussions of what – from a more philosophical 
perspective – would constitute a rational basis for a criminalization; or (b) rather speculative attempts to 
interpret the political processes that have resulted in a criminalization. To identify the underlying reasons is 
hence difficult. The question is also whether these identified characteristics should be characterized as post 
facto explanations to the criminalizations or rather as principles that establish the proper range and scope of 
international criminal law. Fletcher has argued that there should be more precise constitutional principles 
to determine the proper range and scope of international criminal law. G. P. Fletcher, ‘Parochical Versus 
Universal Criminal Law’, 3 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2005), at 27.
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These characteristics of international criminality constitute typical dimensions of the 
social problem that international criminal law purports to address, and a central question 
in this study is how the social problem that international criminality represents has been 
translated into a criminal law question. What dimensions of the social problem have 
been taken into consideration in the law? How has the fact that international criminal 
law is criminal law affected the legal addressing of the social problem? It is hence the 
legal framing of the social problem that is of special interest in this study. Already here, it 
may be noted that international criminality is such a multidimensional phenomenon that 
many different legal solutions are possible. It is, for instance, possible for the criminal 
law to stress the abuse of power or the collective aspect of the criminality. The emphases 
of the law can also change over time, and these changes may at least partly be due to 
changes in the social phenomena addressed through the law. The increased capacity of 
non-State actors to commit international atrocities and the emergence of new types of 
armed conflicts are examples of significant societal changes in connection to international 
criminality. Before the adopted legal solutions will be considered, the investigation into 
the nature of international criminality is, however, continued by turning the attention 
towards criminology. 
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3.  CRIMINOLOGY AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMES
3.1.  Explaining Crime and Criminality 
Criminology is the branch of science that focuses on the causes of crime. It tries to 
explain: (1) criminality, that is, the propensity of individuals and entities to commit 
crime; (2) crime, that is, the occurrence of an event involving law-breaking, and (3) 
criminalization, that is, the process of certain activities being defined as criminal.212 
The existing criminological theories investigating law-breaking have been classified 
in numerous different ways. An often mentioned distinction is that between macro 
and micro theories, that is, theories that try to explain differences in the location and 
proportion of criminal behaviour in various groups and societies (macro theories) and 
theories focusing on differences among individuals in committing and refraining from 
criminal acts (micro theories).213 It is also common to distinguish between rational 
actor theories, positivist theories, social process theories, conflict theories, and critical 
theories. The content of these theories will be elaborated below, as will their significance, 
if any, for understanding international criminality. It should also be noted that there is a 
difference between theories on what causes crime and theories that merely try to explain 
how criminality is possible. 
Criminology as a branch of science has traditionally given scant attention to 
international crimes.214 Instead, political, legal, historical, and psychological explanations 
have been offered to these crimes.215 A reason for this can be that in criminology empirical 
research methods are common and to investigate international crimes empirically poses 
special challenges.216 Another explanation may be criminology’s traditional focus on 
garden-variety type of criminality. 
A controversial question in this regard is to what extent theories developed to 
explain ordinary criminality also can be used to explain international criminality. In this 
212 See D. O. Friedrichs, ‘The Crime of the Century? The Case for the Holocaust’, 34 Crime, Law and Social 
Change (2000), at 26. Criminology is also often described as the field of science studying law-making, law-
breaking and reactions towards law-breaking. E. H. Sutherland, Principles of Criminology, 4th ed. (Chicago: 
J. B. Lippincott, 1947 [1939]), 1. 
213 R. L. Akers, Criminological Theories – Introduction, Evaluation, and Application, 3rd ed. (Los 
Angeles: Roxbury Publishing Company, 2000) 4. In relation to international criminality, Simpson 
makes a similar distinction between structural analysis (focusing on processes, social behaviour, 
institutions, hierarchies etc.) and analysis focusing on agency. G. Simpson, ‘Men and Abstract Entities: 
Individual Responsibility and Collective Guilt in International Criminal Law’, in A. Nollkaemper & 
H. van der Wilt (eds.), System Criminality in International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009), at 94. 
214 E.g., Alvarez 1997, at 141, S. Cohen, ‘State Crimes of Previous Regimes: Knowledge, Accountability, and 
the Policing of the Past’, 20 Law and Social Inquiry (1995), at 10, L. E. Day & M. Vandiver, ‘Criminology 
and Genocide Studies: Notes on What Might Have Been and What Still Could Be’, 34 Crime, Law and 
Social Change (2000), at 43-44, Friedrichs 1996(b), at 44-45, Jamieson 1998, at 480, and W. S. Laufer, ‘The 
Forgotten Criminology of Genocide’, in W. S. Laufer & F. Adler (eds.), The Criminology of Criminal Law 
(New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1999), at 72-73.
215 Alvarez 1997, at 141.
216 E.g., Friedrichs 1996(b), at 45, and G. S. Yacoubian, ‘The (In)significance of Genocidal Behavior to the 
Discipline of Criminology’, 34 Crime, Law and Social Change (2000), at 14.
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connection, some scholars have stressed the unique nature of international criminality. 
For example, Tallgren has held that: 
[The] criminality that international criminal law is addressing is, typically, not a 
result of social or economic marginalization, which is how we tend to view the 
major bulk of crimes dealt with in national systems, such as youth delinquency, 
urban violent crime or drug criminality. That seems to hold true even though parts 
of the vast field falling under international criminal law, such as the use of child 
soldiers or trafficking in human beings for the sex industry, do resemble or originate 
from comparable circumstances. Contrary to most national criminality which is 
understood to constitute social deviation, acts addressed as international crimes 
can, in some circumstances, be constituted in term of conforming to a norm. As 
a result, the refusal to commit such acts could be considered as socially deviating 
behaviour.217 
Likewise, for example, Drumbl has called perpetrators of mass atrocities “qualitatively 
different” from perpetrators of ordinary crimes.218 To completely dismiss the significance of 
existing criminological research for internationality criminality, however, seems premature, 
even though ordinary criminality and international criminality differ as regards the “typical 
perpetrators.”219 To begin with, not all ordinary criminality is the result of economic and 
social marginalization (for example, so-called white-collar criminality) nor constitute 
deviation (for example, shop-lifting). Furthermore, and most importantly, criminology 
217 I. Tallgren, ‘The Sensibility and Sense of International Criminal Law’, 13 European Journal of 
International Law (2002), at 575. Some scholars even find that the “non-deviant character” of 
many participants in international criminality makes it problematic to at all address international 
criminality with criminal law. E.g., Drumbl has put forward that “atrocity crimes are group crimes 
characterized more by collective obedience than by individual transgression” and that a discourse 
shift is therefore needed from juridicalized determinations of individual criminal culpability to 
collective forms of responsibility. M. A. Drumbl, ‘Collective Responsibility and Postconflict Justice’, 
in T. Isaacs & R. Vernon (eds.), Accountability for Collective Wrongdoing (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011), at 24 and 28. As was noted in the introductory chapter, the question to what 
extent alternative ways to address atrocities (e.g., restorative justice measures) would be more suitable 
is beyond the scope of this study.
218 E.g., Drumbl 2005(b), at 1310. See also e.g., M. A. Drumbl, ‘Sclerosis – Retributive Justice and the 
Rwandan Genocide’, 2 Punishment and Society (2000), at 298, M. A. Drumbl, ‘Toward a Criminology 
of International Crime’, 19 Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution (2003), at 268, Drumbl 2005(a), 
at 549-550, and Drumbl 2007, at 8-9. Likewise e.g., Jäger 1992, at 75 (regarding torture), and Liwerant 
who has put forward that the “‘mass killer figure’ neither corresponds with the images of the serial 
killer nor with the criminal man.” Liwerant 2007, at 920.
219 Also e.g. Haveman and Smeulers have found that in relation to international criminality, the most 
important question is not why individuals show deviant behaviour, but why individuals obey and conform. 
R. Haveman & A. Smeulers, ‘Criminology in a State of Denial – Towards a Criminology of International 
Crimes: Supranational Criminology’, in A. Smeulers & R. Haveman (eds.), Supranational Criminology: 
Towards a Criminology of International Crimes (Antwerp: Intersentia, 2008), at 9.
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does not only investigate “deviance” or “deviants,”220 but more generally human behaviour 
in connection to criminality. Finally, when assessing what present criminology has to offer 
international criminal law, it should be emphasized that criminology has not succeeded in 
explaining any type of criminality exhaustively. This does not mean that the criminological 
research is of no value. Criminology has succeeded in identifying many factors that have 
a strong or weak explanatory power in relation to crimes in general or certain types of 
crimes in particular. Due to the complex nature of international crimes, it is also unlikely 
that these crimes could be explained with one theory. Instead, numerous theories may in 
combination shed some light on how these crimes come about. 
The present author therefore believes that studies on everyday human behaviour 
may be useful when trying to understand extraordinary evil.221 The relevance of the 
different criminological theories in relation to international crimes is, however, very 
difficult to test scientifically. What the author has done is to try to compare the degree 
to which the various criminological theories convey the same picture of the criminality 
as the phenomenology of the crimes does. In recent years, the criminological interest in 
international criminality has grown, and the insights from this growing “supranational 
criminology”222 – or the more specific “criminology of genocide” and “criminology of 
war”223 – will naturally also be considered.224 
220 The concept of deviance is problematic, as it is strongly dependant on the chosen group of reference or 
context. E.g., D. Matza, Becoming Deviant (Englewoods Cliffs: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1969), 11. In relation to 
international criminality, it can, e.g., be questioned whether the reference context should be the local society 
or the international community. Neubacher has in this vein argued that calling international criminals deviant 
only makes sense with reference to some standard at a superior level (e.g., international law and universal 
norms). F. Neubacher, ‘How Can It Happen That Horrendous State Crimes Are Perpetrated? – An Overview 
of Criminological Theories’, 4 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2006), at 789. (Cf. in relation to 
ordinary criminality it can be likewise questioned whether the reference context should be a certain suburb 
or the whole State.) Furthermore, if deviance is defined as something that strays from the existing social 
morality, the difficult question arises whether the perpetrators of international crimes really believed that 
they were acting morally correct. Ellis has noted that there a philosophical tradition from Socrates onwards 
that denies the possibility that people knew what they did was wrong, but did it anyway. Ellis, however, notes 
that there are also those who disagree with this assumption (e.g., Peter French). A. Ellis, ‘Introduction’, in A. 
Jokić (ed.), War Crimes and Collective Wrongdoing – A Reader (Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers, 
2001), at 4. The fact that there are numerous people that do something should not alone be seen as a proof 
that the behaviour is thought to be morally correct or ethical. Furthermore, it should be noted that Matza has 
argued that deviance should not only be viewed as “being different”, but also as an “actional activity”. He notes 
that to become deviant is to embark on a course that justifies, invites or warrants intervention and correction. 
Matza 1969, at 155 (referring to Lemert). If one takes this view, the fact that there exists international criminal 
law alone makes international criminals deviant.
221 See hereby Katz 1993, at 3-4.
222 See e.g., the book Supranational Criminology: Towards a Criminology of International Crimes, A. 
Smeulers & R. Haveman (eds.), (Antwerp: Intersentia, 2008).
223 D. O. Friedrichs, ‘Towards a Criminology of International Crimes: Producing a Conceptual and 
Contextual Framework’, in A. Smeulers & R. Haveman (eds.), Supranational Criminology: Towards a 
Criminology of International Crimes (Antwerp: Intersentia, 2008), at 36-37.  
224 Also psychological research will to some extent be considered here. Psychology investigating why 
individuals participate in international crimes is sometimes referred to as the “psychology of evil”. D. 
R. Mandel, ‘Instigators of Genocide – Examining Hitler from a Social-Psychological Perspective’, in L. 
S. Newman & R. Erber (eds.), Understanding Genocide – The Social Psychology of the Holocaust (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002), at 260.  
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It is important to recognize that the goal of this chapter is not to provide an 
exhaustive explanation of international criminality, but rather to shed some more light on 
the social phenomenon. The criminological theories are, however, not only relevant for 
this study in that they increase the understanding of international criminality. Although 
supranational criminology is a new branch of criminology, it has namely already clearly 
affected public sentiments about the criminality (for example, who primarily should be 
blamed for the crimes). 
This Chapter is organized so that the various criminological schools of thought are 
discussed one by one followed by a general discussion about supranational criminology. 
3.2.  Criminals as Rational Actors 
3.2.1. Introduction
The victims of hurricanes [...] are different from victims of genocide. The former 
are struck down by impersonal and essentially random forces of nature [...]. The 
victims of genocide, on the other hand, are struck down by other human beings who 
rationally and cold-bloodedly go about the job of targeting and eliminating specific 
groups within society. [...] In other words, genocide is conceived and carried out by 
human beings, and therefore it is certainly not inevitable.225
The idea that criminals are rational actors, who commit crimes in the rational exercise of 
free will,226 is central to those arguing that criminal law and penalties can deter individuals 
from committing crimes. 227 In classical criminology, represented first and foremost by 
Cesare Beccaria and Jeremy Bentham, “people are more or less free to choose crime as 
one of a range of behavioral options [...] [and the] relative attractiveness of any choice is 
affected by the costs associated with criminal action.”228 Later on, the rationality of human 
action has been stressed by the rational choice perspective of Ronald V. Clarke and Derek 
Cornish and routines activity theory of Marcus Felson and Lawrence Cohen, amongst 
others. In the rational choice perspective emphasis has been put on “adaptive choice, 
strategic analyses, decision making, and bounded or limited rationality.”229 The routines 
activity theory, on its part, asserts that crimes occur when there are motivated offenders, 
suitable targets/victims and a lack of capable guardians.230 The common denominator of 
225 Alvarez 2001(a), at 131.
226 Note, however, Morse who argues that criminal law does not demand free will, but rather intentional 
action and other similar criteria which are not incompatible with determinism in the same way as the 
idea of the free will. S. J. Morse, ‘Determinism and the Death of Folk Psychology: Two Challenges to 
Responsibility from Neuroscience’, 9 Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology (2008), at 2. 
227 On modern deterrence thinking, see e.g., T. L. Meares, N. Katyal & D. M. Kahan, ‘Updating the Study 
of Punishment’, 56 Stanford Law Review (2004), at 1172-1182. 
228 W. Einstadter & S. Henry, Criminological Theory – An Analysis of Its Underlying Assumptions (Fort 
Worth: Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 1995), 44.
229 D. B. Cornish & R. V. Clarke, ‘Preface’, in D. B. Cornish & R. V. Clarke (eds.), The Reasoning Criminal: 
Rational Choice Perspectives on Offending (New York: Springer, 1986), at vi.
230 L. E. Cohen & M. Felson, ‘Social Change and Crime Rate Trends: A Routine Activity Approach,’ 44 
American Sociological Review (1979), at 588-608.
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all rationality theories is that they stress the significance of incentives and disincentives 
to commit crime, and the fact that humans are affected by such external factors due to 
their rationality. Theories stressing rationality can also be called instrumentalist as they 
explain crimes with human interests and intensions.231    
3.2.2.  Are International Criminals Rational Actors?
The idea that individuals participating in international crimes would act rationally 
or be rational seems offensive to many people. International crimes are therefore 
sometimes depicted as “acts of madness” or as behaviour brought about by emotions 
or passions. Some authors have also argued that traditional disincentives to commit 
crime (for example, criminalizations and punishments) do not function in connection 
to international criminality. For example, Tallgren has put forward that: 
What is most relevant here, however, is the extent to which the motives that the 
possible offender has to commit a crime affect the likelihood of any threat of 
punishment having a preventive effect. It could be typical of crimes falling under the 
jurisdiction of the ICC that the offender is not acting individually in a similar sense 
as the offender committing a ‘normal’ murder or robbery. Instead, the offender is 
likely to belong to a collective, sharing group values, possible the same nationalistic 
ideology. In such a situation, the offender may be less likely to break the group values 
than the criminal norms.232
It may indeed be so that the threat of punishment in relation to international crimes 
has a lesser preventive effect than normally. This is, however, not to say that those who 
commit crimes act irrationally or that the crimes as such would be irrational. As Tallgren 
notes above, the context in which the crimes usually are committed is abnormal, and 
rationality is context-bound. Of special interest here is Bauman’s theory of the rationality 
of evil.233 In his study of the Holocaust, Bauman concludes that:
At no point of its long and tortuous execution did the Holocaust come in conflict with 
the principle of rationality. [...] On the contrary, it arose out of a genuinely rational 
concern, and it was generated by bureaucracy true to its form and purpose.234 
231 D. O. Friedrichs, ‘Criminological, Sociolegal, and Jurisprudential Dimensions of the Holocaust: A 
Pedagogical Approach’, in Proceedings of the Fourth Biennial Conference on Christianity and the Holocaust: 
“The 50th Anniversary of the Nuremberg War Crimes Trials: Their Effectiveness and Legacy”, Held at Princeton 
Marriott Forrestal Village, Princeton, New Jersey, April 14-15, 1996 (Lawrenceville, NJ: Rider University, 
1996), at 259. Friedrichs contrasts instrumentalist interpretations with structuralist interpretations, in 
which international crimes are explained with socio-historical forces. Ibid. 
232 Tallgren 2002(b), at 572-573. See also e.g., M. Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing 
History after Genocide and Mass Violence (Boston: Beacon Press, 1998), 50. An opposite view is, however, 
presented by Osiel who argues that while conventional violent offenders are unlikely to be deterred, 
“military officers are much more rational actors, trained to think in terms of the comparative cost of 
alternative methods for goal attainment.” Osiel 2005(a), at 1845-1846. 
233 Bauman has observed that whereas Arendt’s thesis is the banality of evil, his thesis is the rationality 
of evil. Z. Bauman in H. Welzer, ‘On the Rationality of Evil: An Interview with Zygmunt Bauman,’ Thesis 
Eleven (2002), No 70, at 107.
234 Bauman 1989, at 17.
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Contemporary mass murder is distinguished by a virtual absence of all spontaneity 
on the one hand, and the prominence of rational, carefully calculated design on the 
other. [...] Modern genocide is genocide with a purpose. Getting rid of the adversary is 
not an end in itself. It is a means to an end: a necessity that stems from the ultimate 
objective, a step that one has to take if one wants ever to reach the end of the road. 
The end itself is a grand vision of a better, and radically different, society.235 
In short, Bauman thus argues that crimes such as the Holocaust are the product of 
modern society and that cruelty is more social (situational) than character-based 
(dispositional).236 This resonates with criminological theories that see social environment 
as shaping human behaviour. 
From the perspective of criminological theories that stress human rationality, 
Bauman’s distinction between the rationality of the actor and the rationality of the action 
is central. According to Bauman, the rationality of the action, that is, rationality measured 
by the objective consequences for the actor, does not have to resonate with the rationality 
of the actor, which is a psychological phenomenon.237 According to him, reason is “a 
good guide for individual behaviour only on such occasions as the two rationalties 
resonate”.238 In certain contexts, it may be impossible for rational people to evaluate 
correctly what would be rational action. As a concrete example, one may mention the 
participation of Jews in the extermination of Jews during the Nazi era. That irrational 
behaviour can be the result of a rational mind is also argued by Post and Panis, who 
(somewhat confusingly) put forward that their analysis demonstrates that Saddam was 
a rational calculator who, however, often miscalculated.239 What these studies suggest is 
hence that international criminals often are rational from a criminal law perspective.240 
In contrast to, for example, a mental disease, the abnormal social context does not take 
away the rationality of the actor, even though the context may strongly affect the exercise 
of the rationality. That international criminality can be rational from this perspective 
is stressed by the fact that international criminality can be very carefully planned and 
executed, and hence deliberate.  
When wanting to understand how rational people can make decisions that from 
the outside appear to be completely irrational, it is also important to recognize that “the 
decision” to commit an international crime is not necessarily one “big decision” but may 
consist of numerous smaller everyday decisions which eventually result in a situation 
where the individual is confronted with the final decision to “step over to the other side” 
and become involved in international criminality. In this regard, Katz has noted that: 
235 Bauman 1989, at 90-91. Bauman’s idea seems to have some touching-points with the more general idea 
that the difference between good and evil is not simple. Matza has noted that the relationship between 
good and evil phenomena is complicated and that relations between good and evil in sequence can be 
surprising. In other words, bad things can result from highly treasured aspects of social life, and good can 
be born of what was conventionally deemed evil. Matza 1969, at 69.
236 See further e.g., Browning 1998, at 167, and Laufer 1999, at 78-79.
237 Bauman 1989, at 149. 
238 Bauman 1989, at 149. 
239 J. M. Post & L. K. Panis, ‘Tyranny on Trial: Personality and Courtroom Conduct of Defendants Slobodan 
Milošević and Saddam Hussein’, 38 Cornell International Law Journal (2005), at 829. 
240 Morse 2008, at 6. Morse also observes that the law demands the possession of the general capacity, not 
its actual exercise. Ibid., at 7.
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“The route to evil often takes the form of a sequence of seemingly small, innocuous 
incremental steps, in each of which one tries to solve a problem within one’s immediate 
situation.”241 In this process towards evildoing, the individual’s morality follows rather 
than leads.242 The small steps towards evil-doing may be very rational when judged by 
themselves, also from an external perspective. The outcome of the process, on the other 
hand, can appear very irrational. The difficulty many people have in understanding how 
ordinary people can commit grave atrocities may be due to this inability to see that the 
decision to commit the crime may be preceded by many other decisions that pave the 
way for the crucial decision. Interestingly, also for the perpetrators, it may take long time 
to realize that a decision to become involved in an international crime has been made. 
Katz has observed that much of the evil go unrecognized because so much of everyday 
life remains unchanged.243 The decision to commit an international atrocity does thus 
not necessarily turn the world of the perpetrator upside down, at least immediately. 
3.2.3.  Typical Contexts of International Crimes and the Prevalence of Motivated 
Offenders, Suitable Targets and the Lack of Capable Guardians
In criminology, the routines activity theory has put forward that crimes are more likely to 
occur when there are motivated offenders, suitable targets/victims and a lack of capable 
guardians.244 This prompts the question of whether these types of crime-conducive 
circumstances often exist in connection to international criminality. In this regard, it is 
interesting that Holocaust studies have sought to explain the Holocaust by first looking 
at the behaviour of the perpetrators, then by studying the behaviour of the victims and 
finally by looking at the role played by the bystanders.245
Smeulers and Grünfeld note that: ‘Periods of collective violence usually lead to a 
social re-stratification of society and this means new opportunities for people. Profiteers 
and careerists take advantage of the situation.”246 To find people willing to participate 
in international crimes is unfortunately rarely difficult. Profession self-interest (for 
example, advancement, honours) and personal self-interest (for example, fulfilment of 
narcissistic needs) are examples of factors that can motivate individuals to participate in 
international crimes.247 For example, when analyzing the leading Nazis at the Nuremberg 
prison, Gilbert found that some of them could be characterized as political opportunists 
who mainly were interested in achieving fame and fortune.248 Arendt also famously found 
241 Katz 1993, at 13.
242 J. M. Darley, ‘Social Organization for the Production of Evil’, 3 Psychological Inquiry (1992), at 208. When 
individuals engage in behaviour that violates their normal standards, according to the theory of cognitive 
dissonance, they will be motivated to change their attitudes and beliefs to reduce the discrepancy between 
their behaviour and their cognitions. Behaviour can thus according to this theory change thoughts. L. 
S. Newman, ‘What Is a “Social-Psychological” Account of Perpetrator Behavior? The Person Versus the 
Situation in Goldhagen’s Hitler’s Willing Executioners’, in L. S. Newman & R. Erber (eds.), Understanding 
Genocide – The Social Psychology of the Holocaust (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), at 53-54.
243 Katz 1993, at 33.
244 Cohen & Felson 1979, at 588-608.
245 H. Fein, Genocide – A Sociological Perspective (London: Sage Publications, 1993), 58-59.
246 Smeulers & Grünfeld 2011, at 321. 
247 Waller 2002, at 191-196.
248 Gilbert 1950, at 288-289.
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that Eichmann was “banal”, as the only personal defects he displayed was opportunism 
and thoughtlessness.249 In some cases it is not, at least primarily, the individual who 
benefits from the crime, but the collective engaged in it. For example, Haines has 
regarding the armed conflict in Sierra Leone put forward that: “What is clear is that the 
RUF [=Revolutionary United Front] and the government of Sierra Leone were not at war 
with each other over ethnic, racial or religious differences. [...] Many have concluded 
that the civil war in Sierra Leone was actually a struggle over mining concession for 
diamonds.”250 Likewise, for example, the killings of Native peoples in South America 
have been characterized as economically motivated.251 Besides personal/economic gain, 
the desire to obey orders, peer pressure and other social processes that will be discussed 
later on in this chapter may create motivated offenders. 
As regards suitable targets, it is generally recognized that international criminality 
often is characterized by an abnormal perpetrator-victim relationship in which the 
victims are in an especially exposed position. Armed conflicts and persecutory campaigns 
mean that individuals often are driven away from their homes and have to live in refugee 
camps and detention centres where they are especially vulnerable to attacks by potential 
abusers. In situations where armed groups attack civilians, unarmed civilians have little 
possibilities to defend themselves against the attackers.252 
Finally, armed conflicts and totalitarian regimes are also characterized by the lack 
of capable guardians. Most international crimes are committed in situations where the 
State does not act as a guardian in its normal way. Many authors have also noted that 
the bystanders to mass atrocities play a significant role. Staub, for example, has held that 
the passivity of the bystanders allows the perpetrators to see their acting as acceptable 
or even right.253 It is, however, generally recognized that bystanders or “strangers” 
rarely act as guardians in relation to ordinary domestic criminality.254 The abnormal 
withdrawal of State protection and the normal indifference of bystanders thus entail 
that most international crimes are committed in situations of complete lack of capable 
guardians. From the perspective of the routines activity theory, it may be concluded that 
the conditions of armed conflicts appear to be very conducive for criminality.     
In summary, the rational actor theories suggest that international criminality is 
rational, rather than irrational and primordial. This being said, the rationality theories 
may in relation to international criminality overstate the human capabilities to regulate 
249 Arendt 1994 [1963], at 287-288. See also Osiel 2000, at 129-131. 
250 Haines 2003, at 186.
251 See further Alvarez 2001(a), at 101. It should also be noted that in some cases, the bystanders are not 
only bystanders, but also beneficiaries to the crimes. In fact, it has been argued that the high number of 
benefiting bystanders is an explanatory factor to the social support and longstanding survival of certain 
criminal policies. Osiel 2005(a), at 1805.
252 E.g., Markusen 1996, at 81.
253 E. Staub, ‘The Psychology of Bystanders, Perpetrators, and Heroic Helpers’, in L. S. Newman & R. Erber 
(eds.), Understanding Genocide – The Social Psychology of the Holocaust (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002), at 12 and 27. 
254 The traditional bystander reactions of denial, avoidance, passivity and/or indifference have been explained 
with the phenomena of diffusion of responsibility (= if there are many watching, people ask why it should 
be they who intervene), the inability to identify with the victim and the inability to conceive of effective 
intervention. S. Cohen, ‘Human Rights and Crimes of the State: The Culture of Denial’, 26 Australian and 
New Zealand Journal of Criminology (1993), at 104 and 106. 
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their behaviour. An inherent deficit in the rationality theories is namely that they 
downplay the significance of the environment and social processes for human action. 
They also largely disregard individual differences as regards ability to regulate behaviour. 
3.3.  Kinds of People Theories and Theories on the Human Disposition to 
Hostility towards Others
3.3.1.  Generally on Biological/Psychological Theories 
This tendency to explain observed behavior by reference to internal dispositional 
factors while ignoring or minimizing the impact of situational variables has been 
termed the fundamental attribution error (FAE) by my colleague Lee Ross (1977). 
[...] Dispositional analyses are a central operating feature of cultures that are based 
on individualistic rather than collectivist values [...]. Thus, it is individuals who are 
lauded with praise and fame and wealth for achievement and are honored for their 
uniqueness, but it is also individuals who are blamed for the ills of society. Our legal 
[...] systems all are founded on principles of individualism.255
Biological and psychological criminological theories, which explain criminality with 
the biological or psychological characteristics of the criminals, have been nicknamed 
“kinds of people” theories.256 In early times, these theories were largely deterministic, and 
theorists representing this school saw the biological or psychological traits of individuals 
as factors forcing individuals into criminality. Nowadays, biological and psychological 
criminologists are often more cautious and only see the personal characteristics as 
factors that can increase the likelihood of offending. This development is in line with the 
idea that is a false dichotomy that has been created between pitting the person against the 
situation in explaining human behaviour.257 
It is not only the nature of the causal relationship that has been modified over 
the years. Also the biological traits that have been found to have a connection to 
offending have undergone a major change. In the 19th century, abnormalities in the 
physical appearance were searched for and it was sometimes argued that criminals were 
biologically inferior (“atavists”). For example, Franz J. Gall studied bumps on craniums 
and Cesare Lombrose head size, arm length, etc. Today, no one would seriously suggest 
that criminals have these kinds of physical traits in common. The focus in biological 
criminology is instead nowadays on factors such as hormones, nutrition, genes, IQ and 
neurotransmitters. Psychological theories, on the other hand, can roughly be divided 
into psychoanalytic theories and personality theories. In psychoanalytic theories, 
the explanations for offending are searched in disturbances in individuals’ emotional 
development. Personality theories, on their part, argue that certain personality traits (for 
example, impulsiveness and aggressiveness) increase the risk of offending.     
255 P. G. Zimbardo, ‘A Situationist Perspective on the Psychology of Evil – Understanding How Good 
People Are Transformed into Perpetrators’, in A. G. Miller (ed.), Social Psychology of Good and Evil (New 
York: Guilford Press, 2004), at 24-25. 
256 Cf. A. K. Cohen, Deviance and Control (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966), 42. 
257 Newman 2002, at 50.
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3.3.2.  Post-World War II Studies and Criminal Personalities 
After World War II, the idea of the “mad Nazis” was for a while generally accepted.258 
Especially, after an initial autopsy of the deceased defendant Robert Ley revealed a 
brain abnormality, some though that the madness of the Nazis was proven.259 The 
psychological condition of the leading Nazis, was, however, soon given more thorough 
scientific attention. Interestingly, some psychiatrists and psychologists worked at 
the Nuremberg prison, and hence had the possibility to interview and observe the 
former Nazi leaders during a longer period of time. The psychological team included 
Douglas M. Kelley and Gustave Gilbert, who also made some psychological tests 
on the prisoners (including IQ tests and the Rorschach test).260 The results of the 
Nuremberg prison studies have been contradictory.261 Kelley’s conclusion was that 
Nazism could not be explained with madness or special personalities. He noted that 
the Nazi leaders only had in common three characteristics with many other people: 
overweening ambition, low ethical standards and a strongly developed nationalism.262 
Gilbert, on the other hand, divided the leading Nazis into different personality types, 
including ideological fanatics, political opportunists (who could be divided into 
aggressive psychopaths and passive, suggestible conformists), militaristic personalities 
and schizoid personalities. He noted that the different types of personalities reacted/
adapted differently to the prevailing social environment.263 For Gilbert, Hitler, for 
example, was a paranoid psychopath. He also noted that Hitler had had an alcoholic 
and harsh father, and concluded that: “But it is certain that somewhere in the darker 
recesses of Hitler’s libido there lay smoldering ashes of violent, unresolved Oedipal 
conflicts [...]. Thus, [...] we can now see how Hitler resolved his libidinal anxieties, 
his feelings of inferiority, and his ambivalent ego-identifications through absolutely 
rigid, paranoid obsessions and aggressions.”264 More generally, Gilbert explained the 
Holocaust with the “complex interaction of individual personalities, group interests, 
critical events, and broader social forces”.265 
258 See further Waller 2002, at 55-71. Browning has observed that: “In the first decade after the Holocaust, 
attempts at understanding the perpetrators focused for the most part on the questions of individual 
psychological makeup, on the other hand, and a specifically German iniquity, on the other.” C. R. Browning, 
‘Introduction’, in L. S. Newman & R. Erber (eds.), Understanding Genocide – The Social Psychology of the 
Holocaust (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), at 3. 
259 Waller 2002, at 58.
260 Kelley 1947, at viii.
261 See further e.g., Waller 2002, at 58-71.
262 Kelley 1947, at 239. 
263 Gilbert 1950, at 203-204, 219 and 285 (see also 118-119, 154 and 266). 
264 Gilbert 1950, at 18-21, 64 and 283. Also regarding other international criminals has the unhappiness of 
the childhood been noted. E.g., apparently Slobodan Milosevic’s parents and favourite uncle committed 
suicide, and Saddam Husseins’s father and brother died near Hussein’s birth, leaving Hussein’s mother 
too depressed to take care of Hussein when he was an infant. See e.g., Post and Panis 2005, at 824 and 
826, and M. P. Scharf & W. A. Schabas, Slobodan Milosevic – A Companion (New York: Continuum, 
2002), 5. See also Smith, who discusses the possible connection between harsh child-rearing practices 
and aggressive cultures in relation to the Rwanda genocide. D. N. Smith, ‘The Psychocultural Roots of 
Genocide: Legitimacy and Crisis in Rwanda’, 53 American Psychologist (1998), at 751. 
265 Gilbert 1950, at 265.
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Also other psychological studies were conducted in the wake of World War II. For 
example, a book with the title The Authoritarian Personality was published by Theodor 
W. Adorno and his research colleagues in 1950. After studying a group of individuals 
who possessed anti-Semitic attitudes, they came to the conclusion that some individuals 
have a prejudiced personality and are very submissive and obedient to those in power. 
The development of this authoritarian personality was largely explained with strict 
parenting.266 The research results and methodology of this study have been put into 
question.267 The methodological flaws connected to the authoritarian personality 
research partly explain why research focusing on the psychological makeup of the 
international criminals appears to be more or less non-existent today.268 Instead, 
some researchers focus on parts of a personality, such as cognitive style. It has, for 
example, been noted that authoritarians have a tendency to black-or-white thinking 
and display intolerance to ambiguity.269 This makes the authoritarians more prone to, 
for example, erroneous stereotyping. Suedfeld and Schaller, however, emphasize that 
an authoritarian cognitive style does not automatically lead to oppressive attitudes.270 
It has also been suggested that people react differently to drastic social changes, that is, 
that individuals have “hidden” behavioural traits that only become visible due to the 
new life circumstances.271
Today, it is generally held that biological and psychological theories that focus on 
individual abnormalities are at odds with crimes characterized by collective wrongdoing.272 
For example, Webel and Stigliano argue that: “Stalin may have been ‘paranoid’, but the 
genocidal actions of thousands of bureaucrats, police, tortures and prison guards could 
not be explained solely in terms of his mental/brain ‘disease’.”273 It has hence been put 
forward that mass crimes, such as the Holocaust, negate the idea that evil crimes are only 
committed by evil people.274 The concept of evil people is very pejorative and should as 
such be rejected, but it seems clear that the Holocaust affirms that the mass atrocities 
cannot be explained with personality theories alone. Most international crimes are thus 
266 T. W. Adorno et al., The Authoritarian Personality (New York: Harper & Row, 1950), 971. 
267 E.g., P. Suedfeld & M. Schaller, ‘Authoritarianism and the Holocaust – Some Cognitive and Affective 
Implications’, in L. S. Newman & R. Erber (eds.), Understanding Genocide – The Social Psychology of the 
Holocaust (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), at 69, and Waller 2002, at 80-81.
268 Friedrichs has noted that there has been a relatively greater emphasis on personality factors in explaining 
governmental crime than in explaining white collar crime. Friedrichs 1996(b), at 49.
269 Suedfeld & Schaller 2002, at 74.
270 Suedfeld & Schaller 2002, at 75 (see also 86).
271 J. M. Steiner, ‘The Role Margin as the Site for Moral and Social Intelligence: The Case of Germany and 
National Socialism’, 34 Crime, Law & Social Change (2000), at 69. 
272 E.g., Alvarez 2001(a), at 7, and C. Webel & T. Stigliano, ‘Are We ‘Beyond Good and Evil’? Radical 
Psychological Materialism and the ‘Cure’ for Evil’, 14 Theory & Psychology (2004), at 95. 
273 Webel & Stigliano 2004, at 95.
274 R. H. Burke, An Introduction to Criminological Theory (Cullompton: Willan Publishing, 2001), 
75. Aschheim notes how the idea of “evil” after the September 11 terrorist attacks has again become 
topical, and he asks whether “Osama Bin Laden and al-Qaeda and the new ‘axis of evil’ (Iraq, Iran and 
North Korea) [will] usurp the more home-grown twentieth-century forms of the Gulag and the death 
camps.” S. E. Aschheim, ‘Imaging the Absolute: Mapping Western Conceptions of Evil’, in H. Dubiel 
& G. Motzkin (eds.), The Lesser Evil: Moral Approaches to Genocide Practices (London: Routledge, 
2004), at 80. 
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committed by persons who are biologically and psychologically normal.275 This does not, 
however, mean that perpetrators cannot have particular biological or psychological traits 
that partly explain their individual offending (such as impulsiveness and aggressiveness).276 
As noted above, international crimes often have different types of participants and it does 
not seem impossible to hypothesize that some individuals participating in the crimes as 
hands-on criminals may be characterized by similar biological/psychological traits as 
individuals committing ordinary violent crimes. International and ordinary domestic 
crimes, for example, have in common that they often are committed by young, male 
persons.277 Alcohol and drug abuse is further common among certain sub-groups of 
international criminals,278 as it is in connection to certain ordinary crimes. Biological 
or psychological explanations may thus shed some light on why certain types of people 
participate in collective crimes. In connection to individual offenders, the question of 
whether they have suffered from insanity or diminished mental capacity may also be 
relevant.279 The personality trait theories can, however, not explain the crimes as a social 
phenomenon or the criminal behaviour of masses. 
3.3.3.  Human Nature Theories
Due to the scientific problems associated with personality theories, the focus of 
biological/psychological theories is today usually on human nature, rather than on 
individual abnormalities, with regard to international crimes.280 For example, Brannigan, 
with reference to amongst others Matt Ridley’s thoughts, argues that:  
Whereas Lombroso’s Darwinism was reductionistic, the new evolutionary psychology 
presupposes a theory of action, that is, human decision making is based on choices, 
moral conflicts, and dilemmas – not mechanical causation or reflex action. However, 
the “appetites” are not socially constructed [...]. But how does this illuminate the 
question of genocide? There is persuasive evidence that the human species exhibits 
275 E.g., D. Frey & H. Rez, ‘Population and Perpetrators – Preconditions for the Holocaust from a Control-
Theoretical Perspective’, in L. S. Newman & R. Erber (eds.), Understanding Genocide: The Social Psychology 
of the Holocaust (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), at 208, Katz 1993, at 35, and Waller 2002, at 18. 
Charny has, however, argued that it from the point of view of the legitimacy of psychology is problematic 
if participation in mass atrocities is not characterized as abnormal. More specifically he finds that even 
though mass atrocities often are committed by “everyday human beings”, the behaviour as such should be 
characterized as pathological or disturbed. I. W. Charny, ‘Genocide and Mass Destruction: Doing Harm to 
Others as a Missing Dimension in Psychopathology’, 49 Psychiatry (1986), at 144 and 148.
276 Similarly Waller 2002, at 123. See also Steiner who has argued that individuals differ with respect to 
their “social and moral intelligence,” which affects how they adapt to social changes and, e.g., behave in 
totalitarian societies. Steiner 2000, at 62, 64 and 67.
277 Cf. J. Young, ‘Merton with Energy, Katz with Structure: The Sociology of Vindictiveness and the 
Criminology of Transgression’, 7 Theoretical Criminology (2003), at 392.
278 E.g., Alvarez 2001(a), at 13 and 24, and Greenberg Research Inc. 2000, at 35-36. 
279 See e.g., M. Soyka, ‘Psychiatrische Begutachtung von Angeklagten für das “United Nations International 
Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian 
Law Committed in the Former Yugoslavia” (ICTY)’, 70 Fortschritte der Neurologie – Psychiatrie (2002), at 
84-87.  
280 Also in philosophy and theology has the question of whether human beings have a natural inclination 
to be good and/or bad been much debated. On this discussion, see further e.g., Waller 2002, at 136-138.
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xenophobia and, like chimpanzees, practices murderous competition and out-group 
exclusion. [...] The coalitionist or “tribal” instinct is at the core of human nature. We 
cooperate to compete. But the dark side of this sociability is group prejudice and an 
intolerance for out-groups.281 
In summary, the evolution of sociability, altruism, and the instincts for coalitions goes 
hand in hand with hostility to outsiders. [...] [T]his does not mean there is a gene for 
genocide. But genocide thrives through a combination of cultural animosities, forces 
that are proximal, and our instinctual legacy of groupishness, forces that are distal.282 
Likewise, Waller regards evolutionary psychology as relevant and believes that there are 
three innate, evolution-produced tendencies of human nature that can partly explain the 
human capacity for extraordinary evil, namely ethnocentrism, xenophobia, and the desire 
for social dominance.283 Here, it should, however, be noted that a human disposition to be 
suspicious towards people belonging to another group does not necessarily mean that the 
outcome must be racism or genocides. Inter-group resentment may take many different 
forms. Bauman, for example, distinguishes between heterophobia, constant enmity and 
racism. He finds heterophobia to be a “manifestation of a still wider phenomenon of anxiety 
aroused by the feeling that one has no control over the situation” which can be found more 
or less everywhere, whereas constant enmity is a “more specific antagonism generated by 
the human practices of identity-seeking and boundary-drawing.” Racism, on the other 
hand, is something that is “in the service of the construction of an artificial social order” 
and which is characterized by a declaration that “a certain category of people endemically 
and hopelessly resistant to control and immune to all efforts at amelioration” with the 
consequence that they should be removed or destroyed.284 In other words, the fact that 
people may have a disposition to, for example, ethnocentrism does not mean that bias 
crimes, such as genocide, come from “inside”. Evolutionary psychology, however, explains 
why propaganda and ethnic agitation can be so effective. 
Another viewpoint having as its starting-point human nature is that by Staub who 
stresses basic human needs. Staub argues that needs for security and for control over one’s 
life are examples basic human needs, that when frustrated may lead to one group in society 
turning against another.285 Difficult life conditions are therefore, according to him, often 
the starting-point for mass atrocities.286 He also notes that finding scapegoats and ideologies 
are typical destructive reactions to difficult life conditions threatening basic needs.287 
281 Brannigan 1998, at 270-271. See also Waller 2002, at 145-168 on evolutionary psychology.
282 Brannigan 1998, at 272 (containing a reference to Gould).
283 Waller 2002, at 153. He defines ethnocentrism as the inclination to focus on one’s own group as the 
right one and xenophobia as the tendency to fear outsiders or strangers. Ibid., at 154-155. See also J. E. 
Waller, ‘The Ordinariness of Extraordinary Evil: The Making of Perpetrators of Collective Violence’, in 
A. Smeulers (ed.), Collective Violence and International Criminal Justice: An Interdisciplinary Approach 
(Antwerp: Intersentia, 2010), at 23-25.
284 Bauman 1989, at 64-65 (italics omitted). 
285 Staub 2002, at 13.
286 Staub 2002, at 13. Staub, however, notes that sometimes mass killings instead start from self-interests, such 
as land interests. E. Staub, ‘Predicting Collective Violence: The Psychological and Cultural Roots of Turning 
against Others’, in C. Summers & E. Markusen (eds.), Collective Violence – Harmful Behavior in Groups and 
Governments (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1999), at 199. 
287 Staub 2002, at 18-19.
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Theories focusing on human nature/needs have been found to have a little 
explanatory power in connection to international crimes in that the theories do not 
explain why international crimes occur in certain societies, but not in all. As such, most 
find that these theories must be complemented with other theories that explain how the 
typical human features become relevant for offending. 
In summary, the relationship between biological/psychological factors and 
offending is very indirect.288 Waller has, in this regard, emphasized that one should not 
mistake enablement for causation.289
3.4.  Social Pathology: Sociological Theories and International Crimes
3.4.1.  Introduction
What kind of people are able to hack women and children to death while ignoring 
their pleas and agony? [...] More disturbingly, might we ourselves be capable of such 
deeds?290 
Sociological theories can be defined as theories that argue that the social environment 
shapes human behaviour. The theories have a positivist element in that they regard 
behaviour as determined by factors beyond the individual’s control.291 The most famous 
theories of this kind are the social disorganization theory, the anomie/strain theories and 
the subculture theories. 
The social disorganization theory is also known as the Chicago school of human 
ecology. The most known representatives of this school were Clifford R. Shaw and Henry 
McKay, who in the 1930s divided Chicago into different “concentric circles” and noted 
that certain areas have higher crime rates than others. Most notably, they observed 
that criminality was high in so-called zones in transition. A central idea in the theory, 
which largely is borrowed from Émile Durkheim, is that rapid social change leads to a 
breakdown of social rules and norms, that is, to so-called anomie.292 
In contrast to the human ecology theory, which aims at explaining why more crimes 
are committed in certain geographical areas, strain and subculture theorists study the 
social structure of whole societies.293 In Robert K. Merton’s anomie theory criminality is 
explained by the strain or pressure that the impossibility to reach culturally valued things 
by legitimate means causes.294 Criminality is hence seen as an adaptation to a social 
pressure to be successful. Robert Agnew has developed Merton’s theory by, among other 
things, identifying other types of stress than the impossibility to reach the “American 
288 Cf. attempts to explain rape with male biology, and the fact that rape rates vary considerably from 
society to society.
289 Waller 2002, at 163. 
290 Alvarez 2001(a), at 110.
291 G. B. Vold, T. J. Bernard & J. B. Snipes, Theoretical Criminology, 5th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002), 9.
292 C. R. Shaw & H. D. McKay, Juvenile Delinquency and Urban Areas, rev. ed. (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1969 [1942]). 
293 Einstadter & Henry 1995, at 145.
294 R. K. Merton, ‘Social Structure and Anomie’, 3 American Sociological Review (1938), at 672-682.
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dream” which produce criminality. He notes that individuals do not only “seek certain 
goals, they also try to avoid painful or aversive situations.”295 Finally, Richard A. Cloward 
and Lloyd E. Ohlin have put forward a differential opportunity theory. The central idea in 
their theory is that there may be differentials in access to success-goals in both legitimate 
and illegitimate opportunity structures.296 In certain areas delinquent subcultures arise 
and criminal behaviour becomes an available option.297    
In Albert K. Cohen’s delinquent subculture theory, the idea that all people share 
the same social goals is put in question. Cohen on his part argues that the impossibility 
of all individuals to reach the dominant goals leads to the emergence of subcultures 
with reachable goals. This can according to Cohen explain so-called purposeless crime, 
such as vandalizing.298 In the same way as Cohen, Walter Miller has stressed that certain 
groups in society have their own culture. In his theory of the focal concerns of lower-
class culture, Miller argues that representatives of the lower-class value highly qualities, 
such as toughness and smartness.299 
3.4.2.  Social Pathology and International Crimes
Many international crimes are committed in abnormal social circumstances, such as 
armed conflicts and totalitarian regimes. Some authors have emphasized this fact, and 
have stressed the relationship between the structure of the society and the criminality. 
A famous representative of the sociological way of thinking is R. J.  Rummel who has 
argued that mass killing by government is less likely in democracies.300 According to 
him, an explanation to this is that in democracies there are checks and balances on the 
use of power and that in democratic cultures compromises, negotiation and tolerance are 
promoted.301 A crucial problem in non-democratic societies is, according to Rummel, 
the concentration of power. In this context, he notes that: “Power kills; absolute Power 
kills absolutely.”302 He also argues that in non-democratic societies, the society is often 
converted into a hierarchical, task-oriented organization, where the members are divided 
into those who command and those who obey.303 In these types of societies the use of 
violence is much more likely. 
A different perspective on how social structure affects the possibilities of 
grave atrocities is presented by Bauman. His central thesis is the link between the 
modernity and the Holocaust. The modern civilization was for Bauman a necessary, 
295 R. Agnew, ‘A Revised Strain Theory of Delinquency’, 64 Social Forces (1985), at 154. Agnew has also in 
later research emphasized the effect of personality traits on reactions to strain. E.g., R. Agnew, T. Brezina, 
J. P. Wright & F. T. Cullen, ‘Strain, Personality Traits, and Delinquency: Extending General Strain Theory’, 
40 Criminology (2002), at 43-71.  
296 R. A. Cloward & L. E. Ohlin, Delinquency and Opportunity – A Theory of Delinquent Gangs (Illinois: The 
Free Press of Glencoe, 1960) 150-151.  
297 Cloward & Ohlin 1960, at 28 and 153. 
298 A. K. Cohen, Delinquent Boys: The Culture of the Gang (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1955) 65-67. 
299 W. B. Miller, ‘Lower Class Subculture as a Generating Milieu of Gang Delinquency’, 14 Journal of Social 
Issues (1958), at 5-19. 
300 Rummel 1997, at 3 and 6. 
301 Rummel 1997, at 6, 8, and 101.
302 Rummel 1997, at 9.
303 Rummel 1997, at 7 and 200. 
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albeit not sufficient, condition for the Holocaust.304 Modern societies can create a 
moral indifference through mechanisms, such as authorization, routinization, and 
dehumanization. In a similar way as a higher living standard makes ordinary property 
crimes more likely, a modern lifestyle makes genocide more likely. Alvarez has, in this 
regard, pointed out that Norbert Elias’ argument that the civilizing process has made 
violence in modern societies less prevalent is challenged by the high level of violence 
in modern armed conflicts and genocides.305 
It is also usual to stress the lack of norms or anomie prevailing in societies engaged 
in armed conflicts, and the effect this has on human behaviour.306 More specifically, it 
has been argued that social conditions that frustrate basic psychological needs make 
violence more likely.307 In armed conflicts, it is not only international crimes that are 
committed, but also numerous ordinary crimes.308 The over-criminalization of societies 
engaged in armed conflicts, has not only been explained with anomie theories. Also very 
concrete features in these societies, such as the availability of weapons, have been noted 
to partly explain increases in crime.309
It has also been put forward that in armed conflicts and dictatorships there emerge 
cultures of cruelty, that is, types of subcultures that diverge from “normal cultures” 
in that they reward individuals for acts of cruelty.310 In this vein, Waller notes that: 
“Perpetrators create, and are created by, a culture of cruelty that helps them initiate, 
sustain, and cope with their extraordinary evil.”311 In cultures of violence, socially 
construed symbols and messages thus help participants to accommodate themselves 
304 Bauman 1989, at 13. For interpretations of Bauman’s thinking, see e.g., Browning 1998, at 167, N. 
Christie, Crime Control as Industry – Towards Gulags, Western Style, 3rd ed. (London: Routledge, 2000), at 
179-181, and D. Hirsh, Law against Genocide: Cosmopolitan Trials (London: The GlassHouse Press, 2003), 
at xvi and 24-31. Significantly, Bauman does not describe the German society as abnormal, but as modern. 
Christie divides the explanations given to the Holocaust extermination camps into three ways, i.e., the first 
wave explaining the camps with abnormal minds, the second wave explaining the camps with a deviant 
social system, and the third wave explaining the camps with the prevailing type of social organization. 
Christie 2000, at 177-178.
305 Alvarez 2001(a), at 32-33.  
306 “Durkheim (1992) and Sorokin (1944) both insist that war (and revolution) inevitably usher in a state 
of social disorganization and normlessness. [...] It could be argued, however, that some wars [...] may 
usher in a state of hyper-discipline [...].” Jamieson 1998, at 482. See also Alvarez, who discusses anomie in 
connection to genocide. Alvarez 2010, at 38-39. 
307 E. Staub, ‘Notes on Cultures of Violence, Cultures of Caring and Peace, and the Fulfillment of Basic 
Human Needs’, 24 Political Psychology (2003), at 1. Likewise, Steiner has noted that societies where broad 
segments of the population are discontent are more susceptible to charismatic demagogues. This may 
result in persecutions, genocide, etc. Steiner 2000, at 66.
308 See further Section 2.2. 
309 Nikolić-Ristanović 1998, at 475-476.
310 E.g., Katz 1993, at 31, 86 and 89, and Waller 2002, at 203. The idea of subcultures is connected to the 
idea of various organizational cultures. Shover and Hochstetler note that the concept of “organizational 
culture” is over 50 years old. It has been mainly used to explain differences between organizations in 
financial performance, but also to explain organizational crime. A shortcoming in organizational culture 
research is, however, according to Shover and Hochstetler the failure to explore the effects of hierarchy and 
agency as constraints on culture. N. Shover & A. Hochstetler, ‘Cultural Explanation and Organizational 
Crime’, 37 Crime, Law and Social Change (2002), at 4-6.
311 Waller 2002, at 203.
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to, for example, killing.312 In these cultures characteristics such as braveness and 
toughness can be highly evaluated and a decision not to participate in the criminal 
activity can be questioned. It has also been suggested that the “normal” culture in 
armed conflicts becomes twisted and certain aspects of the culture become emphasized. 
Rapes in armed conflicts have, for example, been characterized as “culturally rooted 
contempt for women that is lived out in times of crisis.”313 Even more generally, it 
has been suggested that in certain nations or societies there exists certain cultures, 
which at least partly explain mass atrocities.314 The Holocaust has, for example, been 
explained through the exceptionalism of German history and the German traditions of 
militarism, authoritarianism, and anti-Semitism.315 Other authors have differentiated 
between cultures that emphasize individual interests and cultures that emphasize 
collective interests, and have argued that there is a link between individually based 
democratic values and reduced risk of inter-group violence.316 More generally, Staub 
has argued that a cultural devaluation of a group, respect for authority, a monolithic 
culture, certain cultural self-concepts (for example, a belief in cultural superiority), 
unhealed wounds due to past victimization and a history of aggressiveness often 
characterize societies where mass atrocities are committed.317
In summary, of the criminological theories, the sociological theories are those that 
most readily recognize the criminogenic effect of abnormal societies. A problematic 
question for these theories is, however, why the environment does not affect all people 
in the same way. The theories also view humans as very passive. In contrast to the 
sociological theories, social process theories recognize that people do not only react to 
situations, but also influence them.318 
312 Alvarez 1997, at 151.
313 R. Seifert, ‘War and Rape: A Preliminary Analysis’, in A. Stiglmayer (ed.), Mass Rape: The War against 
Women in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1994), at 65. MacKinnon has in a 
similar vein argued that: “The rapes in the Serbian war of aggression against Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia 
are to everyday rape what the Holocaust was to everyday anti-Semitism: both like it and not like it at all, both 
continuous with it and a whole new departure, a unique atrocity yet also a pinnacle moment in something 
that goes on all the time.” C. A. MacKinnon, ‘Turning Rape into Pornography: Postmodern Genocide’, in A. 
Stiglmayer (ed.), Mass Rape: The War against Women in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Lincoln: University of Nebraska 
Press, 1994), at 74.
314 See Waller 2002, at 36-49. Staub argues that there are different types of “cultures of violence”. The culture 
of violence that prevails in the United States, e.g., entails a high level of interpersonal violence. The risk 
of genocide, on the other hand, is, according to Staub, insignificant in the United States. Staub 2003, at 6.
315 See e.g., Goldhagen 1997, at 479-480.
316 D. Oyserman & A. Lauffer, ‘Examining the Implications of Cultural Frames on Social Movements and 
Group Action’, in L. S. Newman & R. Erber (eds.), Understanding Genocide – The Social Psychology of the 
Holocaust (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), at 162-163.
317 Staub 2002, at 15-18. 
318 The theories, however, diverge in how active a role they think individuals have in shaping their own 
lives. According to Einstadter and Henry learning, neutralization and control theories see individuals as 
rather passive actors, whereas the labelling theory views humans as active agents. Einstadter & Henry 
1995, at 197. 
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3.5.  Social Process Theories on Criminality
3.5.1.  Introduction 
[W]e can demystify evil. No alien powers are at work in evil, merely human beings 
responding to the context in which they find themselves and making decisions on 
their own.319
Social process theories are characterized by their focus on the socio-psychological 
processes that develop over time in the course of social interaction.320 The theories can 
be divided into: (1) learning theories, (2) neutralization theories; (3) control theories; 
and (4) labelling theories.321 In learning theories, attention is paid to the relationship 
between normal learning and criminal behaviour. An early representative of the 
learning school in criminology was Gabriel Tarde who put forward the so-called laws of 
imitation.322 The most famous and influential theories are, however, Edwin Sutherland’s 
differential association theory and Ronald Akers’ social learning theory. Sutherland’s 
differential association theory (1939/1947) argues that criminal behaviour is learned 
behaviour and that the principal part of learning occurs within inmate personal groups. 
The learned matters include techniques for committing crimes, motives, rationalizations 
and attitudes. Crimes are, according to this theory, committed when the association 
with criminal tendencies becomes stronger than the association with non-criminal 
tendencies.323 In Akers’ social learning theory the focus is placed on the mechanisms 
of learning, and the theory differentiates between differential association, definitions, 
differential reinforcement and imitation.324 Akers has himself defined the concepts as 
follows: 
Differential association refers to the process whereby one is exposed to normative 
definitions favorable or unfavorable to illegal or law-abiding behavior. [...] Definitions 
are one’s own attitudes or meanings that one attaches to given behavior. [...] Some of 
the definitions favorable to deviance are so intensely held that they almost “require” 
one to violate the law. For instance, the radical ideologies of revolutionary groups 
provide strong motivation for terrorist acts [...]. Differential reinforcement refers 
to the balance of anticipated or actual rewards and punishments that follow or are 
consequences of behavior. [...] Imitation refers to the engagement in behavior after 
the observation of similar behavior in others. 325
319 Katz 1993, at 126.
320 Einstadter & Henry 1995, at 175.
321 Einstadter & Henry 1995, at 176-177 and 197.
322 G. Tarde, Les lois de l’imitation : étude sociologique (Paris : Alcan et Réunies, 1911). 
323 Sutherland 1947 [1939], at 6-7. Tindale et al. have noted that according to the dynamic social impact 
theory, the impact that others have on a person’s attitudes, beliefs, preferences, and so on is determined 
by the strength (e.g., status, expertise), immediacy (closeness in terms of physical or social distance), and 
number of influence sources. R. S. Tindale, C. Munier, M. Wasserman & C. M. Smith, ‘Group Processes 
and the Holocaust’, in L. S. Newman & R. Erber (eds.), Understanding Genocide – The Social Psychology of 
the Holocaust (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), at 151. 
324 The theory was first put forward in an article co-written with Robert L. Burgess. R. L. Burgess & R. L. Akers, 
‘A Differential Association-Reinforcement Theory of Criminal Behavior’, 14 Social Problems (1966), at 128-147. 
325 Akers 2000, at 76-79.
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The neutralization theory, on the other hand, has as its starting-point that people 
are socialized into non-criminal, conventional behaviour, that is, that also criminal 
individuals share the dominant value system of society. The theory therefore focuses 
on the learning of so-called techniques of neutralization that allow people to commit 
crimes without moral qualms.326 The concept of neutralization is clarified by Alvarez, 
who notes that techniques of neutralization are not rationalizations as: “Rationalizations 
are attempts to ease one’s conscience after the fact, whereas these techniques, used prior 
to the behavior, make it possible to engage in otherwise unacceptable activities.”327 The 
idea of neutralization techniques is often connected to Gresham M. Sykes and David 
Matza. They identified five techniques of neutralization that allow individuals to engage 
in criminal behaviour: denial of responsibility, denial of injury, denial of the victim, 
condemnation of the condemners and appeal to higher loyalties.328 
A completely different view on the socialization process is presented by the control 
theories or social bonding theories. In these theories, the central question is why 
individuals do not commit crimes. In the 1950s/1960s, Alber J. Reiss and F. Ivan Nye 
introduced the difference between internal control (socialization) and external control 
(rewards/punishments), and Walter Reckless a theory of inner and outer containment, 
and pushes and pulls towards delinquency.329 The most famous control theory is, however, 
that by Travis Hirschi, in which the main argument is that individuals with a weak bond 
to society commit crimes and four different types of bonds to society are identified (that 
is, attachment to parents, peers and school, commitment to conventional lines of action, 
involvement in conventional activities and belief in common values).330 In the 1990s, 
Hirschi and Gottfredson put forward the idea that the main factor explaining criminality 
is bad self-control.331 
Finally, according to social interactionism “an individual’s identity and self-concept, 
cognitive processes, values, and attitudes are seen as existing only in the context of society 
acting, reacting, and changing in social interaction with others.”332 In criminology, the 
labelling theory has seized upon this standpoint, and views stigmatizing labels, such 
as “a criminal”, as an independent variable that causes criminality. Individuals who are 
326 Einstadter & Henry 1995, at 178.
327 Alvarez 1997, at 153. Newman notes that the recontextualization of behaviour can reduce dissonance, 
that is, the discrepancy between one’s behaviour, and attitudes and beliefs. Newman 2002, at 56. 
328 G. M. Sykes & D. Matza, ‘Techniques of Neutralization: A Theory of Delinquency’, 22 American 
Sociological Review (1957), at 667-669. Maruna and Copes note the connection between the neutralization 
techniques and Freudian ego psychology, that is, the idea of defence mechanisms that defend the integrity 
of the ego when internal and external events occur that violate the preferred view of the self (e.g., denial 
and projection). S. Maruna & H. Copes, ‘What Have We Learned from Five Decades of Neutralization 
Research?,’ 32 Crime and Justice (2005), at 236. 
329 See further e.g., A. J. Reiss, ‘Delinquency as the Failure of Personal and Social Controls’, 16 American 
Sociological Review (1951), at 196-207, F. I. Nye, Family Relationships and Delinquent Behavior (New York: 
John Wiley & Sons, 1958), and F. E. Hagan, Introduction to Criminology: Theories, Methods, and Criminal 
Behaviour, 7th ed. (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2011), 164 (referring to Reckless).
330 T. Hirschi, Causes of Delinquency (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969).
331 T. Hirschi & M. Gottfredson, ‘Rethinking the Juvenile Justice System’, 39 Crime & Delinquency (1993), 
at 263. 
332 Akers 2000, at 122 (referring to Ritzer).
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labelled as criminals are hence likely to develop a criminal self-identity and may become 
more criminal than they were before the labelling.333  
3.5.2.  Social Process Theories and International Criminality
The idea of armed conflicts as “schools of crime”, in which criminal behaviour is 
learnt, has a clear connection to learning theories in criminology.334 It has also been 
put forward that aggression at least partly is a learned behaviour and that armies 
function as institutions where individuals learn the techniques and justifications for 
using violence.335 More often international crimes are, however, addressed through 
the neutralization theories. An author who has explicitly used Sykes and Matza’s 
neutralization theory to the Holocaust is Alvarez.336 More concretely, he suggests 
that most of the neutralization techniques identified by Sykes and Matza can be used 
to explain the Holocaust and puts himself forward a further, sixth neutralization 
technique, viz. denial of humanity.337 Regarding the neutralization technique of 
denial of responsibility, Alvarez notes that the use of this technique “is evident in the 
argument of many perpetrators that they were only following orders.”338 Denial of 
injury, on the other hand, could according to Alvarez be achieved through the use of 
sterile and technical language (for example, calling killing treatment)339 and denial of 
victims by claiming that the victims themselves could be blamed for their victimization 
(for example, claiming that the attacks were self-defence).340 The denial of victims is 
often the result of so-called othering, that is, a process in which enemies artificially are 
created.341 The technique of condemning of the condemners was not so much resorted 
to as, Alvarez notes, there was not much external condemnation at the time.342 Finally, 
appeal to higher loyalties was achieved by “portraying the Jews as a serious threat to the 
German people” as this “made it possible for the perpetrators who helped bring about 
the Final Solution to assert they were doing so for their people and their country.”343 
333 Akers 2000, at 123.
334 Jamieson 1998, at 484-485 (referring to authors having this view), and Nikolić-Ristanović 1998, at 475-
476.
335 Smeulers & Grünfeld 2011, at 205 (referring to Bandura and Berkowitz) and 268-282. 
336 Alvarez 1997, at 139 ff., and Alvarez 2001(a), at 112 ff. Cohen has regarding the application of the 
neutralization theory to international atrocities noted that: “For Sykes and Matza’s point was precisely that 
delinquents are not “political” in the sense implied by the subcultural theory [...]. But exactly the same 
techniques appear in the manifestly political discourse of human rights violations”. Cohen 1993, at 107.
337 Alvarez 1997, at 166.
338 Alvarez 1997, at 158-159. See also Alvarez 2001(a), at 115-117. 
339 Alvarez 1997, at 160-162. See also Alvarez 2001(a), at 117-120.
340 Alvarez 1997, at 162. See also Alvarez 2001(a), at 120-123.
341 “[A] process of othering [...] involves the two components of a feeling of economic injustice (relative 
deprivation of some sort) and feelings of ontological insecurity. Thus, in order to create a ‘good enemy’ we 
must be able to convince ourselves that: (1) they are the cause of a large part of our problems; (2) they are 
intrinsically different from us-inherently evil, intrinsically wicked, etc. [...] It goes without saying that such 
a process of essentialization occurs not only domestically [...], but also in terms of the dramatization of evil 
between, say, the First World and its terrorists.” Young 2003, at 400.
342 Alvarez 1997, at 164-165. See also Alvarez 2001(a), at 123-124.
343 Alvarez 1997, at 165. See also Alvarez 2001(a), at 124-125.
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The sixth neutralization technique Alvarez identifies is denial of humanity, and he 
notes that dehumanization both preceded and accompanied killings.344 Alvarez is not 
alone in arguing that dehumanization has a great explanatory power in relation to 
mass atrocities. For example, Staub argues that devaluing and scapegoating of others is 
common in ethnic and group conflicts.345 
Alvarez is not the only one who has found the neutralization theory to be 
useful when trying to understand how international criminality can occur. Also, for 
example, Herbert Jäger has analyzed international criminality with reference to the 
various neutralization techniques.346 Furthermore, there are many other theories on 
international criminality that identify similar processes as the neutralization theory. 
For example, Herbert C. Kelman and V. Lee Hamilton identify three elements typical 
for what they call crimes of obedience, viz. (1) authorization, (2) routinization; and 
(3) dehumanization.347 Psychologist Albert Bandura has in his research identified 
practices through which harmful conduct is cognitively restructured so that it becomes 
possible for people who are socialized into human behaviour. He notes that through 
moral justification reprehensible conduct is made personally acceptable “by portraying 
it as serving socially worthy or moral purposes.”348 Furthermore, Bandura argues that 
euphemistic labelling is used to “make harmful conduct respectable and to reduce 
personal responsibility for it.”349 Finally, exonerating comparisons, often based on flawed 
information on the adversary’s behaviour, make the own behaviour seem acceptable.350 
According to Bandura, the reconstruction of the conduct so that it does not appear 
as immoral is, however, only one element in a larger disengagement process making 
atrocities possible. Displacement and diffusion of responsibility, disregard or distortion 
of consequences, and dehumanization of the victims are, according to him, other central 
processes.351 Also Möller has noted that political or military goals, collective interests, 
etc., that is, higher supra-individual goals, often are used to justify action both before 
and after it, that a desensibilization (Desensibilisierungsprozess) or “blunting” process 
(Abstumpfungsprozess) often precedes international criminality and that the creation of a 
special distant offender-victim relationship often is a precondition for the criminality.352 
Somewhat similar to neutralization thinking is also the doubling theory of Robert Jay 
Lifton, which argues that individuals in the “service of social madness” develop a second 
344 Alvarez 1997, at 166. See also Alvarez 2001(a), at 125-128.
345 Staub 1999, at 196. 
346 Jäger 1989, at 187 ff. 
347 Kelman & Hamilton 1989, at 16-19, and Kelman 2005, at 131. 
348 A. Bandura, ‘Moral Disengagement in the Perpetration of Inhumanities’, 3 Personality and Social 
Psychology Review (1999), at 194.
349 Bandura 1999, at 195.
350 Bandura 1999, at 195-196.
351 Bandura 1999, at 194 and 196 ff. With displacement of responsibility Bandura refers to arguments 
made that the behaviour was dictated by the authorities. Diffusion of responsibility, on the other hand, 
can occur due to division of labour, collective action, etc. Ibid., at 196 and 198. See also A. Bandura, B. 
Underwood & M. E. Fromson, ‘Disinhibition of Aggression through Diffusion of Responsibility and 
Dehumanization of Victims’, 9 Journal of Research in Personality (1975), at 253-269. 
352 See further Möller 2003, at 267-271. 
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self which allows them to remain sane, that is, that a type of psychological dissociation 
takes place.353  
The ideas of the control theories have not really been used to analyze crimes of 
international concern. A reason for this is probably that some underlying presumptions 
of the theories (such as that a strong bound to society means that a person is less likely 
to offend) do not correspond well with the reality of international crimes. Some scholars 
have, however, investigated the question of why certain individuals have not participated 
in international criminality. For example, Fogelman, who has conducted an interview 
research on the rescuers of Jews during the Holocaust. With reference to Lifton’s different 
self theory, she argues that the rescuers developed a different self which made it possible 
for them to continue to counteract the Nazi regime.354 She also notices that the rescuers 
often had a childhood characterized by love, nurturance, and tolerance for different 
people.355 
Finally, the labelling theory is also a theory that has seldom been used to analyze 
international criminality.356 A reason for this may be that international criminals are 
often not viewed as criminals by their environment. The international criminals do 
hence not necessarily have a criminal self-image,357 and the idea that the criminal label 
would lead to more criminal behaviour does not seem to fit.  
3.5.3.  Processes Often Present in International Criminality 
Organizations such as those involved in the Nazi death camps have not one but two 
outputs. They produce not only death, but individuals who become autonomously 
capable of and committed to producing other deaths.358
In many social process theories on international crimes, distancing, bureacratization, 
routinization, brutalization and dehumanization are mentioned. Many scholars regard 
these processes as those that have the greatest explanatory power in connection to 
international criminality and they will therefore be considered in greater detail here. 
353 R. J. Lifton, The Nazi Doctors: Medical Killing and the Psychology of Genocide (New York: Basic Books, 
1986) 418-419. See also R. J. Lifton & E. Markusen, The Genocidal Mentality: Nazi Holocaust and Nuclear 
Threat (New York: Basic Books, 1990), at 193 ff. Lifton’s idea of a “doubled personality” has, however, not 
convinced all. See e.g., Darley 1992, at 209. See also Alvarez 1997, at 147, and Waller 2002, at 113-120. 
A distinction may be made between divided self-conceptions (e.g., Lifton) and unitary self-conceptions. 
According to unitary self theories the self is altered due to social forces, whereas divided-self theories assert 
that an alternative self can be created due to social forces. Waller has noted that according to “contemporary 
social psychology [...] people tend toward integration (i.e., unitary self).” J. E. Waller, ‘Perpetrators of the 
Holocaust: Divided and Unitary Self Conceptions of Evildoing’, 10 Holocaust and Genocide Studies (1996), 
at 11, 14 and 16.
354 E. Fogelman, ‘Victims, Perpetrators, Bystanders, and Rescuers in the Face of Genocide and Its Aftermath’, 
in C. B. Strozier & M. Flynn (eds.), Genocide, War, and Human Survival (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, 1996), at 88-90.
355 Fogelman 1996, at 95.
356 Neubacher has, however, used the labelling theory to discuss the international criminalization process. 
Neubacher 2005, at 176 ff.  
357 Cf. Alvarez 2001(a), at 105.
358 Darley 1992, at 216. 
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Distancing has been defined as the psychological and/or physical separation 
of participants and victims in, for example, genocides.359 The effect of distancing can 
be achieved in many different ways. For example, the victims may be dehumanized 
(psychological distancing) or made impersonal through the use of long-distance weapons 
(physical distancing).360 The psychological rationale behind distancing is that it is easier 
to harm others, when those victimized are unknown, depersonalized or dehumanized. 
In relation to this Bauman has argued that: “The increase in the [...] distance between 
the act and its consequences achieves more than the suspension of moral inhibitions; 
it quashes the moral significance of the act and thereby pre-empts all conflict between 
personal standard of moral decency and immorality of the social consequences of the 
act.”361 Bureaucratization, routinization and dehumanization are all processes that can 
result in distancing. 
The role of bureaucratization in connection to international criminality has been 
considered especially in relation to the Holocaust.362 Bureaucracies are often pictured as 
“world[s] of operations without consequences, information without knowledge” and it 
has been held that in bureaucracies people become “mindless perpetrators doing what 
they are ordered to do and expected to do without being personally involved, committed, 
or aware of the terrifying destruction they are executing.”363 In bureaucracies, the division 
of labour makes it easy to overlook the horrors that the bureaucracy as a whole produces. 
Scholars, however, diverge in the extent to which they see international criminals 
as “innocent cogs” in bureaucratic machineries. For some, the bureaucratic nature of 
the criminality can almost exclude meaningful criminal responsibility. Arendt has, for 
example, famously noted the problem of punishing persons who do not appear to have 
intent to do wrong.364 For others, the ignorance of the bureaucrats is rather seen as a 
sign of conscious choice to disregard the reality.365 For those believing that individuals 
maintain a possibility to affect their behaviour in bureaucracies, the idea that bureaucratic 
organizations have two “components” is of special significance. In the following passage, 
Katz describes these components and analyzes Arendt’s description of Auschwitz:  
One component is a system of control, which coexists with the other component, 
a system of autonomy. Traditional descriptions of bureaucracies concentrated on 
controls. [...] In such a system of control there are explicit rules for guiding the 
359 Alvarez 2001(a), at 15. 
360 Cf. Alvarez 2001(a), at 15 (referring to Grossman).
361 Bauman 1989, at 25. Bauman finds that the most interesting aspect of Milgram’s study is the finding of 
“the inverse ratio of readiness to cruelty and proximity to its victim”, that is, that it is more difficult to harm 
people that one touches. Ibid., at 154-155 (italics omitted).
362 E.g., Bauman 1989, at 17, and R. L. Rubenstein, Förintelsens lag (Stockholm: Alba, 1980) 29-42. 
363 Waller 2002, at 96 (interpreting Arendt).
364 Arendt 1994 [1963], at 276. Smeulers and Werner, however, argue that Arendt despite her thesis of 
the banality of evil did not regard the lack of criminal intent as a defence or an excuse. As a proof of this 
they refer to works of Arendt where she opposes attempts to attribute guilt to collectives. A. Smeulers & 
W. Werner, ‘The Banality of Evil on Trial’, in C. Stahn & L. van den Herik (eds.), Future Perspectives on 
International Justice (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2010), at 31.  
365 See also Cohen, who questions the argument put forward by some that they were just doing their job from 
a temporal perspective: “Memory is a social product [...] When you say that you were “just doing your duty” 
or were “only a cog in the machine” or that “others have done much worse,” was this “true” at the time, or 
fabricated in the light of later political history?”. Cohen 1995, at 45.
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behavior of the bureaucracy’s officials in response to problems that might arise; 
the career of officials is geared to carrying out these rules; success in a bureaucratic 
career depends on how well the bureaucrat performs tasks, as judged by those 
higher in the bureaucratic hierarchy; there is clear separation between the official’s 
work and personal life; and within the bureaucratic organization, there are clearly 
defined objectives for the organization and clearly stipulated steps for reaching the 
objectives.366 
But toward the middle of her statement Arendt mentioned that there was activity 
at Auschwitz that deviated from the official controls. Much of the life at Auschwitz 
seemed to be entirely arbitrary and capricious. [...] What she caught a glimpse of was 
a system of autonomy that can exist within bureaucracies. Such systems of autonomy 
derive from the fact that the bureaucracy’s rules and regulations usually have a great 
deal of room for interpretation by the individual who makes decisions during day-
to-day work activities.367
Katz’s point is important, but is should also be noted that a difference should be made 
between: (a) the alternatives an individual in reality has; and (b) the alternatives an 
individual believes to have. In bureaucratic organizations also knowledge can be divided, 
which means that a person may believe that she has no discretion even though she in 
fact has some.368 
The bureaucratization thesis has furthermore been criticized for disregarding the 
non-bureaucratic participation of hands-on criminals369 or “the spontaneous initiative at 
lower echelons”.370 The hands-on criminals generally see the destructive consequences of 
their actions, which entails that bureaucratization does not distance them from the harm 
caused. In this regard, Kelman and Hamilton have noted that: “Normalization of atrocities 
is more difficult to the extent that there are constant reminders of the true meaning of the 
enterprise.”371 For the hands-on criminals, the process of routinization therefore appears 
to have a greater explanatory power than the process of bureaucratization. Kelman 
and Hamilton describe routinization as a process that first and foremost explains why 
individuals continue with their criminal activity. They argue that: 
Routinization fulfills two functions. First, it reduces the necessity of making decisions, 
thus minimizing the occasions in which moral questions may arise. Second, it makes 
it easier to avoid the implications of the action, since the actor focuses on the details 
of the job rather than on its meaning.372  
In practice, routinization entails that the commission of atrocities becomes something 
normal. Often routinized people see themselves as people “just doing their job”. For 
people caught in routinization, the idea that they are “professionals” is often crucial.373 
366 Katz 1993, at 79.
367 Katz 1993, at 80.
368 D. Luban, A. Strudler & D. Wasserman, ‘Moral Responsibility in the Age of Bureaucracy’, 90 Michigan 
Law Review (1992), at 2355. 
369 Browning 1998, at 162.
370 Osiel 2010, at 112. 
371 Kelman & Hamilton 1989, at 18. 
372 Kelman & Hamilton 1989, at 18. 
373 Kelman 2005, at 132.
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Another process that has been found to affect hands-on criminals is the process of 
brutalization.374 Each act of violence makes further acts of violence easier to commit.375 
Staub has observed that: “Mass killing or genocide is usually the outcome of an evolution 
that starts with discrimination and limited acts of harm-doing. Harming people changes 
the perpetrators (and the whole society) and prepares them for more harmful acts.”376 
The process of brutalization can therefore be characterized as a re-socialization in beliefs, 
values, and standards of conduct.377 A brutalized person uses violence “more often and 
more easily” and the use of violence is often characterized by its excessive nature.378 In 
this vein, it has been suggested that sadism sometimes is the consequence of participation 
in atrocities rather than a personality trait.379
Finally, most large-scale atrocities have been preceded by a process of 
dehumanization of the victim group. In dehumanization, the victims are deprived 
of two significant characteristics, namely identity, that is, the standing as distinctive 
individuals, and community, that is, membership in the collective of individuals who 
care for each other.380 More concretely, dehumanization often entails the assignment 
of derogatory labels or negative stereotyping. Often, members of the victim groups 
are referred to in terms of animals, diseases or monsters. Through an “ideology of 
antagonism” the victims can thus be presented as posing a danger to the existence of 
oneself.381 Dehumanization is usually the result of organized propaganda, in which 
history can be falsified.382 The goal of dehumanization is the “social death” of the 
victims.383
In relation to distancing, the role of denial has also sometimes been put forward. 
Denial is often seen as an unconscious psychological defence mechanism for coping with 
guilt and other disturbing realities.384 According to the denial paradox, a person in denial 
can simultaneously both know and not know the true state of affairs.385 Knowledge can 
also be affected by cognitive bias, that is, the selection of information to fit existing 
perceptual frames.386
374 On brutalization, see e.g., Newman 2002, at 55. 
375 T. Ward, ‘State Crime in the Heart of Darkness’, 45 British Journal of Criminology (2005), at 441. 
376 Staub 2002, at 22. See also Staub 1999, at 196. 
377 Staub 2002, at 24.
378 Smeulers & Grünfeld 2011, at 62.
379 Kelman 1973, at 35-36. 
380 Kelman & Hamilton 1989, at 19. In a similar vein, Fein has argued that the exclusion of the victim 
from the universe of obligation is a necessary but not sufficient condition for genocide. Fein 1993, at 36. 
According to her, this exclusion need not entail dehumanization. Ibid.
381 Staub 1999, at 197.
382 Waller points out that linguistic dehumanization is often connected to an abuse of victims (e.g., 
starvation, not letting the victims take care of their hygiene) which “proves” their dehuman nature. Waller 
2002, at 247-248. 
383 Waller 2002, at 237-238.
384 Cohen 1993, at 105.
385 Cohen 1993, at 105.
386 Cohen 1993, at 105.
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3.5.4.  Authorization and Obedience to Authority 
Another popular way to explain how “ordinary people” become involved in international 
atrocities is to stress the role played by authorization. Authorization can be defined as 
legitimate authorities explicitly ordering, implicitly encouraging, tacitly approving or at 
least permitting criminal behaviour.387 According to the authorization thesis, people have 
a natural inclination to obey authorities. Milgram’s research at the University of Yale in the 
beginning of the 1960s is often cited in this context.388 In his experiments, test persons were 
asked to administer (in real life fake) electric shocks to a person and in the experiment 
exhibited a strong tendency to obey authorities. After the experiment, Milgram noted that: 
After witnessing hundreds of ordinary people submit to the authority in our 
experiments, I must conclude that Arendt’s conception of the banality of evil comes 
closer to the truth than one might dare imagine. The ordinary person who shocked 
the victim did so out of a sense of obligation – a conception of his duties as a subject 
– and not from any peculiar aggressive tendencies.389 
The positive side of the human inclination to adhere to authorities is that it makes it 
easier for people live in collectives. The negative side, on the other hand, is that people 
start to feel non-responsible for their doings and that the authorization appears to remove 
the urge to make choices and judgments.390 Authorization also legitimates criminal 
behaviour ex post facto.391 
The degree to which individuals orientate towards authorities seems to be a 
question of both socialization (culture) and personality.392 Waller has also observed that 
certain religious belief systems make people react passively to authority orders, as the 
belief systems make people assume that they cannot redefine situations through their 
own actions.393 Also the “monopoly” of the authority affects the influence of the authority 
over individuals. In this context, Bauman has argued that “pluralism is the best preventive 
medicine against morally normal people engaging in morally abnormal actions.”394 
3.5.5.  Group Dynamics and the Idea of Conformism 
Obedience to authorities appears to have a significant explanatory power in connection to 
low- and mid-level actor behaviour in vertical collectives. There are, however, also other 
387 Kelman & Hamilton 1989, at 16.
388 S. Milgram, Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View (London: Tavistock, 1974). See also e.g., T. 
Blass, ‘Perpetrator Behavior as Destructive Obedience: An Evaluation of Stanley Milgram’s Perspective, 
the Most Influential Social-Psychological Approach to the Holocaust’, in L. S. Newman & R. Erber (eds.), 
Understanding Genocide: The Social Psychology of the Holocaust (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 
at 105, Smeulers & Grünfeld 2011, at 212-232, and Waller 2002, at 102-111. Blass has, however, noted that 
Milgram’s research is first and foremost situational as it emphasizes the significance of the external pressure 
exerted by authorities. Blass 2002, at 95. 
389 Milgram 1974, at 6. 
390 Kelman & Hamilton 1989, at 16. 
391 H. Jäger, ‘Zur Kriminalisierung von Politik durch ein Völkerkriminalrecht’, 2 Mittelweg 36 (1993), at 69.
392 Waller 2002, at 180-182.
393 Waller 2002, at 180.
394 Bauman 1989, at 165 (italics omitted). 
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types of collectives and horizontal relationship within vertical collectives.395 Interestingly, 
therefore, rather few scholars have emphasized the role of non-vertical group processes 
in respect to international criminality. Exceptions to this are, for example, Browning 
who in his analysis of the Reserve Battalion 101 has emphasized the role played by peers 
and the idea of conformism,396 and Alvarez, who has noted the relevance of conformism 
in connection to genocides.397 Also Smeulers and Grünfeld have in their book devoted a 
whole chapter to conformism, group behaviour and collective identities.398 
Social groups have a tendency to require that their members conform to the group’s 
values and actions. Members of a group should thus behave in a manner “appropriate” 
for the group.399 Conformism is, however, not only the result of an external pressure 
to conform. Peer pressure and conformism may make people do things they think are 
wrong (and not do things they think are right) if they believe that their feelings, beliefs or 
preferences discrepant from their group’s feelings, beliefs or preferences.400 In this regard, 
research indicates that individuals have a need to “fuse oneself with some larger entity”, 
especially in situations of chaos or crisis,401 probably in order to enhance self-esteem and 
to reduce uncertainty.402 The adaptation to the group norms may be realized in different 
ways, for example, through compliance, identification or internalization.403  
Group dynamics may thus alter the behaviour of individuals. It has, however, also 
been argued that such dynamics may change individual thoughts and feelings. It has, for 
example, been noted that: “Often we believe certain things to be true simply because 
most, if not all, of the people around us believe and/or assert them to be true.”404 It has 
also been observed that opinions and behaviours often become more extreme as a result 
of group interaction.405 In connection to international criminality, collective thinking 
often becomes especially pronounced.406 There is an élan or sense of “one for all and all 
for one” which allows leaders to “coordinate” the collective action, instead of extorting 
the compliance of the members of the group.407 
395 More or less all groups, however, have some type of a leader, and in this regard it is noteworthy that 
studies on group processes have not always given much attention to the question of leadership in non-
vertical collectives. Hogg has – more generally – observed that as “[l]eadership is a core feature of social 
groups [...] it seems odd that leadership is often not a core feature of the study of group processes and 
group processes are not often a core feature of the study of leadership.” M. A. Hogg, ‘Social Psychology of 
Leadership’, in A. W. Kruglanski (ed.), Social Psychology: Handbook of Basic Principles, 2nd ed. (New York: 
Guilford Press, 2007), at 725 (referring to Chemers).
396 Browning 1998, at 184. 
397 Alvarez 2010, at 51. 
398 Smeulers & Grünfeld 2011, at 243-266.
399 Cf. the idea of socialization, that is, the idea of people learning what is appropriate behaviour and 
behaving accordingly.
400 Newman 2002, at 48. 
401 Hintjens 2001, at 38 (referring to Fromm, Yurick and Kristeva).
402 Tindale et al. 2002, at 145.
403 Smeulers & Grünfeld 2011, at 247. 
404 Tindale et al. 2002, at 149.
405 Waller 2002, at 35.
406 See further e.g., Fletcher 2002(b), at 1525.
407 M. J. Osiel, ‘Modes of Participation in Mass Atrocity’, 38 Cornell International Law Journal (2005), at 
797. 
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It has also been put forward that deindividualization may have a connection 
to aggressive behaviour, that is, that individuals as anonymous members of a crowd 
(or, for example, with their faces concealed) are more prone to behave aggressively.408 
Deindividualization may hence diffuse the responsibility and facilitate “the transformation 
from an individual to a collective identity.”409 As social beings, humans like to be members 
of groups and they are attracted to mass movements.410 
3.5.6.  Concluding Remarks
In summary, among criminologists, social process theories are those that have been found 
to have the greatest explanatory power in connection to international crimes. Certain of 
these theories have also become influential outside criminology. International criminal 
law scholars, for example, often refer to Milgram’s theory on obedience to authority when 
discussing how the criminal responsibility should be distributed between superiors and 
subordinates. What is significant in connection to the social process theories is that they 
often have been used to explain the criminal behaviour of mid- and low-level actors. 
Very little attention has in supranational criminology been given to the criminality of 
high-level actors. 
3.6.  Critical Criminological Theories
In critical criminology, the starting-point is that crime is the outcome of conflict and 
domination.411 A number of critical criminologists have, in contrast to mainstream 
criminologists, focused on the crimes of the powerful and have argued that “working-
class crime is insignificant when compared to the ‘crimes of the powerful’ that largely 
go unpunished.”412 The critical element in these theories often consists of questioning 
the official definitions of crime and the existing social order.413 Critical criminology 
has many sub-theories, such as conflict theory, radical criminology, feminist 
criminology, Marxist criminology, left realism, anarchist criminology and so-called 
new criminology.414 
Interestingly, however, even though critical criminologists have focused on the 
crime of the powerful, they have not traditionally given international criminality much 
attention. There are, however, a few important exceptions: Susan Brownmiller, Catharine 
408 Smeulers & Grünfeld 2011, at 207 (referring to inter alia Zimbardo) and 263. 
409 Smeulers & Grünfeld 2011, at 208. 
410 Smeulers & Grünfeld 2011, at 256-257 and 261. 
411 Einstadter & Henry 1995, at 227. The term critical criminology is, however, used in somewhat different 
meanings by various authors. Burke, for instance, uses it to refer to left realism and left idealism, the latter 
of which is a criminological theory closely founded on the victimized actor model. Burke 2001, at 173. 
412 Burke 2001, at 177.
413 Einstadter & Henry 1995, at 227.
414 Einstadter & Henry 1995, at 228, 259 and 277. Simplifying, conflict theorists stress different group 
interests and conflicts, Marxist and radical theories economic conflict and capitalism, new criminology 
capitalism and the labelling of criminals, anarchist theorists the abolition of systems of domination, and 
left realism the harm of ordinary crimes. E.g., Burke 2001, at 147 and 154, and Einstadter & Henry 1995, 
at 228-234.
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A. MacKinnon, Austin Turk, and Jock Young. The feminist authors (Brownmiller, 
MacKinnon) have first and foremost concentrated on the traditional impunity for sexual 
violence against women in armed conflicts.415 The other critical criminologists have, on 
the other hand, often focused on human rights violations by States, and have sometimes 
argued for the criminalization of such violations.416 Lately also conflict thinking has been 
advanced in connection to international criminality. The genocidal violence in Darfur 
has, for example, been found to be the result of the “competition between patriarchal and 
hierarchically organized racial and ethnic groups”.417 
It has been noticed that some individuals who participate in international crimes 
are, in fact, the absolute antithesis of “criminals” as conventionally conceived. Their 
social class, status and respectability may be completely different from that of “normal” 
offenders. In this respect, international criminals are similar to so-called white-collar 
criminals. The concept of white-collar criminals was coined by Edwin Sutherland in the 
late 1930s. He used this concept to refer to crimes committed by persons of respectability 
and high social status in the course of their occupation.418 Even though Sutherland 
conducted his research during the Nazi epoch, he himself did not discuss genocide as 
a form of white collar criminality.419 Rather, he used the concept when elaborating on 
economic criminality. Only lately, has the idea of Hitler as the “greatest white-collar 
criminal” been put forward.420 According to Braithwaite, international criminality and 
economic criminality namely have certain common features: the motivating force of 
greed, special opportunities to commit crimes, and the offender’s perceived right to 
humiliate his/her victims (the social structure of humiliation).421     
The significance of the concept of white-collar crime lies primarily in that it forces 
one to pay attention to the role of social power in shaping opportunities for and responses 
to criminal behaviour.422 In this regard, it is interesting that Shapiro has criticized the 
traditional white-collar crime research for focusing on offender characteristics and for 
disregarding offence characteristics. As an alternative, she wants to define white-collar 
415 E.g., S. Brownmiller, Against Our Will: Men, Women and Rape (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1975), 
and MacKinnon 1994(b).
416 Einstadter & Henry 1995, at 246. See also e.g., W. J. Chambliss, ‘State-Organized Crime − The American 
Society of Criminology, 1988 Presidential Address’, 27 Criminology (1989), at 183–208, Cohen 1993, at 97-
115, and H. Schwendinger & J. Schwendinger, ‘Defenders of Order or Guardians of Human Rights’, 5 Issues 
in Criminology (1970), at 123-157.
417 J. Hagan & W. Rymond-Richmond & P. Parker, ‘The Criminology of Genocide: The Death and Rape of 
Darfur’, 43 Criminology (2005), at 531 and 553 [NB. The article is not persuasive regarding the content of 
international criminal law]. 
418 E. H. Sutherland, ‘White-Collar Criminality’, 5 American Sociological Review (1940), at 1-12, and 
Sutherland 1983 [1949], at 7. See also D. Weisburd, E. Waring & E. F. Chayet, White-Collar Crime and 
Criminal Careers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) 8. 
419 Friedrichs 2000(a), at 25. 
420 Braithwaite 1992, at 100. This comparison between genocidaires and “price-fixing executives” has, 
however, been criticized by Friedrichs, who thinks that this classification trivializes the crimes of those 
participating in genocides. Friedrichs 1996(b), at 47 (see also at 59).
421 Braithwaite 1992, at 81. 
422 K. Schlegel & D. Eitle, ‘Back to the Future: A Reminder of the Importance of Sutherland in Thinking 
about White-Collar Crime’, in W. S. Laufer & F. Adler (eds.), The Criminology of Criminal Law (New 
Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1999), at 364.
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crime as violations of trust.423 She notes that social class, status, etc. are related to the 
distribution of positions of trust, which provide opportunities for abuse, but that social 
standing should not be equated with social role.424 While Shapiro obviously has a point, it 
should be noted that much research indicates that actor characteristics often influence how 
a person is treated by the criminal justice system. The concept white-collar criminality is 
thus important in that it emphasizes that there may be different types of criminals (or to 
put it another way, criminals who do not correspond with the cliché idea of criminals) and 
that, for example, conventional criminal law ideas, such as that a significant difference 
should be made between first-time offenders and recidivists, are problematic to apply to 
high-level economic and international criminals. Crimes requiring a position of trust 
are difficult, if not impossible, to commit after one has received a criminal record, and 
economic and political leaders therefore rarely have a (relevant) criminal record. 
3.7.  Concluding Remarks 
As the present author sees it, more or less all criminological theories that have been 
used to consider ordinary criminality can to some extent be applied to international 
criminality, even though some theories appear more suitable than other. That the same 
types of theories can be used to address both types of criminality is not surprising. Both 
types of crimes are committed by human beings and human behaviour is influenced 
by certain factors. Vaughan has in this line argued that while crimes take “place in a 
variety of socially organized settings” it is always possible to identify certain elements 
of social organization (such as, division of labour and hierarchies) as well as certain 
common processes (such as power, competition, conflict, cooperation, domination, 
subordination, culture, and socialization).425 “Unique” crimes, such as the Holocaust, can 
therefore be regarded as extreme cases of familiar social phenomena.426 That ordinary 
and international criminality have features in common is thus natural, but at the same 
time frightening. As observed by Osiel: “Some side of us [...] wants such acts to remain 
unintelligible, incomprehensible.”427 
Criminology has not during its years of existence been able to solve the “mystery” 
of ordinary criminality. Rather the various criminological theories coexist, however, 
so that some theories have lost in popularity and influence (most notably, determinist 
423 S. P. Shapiro, ‘Collaring the Crime, Not the Criminal: Reconsidering the Concept of White-Collar 
Crime’, 55 American Sociological Review (1990), at 347. Schlegel and Eitle have, however, noted that in 
a way all forms of crime can be considered as violations of trust, and they therefore argue that Shapiro’s 
notion does not bring much conceptual clarity. Schlegel & Eitle 1999, at 380-381.
424 Shapiro 1990, at 358. Podgor notes that the white-collar criminality initially was a sociological concept 
that was used to designate crimes committed by persons coming from a certain social class (offender-
based approach). She notes that the concept today partially has become a legal one, and that it increasingly 
is used to denote a certain type of crimes (offence-based approach). Unlike Shapiro, Podgor, however, 
seems to favour an offender-based approach. E. S. Podgor, ‘The Challenge of White Collar Sentencing’, 97 
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology (2007), at 734-735 and 737-738. 
425 D. Vaughan, ‘Criminology and the Sociology of Organizations: Analogy, Comparative Social 
Organization, and General Theory’, 37 Crime, Law & Social Change (2002), at 120.
426 Cf. Bauman 1989, at 2.
427 Osiel 2000, at 144. 
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biological, psychological, and sociological theories). Most criminologists today agree 
that human behaviour is affected both by situational (external) and dispositional 
(internal) factors. Furthermore, many today support multi-theoretical approaches. 
Criminologists, however, often disagree on the significance given to the various factors 
and theories. 
Also in connection to international criminality, the need to have a multi-theoretical 
approach has been stressed. Friedrichs has regarding the Holocaust observed that an 
integrated theory appears to be needed to explain it, but that it seems impossible to find 
a truly testable theory and that at best one can hope to achieve is “a rough approximation 
of the relative “weight” of a broad range of factors [...].”428 This being said, many 
supranational criminologists, however, give sociological and social process theories 
considerable weight. The absolute dominance of these theories has, however, recently 
been put in question by some scholars who find that the subjectivity of the perpetrators 
often is overlooked in supranational criminology. Foster, for example, notes that whereas 
Hannah Arendt’s account of Eichmann as a bureaucrat and “system-man” is quoted by 
more or less all scholars (because it suits the prevailing understanding about the nature 
of international criminality), David Cesarini’s description of Eichmann as “a forceful 
and strong person with considerable energy and zeal” has been given significantly less 
attention.429  
All in all, the present author finds that criminology stresses the common features 
of ordinary and international criminality. This being said, the phenomenology of 
international criminality entails that certain social processes become especially significant 
in connection to those crimes. The collective nature of the criminality, for example, 
emphasizes the role played by phenomena such as peer pressure and crowd behaviour. 
Likewise, the frequent State involvement in the criminality makes criminological 
research on the human inclination to obey authorities relevant. The context of individual 
action cannot hence be disregarded in connection to international criminality. 
Socio-psychological explanations of international criminality may be found to 
have a “relatively exonerating position towards perpetrators”.430 Scholars, however, 
disagree as to the degree to which the context affects individuals and how the context 
of action should be considered in the law. Some scholars emphasize the role played by 
pathological societies very strongly. For example, Tallgren has claimed that the refusal to 
commit international crimes sometimes is socially deviating behaviour, which requires 
“exceptional individuals”.431 With such a viewpoint, it is often difficult to approve the 
use of criminal law in connection to international criminality. Other scholars are less 
deterministic, even though they acknowledge that the pathological societies provide 
individuals with more opportunities to commit crime and pressure to do so. The latter 
428 Friedrichs 2000(a), at 34. 
429 D. Foster, ‘Rethinking the Subjectivity of Perpetrators of Political Violence’, in A. Smeulers (ed.), 
Collective Violence and International Criminal Justice: An Interdisciplinary Approach (Antwerp: Intersentia, 
2010), at 48 and 52.  
430 A. G. Miller, A. M. Buddie and J. Kretschmar, ‘Explaining the Holocaust – Does Social Psychology 
Exonerate the Perpetrators?’, in L. S. Newman & R. Erber (eds.), Understanding Genocide – The Social 
Psychology of the Holocaust (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), at 320. 
431 Tallgren 2002(b), at 573 and 575. 
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standpoint is obviously more compatible with the criminal law idea of individual 
responsibility.432 
The goal of the criminological inquiry in this study has primarily been to gain more 
information about the social problem international criminal law addresses. From this 
perspective, it is also significant to note areas where very little criminological research has 
been conducted. In supranational criminology, much attention has been devoted to the 
question of why “ordinary people” or the masses participate in the criminality. The focus 
has hence essentially been on explaining the participation of mid- and low-level actors.433 
Why the leaders (or “instigators”) engage in the criminality has, on the other hand, been 
given very little attention, especially during the last decades.434 After World War II, the 
leading Nazis were psychologically examined, but due to the methods used, this research 
is not given much weight today. The present author feels that this imbalance in research 
is problematic. In many accounts of international criminality, an image is depicted of 
rational and manipulative leaders who intentionally create an abnormal social context 
and who maliciously lurk “ordinary people” to participate in the criminality. Jäger in 
this regard talks about the influential stereotype of the “remote-controlled” and without 
individual motivation acting low-level participant.435  
The prevailing research makes it justified to primarily blame the leaders for the 
criminality and to largely excuse the masses for their participation. The present author, 
however, believes that criminology does not as such support that high-level actors should 
take all blame. Milgram’s research does persuasively point out that people in positions of 
authority often are obeyed. But to what extent do peers affect each other? And, what drives 
the leaders to commit crimes? Does the behaviour of subordinates affect the behaviour 
of superiors? It is thus important to recognize that even though criminology provides 
insights into the nature of international criminality, it is not evident that supranational 
criminology yet has identified all relevant relationships and processes, or given them 
the right weight. When certain features of the criminality are stressed, it is possible that 
others at the same time are concealed. 
432 Norrie discusses the thinking of Arendt and Jaspers and notes two alternatives in the questioning of 
the possibility of legitimate criminal justice in these situations. On the one hand, it can be argued that 
individuals are not really to blame because of their circumstances, that is, that there has been a loss of a 
subjective moral grip on the individual. On the other hand, it can be argued that the law has objectively lost 
its moral claim to validity, as justice requires a common framework within which the judge and the judged 
coexist. A. Norrie, ‘Justice on the Slaughter-Bench: The Problem of War Guilt in Arendt and Jaspers’, 11 
New Criminal Law Review (2008), at 193 and 196.
433 Friedrichs has observed that: “We need to understand more fully differences in the psychodynamics of 
instigators as opposed to hands-on perpetrators. Those who formulate the instigating orders in cases of 
genocide might not be capable of implementing these orders; and those who implement the orders might 
not be capable of instigating them.” Friedrichs 2000(a), at 27. Friedrichs argument challenges questions 
such as “why do people commit genocide?”, as genocides may have many different types of participants to 
whom different answers apply. Criminology has for sure considered the difference between physical and 
non-physical participants, but not so much the participation of the top-level participants.  
434 This is also noted by Mandel, who points out that the instigator-perpetrator distinction is not identical 
to the leader-follower distinction. He notes that not all high-level actors in Nazi Germany were instigators. 
Mandel 2002, at 261-262.  
435 Jäger 1995, at 333 (‘das Stereotyp des funktionalisierten, ohne Eigenmotivation mitwirkenden Täters’).
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As regards the relationship between the social problem and the criminal law, it 
has been noted that the insights that sciences such as criminology has produced about 
human behaviour scantly has affected criminal law. For example, Jeffrey has argued that 
criminal law and criminology always have been “in conflict” and that criminologists 
have been frustrated with the fact that their research has not influenced the lawyers and 
politicians who decide about criminal law.436 Denno, on her part, has held that type of 
information social sciences produce rarely is relevant for criminal law. According to her, 
the causation social science is interested in is namely different than the one criminal law 
is interested in.437 
While it is true that criminological research rarely is quoted in criminal law 
contexts, it is, however, untrue that the social problems (including the causes of crime) 
would be irrelevant for criminal law. In fact, as noted also by Osiel, “the moral complexity 
present in much wrongdoing” is something that the criminal law seeks to acknowledge 
and accommodate through, for example, doctrines on mens rea and justifications and 
excuses.438 Criminal law is always adopted as a response to a true or perceived social 
problem. For legitimacy reasons, the criminal law must therefore to some extent reflect 
reality. 
As the present author sees it, criminal law is not indifferent to the social reality it 
tries to address, but rather selective. This can be explained with the fact that criminal law 
is not just an objective reflection of the empirical reality, but an interpretation of it which 
has been affected by social moral evaluations about what is relevant for responsibility 
and what is not. Criminal law thus contains certain built-in evaluations of relevance and 
irrelevance, which entails that when a certain social problem is translated into a criminal 
law question certain aspects of the social phenomena are taken into consideration and 
others are overlooked. In this transformation, it is often aspects of the criminality that 
are incompatible with the rationale of criminal law that are “lost in translation.” 
This translation of the social problem of international criminality into a criminal 
law question is the object of Chapters 6−9 in this study. Before the international criminal 
law as such will be analyzed, some words must be said about the instrument with which 
international criminality is addressed. More specifically, the next part of the study tries 
to identify the basic features of criminal law in general and international criminal law in 
particular.
436 C. R. Jeffrey, ‘Criminology and Criminal Law: Science versus Policy and the Interaction of Science 
and Law’, W.S. Laufer & F. Adler (eds.), The Criminology of Criminal Law (New Brunswick: Transaction 
Publishers, 1999), at 5-7.
437 D. W. Denno, ‘Human Biology and Criminal Responsibility: Free Will or Free Ride?’, 137 University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review (1988), at 649. 
438 Osiel 1995, at 487. 
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4.  THE BASIC FEATURES OF CRIMINAL LAW 
4.1.  Introduction
Punishment is not wholly explicable in terms of its purposes because no social 
artefact can be explained in this way. Like [...] table manners, punishment has an 
instrumental purpose, but also a cultural style and an historical tradition, and a 
dependence upon ‘institutional, technical and discursive conditions’.439
The existence of criminal law is today, and has for a long time been, regarded as a self-
evident. All nations in the world have criminal law. The role played by and the nature 
of criminal law have, however, changed over time. Nowadays, criminal law is one of 
the main ways to deal with behaviour deemed unacceptable by society, at least in the 
Western parts of the world. The recent expansion of the use of criminal law can be 
explained with the easiness with which criminal law can be adopted combined with the 
prevailing conception that adopting criminal law means “doing something” to address a 
social problem. In other times and cultures, alternatives to criminal law, such as civil law, 
restorative justice or administrative measures, have been more popular.440 
Even though there is criminal law in all nations, its content and scope varies from 
country to country. In some countries, there also co-exist several criminal law systems 
with their own specific features.441 For example, in the United States, the states have 
criminal laws of their own that co-exist with federal laws. The various systems are, 
however, often grouped into certain traditions or families to make comparisons more 
feasible. Criteria used to divide legal systems into legal families include the system’s 
historical background and development, characteristic mode of thought, distinctive 
institutions, use of legal sources, and ideology.442 The common law (Anglo-American) 
tradition, the civil law (continental law) tradition, the religious law tradition and the 
socialist law tradition are often regarded as the major contemporary legal traditions.443 
Even though there are significant differences between how different criminal law systems 
and traditions approach the social problem of crime, it is, however, argued here that all 
439 Garland 1990, at 19 (quoting P. Q. Hirst).
440 Society can naturally also choose not to react at all to certain deviant or antisocial behaviour.
441 See e.g., R. David & J. E. C. Brierley, Major Legal Systems in the World Today – An Introduction to the 
Comparative Study of Law (London: Stevens & Sons, 1985), 17-18. Merryman defines a legal system as 
“an operating set of legal institutions, procedures, and rules”. J. H. Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition – 
An Introduction to the Legal Systems of Western Europe and Latin America (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1969), 1. 
442 K. Zweigert & H. Kötz, Introduction to Comparative Law, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1998), 68. Cf. de Cruz regarding the concepts of legal system, parental legal system, and legal tradition. 
P. de Cruz, Comparative Law in a Changing World, 2nd ed. (London: Cavendish Publishing, 1999) 3-5, 33 
and 101.
443 E.g., P. L. Reichel, Comparative Criminal Justice Systems – A Topical Approach, 3rd ed. (Upper Saddle 
River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2002), 81. See also David and Brierley who do not enumerate the religious 
law tradition. David & Brierley 1985, at 22. There also exists indigenous legal systems, but these are usually 
not grouped, as they do not share a common legal tradition. Reichel 2002, at 81.
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the various criminal law systems have certain common characteristics. In other words, 
calling a social conflict a “crime” implies a certain way of managing it.444 In this vein, 
Fletcher has argued that: “It is true that every country has a criminal code, but these 
codes should be understood as local answers to the universal questions that constitute 
the foundation of criminal law.”445
The rise of the nation State and the ideals of the Enlightenment together gave rise 
to what today often is called modern criminal law.446 During the Enlightenment, the 
conception of justice changed and the heavily discretionary decision-making processes, 
which previously had dominated, were increasingly seen as unjust and replaced by 
processes stressing values such as uniformity, proportionality, equality in law, and the 
strict application of rules.447 The modern criminal law we have today is thus to a high 
degree a historical product.448 In relation to the significance of the Enlightenment period 
for the development of criminal law, Norrie has noted that: “modern criminal law was 
formed in a particular historical epoch and derived its characteristic ‘shape’ from the 
fundamental features of the social relations of that epoch. Its principles, therefore, are 
historic and relative rather than natural and general.”449 Also after the Enlightenment 
period, criminal law has continued to adapt to prevailing circumstances, even though 
the law has not since experienced a similar fundamental change. 
In this chapter, some basic features of modern criminal law will be identified 
and elaborated upon. As international criminality is addressed with criminal law, it is 
important to recognize what is feasible within the paradigm of criminal law.450  
4.2.  Criminal Law Puts the State in Charge 
Ashworth has argued that one of the key procedural elements that distinguish criminal 
from civil proceedings is that criminal proceedings are generally initiated by a public 
444 H. Steinert, ‘‘Ideology with Human Victims’ – The Institution of ‘Crime and Punishment’ between 
Social Control and Social Exclusion: Historical and Theoretical Issues’, in V. Ruggiero, N. South & I. Taylor 
(eds.), The New European Criminology – Crime and Social Order in Europe (London: Routledge, 1998), at 
407 (referring to Christie). Cf. Nuotio who talks about the basic concepts of criminal law. K. Nuotio, Teko, 
vaara, seuraus – Rikosvastuun filosofisista, kriminaalipoliittisista ja lainopillisista perusteista (Helsinki: 
Suomalainen lakimiesyhdistys, 1998), 38.  
445 G. P. Fletcher, Basic Concepts of Criminal Law (Cary, NC: Oxford University Press, 1998), 5.
446 Cesare Beccaria (1738-1794) is often mentioned as the father of modern criminal law. E.g., A. Norrie, 
Crime, Reason and History – A Critical Introduction to Criminal Law, 2nd ed. (London: Butterworths, 2001), 
17.
447 Garland 1990, at 206 (with reference to Beattie’s study concerning England).
448 Tuori has pointed out that viewing law as a historical product does not mean that one has to adopt 
evolutionary theoretical assumptions. Rather, it can merely signify that one acknowledges the interaction 
between law and the society that surrounds it. He has also pointed out that whereas the law on its surface 
may change quickly, the deeper layers of the law (viz. the legal culture and the deep structure of the law) 
change more slowly. K. Tuori, Critical Legal Positivism (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002), 3-6, 155, and 184.    
449 Norrie 2001, at 8.
450 Ohlin has noted that a difference can be made between criminal law theory (ideal criminal law identified 
through philosophical inquiry) and principles that are common in many domestic criminal law systems. J. 
Ohlin, ‘Where to Find Liberal Principles of Criminal Law’, Lieber Code [blog], 10 April 2013. The two are, 
however, connected, and both affect sentiments about how criminal law should be structured.
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official.451 More generally, it has been argued that criminal law forms a system of various 
levels of action, each connected with its own public authorities.452 Criminalization 
decisions are usually made by members of democratically elected bodies, crimes are 
generally investigated by police officials or other public officials (such as coroners), 
conviction and sentencing decisions are made by State or municipal courts, and the 
execution of punishments is administered by various administrative authorities. The 
“criminal model” thus puts the State in charge.453 This heavy involvement of various 
public officials in the administration of criminal law reflects that criminal law is law, 
that is, part of the regulatory system of a State. Criminal law is thus not characterized by 
“privatization” or, to put it another way, of elements, such as negotiation, flexibility and 
self-regulation.454 In legal systems were a difference is made between civil law (essentially 
regulating the relationship between citizens) and public law (regulating the relationship 
between citizens and authorities, or the relationship between authorities), criminal law 
is thus traditionally categorized as public law.455 
The active involvement of State officials in the administration of criminal law 
obviously requires the existence of such officials.456 The development of modern 
criminal justice systems is therefore connected to the emergence of the modern State 
with characteristics such as a central government adopting centralized legislation and 
a bureaucratic mode of administration.457 This change from traditional feudal societies 
to modern ones was not only characterized by a different mode of administration, but 
also of a new view on the role of the State and the authorities.458 The State essentially 
monopolized the use of force on its territory and became the unit responsible for security 
451 A. Ashworth, ‘Is the Criminal Law a Lost Cause?,’ 116 The Law Quarterly Review (2000), at 230. See also 
Benham v. United Kingdom, Judgment, GC, ECtHR, 10 June 1996, para. 56.
452 Jareborg 1995(b), at 18. 
453 S. E. Marshall & R. A. Duff, ‘Criminalization and Sharing Wrongs’, Canadian Journal of Law and 
Jurisprudence (1998), at 15. See further also D. Robinson, ‘International Criminal Law as Justice’, 11 Journal 
of International Criminal Justice (2013), at 705-706. 
454 M. Delmas-Marty, ‘International Criminalisation of Economic Activities: Variable Geography and 
Geometry’, in Flores juris et legum – festskrift till Nils Jareborg (Uppsala: Iustus förlag, 2002), at 170. 
455 E.g., D. Frände, Allmän straffrätt (Helsinki: Juridiska fakulteten, Helsingfors universitet, 2004), 4 
(regarding Finland), and N. Jareborg, Straffrättens gärningslära (Stockholm: Nordstedts Juridik/Fritzes, 
1995), 36 (regarding Sweden).
456 See e.g., C. Emsley, Crime, Police, and Penal Policy – European Experiences 1750-1940 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), 270, and D. Garland, ‘The Limits of the Sovereign State: Strategies of Crime 
Control in Contemporary Society’, 36 The British Journal of Criminology (1996), at 448-449.  
457 E.g., Mann has argued State modernization encompasses four processes of growth, viz. (1) in State size; 
(2) in the scope of its functions; (3) in administrative bureaucratization; and (4) in political representation. 
Mann 1993, at 358. 
458 Jareborg has held the there has existed different types of crime ideologies, and argue that whereas crimes 
in early times were regarded as acts of disobedience to a person in a position of power (primitive ideology), 
they are today often are seen as acts against the prevailing legal order (collectivist ideology) or as acts against 
certain values or interests (radical ideology). According to Jareborg, the collectivist ideology characterizes 
modern criminal law. N. Jareborg, Scraps of Penal Theory (Uppsala: Iustus Förlag, 2002), 75-80. See also R. 
A. Duff, ‘Conceptions of Crime’, in Flores juris et legum – festskrift till Nils Jareborg (Uppsala: Iustus förlag, 
2002), at 183-195.
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and order.459 Crime prevention and control hence became State tasks and criminal law 
turned into a central State instrument to protect collective and individual interests 
against certain types of interferences.  
That the State plays a central role in criminal law is also reflected in the fact that the 
question of what kinds of wrongs criminal law should deal with often is answered with 
“wrongs that are of public concern.” This distinction between wrongs that are of public 
concern and wrongs that only are of private or individual concern is, however, not easy 
to draw in practice.460 Marshall and Duff, for example, emphasize that this distinction 
is not the same as the distinction between collective and individual wrongs, and that 
the level of seriousness of the wrong does not by itself explain why certain wrongs are 
public wrongs.461 Instead, they argue that the difference lies in the “character of the 
seriousness.”462 The requirement of “higher interests” that go beyond purely individual 
or collective interests is thus characteristic for criminal law. The idea that the crimes are 
not only violations of individual interests that can or should be revenged is connected 
to the idea that punishment presupposes a neutral authority, or to put it another way, an 
authority that represents the public.463
It thus lies in the nature of criminal law that the State and its public officials are 
heavily involved in the production and management of the law. It is due to this extensive 
State involvement that the fact that the perpetrators are public officials is both a practical 
problem and a moral problem for criminal law. Cohen has in this vein argued that “there 
are good moral reasons why any grading of seriousness should take this into account 
– in particular, the fact that the very agent responsible for upholding law, is actually 
responsible for the crime.”464
4.3.  Criminal Law Is a Social Artefact 
Society produces its own idea of evil as it condemns sin and punishes crime.465
That criminal law generally is adopted by legislative bodies, such as democratically 
elected parliaments, stresses another feature of criminal law, namely that criminal law 
is something adopted and created. Christie has in this regard put forward that: “Acts are 
not, they become. So also with crime. Crime does not exist. Crime is created. First there 
459 Max Weber famously defines the State as the entity having the monopoly of the legitimate use of force 
at a particular area. M. Weber, Gesammelte Politische Schriften (München: Drei Masten Verlag, 1921) 397 
[in the essay “Politik als Beruf ”]. Garland has, however, identified a countertrend, and argues that the high 
crime rates in certain modern societies have challenged the idea that States alone can provide security, law 
and order within their territories, and that citizens for that reason are expected to protect their property 
against thefts, etc. Garland 1996, at 448. 
460 Marshall & Duff 1998, at 7.
461 Marshall & Duff 1998, at 7-8.
462 Marshall & Duff 1998, at 8.
463 Fletcher 1998, at 35.
464 Cohen 1993, at 101.
465 P. Allott, The Health of Nations: Society and Law beyond the State (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002), 63.
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are acts. Then follows a long process of giving meaning to these acts.”466 A decision to 
criminalize is thus essentially a political decision, which generally is preceded by moral 
argumentation.467 To some extent the criminalization process is, however, constrained 
by law468 and, for example, practical factors, such as budget considerations. Garland has 
therefore regarding processes of criminalization noted that: 
Broad ideological ambitions may run up against immediate financial constraints, 
political expediency may conflict with established sensibilities, the perceived 
requirements of security may differ from those of morality, the professional interests 
of one group may be in tension with those of another, and the pursuit of any one 
value will generally involve the violation of several others.469 
Criminal law can therefore be called a “cultural artefact” which embodies and expresses 
the cultural forms of society.470 If then a criminalization decision is a political decision 
affected by numerous different types of factors, what can then be said about the function 
or objective of criminal law and the criminal justice system surrounding it? Is the primary 
aim of criminal law the prevention of certain harms, to censure unwanted behaviour, to 
protect particular legal goods or something else? Jareborg has in this regard distinguished 
between ethical motivations (for example, to make the living conditions for people 
living in societies tolerable or to censure unwanted behaviour), political motivations 
(the protection of society and its institutions) and socio-psychological motivations 
(to prevent private revenges).471 One may also question whether the goal of criminal 
law is to deter crime, prevent crimes, provide retribution, rehabilitate offenders etc.472 
Different answers to what the primary objective should be have been presented, but the 
above mentioned functions are usually in some way included in the argumentation. 
Some scholars also find that it is impossible to identify “the” goal of criminal law, that 
is, they find that one instead should focus on identifying more limited goals, such as the 
goal of criminalizations, the goal of conviction/sentencing and the goal of enforcement 
of sentences.473 It is also widely questioned whether criminal law in reality fulfils the 
missions given to it, and especially the goal of general prevention. No modern State 
466 N. Christie, ‘Between Civility and State’, in V. Ruggiero, N. South & I. Taylor (eds.), The New European 
Criminology – Crime and Social Order in Europe (London: Routledge, 1998), at 121. 
467 See e.g., N. Jareborg, Straffrättens ansvarslära (Uppsala: Iustus förlag, 1994), 308. Cohen speaks of the 
“constructionist triangle”: (1) the actual incidence; (2) the public perception of the seriousness of the 
crime problem; and (3) the rhetorical manipulation of the crime problem and public anxiety in media 
and political discourse. S. Cohen, ‘Crime and Politics: Spot the Difference’, 47 British Journal of Sociology 
(1996), at 8.
468 E.g., human rights law prohibiting retroactive criminalization. 
469 Garland 1990, at 285. 
470 Garland 1990, at 193 (regarding punishment). Garland notes that the causality runs in both ways, i.e., 
culture affects what is punishable and punishments form culture. Ibid. 
471 Jareborg 1994, at 328. 
472 Ashworth has, e.g., noted that a difference lies between him and John Braithwaite in that Braithwaite 
stresses the preventive effect of criminal law whereas he sees censure as the main function of criminal law. 
Ashworth 2000, at 249-250.
473 At least in the Nordic countries, it is often argued that a difference should be made between the primary 
goals of criminalizations (general prevention), the goals of the conviction/sentencing stage (retribution) 
and the goals of execution of punishments (individual prevention).  
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has, however, dared to abolish its criminal justice system as a whole.474 Criminal law is 
therefore the normal way to respond to certain unwanted behaviour today, even though 
the legal systems in the world differ in how much and what kind of criminal law they use. 
Generally accepted criminalization criteria are that: (a) a legitimate interest is 
violated or threatened; (b) that a person is culpable to the violation/threat; and (c) that 
the protection of the interest demands a criminalization, that is, criminal law should 
only be used “as a last resort or for the most reprehensible types of wrongdoing.”475 These 
principled criminalization criteria do not, however, alone determine which deeds are 
criminalized and how. The fact that criminal law is something created therefore also 
raises the question of who creates the law, or more specifically, whose interests does the 
law protect. As noted above, in most countries, criminal statutes and codes are adopted 
by democratically elected bodies, such as the parliament, and political considerations 
therefore affect criminalization decisions. Furthermore, in criminology, it has become 
popular to speak about moral entrepreneurs (for example, mass media, interest 
groups) who influence the legislators.476 “Moral panics” have also been found to affect 
criminalization decisions.477 Cohen has explained the term of moral panics by noting 
that: “Societies appear to be subject, every now and then, to periods of moral panic. A 
condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become defined as a threat 
to societal values and interests; its nature is presented in a stylized and stereotypical 
fashion by the mass media”.478 Moral panics may arise, for example, as a result of shocking 
incidents (such as the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks) or as a result of media attention 
given to a particular societal phenomenon. The political decision-making preceding 
criminalizations and the phenomena of moral entrepreneurs/panics emphasize that the 
content of criminal law is not only determined by “objective” criminalization criteria, 
such as the societal harmfulness of the behaviour. 
In this regard, critical criminologists have stressed the role played by societal 
conflict and domination in criminalization processes.479 They have more specifically 
pointed out that criminal law traditionally has focused on the criminality of the working 
class and deviants, whereas the crimes of the powerful largely have gone unrecognized 
and unpunished.480 From the point of view of this study the following argument made by 
Norrie is interesting: due to the fact that criminal law primarily is used to deal with the 
“criminal classes” of society and hence street or garden-variety criminality, it has been 
474 Jareborg 1994, at 328.
475 Jareborg 1995(b), at 22. See further Section 4.4.2. 
476 The concept of moral entrepreneurs is often connected to Howard Becker. H. S. Becker, Outsiders: 
Studies in the Sociology of Deviance (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963).
477 The concept of moral panics is often connected to Jock Young and Stanley Cohen. See further J. Young, 
‘The Role of the Police as Amplifiers of Deviancy, Negotiators of Reality and Translators of Fantasy: Some 
Consequences of Our Present System of Drug Control as Seen in Notting Hill’, in S. Cohen (ed.), Images of 
Deviance (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1971), at 37, and S. Cohen, Folk Devils & Moral Panics – The 
Creation of the Mods and Rockers (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1972/1980).
478 Cohen 1972/1980, at 9. In Young’s definition of moral panics, the societal reaction to a phenomenon 
is always “grossly disproportionate to the event or the activities of the individuals concerned”. J. Young, 
‘Moral Panic: Its Origins in Resistance, Resentment and the Translation of Fantasy into Reality’, 49 British 
Journal of Criminology (2009), at 13.    
479 Einstadter & Henry 1995, at 227. 
480 See further Burke 2001, at 173 and 177.
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formed in a way that suits that criminality. The flip-side is hence that criminal law has not 
really been designed to deal with “respectable criminals”, such as corporate leaders, State 
officials or “ordinary people”.481 As criminal law today increasingly is used the address 
criminality that cannot be categorized as street criminality (for example, environmental, 
economic and international criminality) the need to revise some established criminal 
law doctrines has arisen. 
4.4.  Criminal Law Is Connected to Pain Infliction
4.4.1.  Criminal Law and Pain Infliction
The most central characteristic of criminal law is, however, probably the fact that criminal 
law is connected to the threat of intentional pain infliction or punishment. Criminal law 
is, in fact, called penal law in many languages.482 Many punishments entail interferences 
with basic human rights. The right to freedom of movement is, for example, affected 
by imprisonment sentences and the right to life by death penalties. In addition to the 
pain that the punishment itself entails, criminal law is furthermore characterized by 
its censuring nature. It is generally more stigmatizing to be punished in a criminal law 
procedure than to receive a civil sanction. The line between criminal punishment and 
civil/administrative sanctions is, however, not drawn similarly in all legal systems. Due 
to this, for example, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has had to decide 
whether certain domestic proceedings fall under Article 6 of the European Convention 
of Human Rights (ECHR) and a person hence is “charged with a criminal offence” 
even though certain has sanctions have been classified as a civil or administrative in 
domestic law. In those determinations, the degree of severity of the penalty has been a 
central criterion.483 Criminal law is thus essentially about inflicting pain and not about 
forgiveness or mercy.
The close connection between criminal law and pain infliction has entailed 
a vivid discussion on how the practice of pain infliction can be legitimized. With 
respect to legitimizing criminal law, a difference is often made between retributive and 
utilitarian thinking.484 In retributive thinking, the connection between wrongdoing and 
punishment is emphasized.485 In utilitarian thinking, on the other hand, the focus is on 
481 Norrie 2001, at 82.
482 Fletcher, however, notes that in some legal systems it is not only punitive sanctions, but e.g., treatment, 
that is included in the “penal law”. Fletcher 2007(a), at 69-73. 
483 See e.g., Benham v. United Kingdom, Judgment, GC, ECtHR, 10 June 1996, para. 56, Engel and Others 
v. The Netherlands, Judgment, PL, ECtHR, 8 June 1976, para. 82, and Ravnsborg v. Sweden, Judgment, CH, 
ECtHR, 23 March 1994, para. 35. 
484 Norrie has argued that there is a connection between the emergence of the liberal ideal of criminal justice 
with its emphasis on individual responsibility and the development of modern theories of punishment. A. 
W. Norrie, Law, Ideology and Punishment – Retrieval and Critique of the Liberal Ideal of Criminal Justice 
(Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991), 15.
485 Fletcher, on his parts, argues that punishment may be imposed: (1) for a criminal act (act-based criminal 
law); (2) due to guilt (guilt-based criminal law); or (3) on an offender as a person (actor-based criminal 
law). Fletcher 2007(a), at 27-37.  
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what the punishment should bring about, that is, for example, deterrence, prevention 
and incapacitation. From the point of view of this study, the more interesting question 
is, however, what the pain infliction feature has entailed for the content of criminal law. 
The fact that punishment entails intentional pain infliction has led to various 
safeguards against arbitrary exercise of public power. As noted above, today discretionary 
and non-uniform decision-making in criminal law matters is generally regarded 
as “scandalous and unjust.”486 The various safeguards are often called the principles 
of rule of law. Whereas the extensively used concept of “rule of law” has been given 
different definitions in different contexts, in the criminal law context it is, however, often 
connected with principles or values such as consistency as between laws, possibility of 
compliance, congruence between declared rule and official response, non-retroactivity, 
clarity, relative stability, publicity, and generality.487 In a similar vein, Jareborg has argued 
that a criminal law policy which follows the values of a Rechtsstaat is characterized 
by both certain principles for criminalization (a crime presupposes that a legitimate 
interest has been violated or threatened, criminal responsibility presupposes culpability, 
criminalizations must be general, that is, not directed towards specific individuals, 
the crime definitions must be understandable, etc.), certain procedural safeguards (the 
existence of independent courts, the placing of the burden of proof on the prosecutor, the 
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, etc.) and certain sentencing principles 
(proportionality between crime and punishment and parity between punishments for 
equally reprehensible crimes).488 Some of these principles identified by Jareborg will now 
be considered in greater detail.  
4.4.2.  The Pain Infliction and Its Consequences for Substantive Criminal Law
Jareborg has thus argued that the fact that criminal law is connected to pain infliction 
entails that the law to be rational should protect certain essential values or interests.489 
There is some disagreement on what interests criminal law should protect, but those 
that are protected through criminal law, however, often include fundamental rights and 
freedoms of individuals (for example, life, physical integrity, psychological integrity, 
property and sexual integrity), public security and the security of the State.490 Jareborg 
has, in this regard, however, noted that it is not enough that there is an interest worth 
protecting. The question of how deserving certain behaviour is of punishment is namely 
not only related to what interests are violated but how direct the relationship is between 
the act/omission and the interest violation (for example, the difference between to kill 
486 Garland 1990, at 205-206 (with reference to Beattie’s study concerning England).
487 N. Lacey, State Punishment – Political Principles and Community Values (London/New York: Routledge, 
1988), 149. 
488 Jareborg 1995(b), at 22-23. 
489 Jareborg 1994, at 328. 
490 Cohen has noted that what some authors call legally protected interests, is very close to what is 
understood by human rights. Cohen 1993, at 101. Jareborg has in relation to this noted that there seems to 
a much greater universal agreement on what it, e.g., means to hurt another person than what a good life is. 
Jareborg 1994, at 290. Garland, on his part, points out that even though there is an agreement that murder 
shall be criminal, there are great variations in the exact understanding of most concepts (e.g., is abortion 
murder?). Garland 1990, at 57.
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intentionally and to put somebody’s life in danger).491 The principle that not all interests 
worth of protecting should be protected through criminal law is also reflected in the 
principle of criminal law as ultima ratio, which establishes that criminal law should only 
be used when no other suitable means exist.492 Criminal law is thus not something that 
can solve all social problems.493
The fact that criminal law is connected to pain infliction is also reflect in the 
principle of nullum crimen, nulla poena sine praevia lege poenali, that is, no crime, 
no punishment without previous penal law. This legality principle has been a central 
criminal law principle in many legal systems since the Enlightenment period. In France, 
for example, the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen asserted it. In Germany, 
the influential legal scholar von Feuerbach gave the principle its famous Latin maxim in 
the early 19th century. Today, it is also codified in many human rights instruments.494 
In many legal systems, the legality principle is understood to require that criminal law: 
(1) should be statutory law (lex scripta); (2) that criminal law should be not be to open 
and vague (lex certa); (3) that criminal law should not be retroactively applied to the 
detriment of the accused person; and (4) that analogy should not be accepted in criminal 
law contexts. The criminal law should thus be foreseeable and fair in order to make it 
possible for individuals to plan their lives so that they can avoid the coercive intervention 
of the criminal law.495 As will be considered to some extent in the next chapter, due to the 
fact that international criminal law accepts customary international law, the principle of 
nullum crimen sine lege has been interpreted rather liberally in international criminal law. 
It is, however, clearly established that “the prosecution and punishment of an individual 
for acts which he reasonably believed to be lawful at the time of their commission” is not 
acceptable.496
4.4.3.  The Pain Infliction and Its Consequences for Procedural Criminal Law
For many, criminal law is characterized by the procedural law that is connected to it.497 
Due to the connection between crime and punishment, most legal systems provide 
491 Jareborg 1994, at 330 and 332. 
492 See e.g., Fletcher 2007(a), at 157 and 262, and N. Jareborg, ‘Criminalization as Last Resort (Ultima Ratio)’, 
2 Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law (2005), at 524 ff. Cf. Ashworth who has argued that criminal law 
should only be used in cases of “serious wrongdoing”. A. Ashworth, ‘Conceptions of Overcriminalization’, 
5 Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law (2008), at 408.  
493 Jareborg makes a difference between a defensive criminal law policy, which follows the values of a 
Rechtsstaat, and an offensive approach, where criminal law primarily is seen as a means to solve social 
problems. Jareborg argues that criminal law should be designed in accordance with the defensive model. 
Jareborg 1995(b), at 21-28 and 33. 
494 E.g., Article 11(2), UDHR, Article 15, ICCPR, and Article 7, ECHR.
495 Lacey 1988, at 149. 
496 Delalić et al., Judgement, TC, ICTY, 16 November 1998, para. 313. See also e.g., Delalić et al., Judgement, 
AC, ICTY, 20 February 2001, paras 179-180, and Göring et al., Judgment, IMT, 1 October 1946, at 219.
497 See e.g., Ashworth 2000, at 230. This is so, even though also the procedural systems of the world vary. 
See e.g., V. Tochilovsky, ‘Legal Systems and Cultures in the International Criminal Court: The Experience 
from the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’, in H. Fischer, C. Kreß & S. R. Lüder 
(eds.), International and National Prosecution of Crimes under International Law (Berlin: Arno Spitz 
GmbH, 2001), at 627-644.
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greater procedural protections in criminal trials than in civil or administrative hearings.498 
Individuals accused of crimes thus have the right to certain fair trial rights. These rights 
have today been codified in many human rights instruments and include the right to a 
fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established 
by law, the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law, the right 
to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of one’s defence, the right to be 
tried without undue delay, and the right not to be compelled to testify against oneself or 
to confess guilt.499 
As this study focuses on substantive criminal law, it is the consequences of the 
fair trial rights on the law of evidence that is of special interest here. It is generally 
recognized that defendants in criminal law cases have the right to the “benefit of doubt.” 
A criminal law conviction therefore requires that an individual is found guilty beyond 
reasonable doubt. This among other things entails that a “not guilty” outcome in a 
criminal proceedings does not have to correspond with “not guilty in reality.” Criminal 
trials produce a procedural truth which, among other things, is affected by the evidence 
presented at trial. This is especially evident in certain legal systems, where the accepted 
evidence is strictly defined and the trials are rather a battle between the prosecutor and 
the defence team than an “objective” inquiry into the truth.
It should also be recognized that the possible outcome in many criminal justice 
systems is “guilty” and “not guilty”.500 Zehr has in relation to this observed that: “Legally 
the question of guilt is an either-or question. Degrees of severity of the offense may vary, 
but in the end there are no degrees of guilt. One is guilty or not guilty.”501 The guilty-
not guilty dichotomy has been found especially problematic in relation to international 
criminality as it is often large-scale bystander support that makes the criminality possible. 
This raises the question of how non-criminal bystanders should be distinguished from 
criminally responsible aiders and abettors. 
In criminal law limitations must hence be made between legally relevant and 
irrelevant facts. This may entail that the complexities of the real world become overlooked. 
4.5.  Criminal Law Focuses on Individual Human Behaviour 
4.5.1.  The “Juridical Individual” 
That criminal law focuses on individual behaviour is a further characteristic of modern 
criminal law. The origin of the focus on individual behaviour has also been traced back 
to the Enlightenment period. In the 17th−18th centuries, the idea that the basic units of 
society were discrete and autonomous individuals namely gained ground.502 Before that, 
the ultimate units of society and also, for example, responsibility had been the clan, the 
498 Fletcher 1998, at 26.
499 See further e.g., Article 10, UDHR, Article 14, ICCPR, and Article 6, ECHR.
500 In Scottish criminal law, the outcome “not proven” is, however also possible. ‘Scots Law – Criminal 
Courts and Procedure’ available at http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/Justice/legal/criminalprocedure 
(last visited 3 May 2012).
501 H. Zehr, Changing Lenses (Scottdale: Herald Press, 1995), 67. 
502 See e.g., E. H. Wolgast, The Grammar of Justice (Ithaca: Cornell University Press) 1-27. 
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kinship group or the family.503 The individuality that Enlightenment brought about was, 
however, not individuality as the term often is understood today. In the individuality of 
Enlightenment, the focus was not namely on the innumerable differences between various 
persons, but on a certain characteristic common to most people, that is, essentially the 
ability to reason and calculate.504 Abstractions such as the “economic man” date back to 
the Enlightenment period. In line with this, Norrie has argued that modern criminal 
law is based upon an ideological representation of human life through the idea of the 
abstract legal individual or “juridical individual.”505 This juridical individual is, according 
to Norrie, characterized by psychological individualism, which signifies that the contexts 
in which individuals operate as much as possible are excluded from the realm of criminal 
law.506 The consequence of this is that the social and political conflicts existing in societies 
largely are overlooked by criminal law.507 The individual focus of criminal law has also had 
consequences on how collective action and collective units are perceived. Fletcher has 
pointed out that the law focuses on “individuals in their transactions with each other” and 
that “even when addressing complex systems of interaction” they are treated “as though 
they were single agents.” “Collective entities, their actions, their responsibility, and their 
guilt” are therefore, according to Fletcher, “ideas that run afoul of the methodological 
commitments of the legal mind.”508 This being said, for example, corporate criminal 
responsibility is today accepted in a number of domestic jurisdictions.509 To some extent, 
modern criminal law has therefore been forced to look beyond the juridical individual. 
503 J. Feinberg, Doing & Deserving – Essays in the Theory of Responsibility (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1970), 235. 
504 Norrie 2001, at 21.
505 Norrie 2001, at 231.
506 Norrie 2001, at 223. See also Zehr 1995, at 70-73. It is sometimes argued that criminal law reflects 
the “folk psychological theory”, which explains behaviour in terms of desires, beliefs and intentions. This 
approach has been supported by Morse, who argues that “[d]iscovering a cause for behavior, whether it is 
biological, psychological or social, does not mean that the agent is not responsible” since “[a]ll behavior 
has causes”. That something (e.g., a personality trait or the environment) makes criminal behaviour more 
predictable is thus not, according to him, per se a reason to exclude responsibility. Only when a cause, 
such as deprivation, severely diminishes an individual’s capacity for rationality does Morse think that 
the cause should excuse the individual. More himself categories himself as a compatibilist, who does not 
regard free will thinking (liberitarianism) and determinism to be mutually exclusive. S. J. Morse, ‘Criminal 
Responsibility and the Disappearing Person’, 28 Cardozo Law Review (2007), at 2551-2554 and 2569. See 
also S. J. Morse, ‘Rationality and Responsibility’, 74 Southern California Law Review (2000), at 256 and 263.
507 Norrie 2001, at 223. Second, there is the component of political individualism, which entails a 
strengthening of the status of individuals in relation to the State. For Norrie, the juridical individual thus 
has a dualistic character, as “judged against the actualities of human life, it functions to repress individuals; 
measured against the strength of state power, it can act to defend them.” Ibid., at 224.
508 Fletcher 2002(b), at 1511. 
509 On corporate criminal liability, see e.g., H. Jaatinen, Oikeushenkilön rangaistusvastuu (Helsinki: 
Lakimiesliiton kustannus, 2000), Norrie 2001, at 92 ff.,  and B. Swart et al., ‘International Trends towards 
Establishing Some Form of Punishment for Corporations’, 6 Journal of International Criminal Justice 
(2008), at 947 ff. Jaatinen has observed that the traditional conception of a crime has been developed 
with a human offender in mind and that it therefore is impossible to apply it without modifications to 
corporations. Jaatinen 2000, at 16. Also Swart considers to what extent corporations may act and be 
morally culpable, that is, how corporations may fulfil the requirements for criminal responsibility. Swart 
in Swart et al. 2008, at 950-951.  
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The “juridical individual” is like much other modern criminal law thinking an 
outcome of the reaction against the highly discretionary criminal law that preceded 
modern criminal law. The merit of the “juridical individual” is its connection to equality 
thinking. All human beings have certain things in common and the focus should be 
placed on these common characteristics and not on individual life circumstances. In real 
life, however, there exists inequality and life circumstances, which means that juridical 
individual thinking also entails that reality is simplified and morally significant differences 
can be overlooked. Criminal law is, however, not generally interested in finding out how 
average people act or think. The law rather makes normative assessments. For example, 
when it is considered what a “reasonable man” would have done, it is evaluated what “is 
right for persons to think, feel and behave– or, at the very least, ways in which it is not 
wrong for them to do so.”510 
The modern criminal law is, however, not throughout based on the idea of the 
abstract legal individual. Garland has observed that the Enlightenment ideals stressing 
formal justice later on have been challenged by another justice conception, which 
requires that consideration is given to individual situations and interests.511 In Garlands 
opinion, many of the problems and dilemmas criminal law faces today (for example, 
how to reconcile the need to individualize sentences and the principle of equality) are 
the result of contradictory conceptions of justice which exist side by side within modern 
culture.512 
4.5.2.  The Requirement of Individual Culpability
For criminal responsibility to become topical there must be a wrongdoer, a criminal 
agent, that is, “someone who does the wrong and can be held responsible for it.”513 As 
noted, based on the traditional criminal law way of thinking it is thus essentially only 
individuals who can act and be guilty from a criminal law perspective. Natural events are 
of no interest to criminal law.514 Nor are the acts of persons who are unable to form valid 
intentions, that is, the insane or children under a certain age. In criminal law, the agent 
is thus usually a natural person possessing certain intellectual capacities, or to put it 
another way, a certain mental maturity. Criminal law is thus based on the idea of rational 
human beings who can make choices regarding behaviour and action.515 In this context, 
Fletcher has argued that: 
Legal systems vary in the extent to which they show respect for offenders and 
suspected offenders as subjects rather than objects. One primary mode of expressing 
this respect is found in the rule that punishment is imposed only for human actions, 
that is, for the crimes committed by human beings when they act as subjects. The 
510 P. Westen, ‘Individualizing the Reasonable Person in Criminal Law’, 2 Criminal Law and Philosophy 
(2008), at 138. 
511 Garland 1990, at 206.
512 Garland 1990, at 206-207.
513 Marshall & Duff 1998, at 14. 
514 See e.g., Fletcher 1998, at 60, and S. H. Kadish, ‘Complicity, Cause and Blame: A Study in the 
Interpretation of Doctrine’, 73 California Law Review (1985), at 330.
515 E.g., Osiel argues that criminal law embodies liberal assumptions of human nature, that is, that 
individuals have moral autonomy and rational capacity. Osiel 1995, at 469. 
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requirement is called the “act requirement,” and it is as close to a universal requirement 
of criminal justice that exists.516 
For criminal responsibility to arise, it is, however, rarely enough that a person with certain 
faculties has caused harm (strict responsibility). What is furthermore needed is often 
called culpability or a “guilty mind” (or to use the Latin term mens rea). The principle 
of culpability (nulla poena sine culpa) is often mentioned as one of the fundaments of 
modern criminal law.517 This viewpoint is reflected, among other things, in the case 
law of the ECtHR, where culpability requirements have been found characteristic for 
criminal proceedings and hence criminal law.518 Legal systems, however, vary somewhat 
in how they define the requirement of culpability.519 In common law jurisdictions, it is 
common to speak of mens rea and to denote with this either intention to commit the 
crime or recklessness as to whether a crime will occur as a result of one’s actions.520 An 
act can be said to be intentional when it is done with the aim of carrying out the act.521 
Recklessness, on the other hand, is characterized by the creation of a substantial and 
unjustifiable risk of harm to others and by a conscious disregard for or indifference to that 
risk.522 Whereas intent and recklessness is generally regarded as enough for establishing 
criminal fault, criminal responsibility for negligence is more exceptional.523 Negligence 
516 Fletcher 1998, at 43-44.
517 Jareborg 2005, at 522. 
518 See further Ashworth 2000, at 230. It should, however, be noted that the ECtHR has not ruled out strict 
criminal liability completely. See e.g., Salabiaku v. France, Judgment, CH, ECtHR, 7 October 1988, para. 
27.
519 It should be noted that concepts of mens rea and culpability can be used in two different meanings. 
On the one hand, the concepts can be given a descriptive function and in these situations mens rea or 
culpability signifies that the defendant acted with the mental state required by the law (e.g., acted with 
intent). On the other hand, the concepts can be used in a normative (or evaluative) sense and then they 
imply that the individual actor meets the criteria for being blamed for the action (that is, in the normative 
understanding, it is impossible to argue that someone is culpable if the person has, e.g., been excused). 
While the descriptive use has been regular in common law jurisdictions, civil law jurisdictions generally 
give the concept a normative understanding. See e.g., G. P. Fletcher, ‘Criminal Theory in the Twentieth 
Century’, 2 Theoretical Inquiries in Law (2001), at 273-274, and Fletcher 2007(a), at 288. Likewise, Jescheck 
has differentiated between culpability as “the requirement of mens rea” and culpability as a “court’s 
conviction that the defendant is personally reproachable for the crime”. H.-H. Jescheck, ‘The General 
Principles of International Criminal Law Set Out in Nuremberg, as Mirrored in the ICC Statute’, 2 Journal 
of International Criminal Justice (2004), at 44.
520 Norrie 2001, at 35, and Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th ed. (2009) (‘mens rea’). See also e.g., H. L. A. Hart, 
Punishment and Responsibility – Essays in the Philosophy of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), 114-115 
and 117.  
521 Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th ed. (2009) (‘intentional’). 
522 Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th ed. (2009) (‘reckless’). 
523 E.g., A. Ashworth, ‘Further Notes on Coherence in Criminal Justice’, in Flores juris et legum – festskrift 
till Nils Jareborg (Uppsala: Iustus förlag, 2002), at 19, and Ashworth 2008, at 411. Finkelstein observes that 
the idea that negligence is an unsuitable base for criminal responsibility was most famously articulated 
by J.W.C. Turner (1936), whereas H.L.A. Hart (1968) has defended criminal negligence (not as a state 
of mind, but as an failure to live up to an objective standard of conduct). C. Finkelstein, ‘Responsibility 
for Unintended Consequences’, 2 Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law (2005), at 579-580. Hart himself, 
however, notes that he does not advocate punishing negligence, but merely wants to show that it is not a 
form of strict liability. Hart 1968, at 157.  
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denotes the failure to exercise the standard of care that a reasonably prudent person 
would have exercised in a similar situation.524 Often the criminal responsibility for 
negligence demands that the deviance from the reasonable standard has been significant, 
that is, for example, that the negligence can be characterized as gross negligence. The 
distinction between intent, recklessness and negligence stresses that culpability is not 
merely something that is used to distinguish criminal behaviour from non-criminal 
behaviour, but to grade blameworthiness. 
In civil law jurisdictions, a difference is often made between dolus and culpa, so 
that dolus approximately stands for intent and culpa for negligence.525 Also in civil law 
jurisdictions, “[d]olus crime is [...] the archetype, but the trend is to criminalize negligent 
behaviour increasingly.”526 This is the case especially for gross negligence.527 Furthermore, 
in civil law jurisdictions, it is common to differentiate between different types of dolus 
to make the categorization more nuanced. A common distinction is that between dolus 
determinatus (or direct intention, the goal of the perpetrator has been to achieve the 
outcome of the crime), dolus directus (or almost certain knowledge, the objective of the 
perpetrator has not been to achieve a certain outcome, but he/she must have known that 
the outcome will be the one that has been realized) and dolus eventualis (the objective 
of the person has not been to achieve the realized outcome, but he/she knows that a 
certain outcome is possible and remains indifferent or accepting to this possibility).528 In 
comparative contexts, it is especially the relationship between common law “recklessness” 
and civil law “dolus eventualis” that has been debated. Some legal scholars equate these 
524 Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th ed. (2009) (‘negligence’).
525 In civil law jurisdictions, it is common to distinguish between: (a) the requirement that the offence 
elements are fulfilled; (b) the requirement that the act/omission has been wrongful; and (c) the requirement 
of personal guilt. The question of whether the offender has acted with intention is today often considered 
as a question of whether the offence elements are fulfilled (and not as a question of personal guilt). See 
e.g., G. Taylor, ‘Concepts of Intention in German Criminal Law’, 24 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (2004), 
at 120. In this regard, also the distinction between act-oriented culpa (or fault) and actor-oriented culpa 
(or guilt) should be noted. E.g., N. Jareborg, Essays in Criminal Law (Uppsala: Iustus förlag, 1988), at 29, 
and Jareborg 1994, at 36-37. A similar distinction is that between the questions: (a) whether the offender 
generally speaking should have acted otherwise (Finnish teon huolimattomuus); and (b) whether the 
actor can be blamed for the way he/she acted (Finnish tekijän huolimattomuus). V. Hahto, Tuottamus 
vahingonkorvausoikeudessa (Helsinki: WSOY, 2008) 13. Others, however, see intention as a question 
of whether there has been personal guilt. S. Melander, Rikosoikeus 2010-luvulla (Helsinki: Helsingin 
yliopiston oikeustieteellinen tiedekunta, 2010) 90. Due to international criminal law’s orientation towards 
the common law’s mens rea thinking, intent is considered here in connection to the question of culpability. 
526 Jareborg 2002, at 45. Hörnle has noted that in German law there are more crimes that can be committed 
negligently than in American and English law (common law jurisdictions). T. Hörnle, ‘Social Expectations 
in the Criminal Law: The ‘Reasonable Person’ in a Comparative Perspective’, 11 New Criminal Law Review 
(2008), at 6. 
527 E.g., in Finland, a difference is made between gross negligence (törkeä tuottamus) and negligence 
(tuottamus) and both forms of responsibility demand that the criminal code explicitly stipulates that 
negligence can be the basis for criminal responsibility. Criminal Code of Finland, Chapter 3, Sections 5 and 
7. Most provisions in the criminal code providing for negligence responsibility demand gross negligence. 
See further e.g., A.-M. Nuutila, Rikosoikeudellinen huolimattomuus (Helsinki: Lakimiesliiton kustannus, 
1996), 581, 590-591, and 612.
528 See e.g., K. Nuotio & M. Majanen, Rikosoikeuden poluilla (Helsinki: Helsingin yliopisto, 2003), at 51-53, 
and Taylor 2004, at 106. Generally on intent in criminal law, see further e.g., J. Matikkala, Tahallisuudesta 
rikosoikeudessa (Helsinki: Suomalainen lakimiesyhdistys, 2005).  
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concepts,529 whereas others point to differences. For example, Fletcher has argued that 
whereas dolus eventualis refers to a negative attitude towards causing harm (a certain 
attitude), the common law recklessness only requires the conscious running of an 
unjustified risk (certain knowledge).530 Duff has, however, argued that recklessness can 
be viewed both as a choice (a conscious and unjustified risk-taking) and as an attitude (an 
indifference to the consequences of one’s action).531 
In all criminal justice systems, the intent is thus central even though the systems define 
the concept somewhat differently. In certain legal systems, a difference is, for example, not 
made between intent and recklessness, which can cause confusion in comparative contexts. 
This divergence in understanding of what constitutes intent is partly due to the fact that the 
concept can be used in different meanings both in everyday speech and in legal parlance. 
Duff has, for example, held that there are two strands of judicial thought about the legal 
meaning of this concept. The first one analyses intention in terms of desire and foresight. An 
agent intends both those consequences which he wants to come about and those which he 
foresees as being to some appropriate degree likely or probable. The second strand explains 
intention in terms of what the agent decides to do.532 This difference in use is reflected in the 
distinction between intention in relation to the consequence and intention in relation to the 
conduct. It is also reflected in the distinction between intending a result and bringing about 
the result intentionally. For example, Duff has argued that: 
The paradigm distinguishes an action’s intended effects, which an agent acts in order to 
bring about, from its foreseen side-effects, which she expects and might want, but does 
not act in order to bring about. [...] Philosophers as well as jurists sometimes include 
expected side-effects within the scope of intention. [...]. I do not intend [...] the expected 
side-effects of my action; but I might be said to bring them about intentionally.533
Criminal law generally demands intention in relation to the conduct and consequences, 
but certain crimes also demand that an act or omission is committed with a certain further 
outcome in mind. These crimes are often called specific intent crimes.534 Specific intent 
should be distinguished from motives that refer to “the reason [..., the] consequences are 
desirable to the actor”.535 It is generally held that the motives are irrelevant in criminal law 
when guilt determinations are made.
529 E.g., Cassese 2008, at 58 and 66.
530 Fletcher 2007(a), at 317. Taylor has, however, emphasized that dolus eventualis has both a cognitive 
element and a requirement of a particular attitude. Taylor 2004, at 109-110.  
531 R. A. Duff, Intention, Agency & Criminal Liability – Philosophy of Action and the Criminal Law (Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1990), 140 ff.
532 For Duff neither of these definitions is, however, of great clarity. Duff 1990, at 18.
533  Duff 1990, at 74-76 (see also at 36-37). He also makes a difference between: (1) intended effects (i.e., 
reason for action); (2) expected side-effects which provide reason against action; and (3) expected side-
effects, which provide no reason either for or against the action. He notes that the first two are brought 
about intentionally. Category 3 side-effects are “effects which the agent does not act with the intention of 
bringing about, but which are properly ascribed to her as their responsible agent.” Ibid., at 79.
534 See e.g., Duff 1990, at 38, and Hart 1968, at 117-118, 120-121 and 125.  
535 M. T. Rosenberg, ‘The Continued Relevance of the Irrelevance-of-Motive Maxim’, 57 Duke Law Journal 
(2008), at 1146. E.g., a person may intentionally kill another person (general intent) with the intent to 
participate in the destruction of a particular societal group (specific intent) with the underlying desire to 
gain personal advantages (motive). See further Section 6.3.5.2.
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Besides intent, a guilty mind also prerequisites a certain cognitive element, namely 
knowledge. Knowledge can be defined as awareness that a circumstance exists or a 
consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events.536 Cassese has observed that 
while knowledge in many common law jurisdictions clearly is distinguished from the 
volatile aspect of the mens rea, it in many civil law jurisdictions is part of the dolus or 
culpa.537 
Lacey has observed that the focus on intention, recklessness, foresight, knowledge 
etc. represents a capacity-based viewpoint on responsibility, which is characteristic for 
modern criminal law.538 At the same time, other conceptions of responsibility (continue 
to) co-exist and influence the formation of the law, namely character principles of 
responsibility and outcome responsibility.539 In the same way as Garland, Lacey has 
therefore questioned the assumption of some criminal law theorists that criminal law 
today is based on one coherent principle of responsibility.540 This being said, capacity-
based conceptions of responsibility dominate in the criminal law today.   
4.5.3.  Acts and Omissions that Are Connected to the Causing of Harm 
It has been observed that the primary interest of criminal law is the harmful consequences 
of human action.541 It has therefore been suggested that only individual behaviour that 
causes harm or another relevant change in the external world should be criminalized. 
That an individual through his/her acts or omissions causes harm or at least substantially 
contributed to its occurrence, that is, causation or contributory fault, is thus generally a 
prerequisite for criminal responsibility.542 In rare cases, it is accepted in criminal law that 
the contributory fault of one person is ascribed to another person (vicarious liability).543 
536 Article 30(3), ICC Statute. Clark notes that the reference to circumstances “was a crucial one, and 
caused much debate later in the process of drafting the Elements.” R. S. Clark, ‘The Mental Element in 
International Criminal Law: The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and the Elements of 
Offences’, 12 Criminal Law Forum (2001), at 306.
537 Cassese 2008, at 61-62. 
538 N. Lacey, ‘Space, Time and Function: Intersecting Principles of Responsibility across the Terrain of 
Criminal Justice’, 1 Criminal Law and Philosophy (2007), at 236 and 246. The human capacities of cognition 
and volition hence today lie as the foundation of criminal law. Ibid., at 236.
539 Lacey distinguishes between two types of character principles: (1) the overall-character principle arguing 
that the “defendant’s conduct is evidence of a wrongful, bad, disapproved character trait”; and (2) the more 
cautious form of character responsibility restricting the evaluation of the specific conduct which forms 
the basis of the present allegation. Lacey 2007, at 238-239. In outcome responsibility, “being the cause of a 
particular outcome may under certain circumstances ground an attribution of responsibility”. Ibid., at 239. 
540 Lacey 2007, at 240 and 246. 
541 E.g., Fletcher 1998, at 60. Fletcher notes that the production of certain harms per definition requires 
human action (e.g., rape). In other cases, the harm can be caused both by human action and natural events 
(e.g., death of a human being). In these cases, it must first be settled whether the harm was caused by 
human action or a natural event, before the question of individual responsibility at all becomes topical. 
Ibid., at 60-61.
542 E.g., Feinberg 1970, at 222, and Norrie 2001, at 134. The question of what criteria of causation should 
be applied in criminal law (or in a particular criminal law decision-making situation) is a complicated one 
and the alternatives are many. See further e.g., P. K. Ryu, ‘Causation in Criminal Law’, 106 University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review (1958), at 786 ff.  
543 Feinberg 1970, at 227. 
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In these rare cases, there is usually a special relationship between the person in fault and 
the person held liable, for example, a superior-subordinate relationship that is deemed 
to justify the extended liability.544 The main rule is, however, that criminal responsibility 
requires both personal fault (causation or participation) and personal guilt (guilty mind). 
According to modern criminal law, criminal responsibility for the acts and thoughts of 
others is thus generally found unacceptable as well as collective criminal responsibility.545 
In practice, it may, however, be difficult to draw the line between acceptable and 
unacceptable responsibility for the acts of others in situations where many people act 
together.546 
Criminal responsibility thus generally presupposes that harm has been caused and 
individual fault in relation to that harm. To a certain degree, it is, however, accepted that 
behaviour that only entails an increased risk of harm can lead to criminal responsibility 
(so-called endangerment offences) and, in fact, these types of criminalizations have 
become more common.547 Significantly, criminal responsibility, however, always requires 
blameworthy behaviour. Personal characteristics or dispositions, social status or position 
or mere thoughts are hence today generally held as factors that cannot function as the 
base for criminal responsibility.548 A central element in crime definitions is therefore 
the description of the unlawful deed or conduct. In common law jurisdictions, this 
is often called the actus reus part of the crime definition.549 In civil law jurisdictions, 
on the other hand, it is generally held that criminal responsibility presupposes that all 
offence elements as they have been defined in a criminal statute are satisfied (German 
Tatbestandsmäßigkeit). The aim of actus reus element is to limit the criminal legislation 
by requiring a specification of the conduct that will incur responsibility. 
In most cases, the actus reus is a particular act, but it may also consist of an 
omission. The reason why criminal law is more focused on acts than omissions550 has 
by Norrie been explained by the liberal worldview on which criminal law is based 
and in which duties to act mainly are established by contractual obligations.551 Some 
544 Feinberg has noted that: “In short, liability can transfer, but not agency, causation, or fault [...], and 
certainly not guilt.” Feinberg 1970, at 233. 
545 See e.g., Cassese 2008, at 33, and Tadić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 15 July 1999, para. 186. The prohibition 
against collective punishments has explicitly been endorsed in international humanitarian law. See 
e.g., Article 87, GC III, Article 33, GC IV, Article 75, AP I, and Article 4, AP II. See also Human Rights 
Committee, General Comment No. 29, para. 11 (UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11).
546 This question will be considered further in Chapter 7. 
547 See e.g., H. Takala, ‘On Risks and Criminal Law’, in A. Snare (ed.), Beware of Punishment – On the Utility 
and Futility of Criminal Law (Oslo: Pax Forlag A/S, 1995), at 52-53. According to Nuotio, the increased 
focus on activities that have a high risk on causing harm has entailed that criminal law has started to pay 
more attention to organizatorial wrongdoing, where the focus is not so much on the causal relationship 
between happenings, but rather on who bears the responsibility based on the distribution of responsibility 
in the organization. K. Nuotio, ‘Yhteiskunnallistuva rikosoikeus’, Lakimies (1998), at 593.
548 E.g., B. M. Baker, ‘Theorizing about Responsibility and Criminal Liability’, 11 Law and Philosophy 
(1992), at 408-409 (discussing the Anglo-American act doctrine), and Wallerstein 2007, at 2700. 
549 Actus reus is a Latin term that denotes “guilty act” or “deed of crime”. Black’s Law Dictionary defines 
actus reus as the wrongful deed that comprises the physical components of a crime. Black’s Law Dictionary, 
9th ed. (2009) (‘actus reus’). 
550 In certain legal systems (e.g., Anglo-American criminal law), omission responsibility is exceptional. 
Norrie 2001, at 120.
551 Norrie 2001, at 124-125.
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legal scholars have, however, found that omission responsibility should be extended as 
“[t]here are certain duties of citizenship which extend beyond those responsibilities 
that one has voluntarily undertaken [...] that comes from living in a community with 
others.”552 The broadening of omission responsibility is, however, complicated by the 
difficulty to draw the line between situations where there is a duty to act and situations 
where there is not, and the fact that “[t]he law of acts secures liability for a particular 
group of individuals, while the law of omissions ensures that the boundaries of liability 
will not become extended to cover other groups who are not constructed as criminal by 
the dominant ideology.”553 The latter explanation for the fact that there is reluctance to 
broaden omission responsibility is particularly interesting for international criminal law, 
as many international crimes are characterized by extensive bystander passivity. It should 
be noted that whereas criminal law traditionally often has focused on isolated deeds, it 
has become more usual to consider chains of events instead. In practice, this may entail 
that act-omission distinction is difficult to maintain, as such chains may consist of both 
acts and omissions.554 
That criminal responsibility requires blameworthy behaviour furthermore entails 
that the behaviour must be attributable to the person in question. More specifically, it is 
often pointed out that the criminalized behaviour should be carried out voluntarily.555 
In reality, the question of whether an action or an omission has been voluntary or not 
is often one of degree. An act carried out under a death threat is more voluntary than 
as something done as a result of a spasm, but it is not fully voluntary.556 In this regard, a 
difference has been made between involuntary behaviour, which involves incapacity or 
inability to control conduct in accordance with choices, and non-voluntary behaviour, 
which involves being unable to choose freely because of constraints.557 In criminal law, 
a difference is sometimes made between a capacities viewpoint on voluntariness in 
criminal law, where the central question is whether the individual has certain faculties, 
abilities, etc. which makes it possible for him/her to conform to the law.558 Criminal law 
voluntariness can, according to this perspective, be negated by factors such as lack of 
muscular control, impaired mental capacity, lack of skills and knowledge and constraints 
on choice imposed by circumstances.559 An alternative to the capacities viewpoint is the 
552 Norrie 2001, at 128 (partly referring to e.g., Ashworth).
553 Norrie 2001, at 133. On omission responsibility, see also e.g., A. Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law, 
5th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), at 109-113. 
554 In certain situations, a per se non-criminal act may affect evaluations of later omissions. Nuotio 
mentions as an example a teacher taking children to a pool area to swim, where the teacher first actively 
acts and creates a situation (a situation of increased risk) and where an omission later on may take place. 
Nuotio 1998(a), at 286-287 and 289. 
555 Norrie 2001, at 110. 
556 See further e.g., Feinberg 1970, at 149, Fletcher 2007(a), at 286, and H. L. A. Hart & A. M. Honoré, 
Causation in the Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959) 38-39. Note also the difference between (voluntary) 
action and mere bodily movements. Feinberg 1970, at 150, and Fletcher 2007(a), at 286. 
557 Baker 1992, at 420 (referring to Sistare). See also Ashworth 2006, at 224. Ashworth has observed that 
involuntariness or automatism is primarily a denial of authorship. Ibid., at 98. 
558 Baker 1992, at 403, and C. T. Sistare, ‘Models of Responsibility in Criminal Theory: Comment on Baker’, 
7 Law and Philosophy (1989), at 311. 
559 Baker 1992, at 417-418.  
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cognitivist viewpoint, where the idea of a conscious choice is central.560 While it is clear is 
that criminal responsibility does not arise in situations of involuntary behaviour, the legal 
systems in the world, however, differ somewhat in how they approach non-voluntary 
behaviour. In all criminal law systems, it is given legal significance that a person, for 
example, acts in self-defence or in duress, but how it is done varies. 
4.5.4.  Degrees of Guilt 
Criminal law thus has numerous in-built requirements about factors that must be present 
for criminal responsibility to arise. These factors include a guilty mind, behaviour having 
a causal link to a harm, etc. These requirements are, however, not only relevant for 
the determination of whether there is criminal guilt or not. They are also relevant for 
evaluations of the blameworthiness of the behaviour or the degree of guilt. Fletcher has 
in this regard observed that: 
The striking assumption of modernity is that some people are more guilty than 
others. Their relative degrees of guilt depend on two factors: first, how much they 
contribute or how close they come to causing physical harm, and second, their 
internal knowledge of the action and its risks. The principal who controls the actions 
leading to harm is more guilty than the accessory who merely aids in execution of the 
plan. Those who take risks intentionally are worse than those who do so inadvertently. 
These assumptions about relative guilt are built into the modern way of thinking 
about crime and punishment.561
Criminal law has thus codified certain societal perceptions of what kinds of mental 
states and behaviour are more blameworthy than others. From the point of view of 
international criminal law this is interesting. Modern criminal law is namely largely 
based on blameworthiness evaluations done in connection to ordinary criminality. The 
special features of international criminal law, however, raise the question of whether 
certain established assumptions should be reconsidered. It can, for example, been asked 
whether the idea that the hands-on criminal generally is one of the most blameworthy 
participants in the crime should be abandoned. 
4.6.  Concluding Remarks on the “Essence” of Criminal Law
The aim of this chapter has been to introduce the instrument used to deal with 
international criminality, that is, to give a description of what criminal law is. To give 
560 Baker 1992, at 418 (and 403), and Sistare 1989, at 311. A similar distinction seems to be the one between 
behaviour that the actor could have avoided and behaviour that could not have been avoided. Fletcher 
refers to Jaspers and observes that: “Moral guilt may coincide with criminal guilt, but it need not do so. 
[...] Jaspers would say that those who act under duress or personal necessity [...] are still morally guilty 
if they could have avoided the act.” Jasper also identifies political and metaphysical guilt. “Both political 
and metaphysical guilt are beyond the moral category of the avoidable. They attach even in cases of living 
under dictatorships where it is not humanly possible to avoid the inhuman actions of those in charge. 
Political guilt is borne by each person in a political community merely by virtue of being there and being 
governed.” Fletcher 2002(b), at 1530-1531. 
561 Fletcher 2002(b), at 1564-1565.
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a representative description is obviously difficult due to the differences between the 
various criminal justice systems of the world. Despite the differences, there is, however, 
something that can be called “modern criminal law” with certain typical features. Modern 
criminal law is, first and foremost, characterized by it being created as a reaction to the 
highly discretionary criminal law that existed before, and as such modern criminal law 
emphasizes the equality of people and values such as consistency and equal treatment. 
This is the central strength of modern criminal law, which, however, at the same time has 
entailed that criminal law at times overlooks aspects of reality. Zehr has observed that: 
“Social, moral, and personal factors are relevant only insofar as they are legally defined as 
relevant” and that “questions of social justice are rarely relevant.”562 Likewise Norrie has 
criticized the criminal law conceptions of voluntariness and causation for being based 
on a simplified conception on the relationship between individual agency and societal 
structures, in which the social character of the lives of individuals to a high degree is 
overlooked.563 Modern criminal law thus essentially focuses on individuals as rational 
actors, and not as features formed by their history and surrounding. As such, criminal 
law has a tendency to emphasize the significance of individuals in producing outcomes. 
This feature of criminal law has been found to be especially problematic in relation to 
international criminality, as both the phenomenology and criminology of international 
criminality stresses the role of situational factors in connection to individual offending. 
Criminal law is also strongly characterized by it being connected to intentional pain 
infliction by public authorities. Requirements of culpability, causation and harm are 
therefore typical for criminal law. 
In relation to criminal law, critical criminologists have pointed out that criminal 
law at least traditionally only has been used to deal with the “criminal classes” or 
ordinary criminality, and that harmful behaviour by the elites or non-deviant people 
are not generally considered as criminal. It should, however, be noted that it is not only 
international criminality which by its nature differs from the garden-variety criminality, 
which criminal law so-to-say primarily addresses. As noted, in many domestic criminal 
justice systems, the last decades have been characterized by the expansion of the use of 
criminal law. This development has had consequences not only on the amount of criminal 
legislation, but on its content. Criminal law is increasingly used to address phenomena 
such as corporate misbehaviour and environmental harm, where the criminals are not 
traditional street criminals. Many legal systems today recognize corporate criminal 
responsibility. Also otherwise criminal law has gained new characteristics. The law 
does not anymore only focus on the intentional causation of harm, but increasingly 
considers negligent behaviour and risk behaviour. This being said, many of these “new” 
developments continue to be “legal irritants” that challenge established perceptions of 
“good criminal law”. 
New types of criminal law that attracts discussion is, however, not merely created as 
a response to new societal phenomena that demand new legal solutions, but may rather 
be the result of legislative processes in which thorough consideration has not been given 
to the basic dogmas of criminal law. Ashworth, in this regard, argues that: “Legislatures 
frequently create and reenact offenses without proper consideration of the extent of 
562 Zehr 1995, at 81. 
563 Norrie 2001, at 140 (regarding causation).
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their conformity with general principles or of the justification for departures.”564 He, for 
example, finds it problematic that it is not anymore self-evident that without a guilty 
mind there can be no criminal liability.565 A difficult question is therefore to what extent a 
certain deviation from the basic tenets of criminal law constitutes a violation of the tenet 
or rather a move away from it. When finding a deviation from an established principle 
one must therefore consider to what extent the deviation, in fact, is justified and as such 
could be considered as a new path in criminal law. 
So, if the central principles of modern criminal law are not necessarily absolute or 
unchangeable, what is the point in trying to identify them? One function of the basic 
tenets is to function as an instrument in normative assessments of criminal law. Particular 
criminal law provisions/case law can be found to live up or fall short of the principles, 
goals and values of “good criminal law”.566 There thus exists some sort of “ideal criminal 
law” against which concrete criminal law can be assessed. In international criminal law, 
for example, certain doctrines have attracted considerable criticism from criminal law 
scholars and the identification of the basic principles of criminal law thus helps one to 
understand why.567 For this thesis, the identification of the basic principles of criminal 
law is also important in that the principles have affected the legal choices made in certain 
questions. Furthermore, the tenets have a value in themselves, even though they are not 
necessarily unchangeable. Nuotio has pointed out that one function of these basic tenets 
of criminal law is to slow down the process in which the criminal law is changed and in 
this way protect the criminal law from becoming an abused instrument for solving all 
societal problems.568 New paths in criminal law must hence be justified well. 
564 A. Ashworth, ‘Towards a Theory of Criminal Legislation’, 1 Criminal Law Forum (1989), at 41. In fact, he 
finds that “almost all jurisdictions are experiencing a constant stream of criminal legislation that tramples 
clumsily, needlessly, or unfairly on general principles of criminal law.” Ibid., at 60.
565 Ashworth 2000, at 228. 
566 Cf. R. A. Duff, ‘Theorizing Criminal Law: A 25th Anniversary Essay’, 25 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 
(2005), at 354-355. 
567 E.g., the joint criminal responsibility doctrine. See further Chapter 7. One may, of course, ask to what 
extent it is necessary for international criminal law to adhere to the fundamentals of municipal criminal 
law. It is, e.g., possible to argue that international context sometimes requires sui generis solutions. Cf. 
M. Damaška, ‘The Shadow Side of Command Responsibility’, 49 American Journal of Comparative Law 
(2001), at 456-457, and 471. As the goal of many fundamentals is to protect individuals against abuse of 
power, it is not unproblematic to disregard them in the international context either.
568 Nuotio 1998(a), at 20. The basic principles of criminal law are thus persevered by criminal law scholars, 
judges, etc. but also by, e.g., human rights law.
94
5.  THE SPECIAL FEATURES OF INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL LAW 
5.1.  Unusual Sources of Criminal Law 
5.1.1.  A Short Recapitulation of the History of International Criminal Law 
Traditionally, public international law has been a branch of law regulating State 
behaviour and protecting State interests. In the late 1940s, the multinational prosecution 
of the leading war criminals of World War II and the emergence of human rights law, 
however, brought new elements into the law. The question of individual obligations and 
individual rights then became topical. International criminal law is the branch of public 
international law, which addresses individual obligations. 
Historically, the development of international criminal law has been strongly 
connected to the establishment and existence of multinational or international criminal 
tribunals.569 After World War II, two such tribunals were established to prosecute 
the some leading war criminals, that is, the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals. In the 
immediate post-war period, there were also some other war crime trials, such as the 
trials held before the United States Military Tribunals in Nuremberg based on Control 
Council Law No. 10 (CCL).570 
In its judgment, the Nuremberg Tribunal put forward that: “The [Tribunal’s] 
Charter is not an arbitrary exercise of power [...] but in the view of the Tribunal, [...] it 
is the expression of international law existing at the time of its creation [...].”571 It has, 
however, frequently been noted that of the crimes within the jurisdiction of the post-
World War II tribunals only war crimes was somewhat established. Crimes against 
humanity and crimes against peace were not settled crimes and as such the punishment 
for these crimes was controversial.572 In the mid-1940s, it was not only the international 
569 The Nuremberg Tribunal has, inter alia, been called multinational, a “joint national court” (Jescheck) 
and a “four-power tribunal” (Jackson). W. Jackson in ‘Panel I. Telford Taylor Panel: Critical Perspectives on 
the Nuremberg Trial’, 12 New York Law School Journal of Human Rights (1995), at 495, and Jescheck 2004, 
at 39. Whereas the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals often are characterized as multinational, the ICTY, 
ICTR and ICC are international tribunals. E.g., ICTY in its Bulletin notes that whereas the Nuremberg 
Tribunal was a “military court, established by the four victorious Allies as a part of a political settlement,” 
ICTY is a “non-military court, established by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.” 
Bulletin of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, No. 5/6 (1996), at 4.  
570 See further Trials of War Criminals before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law 
No. 10, Volumes I-XV.
571 Göring et al., Judgment, IMT, 1 October 1946, at 218. 
572 See e.g., Jescheck 2004, at 41-42, 48 and 50, Meron 2006, at 564-565 (see, however, an opposite view at 
567) and R. Wolfe in ‘Panel I. Telford Taylor Panel: Critical Perspectives on the Nuremberg Trial’, 12 New 
York Law School Journal of Human Rights (1995), at 485-490. The Nuremberg Tribunal, however, also 
found that the “law of the Charter is decisive, and binding upon the Tribunal” and that Allied occupying 
countries had an “undoubted right” to legislate for the occupied territories. Göring et al., Judgment, IMT, 
1 October 1946, at 218. In practice, it has therefore been argued that the tribunal in connection to crimes 
against peace and crimes against humanity essentially had to rely on its ex post facto adopted charter or the 
“binding occupation law.” Jescheck 2004, at 41.
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crimes that were not firmly established, but also the principle of international individual 
criminal responsibility. The Nuremberg Tribunal, however, famously stipulated that: 
“Crimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, 
and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of 
international law be enforced.”573 This statement has been found to announce “the end of 
the classic doctrine whereby only states possess legal personality in international law.”574 
Taken into consideration the alternatives put forward to the criminal prosecutions (such 
as, summary executions of the leading war criminals) the prosecutions have, however, in 
retrospective often been regarded as a civilized means to address the atrocities committed 
during World War II. The way in which especially the Nuremberg Tribunal tried to take 
into consideration the retroactivity concerns (for example, by interpreting the crime 
against humanity narrowly) as well as the fair trial rights of the accused (such as, the 
presumption of innocence) has also enhanced its historical legitimacy. After the post-
World War II trials, the UN General Assembly affirmed the principles of international 
law recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in its judgment.575 Also 
human rights instruments adopted after World War II have acknowledged the existence 
of international criminal law.576
In the 1940s, international criminal law thus significantly developed through to 
war crime tribunals. In the same time period, the law, however, also evolved through 
the adoption of international treaties. Most importantly, the Genocide Convention 
was adopted in 1948 and the four Geneva Conventions in 1949. During the rest of the 
Cold War, international criminal law, however, hardly developed at all. Attempts to 
adopt international criminal law instruments frequently failed577 and prosecutions of 
international crimes were rare.  
The next phase of fast development of international criminal law started in the mid-
1990s, when the UN Security Council through resolutions adopted under Chapter VII 
of the UN Charter established ICTY (1993) and the ICTR (1994). These tribunals were, 
in the same way as the post-World War II tribunals, created after the crimes already had 
been committed. When, for example, the ICTY was established the UN Secretary-General 
who was responsible for the preparation of a draft statute therefore emphasized the need 
to limit the subject-matter jurisdiction of the tribunal to violations of international 
humanitarian law that beyond any doubt entail individual criminal responsibility based 
on customary law.578 Through their case law, the ad hoc tribunals have made international 
criminal law much more settled and specific. In 1998, the most significant instrument 
of international criminal law was adopted viz. the Rome Statute of the ICC, which is 
573 Göring et al., Judgment, IMT, 1 October 1946, at 223. 
574 Jescheck 2004, at 43. 
575 UN Doc. G.A. Res. 95 (I) of 11 December 1946. 
576 E.g., Article 15, ICCPR stipulates that: “No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account 
of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under national or international law, at 
the time when it was committed” and that nothing in the article “shall prejudice the trial and punishment 
of any person for any act or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal according 
to the general principles of law recognized by the community of nations.” 
577 AP I and AP II, and the Torture Convention are, however, examples of conventions that were adopted 
during the Cold War period.
578 UN Doc. S/25704, 3 May 1993, paras 33-34.
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the only international criminal court statute that has been adopted before the crimes 
have been committed. In the 21st century, the international criminal tribunals have been 
followed by so-called hybrid courts that have both international and national “elements”, 
such judges and applicable law. Such hybrid tribunals are for example the SCSL and the 
ECCC. 
Now in the 2010s, after an intense phase of development, international criminal law 
is (again) experiencing a period where its future direction is debated and its legitimacy 
is questioned.579 This being said, and as noted by Schabas, “it is probably misplaced 
to contemplate a total collapse [of international criminal justice] analogous to what 
occurred in the 1920s and the 1950s”, as it has “become too important a feature of the 
international system.”580 
5.1.2.  The Legal Sources of International Criminal Law
5.1.2.1.  Introduction
In Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) three primary 
sources of international law are enumerated: international conventions, international 
custom and general principles of law recognized by civilized nations. Furthermore, 
two subsidiary sources are mentioned: judicial decisions and the teachings of the most 
highly qualified publicists of the various nations. As international criminal law is part 
of public international law, the international sources of law are also a priori the sources 
of international criminal law.581 This being said, the use of legal sources in international 
criminal law has not always followed the model suggested by general public international 
law. To begin with, the Article 21 of the ICC Statute contains a special provision on 
applicable law, which guides the functioning of that court. Also the ad hoc tribunals have, 
however, at times also approached the sources of law differently.582 The international 
criminal tribunals’ uneasy relationship with the international legal sources may be 
explained with the fact that the tribunals have to apply the legal sources in a criminal 
law context. In criminal law, specificity, clarity and legal certainty are important values. 
In domestic legal systems, criminal law is usually created by special law-making 
bodies, such as parliaments, which adopt the law in the form of written criminal statutes 
or codes. In these law-making processes, the goal is explicitly to create criminal law. 
In international law, there are no equivalent international legislators. The main actors 
in international law are States and multilateral treaty-making processes can only by 
extensive analogy be compared to domestic legislative processes. In many of the treaty 
negotiations that have resulted in treaties that are relevant for international criminal law, 
579 See further e.g., D. Luban, ‘After the Honeymoon – Reflections on the Current State of International 
Criminal Justice’, 11 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2013), at 505-515, D. Robinson, ‘A 
Cosmopolitan Liberal Account of International Criminal Law’, 26 Leiden Journal of International Law 
(2013), at 127-153, and W. A. Schabas, ‘The Banality of International Justice’, 11 Journal of International 
Criminal Justice (2013), at 545-551. 
580 Schabas 2013(a), at 551. 
581 E.g., R. Cryer, H. Friman, D. Robinson & E. Wilmshurst, An Introduction to International Criminal Law 
and Procedure, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 9. 
582 A. Zahar & G. Sluiter, International Criminal Law – A Critical Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2008), 79 (especially regarding procedural law). 
97
the goal has not explicitly been to create criminal law. The treaties therefore often contain 
sweeping and loose compromise rules which are functional in an inter-State context, 
but problematic in a criminal law context.583 The process through which customary 
international law is created is even further away from the usual way in which criminal 
law in domestic legal systems is adopted. 
5.1.2.2.  Treaty Law and Other Written Sources of Law
In international criminal law, there is one legal source that on the surface reminds of 
domestic statutory criminal law, namely the statutes of the international criminal tribunals. 
Especially, the statutes of ICTY and ICTR, however, are very different types of written 
legal instruments. To begin with, the statutes are UN Security Council resolutions, that 
is, instruments adopted by a political organ in processes which cannot be characterized 
as legislative. Secondly, and most importantly, the statutes have been adopted after most 
of the crimes have been committed, that is, ex post facto. It has therefore been held that 
the statutes “are not themselves law”, but rather “pointers to a law existing in some form 
in the rarefied sphere of international law at the time of the alleged offences.”584 This view 
is also reflected in the report by the UN Secretary-General, which preceded the adoption 
of the ICTY and which contained its draft statute. In that report, the Secretary-General 
put forward that “the application of the principle nullum crimen sine lege requires that 
the international tribunal should apply rules of international humanitarian law which 
are beyond any doubt part of customary law so that the problem of adherence of some 
but not all States to specific conventions does not arise.”585 The ICTY has also in its case 
law stressed the customary law basis of its authority to punish.586 
The way in which the ad hoc tribunals have been created may give the impression 
that treaty law is completely insignificant in relation to those tribunals, but this is not quite 
the case. To begin with, the statutes of the tribunals have sometimes been characterized 
as treaty law, as the UN Security Council resolutions find their binding force in Article 
25 of the UN Charter, which is a treaty.587 Secondly, the tribunals have often referred to 
583 Cassese 2008, at 9. 
584 Zahar & Sluiter 2008, at 80.      
585 UN Doc. S/25704, 3 May 1993, para. 34. 
586 See e.g., Milutinović et al., Decision (JCE), AC, ICTY, 21 May 2003, para. 9, Hadžihasanović et al., 
Decision (command responsibility), AC, ICTY, 16 July 2003, para. 44, Blaškić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 29 July 
2004, para. 141, and Galić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 30 November 2006, para. 83. See also T. Meron, ‘Revival 
of Customary Humanitarian Law’, 99 American Journal of International Law (2005), at 821. See, however, 
the Tadić Appeal Judgement, where the Appeals Chamber puts forward that “it is open to the Security 
Council [...] to adopt definitions of crimes in the Statute which deviate from customary international 
law.” Tadić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 15 July 1999, para. 296. Sluiter, however, correctly observers that this 
pronouncement is problematic in that the principle of legality demands that the criminal responsibility of 
individuals is not broadened retroactively. G. Sluiter, ‘“Chapeau Elements” of Crimes against Humanity 
in the Jurisprudence of the UN Ad Hoc Tribunals’, in L. N. Sadat (ed.), Forging a Convention for Crimes 
against Humanity (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), at 110. It is substantive criminal law that 
is guided by the principle of nullum crimen sine lege. With respect to procedural law, there is no similar 
requirement of pre-adopted law, which gives the statutes a more central role in the procedural sphere. 
Cf. Zahar & Sluiter 2008, at 79. Regarding customary international law in the procedural sphere, see also 
Blaškić, Judgement (Croatia), AC, ICTY, 29 October 1997, para. 64.
587 Cryer et al. 2010, at 9. See also Cassese 2008, at 15-16. 
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treaties as evidence of customary law.588 The case law of the tribunals therefore contain 
many references to international treaties, such as the 1948 Genocide Convention and 
the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Thirdly, and most controversially, the tribunals have also 
found that treaties can establish international criminality in cases when the country in 
which the crimes have taken place has ratified the treaty. For example, in the Kordić and 
Čerkez case, the ICTY Appeals Chamber established that: “The maxim of nullum crimen 
sine lege is also satisfied where a State is already treaty-bound by a specific convention, 
and the International Tribunal applies a provision of that convention whether it is part 
of customary international law.”589 The ICTR has similarly in some cases pointed out that 
Rwanda in 1994 had ratified all central international humanitarian law treaties including 
AP II, and that the instruments for that reason were in force in the territory of Rwanda 
and formed part of Rwandan law.590 When making these references, the tribunals have 
generally not considered whether there has been domestic implementing legislation.591 
This is intriguing as most international treaties only establish State obligations 
(international illegality) and not individual obligations (international criminality).592 It 
appears that the ad hoc tribunals increasingly have recognized that this is problematic 
from a legality perspective. For example, the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Galić case 
stressed that treaties usually only “provide for the prohibition of a certain conduct” 
not for its criminalization, and that treaty law prohibition therefore often has to be 
complemented with a customary international law criminalization.593 
588 See further e.g., W. A. Schabas, The UN International Criminal Tribunals – The Former Yugoslavia, 
Rwanda and Sierra Leone (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 99. 
589 Kordić & Čerkez, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 17 December 2004, para. 44.
590 E.g., Akayesu, Judgement, TC, ICTR, 2 September 1998, para. 617, and Rutaganda, Judgement, TC, 
ICTR, 6 December 1999, paras 86-89. In a report written after the finalization of the ICTR Statute, the 
UN Secretary-General indicates that customary international law plays a less central role in relation to 
the ICTR. He notes that: “In that latter respect, the Security Council has elected to take a more expansive 
approach to the choice of the applicable law than the one underlying the statute of the Yugoslav Tribunal, 
and included within the subject-matter jurisdiction of the Rwanda Tribunal international instruments 
regardless of whether they were considered part of customary international law or whether they have 
customarily entailed the individual criminal responsibility of the perpetrator of the crime. Article 4 of 
the statute, accordingly, includes violations of Additional Protocol II, which, as a whole, has not yet been 
universally recognized as part of customary international law, and for the first time criminalizes common 
article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions.” UN Doc. S/1995/134, para. 12. See also Delalić et al., Judgement, 
AC, ICTY, 20 February 2001, para. 170, and Nahimana et al., Judgement, AC, ICTR, 28 November 2007, 
para. 978. 
591 See e.g., Kordić & Čerkez, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 17 December 2004, paras 44-46. 
592 G. Mettraux, International Crimes and the Ad Hoc Tribunals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 
9. Bantekas has characterized this as a “dynamic and evolutionary interpretation” of international treaties. 
I. Bantekas, ‘Reflections on Some Sources and Methods of International Criminal and Humanitarian Law’, 
6 International Criminal Law Review (2006), at 121-123. See also T. Meron, ‘Is International Law Moving 
towards Criminalization?’, 9 European Journal of International Law (1998), at 23-24, and Zahar & Sluiter 
2008, at 87. More cautious towards basing international individual criminal responsibility on treaties 
are e.g., Meron 2006, at 576, and A. Pellet, ‘Applicable Law’, in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta & J. R. W. D. Jones 
(eds.), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary, Volume II (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002), at 1067-1070.
593 Galić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 30 November 2006, para. 83.
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While the role of treaty law is somewhat unclear before the ad hoc tribunals, treaty 
law clearly plays a central role in connection to the ICC. The ICC Statute, which is the 
primary source of law for that court,594 is a multilateral treaty. Werle has, for example, 
noted that: “Until the ICC Statute entered into force, international treaties were of lesser 
importance for international criminal law. Today, the ICC Statute, a multinational 
international treaty, is the main source of international criminal law.”595 The ICC Statute 
departs from the statutes of the ad hoc tribunals in that it has been adopted before the 
crimes have been committed. The ICC Statute also reminds of domestic criminal statutes 
in that the goal of the drafting process explicitly was to create an instrument that would 
function as the basis for criminal prosecutions.596 It should be noted that in the Lubanga 
case, a Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC found that the Statute represents pre-existing 
written criminal norms, which entails that the legality principle is not violated when 
someone is prosecuted based on the Statute regardless of what the customary law on the 
question is.597 
Most interestingly, the ICC Statute furthermore contains a provision on applicable 
law. Article 21 of the ICC Statute establishes that: 
1. The Court shall apply: 
(a) In the first place, this Statute, Elements of Crimes and its Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence; 
(b) In the second place, where appropriate, applicable treaties and the principles and 
rules of international law, including the established principles of the international 
law of armed conflict; 
(c) Failing that, general principles of law derived by the Court from national laws of 
legal systems of the world including, as appropriate, the national laws of States that 
would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime, provided that those principles 
are not inconsistent with this Statute and with international law and internationally 
recognized norms and standards. 
2. The Court may apply principles and rules of law as interpreted in its previous 
decisions. [...]
This provision has been found to “modify” the international sources of law to suit criminal 
law better.598 Before the ICC, its internal written sources of law have supremacy, namely the 
594 Article 21, ICC Statute. 
595 G. Werle, Principles of International Criminal Law, 2nd ed. (The Hague: T. M. C. Asser Press, 2009), 50 
(para. 139). 
596 Cf. Meron 2006, at 567.
597 Lubanga, Decision (confirmation of charges), PTC, ICC, 29 January 2007, para. 303. See, however, B. 
Broomhall, ‘Article 22 – Nullum Crimen Sine Lege’, in O. Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court – Observers’ Notes, Article by Article, 2nd ed. (München: C. H. Beck, 
2008), at 719-720.  
598 M. McAuliffe deGuzman, ‘Article 21 – Applicable Law,’ in O. Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court – Observers’ Notes, Article by Article, 2nd ed. (München: C. H. 
Beck, 2008), at 702. On Article 21, ICC Statute, see also e.g., W. A. Schabas, The International Criminal 
Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 381-400.
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statute, the elements of crimes, and the rules of procedure and evidence.599 The fact that the 
ICC and the ad hoc tribunals apply different legal sources (or give them different weight) 
gives rise to a significant risk of fragmentation, that is, that the international criminal law 
applied by the courts varies. Some have, however, downplayed this risk by noting that the 
ICC Statute largely is declaratory of customary international law,600 and that the Statute 
also has affected the content of customary law through its negotiation and ratification 
processes.601 The initial case of the ICC (especially regarding commission liability), however, 
indicates that international criminal law for sure to some degree is fragmented.602 
5.1.2.3.  International Customary Law 
In most domestic legal systems, non-statutory criminal law is not anymore accepted. In 
international criminal law, customary law, however, still plays a central role.603 This is 
the case especially in connection to the ad hoc tribunals, which have been established 
ex post facto and which apply the general sources of public international law. As the 
ad hoc tribunals generally presume that their statutes reflect customary international 
law,604 the tribunals have primarily looked into customary international law to clarify 
the statutes and to fill gaps. Due to the openness of many of the statute provisions, the 
ad hoc tribunals have, however, in practice often relied on customary international law. 
For the ICC, customary international law or “the principles and rules of international 
599 Bitti distinguishes between the “internal sources of law” and the “external sources of law” in the 
ICC Statute. G. Bitti, ‘Article 21 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court and the Treatment of 
Sources of Law in the Jurisprudence of the ICC’, in C. Stahn & G. Sluiter (eds.) The Emerging Practice of 
the International Criminal Court (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009), at 288 and 293. The ICC 
Elements of Crimes, which “shall assist the Court in the interpretation and application” of the crime 
definitions shall be consistent with the Statute. Article 9, ICC Statute. Triffterer has pointed out that there 
appears to be some inconsistencies (e.g., regarding Article 8(2)(b)(xii)), and asks what should be done in 
that the Assembly of State Parties does not have a legislative power in connection to substantive criminal 
law. O. Triffterer, ‘Can the “Elements of Crimes” Narrow or Broaden Responsibility for Criminal Behaviour 
Defined in the Rome Statute?,’ in C. Stahn & G. Sluiter (eds.), The Emerging Practice of the International 
Criminal Court (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009), at 384. 
600 Meron 2006, at 567.
601 Hunt has observed that even though the aim of the ICC Statute and Elements of Crimes negotiations 
generally has been to develop international criminal law, specific provisions also entail a “straightjacket” 
impeding legal developments. D. Hunt, ‘The International Criminal Court – High Hopes, ‘Creative 
Ambiguity’ and an Unfortunate Mistrust in International Judges,’ 2 Journal of International Criminal 
Justice (2004), at 59.
602 See further e.g., Sections 7.2.4 and 7.2.5.
603 Degan has suggested that written sources of law due to the need for legal certainty should be given 
preference over customary law in international criminal law. V.-D. Degan, ‘On the Sources of International 
Criminal Law’, 4 Chinese Journal of International Law (2005), at 51. The ad hoc tribunals have, however, 
constantly stressed the acceptability of customary law as a source of international criminal law.
604 The tribunals have, however, increasingly started to ascertain the customary basis of the statute 
provisions. E.g., Milutinović et al. Decision (JCE), AC, ICTY, 21 May 2003, para. 9, Hadžihasanović et al., 
Decision (command responsibility), AC, ICTY, 16 July 2003, para. 44, Blaškić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 29 
July 2004, para. 141, and Galić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 30 November 2006, para. 83. See, however, Schabas, 
who questions whether the judges have powers to exercise judicial review of the Security Council, that is, 
whether the Security Council correctly has identified the content of customary international law. Schabas 
2006(b), at 84. Also the SCSL has found that it is “bound to apply customary international law.” Taylor, 
Judgement, TC, SCSL, 18 May 2012, para. 398. 
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law, including the established principles of the international law of armed conflict”605 is a 
secondary source of law which only shall be applied “where appropriate.” 
In Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute, international customary law is defined as 
“international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law.” It is generally 
recognized that the crystallization of norms under customary international law requires 
both State practice and opinio juris, that is, “a general recognition that a rule of law or legal 
obligation is involved.”606 It is well-known that identification of customary international 
law is a difficult endeavour. There are, for instance, many different opinions on what 
constitute relevant State practice and evidence of opinio juris, and, for example, how 
conflicting practice should be reconciled. A debated question is also the relationship 
between State practice and opinio juris, that is, whether the focus should be on what 
States actually do or on what they say that is the right way to act.607 
Schabas has found that the ad hoc tribunals in their search for customary norms 
often have relied on extensively ratified treaties.608 He, however, notes that this is not 
unproblematic in that “treaties do not always codify customary international law”, but may 
exceed or fall short of it.609 Furthermore, the treaties constituting statutes of international 
criminal tribunals (such as the ICC Statute and the Nuremberg Charter) may contain 
provisions that are jurisdictional (aimed at limiting the tribunals’ jurisdiction) rather than 
substantive.610 The ad hoc tribunals have, however, not only looked into treaty law when 
trying to identify customary law. Cassese, for example, has stressed the role played by case 
law as evidence of customary international law.611 Also, for example, soft law instruments, 
such as ILC documents, have been consulted when trying to identify prevailing lex lata.612 
The fact that there are so many different ways to create State practice and to express 
opinio juris, as well as, the possibility to emphasize either State practice or opinio juris in 
practice entails that the identification of customary international law is a process where 
the line between law identification and law creation easily can become blurred. In relation 
to customary criminal law, it is often difficult to establish exactly when a certain act or 
omission has been internationally criminalized. Not surprisingly, some scholars have 
criticized the tribunals for the way in which they have approached customary international 
605 E.g., Pellet 2002, at 1070-1071. See, however, McAuliffe deGuzman 2008, at 706-707. 
606 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, Judgment, ICJ, 20 February 1969, para. 74. 
607 On customary international law, see further e.g., A. E. Roberts, ‘Traditional and Modern Approaches to 
Customary International Law: A Reconciliation’, 95 American Journal of International Law (2001), at 757-791. 
608 Schabas 2006(b), at 98-100. See also B. B. Jia, ‘The Relations between Treaties and Custom’, 9 Chinese 
Journal of International Law (2010), at 103-105. 
609 Schabas 2006(b), at 100. 
610 Cf. The discussion whether the armed conflict nexus requirement in the crimes against humanity 
definition in the Nuremberg Tribunal’s Charter was jurisdictional or substantive. M. E. Badar, ‘From the 
Nuremberg Charter to the Rome Statute: Defining the Elements of Crimes against Humanity’, 5 San Diego 
International Law Journal (2004), at 91-92. 
611 Cassese 2008, at 17-20. See also Zahar & Sluiter 2008, at 97-98. On the use of national case law in the 
identification of customary international law, see also Bantekas 2006, at 131-132, and A. Nollkaemper, 
‘Decisions of National Courts as Sources of International Law: An Analysis of the Practice of the ICTY’, 
in G. Boas & W. A. Schabas (eds.), International Criminal Law Developments in the Case Law of the ICTY 
(Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2003), at 281-286. 
612 See e.g., Furundžija, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 10 December 1998, para. 227, and Kunarac et al., Judgement, 
TC, ICTY, 22 February 2001, para. 537. 
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law and found the practice of the tribunals to be unsystematic and law-making.613 It is 
beyond the scope of this study to in detail discuss the tribunals’ identification of the 
customary law.614 Central for this study is the outcome of the tribunals’ investigations into 
customary law, which will be discussed in the following chapters, as well as the relative 
indeterminacy characteristic for international criminal law. 
5.1.2.4.  General Principles of Law Recognized by Civilized Nations 
The third primary source of international law identified in the ICJ Statute is “general 
principles of law recognized by civilized nations.” These general principles can be defined 
as rules “laid down in the legislation of most countries of the world.”615 In the case law of 
ICTY,616 and in the Statute of the ICC,617 general principles of law have been found to be 
a subsidiary source of law that only should be applied when the written sources of law or 
customary international law does not regulate a question. Due to the still rudimentary 
nature of international criminal law, the ad hoc tribunals have, however, at times referred 
to domestic legislation, and it has been noted that despite being a subsidiary source, general 
principles of law has not been an insignificant source of law.618 The ad hoc tribunals have, 
for instance, turned to general principles of law when establishing the meaning of the term 
“rape”.619 In the same way as the identification of customary international law largely is 
dependent on the methodology used, also the outcome of surveys into general principles 
of law can be affected by methodology. The identification processes by the international 
criminal tribunals have sometimes been criticized for being limited and unrepresentative.620 
613 E.g., Bantekas has argued that ICTY sometimes has disregarded the usus element of custom in favour of 
opinio juris, that is, largely disregarded the behaviour of armies on the battlefields. I. Bantekas, Principles of 
Direct and Superior Responsibility in International Humanitarian Law (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 2002), 15. See also e.g., Zahar & Sluiter 2008, at 92-105, and Sluiter 2011, at 111. 
614 On customary international criminal law and the principle of legality, see e.g., N. Arajärvi, ‘Between Lex 
Lata and Lex Ferenda? Customary International (Criminal) Law and the Principle of Legality’, 15 Tilburg Law 
Review (2011), at 163-182, and M. Heikkilä, ‘Ajatuksia laillisuusperiaatteen merkityksestä univer saali toimi-
valta tapauksissa: Bazaramba-tapaus ja Suomen kansainvälinen rikosoikeus’, Lakimies (2011), at 919-924. 
615 A. Cassese, ‘Balancing the Prosecution of Crimes against Humanity and Non-Retroactivity of Criminal 
Law – The Kolk and Kislyiy v. Estonia Case before the ECHR’, 4 Journal of International Criminal Justice 
(2006), at 415.
616 Kupreškić et al., Judgement, TC, ICTY, 14 January 2000, para. 591. See also W. A. Schabas, An Introduction 
to the International Criminal Court, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 195.  
617 Article 21, ICC Statute. 
618 See further F. O. Raimondo, ‘General Principles of Law as Applied by International Criminal Courts 
and Tribunals’, 6 The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals (2007), at 394-396, and F. O. 
Raimondo, ‘General Principles of Law, Judicial Creativity, and the Development of International Criminal 
Law’, in S. Darcy & J. Powderly (eds.), Judicial Creativity at the International Criminal Tribunals (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2010), at 45-59.  
619 E.g., Furundžija, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 10 December 1998, paras 177-178, and Kunarac et al. 
Judgement, TC, ICTY, 22 February 2001, paras 439 ff. For references to this source of law in international 
criminal law, see also e.g., Erdemović, Judgement (sentencing), TC, ICTY, 29 November 1996, paras 26 
and 40, Erdemović, Judgement (joint sep. op. of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah), AC, ICTY, 7 October 
1997, paras 40 and 56-72, Delalić et al., Judgement, AC, ICTY, 20 February 2001, para. 583, and Tadić, 
Judgement, AC, ICTY, 15 July 1999, para. 225.
620 E.g., Nollkaemper 2003, at 289 and 295, and Raimondo 2007, at 402-403. See also V. Nerlich, ‘The Status 
of ICTY and ICTR Precedent in Proceedings before the ICC’, C. Stahn & G. Sluiter (eds.), The Emerging 
Practice of the International Criminal Court (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009), at 314-315. 
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5.1.2.5.  Judicial Decisions 
Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute identifies judicial decisions as a subsidiary means for the 
determination of rules of law.621 In the case law of the ICTY and ICTR, references to both 
domestic and international case law have, however, been frequent and the legal weight 
attached to case law is often significant. Especially, the legal weight attached to post-
World War II case law has been substantial.622 Often the case law has been referred to as 
sign of the existence of a norm under customary international law.623 The international 
criminal tribunals have also often made reference to their own case law and each other’s 
case law. In international criminal law, judicial decisions are therefore not an insignificant 
subsidiary source of law. The heavy reliance of case law can be explained with the urge to 
ensure legal certainty in a criminal law context. The openness of many treaty provisions 
and customary international law norms furthermore explains the central role played 
by case law. Jurisprudence is namely often the source of law where one can find more 
specific definitions of concepts, principles, etc.624 
The extent to which a Trial Chamber is required to follow earlier decisions made 
by itself, another Trial Chamber or the Appeals Chamber, is not regulated in the statutes 
or rules of the currently functioning ad hoc tribunals.625 In the case law of the ad hoc 
621 It has, however, been observed the interests of certainty and stability have made also the International 
Court of Justice follow its own case law. E.g., Nollkaemper 2003, at 291. 
622 Cf. Fletcher, whose opinion is that the post-World War II case law has been given an undeserved central 
role. Fletcher 2007(a), at 90.
623 In the Kupreškić et al. case, the Trial Chamber noted that: “Clearly, judicial precedent is not a distinct 
source of law in international criminal adjudication. The Tribunal is not bound by precedents established 
by other international criminal courts such as the Nuremberg or Tokyo Tribunals, let alone by cases brought 
before national courts adjudicating international crimes. [...] precedents may constitute evidence of a 
customary rule in that they are indicative of the existence of opinio iuris sive necessitatis and international 
practice on a certain matter, or else they may be indicative of the emergence of a general principle of 
international law. Alternatively, precedents may bear persuasive authority concerning the existence 
of a rule or principle, i.e. they may persuade the Tribunal that the decision taken on a prior occasion 
propounded the correct interpretation of existing law.” Kupreškić et al., Judgement, TC, ICTY, 14 January 
2000, para. 540. Nollkaemper has, however, argued that in certain cases the references to domestic case law 
(especially some domestic post-World War II case law) has been such that it can be argued that the case 
law rather has been regarded as independent authorities than as evidence of customary international law 
or general principles of law. Nollkaemper 2003, at 290-295. Also Judge Shahabuddeen has held that one 
should recognize the role played by case law (“judicial creativity”) in international criminal law. He calls it 
a “pretence” that the decisions of the ad hoc tribunals always would be based on customary international 
law. M. Shahabuddeen, ‘Judicial Creativity and Joint Criminal Enterprise’, in S. Darcy & J. Powderly (eds.), 
Judicial Creativity at the International Criminal Tribunals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), at 186 
(see also 190 and 203). 
624 S. Darcy, ‘Bridging the Gaps in the Laws of Armed Conflict? International Criminal Tribunals 
and the Development of Humanitarian Law’, in N. Quénivet & S. Shah-Davis (eds.), International 
Law and Armed Conflict – Challenges in the 21st Century (The Hague: T. M. C. Asser Press, 2010), 
at 320. 
625 Based on the statutes, the ad hoc tribunals have both Trial Chambers and an Appeals Chamber. Article 
11, ICTY Statute, and Article 10, ICTR Statute. The ICC shall consist of an Appeals Division, a Trial 
Division and a Pre-Trial Division. The judicial functions of the Court shall be carried out in each division 
by Chambers. Articles 34 and 39, ICC Statute.
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tribunals, the precedential value of its Appeals Chamber decisions has, however, been 
recognized.626 In the Aleksovski Appeal Judgement, the ICTY argued that:   
The Appeals Chamber, therefore, concludes that a proper construction of the Statute, 
taking due account of its text and purpose, yields the conclusion that in the interests 
of certainty and predictability, the Appeals Chamber should follow its previous 
decisions, but should be free to depart from them for cogent reasons in the interests 
of justice. [...] Instances of situations where cogent reasons in the interests of justice 
require a departure from a previous decision include cases where the previous 
decision has been decided on the basis of a wrong legal principle or cases where a 
previous decision has been given per incuriam, that is a judicial decision that has 
been “wrongly decided, usually because the judge or judges were ill-informed about 
the applicable law.” [...] The Appeals Chamber considers that a proper construction 
of the Statute requires that the ratio decidendi of its decisions is binding on Trial 
Chambers [...]. The Appeals Chamber considers that decisions of Trial Chambers, 
which are bodies with coordinate jurisdiction, have no binding force on each other, 
although a Trial Chamber is free to follow the decision of another Trial Chamber if it 
finds that decision persuasive. 627
In the Semanza case, the ICTR Appeals Chamber adopted “the findings of ICTY Appeals 
Chamber in the Aleksovski case” and recalled “that in the interests of legal certainty and 
predictability, the Appeals Chamber should follow its previous decisions, but should be 
free to depart from them for cogent reasons in the interests of justice.”628 In the practice of 
the tribunals, it is common that the tribunals refer to, quote, concur with and/or endorse 
decisions by other trial chambers or by other international criminal tribunals, that is, 
even though the tribunals are not formally bound by the decisions.629 In 2004, Cassese 
for example, noted that international criminal law had become so settled that the ad hoc 
tribunals could “confine themselves to citing their previous cases” and “concentrate on 
626 Tracol notes that the principle of judicial precedent is weak before the ad hoc tribunals in that it is 
established by case law only. X. Tracol, ‘The Precedent of Appeals Chambers Decisions in the International 
Criminal Tribunals’, 17 Leiden Journal of International Law (2004), at 67-68. Shahabuddeen has challenged 
the idea that international tribunals are bound by previous decisions, even though he recognizes that the 
tribunals may choose a practice to follow previous decisions. M. Shahabuddeen, ‘Consistency in Holdings 
by International Tribunals’, in N. Ando, E. McWhinney & R. Wolfrum (eds.), Liber Amicorum Judge Shigeru 
Oda, Volume 1 (The Hague: Kluwer Law International 2002), at 633-650. See also Semanza, Decision (sep. 
op. of Judge Shahabuddeen), AC, ICTR, 31 May 2000, and Milošević, Decision (admissibility of evidence, 
part. diss. op. of Judge Shahabuddeen), AC, ICTY, 30 September 2002, para. 38. 
627 Aleksovski, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 24 March 2000, paras 107-108 and 113-114. See also e.g., Galić, 
Decision (acquittal), TC, ICTY, 3 October 2002, para. 10, and Milošević, Decision (preliminary motions), 
TC, ICTY, 8 November 2001, para. 4. 
628 Semanza, Decision, AC, ICTR, 31 May 2000, para. 92. 
629 E.g., Tracol 2004, at 99. See also M. A. Drumbl & K. S. Gallant, ‘Appeals in the Ad Hoc International Criminal 
Tribunals: Structure, Procedure, and Recent Cases’, 3 Journal of Appellate Practice and Process (2001), at 633-634. 
It should be noted that Article 20(3) of the SCSL Statute establishes that: “The judges of the Appeals Chamber 
of the Special Court shall be guided by the decisions of the Appeals Chamber of the International Tribunals for 
the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda. In the interpretation and application of the laws of Sierra Leone, they 
shall be guided by the decisions of the Supreme Court of Sierra Leone.” See also e.g., Kallon, Decision (protective 
measures), TC, SCSL, 23 May 2003, para. 12, Gbao, Decision (protective measures), TC, SCSL, 10 October 2003, 
para. 31, and Norman et al., Decision (indictment), AC, SCSL, 16 May 2005, para. 46. 
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establishing the facts”, instead of discussing the applicable law at great length.630 Some 
scholars have, however, questioned the frequent referring to case law in international 
criminal law. For example, Fletcher has called the ICTY practice for “case law positivism”, 
which he defines as an excessive reliance on case law which indicates that the tribunals 
regard case law as a sufficient authority to settle legal questions.631 
As regards the ICC, the Rome Statute regulates that the Court may apply principles 
and rules of law as interpreted in its previous decisions.632 The ICC Statute thus gives a 
lot of discretion to the ICC regarding the use of its own case law.633 Bitti has observed 
that the early practice of the ICC has been to refer to its own case law, but not to give 
special weight to Appeals Chamber case law.634 The ICC approach thus seems to be more 
amenable to instability than the approach chosen by the ad hoc tribunals, which gives 
appeals chamber case law more weight. The question of what significance the ICC can 
and should give the ad hoc tribunals’ case law has also raised debate, as the ICC Statute 
does not explicitly mention international case law as a source of applicable law.635 Nerlich 
has, however, argued that the ICC can look into ad hoc tribunal case law to find guidance 
on the content of, for example, “the principles and rules of international law.”636 He, 
however, finds that the decisions of the ad hoc tribunals clearly cannot be considered as 
an autonomous source of law for the ICC, as the judges of the ad hoc tribunals do not 
have the power to legislate.637 
5.1.2.6. Subsidiary Means: Teachings of the Most Highly Qualified Publicists 
The ICJ Statute furthermore mentiones the teachings of the most highly qualified 
publicists of the various nations as subsidiary means for the determination of rules 
of law. While it is possible to find some references to academic writing in the ad hoc 
tribunals case law, it has been argued that such references have been rare.638 The ICC 
Statute does not at all mention the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists as a 
630 A. Cassese, ‘Black Letter Lawyering v. Constructive Interpretation – The Vasiljević Case’, 2 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice (2004), at 265. 
631 Fletcher 2007(a), at 89-90.
632 Article 21(2), ICC Statute. 
633 Pellet notes that: “In fact, this provision reflects a compromise between, on the one hand, the partisans 
of the rule of stare decisis in accordance with the common law-approach, and, on the other hand, those 
supporting the civil-law concept that precedent has no compulsory effect. Yet the balance clearly leans in 
favour of the latter since the Court may follow the principles laid down in its previous decisions, but it is 
not bound to.” Pellet 2002, at 1066. Staker observes that Article 21 seems to put ICC case law “at the bottom 
of the hierarchy, although this would seem an unlikely result”, and that the initial ICC case law has not yet 
completely settled the matter. C. Staker, ‘Interpretative Methodologies and the Use of Precedent in Cases 
before International Criminal Courts’, in K. A. A. Khan et al. (eds.), Principles of Evidence in International 
Criminal Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), at 188.   
634 Bitti 2009, at 292-293. 
635 See e.g., Bitti 2009, at 296.
636 Nerlich 2009, at 313. 
637 Nerlich 2009, at 316. See also Lubanga, Judgment, TC, ICC, 14 March 2012, para. 603 (‘decisions of 
other international courts and tribunals are not part of the directly applicable law under Article 21’.) 
638 Schabas 2006(b), at 112. Fletcher argues that more attention should be given to scholarly work and less 
to case law. Fletcher 2007(a), at 90. 
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possible source of law. Also ICC case law, however, contains footnotes with references to 
the writings of legal scholars.639
5.1.2.7.  Interpretation of Written Sources of Law 
Whereas the identification of a norm generally is the problematic question in 
relation to non-written legal sources, interpretation is often the challenging question 
in connection written legal sources.640 The fact that criminal law is connected to 
intentional infliction of pain has in many domestic legal systems entailed that special 
rules of interpretation are applicable in criminal law. The requirement that criminal 
statutes shall be strictly or narrowly constructed is, for example, an important principle 
in many domestic legal systems. In international criminal law, the fact that the sources 
of law are the international ones and the subject-matter is criminal law has raised the 
question of what interpretative principles should be applied, that is, those usually used 
in connection to international law or those used in connection to criminal law or a 
combination of both. 
In international law, the interpretation of treaties is first and foremost regulated by 
the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties which is generally found to reflect 
customary international law and which provides that a “treaty shall be interpreted 
in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to terms of the 
treaty in their context and in light of its objective and purpose” (Article 31). It has 
been argued that this provision manifests four separate but simultaneously applicable 
interpretation principles, namely the principles of textuality, contextuality, teleology 
and good faith.641 In textual or literal interpretation the focus is placed on the terms 
(words) chosen by the drafters, and an ordinary or everyday meaning is to be given 
to the terms, if it is not explicitly established that the parties intended to give them a 
special meaning.642 The contextuality principle, on its part, requires that attention is given 
to the surrounding or framework of the term interpreted.643 Relevant surrounding is, 
for example, the whole text of the treaty (including the preamble and annexes) and to 
639 See e.g., the references to Roxin’s work in Katanga & Ngudjolo, Decision (confirmation of charges), 
PTC, ICC, 30 September 2008, at 162 and 167-168.
640 Indirectly interpretation may, however, also be relevant in relation to non-written legal sources, as 
the written legal sources may function as evidence of a customary norm. Furthermore, in international 
criminal law, the distinction between interpretation and identification is blurred by the fact that when 
interpreting the content of the statutes of the ad hoc tribunals, the identification of customary international 
law is often relevant. See in this regard e.g., Powderly’s article on interpretation, which on numerous 
pages discusses the identification of customary international law. J. Powderly, ‘Judicial Interpretation at 
the Ad Hoc Tribunals: Method from Chaos?’, in S. Darcy & J. Powderly (eds.), Judicial Creativity at the 
International Criminal Tribunals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), at 26-32.
641 E.g., Aleksovski, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 24 March 2000, para. 98. Note, however, Aust who argues that: 
“Article 31 is entitled ‘General rule of interpretation’. The singular noun emphasises that the article contains 
only one rule [...].” A. Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007), 234.
642 Aust notes that: “It is important to give a term its ordinary meaning since it is reasonable to assume, at 
least until the contrary is established, that the ordinary meaning is most likely to reflect what the parties 
intended.” Aust 2007, at 235. 
643 The Vienna Convention in Article 31 refers to the context and other factors that shall be taken into 
account together with the context.
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the treaty attached instruments. Giving attention to the surrounding has often been 
understood to mean that the interpretation must be such that the outcome does not 
make the treaty unsystematic or contradictory. Thirdly, the principle of teleological or 
effective interpretation requires that a term be interpreted taking into account the object 
and purpose of the treaty.644 Finally, the good faith principle has been understood to 
require the interpreters to seek an interpretation that is not absurd or unreasonable.645 
In addition to these four simultaneously applicable main interpretation principles, the 
Vienna Convention also recognizes supplementary means of interpretation, including the 
preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion. The convention 
establishes that recourse may be had to such supplementary means of interpretation in 
order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of the main interpretation 
principles or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to the main 
interpretation principles leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure, or leads to a result 
which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable (Article 32). 
As noted regarding the legal sources of international criminal law, the ICTY and 
ICTR have been established through UN Security Council resolutions. Despite this, the 
tribunals have from time to time explicitly referred to the Vienna Convention and to the 
principles of interpretation enumerated in the convention.646 The references to the Vienna 
Convention have been justified with the argument that the statutes are instruments derived 
from the UN Charter, which is a treaty.647 It has also been put forward that recourse to 
the convention can be made as it, in essence, only manifests principles of interpretation 
generally accepted in domestic jurisdictions.648 As regards interpretative principles set 
644 Linderfalk − like some other authors − differentiates between the concepts of object and purpose, 
which according to him signify a forward-looking explanation (a goal), and the concept of motive, 
which according to him is backward-looking (a historical fact that explains the birth of the provision or 
instrument). Article 31 in the Vienna Convention is according to him only concerned with the forward-
looking object and purpose. U. Linderfalk, Om tolkning av traktater (Lund: Lunds universitet, 2001), 230-
231. 
645 Aust 2007, at 234.
646 See e.g., Aleksovski, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 24 March 2000, para. 98, Bagosora et al., Decision 
(admissibility of appeal), AC, ICTR, 8 June 1998, para. 28, Bagosora et al., Decision (protective measures), 
TC, ICTR, 5 December 2001, para. 2, Delalić et al., Judgement, TC, ICTY, 16 November 1998, para. 1161, 
Erdemović, Judgement (joint sep. op. of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah), AC, ICTY, 7 October 1997, 
para. 3, Kanyabashi, Decision (jurisdiction, diss. op. of Judge Shahabuddeen), AC, ICTR, 3 June 1999, 
at 21, Kanyabashi, Decision (jurisdiction, joint sep. and conc. op. of Judge Wang Tieya and Judge Rafael 
Nieto-Navia), AC, ICTR, 3 June 1999, para. 10, Kanyabashi, Decision (jurisdiction, joint and sep. op. of 
Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah), AC, ICTR, 3 June 1999, paras 15 and 28, Kordić & Čerkez, Decision 
(evidence), AC, ICTY, 18 September 2000, para. 22, fn 39, Milošević, Decision (preliminary motions), TC, 
ICTY, 8 November 2001, para. 47, and Tadić, Decision (protective measures), TC, ICTY, 10 August 1995, 
para. 18. 
647 Kanyabashi, Decision (jurisdiction, joint sep. and conc. op. of Judge Wang Tieya and Judge Rafael Nieto-
Navia), AC, ICTR, 3 June 1999, para. 11. In the case law, it has also been suggested that the interpretation 
principles to be found in the Vienna Convention also can be used when interpreting the rules of the 
tribunals, which are instruments adopted by the Judges. E.g., Kanyabashi, Decision (jurisdiction, joint and 
sep. op. of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah), AC, ICTR, 3 June 1999, para. 16. 
648 Kanyabashi, Decision (jurisdiction, diss. op. of Judge Shahabuddeen), AC, ICTR, 3 June 1999, at 21-22, 
and Kanyabashi, Decision (jurisdiction, joint sep. and conc. op. of Judge Wang Tieya and Judge Rafael 
Nieto-Navia), AC, ICTR, 3 June 1999, para. 11.
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down in the Vienna Convention, it should be noted that the object and purpose of the 
ICTY, and hence the tribunal’s statute, has been identified as threefold: (1) to do justice; 
(2) to deter further crimes; and (3) to contribute to the restoration and maintenance 
of peace.649 (Two Judges of the ICTR’s Appeals Chamber, on the other hand, have put 
forward that: “The overreaching object and purpose of the Statute is ensuring a fair 
and expeditious trial for the accused.”650) In relation to individual provisions references 
have also been made to the object and purpose of, for example, treaties constituting the 
background to the individual treaties. For example, ICTY has held that the purpose of 
GC IV is to ensure the protection of civilians to the maximum extent possible.651 The 
context of the statute, on the other hand, has been considered to include the report of the 
UN Secretary-General containing the draft statute of the ICTY, which was approved by 
the Security Council when adopting the statute.652 It should, however, be noted that this 
report can be viewed both as a to the statute annexed instrument (context), and as a travail 
préparatoire (supplementary means of interpretation). The emphasis put on the report 
in the case law, however, indicates that the report clearly is regarded as more than just a 
supplementary means of interpretation. The opinions expressed by the members of the 
Security Council when voting on the adoption of the statute have, on the contrary, been 
given little significance when interpretations have been made. These opinions have thus 
mainly been regarded as possible supplementary means of interpretation.653 In relation 
to the ICTR, the report of the Secretary-General was presented after the statute already 
had been adopted.654 The ad hoc tribunals have also referred to the travaux préparatoires 
of international treaties, such as the 1948 Genocide Convention.655 Schabas has observed 
that travaux préparatoires that consist of lengthy debates in international organs often 
649 Tadić, Decision (protective measures), TC, ICTY, 10 August 1995, para. 18. On the Internet pages 
of the ICTY, a further objective is identified, viz. to render justice to the victims of crime. See further 
‘Achievements’ [ICTY] http://www.icty.org/sid/324 (last visited 29 August 2012). 
650 Kanyabashi, Decision (jurisdiction, joint and sep. op. of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah), AC, 
ICTR, 3 June 1999, para. 16.
651 Aleksovski, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 24 March 2000, para. 146. See also Tadić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 15 
July 1999, para. 168. 
652 “It should be noted that the Secretary-General’s Report has not the same legal standing as the Statute. 
In particular, it does not have the same binding authority. The Report as a whole was “approved” by the 
Security Council [...], while the Statute was “adopt[ed]” [...]. By “approving” the Report, the Security 
Council clearly intended to endorse its purpose as an explanatory document to the proposed Statute. 
Of course, if there appears to be a manifest contradiction between the Statute and the Report, it is 
beyond doubt that the Statute must prevail. In other cases, the Secretary-General’s Report ought to be 
taken to provide an authoritative interpretation of the Statute.” Tadić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 15 July 
1999, para. 295. See also e.g., Tadić, Decision (protective measures), TC, ICTY, 10 August 1995, para. 
18, and Delalić et al., Judgement, TC, ICTY, 16 November 1998, para. 169. Schabas has argued that this 
understanding of the context diverges from the one contemplated in the Vienna Convention. W. A. 
Schabas, ‘Interpreting the Statutes of the Ad Hoc Tribunals’, L. C. Vohrah et al. (eds.) Man’s Inhumanity to 
Man – Essays on International Law in Honour of Antonio Cassese (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 
2003), at 858-859. 
653 Tadić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 15 July 1999, paras 300 and 303. See, however, Delalić et al., Judgement, 
TC, ICTY, 16 November 1998, para. 169.
654 UN Doc. S/1995/134. 
655 E.g., Musema, Judgement, TC, ICTR, 27 January 2000, para. 162. 
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are problematic as legal sources in that they generally provide support to “practically any 
interpretation.”656  
Finally, it should be noted that the judges of the ad hoc tribunals have not only 
made use of the interpretation principles of the Vienna Convention. Sometimes, the 
judges have used domestic interpretation principles. For example, the principles of strict 
construction of criminal law and in dubio pro reo have occasionally been applied.657 
In the case law, it has also been suggested that the “geographical origin” of a legal 
concept may be taken into consideration when interpreting it.658 Finally, the judges 
have sometimes invoked more “international” interpretative principles, such as the 
interpretation most consistent with international customary law or with international 
human rights law.659 
As the ICC Statute is a treaty, the Vienna Convention is clearly applicable to that 
statute.660 The Statute, however, also contains some articles which regulate interpretation. 
Article 22(2) establishes that the definition of a crime shall be strictly construed and shall 
not be extended by analogy and that in case of ambiguity the definition shall be interpreted 
in favour of the person being investigated, prosecuted or convicted.661 Article 21(3), on 
its part, stipulates that the application and interpretation of law must be consistent with 
internationally recognized human rights and be without any adverse distinction founded 
656 Schabas 2003(a), at 868. Regarding the ICC Statute, Cassese has observed that there “hardly exist 
preparatory works reflecting the debates and negotiations that took place at the Rome Diplomatic 
Conference.” A. Cassese, ‘The Statute of the International Criminal Court: Some Preliminary Reflections’, 
10 European Journal of International Law (1999), at 145.
657 See e.g., Akayesu, Judgement, TC, ICTR, 2 September 1998, para. 319 and 501, Bagilishema, Judgement, 
TC, ICTR, 7 June 2001, para. 57, Delalić et al., Judgement, TC, ICTR, 16 November 1998, paras 408-413, 
Kayishema & Ruzindana, Judgement, TC, ICTR, 21 May 1999, para. 103, and Tadić, Decision (evidence), 
AC, ICTY, 15 October 1998, para. 73. As regards the use of “domestic Vienna Convention equivalents”, see 
e.g., the Čelebići case in which reference was made to the literal, golden and mischief rules of interpretation. 
Delalić et al., Judgement, TC, ICTY, 16 November 1998, paras 158-171.
658 See e.g., Delalić et al., Decision (evidence), TC, ICTY, 1 May 1997, para. 16. Note, however, the view 
expressed by the Appeals Chamber in the Blaškić case: “The Appeals Chamber holds that domestic judicial 
views or approaches should be handled with the greatest caution at the international level, lest one should 
fail to make due allowance for the unique characteristics of international criminal proceedings.” Blaškić, 
Judgement, AC, ICTY, 29 October 1997, para. 23.
659 See further L. Grover, ‘A Call to Arms: Fundamental Dilemmas Confronting the Interpretation of 
Crimes in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’, 21 European Journal of International Law 
(2010), at 548. 
660 Here, it should be noted that it in connection to human rights law treaties has been asked to what 
extent it is problematic that the Vienna Convention “contains many hidden assumptions that are not 
justified in respect of human rights treaties”, e.g., that the treaties regulate the relationship between States. 
Human rights treaties could be regarded as a special regime to which, e.g., different rules apply regarding 
reservations. M. Scheinin, ‘Impact on the Law of Treaties’, in M. T. Kamminga & M. Scheinin (eds.), The 
Impact of Human Rights Law on General International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), at 
27. In a similar vein, it may be asked to what extent conventions establishing (or codifying) individual 
criminal responsibility constitute a special regime, which special feature require special consideration. 
In this regard, it is significant that international criminal tribunals have regularly referred to general 
principles of law in the field of criminal law.   
661 Broomhall has pointed out that Article 22(2) refers to definition of crimes and that the applicability 
of the principle of strict construction to other parts of the Statute (such as defences) is not settled in the 
Statute. Broomhall 2008, at 720.  
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on grounds such as gender, age, race, colour, language, religion or belief, political or 
other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, wealth, birth or other status.
5.1.2.8.  Conclusions
While criminal law in most domestic legal systems is created through written criminal 
statutes, international criminal law is criminal law with legal sources that are different. 
The written legal sources of international criminal law have at least traditionally been 
rudimentary and vague. Customary law continues to play a central role in international 
criminal law. In practice, this entails that international criminal law is plagued by an 
indeterminacy unfamiliar to domestic criminal law.662 Due to the openness of international 
criminal law and various interpretational means open to the judges, it is not surprising 
that the judges of the international criminal tribunals sometimes have been accused 
of creating law instead of just interpreting or applying it. For example, Robinson has 
criticized the judges for expanding the definitions of crimes through victim-focused 
teleological reasoning.663 
For the present study, the nature of international criminal law is relevant from 
two different perspectives. First, it is not always simple to establish what the lex lata of 
international criminal law is. Second, as one goal of the study is to see how different typical 
features of international criminality are reflected in the law, it is important to recognize 
that the international criminalization process often has a feature of arbitrariness. Similar 
phenomena may be treated differently in law due to purely political considerations.664 
The creation of international criminal law has been highly periodic and connected to 
specific atrocities or wars that have shocked the international community. In the heat 
of a moral panic, legal solutions may be quickly adopted, but the drawback is that 
they are not necessarily well thought out. This is especially problematic in that when 
particular legal solutions become established in international criminal law, they are often 
difficult to change afterwards. In domestic criminal law, it is generally easy to establish 
new statutory law that replaces old legislation. In international criminal law, on the 
other hand, customary law often continues to coexist in parallel with new treaty law 
and new treaties are not necessarily ratified by the same States as the old ones. As such, 
international criminal law is by its nature both volatile (subject to sudden changes) and 
conservative (difficult to change).    
5.2.  International Criminal Law is Criminal Law that Is Enforced in an 
Unusual Way
5.2.1.  The Availability of Evidence and Substantive Criminal Law
The frequent State involvement in international criminality has led to widespread 
impunity for international crimes. This has, inter alia, resulted in international 
enforcement mechanisms. More interesting for this study is, however, the idea that 
662 Cassese 2008, at 4-5. 
663 D. Robinson, ‘The Identity Crisis of International Criminal Law’, 21 Leiden Journal of International Law 
(2008), at 933-946. 
664 E.g., war crimes in international and internal armed conflicts. This will be considered further in Chapter 6. 
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the State reluctance to investigate and prosecute the crimes could have an effect on 
substantive international criminal law. 
Former ICTY Prosecutor Del Pointe has noted that international criminal tribunals 
do not have the advantage of contemporaneous investigative tools, such as police 
intelligence information, surveillance, telephone intercepts or undercover operations, 
and that in many cases official records have been destroyed and documents have 
disappeared.665 This has affected the evidence used in the trials (for example, it has led 
to a focus on witness evidence). From a substantive criminal law perspective one may, 
in this regard, ask whether there also has been a push towards substantive criminal 
law that de facto can be proven through the evidence often available in international 
criminal trials. One could, for instance, speculate to what extent the common difficulty 
to establish superior orders has affected the development of the doctrine of superior 
responsibility. Evident is, at least, that lack of available evidence affects prosecutorial 
choices and judicial decisions in international criminal law. 666 
5.2.2.  Selective Prosecutions 
When ordinary domestic crimes are committed, the public officials usually investigate 
and prosecute all persons involved in the crimes. In certain legal systems, the prosecution 
of all culpable parties may even be mandated by law.667 The requirement that all crimes 
should be investigated and prosecuted is generally justified with the principle of equality, 
that is, that like cases should be handled in the same way.668 This being said, the domestic 
prosecutor may, depending on the law in the country in question, in certain cases decide 
not to prosecute.669 
In international criminal law, the situation is completely different. Due to limited 
resources and policy considerations, the international criminal tribunals are only 
expected to investigate and prosecute a handful of the individuals who are suspected 
of having committed crimes. The strategy of the international prosecutors has generally 
been to focus on the leadership stratum of perpetrators (“big fish”). This strategy is often 
justified with the argument that it is the leaders who make the crimes possible and that 
the convictions of leaders give more victims vindication.670 Wald has also observed that 
the big fish strategy “eradicates the unease caused when courts bring the full force of 
international law down on some [low- or mid-level] defendants but fail to try their 
665 Del Ponte 2006, at 546. 
666 E.g., Meron 2006, at 560. Likewise plea agreements may affect for what an individual de facto is 
convicted. It is thus not always only the factual circumstances which dictate for what an individual is 
convicted. On guilty pleas in international criminal law, see further e.g., Mettraux 2005, at 316.
667 Del Ponte 2006, at 541 (e.g., Italy).
668 Nino has argued that the retributivist idea of consistent treatment of offenders partly explain why 
international crimes historically have not been prosecuted in domestic legal systems, that is, he finds that 
the lack of prosecutions can be explained with the impossibility to prosecute all culprits. Nino 1996, at 185.
669 In Finland, the prosecutors may, e.g., choose not to prosecute crimes for which the maximum penalty is 
a fine, when the crime judged as a whole is petty. See further Criminal Procedure Act, Chapter 1, Sections 
6-7. 
670 Meron 2006, at 563. 
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more blameworthy superiors.”671 Prosecutorial decisions have also been affected by 
other considerations, such as availability of defendants and evidence and (probably) the 
aspiration to prosecute different types of cases/crimes. 
In essence, international criminal law has tried to solve the conflict between 
the need to limit the number of cases at the international level with the principle of 
equality with the so-called principle of complementarity. According to this principle, 
the international crime cases are distributed between the international and national 
level so that the international investigations and prosecutions should only be seen 
as complements to national proceedings. The international criminal tribunals vary 
in whether they (ICTY and ICTR) or the domestic courts (ICC) have primacy over 
the cases. In practice, however, national prosecutions of international crimes are 
unfortunately rare. This means that international criminal law still is plagued by 
selective prosecution.672 
For international criminal law, the selectivity is first and foremost an equality or 
legitimacy problem. From the point of view of this study, the more interesting question 
is, however, what consequences the selectivity has had on the image of the criminality that 
the international criminal law conveys and on the content of the law. In scholarly writings, 
it has, for example, been noted that focus on leaders has consequences on the narrative 
of international criminal law. Osiel has, for example, put forward that the Nuremberg 
Tribunal’s focus on the major war criminals and the Nazi aggression (and not the 
Holocaust) entailed that the tribunal missed both the macro picture (viz. the story of 
mass collaboration) and the micro perspective (viz. the story of the victims).673 He has 
also pointed out that: “trials of lower echelons permit exploration of vital historical and 
moral issues that big fish prosecutions cannot: They reveal how bureaucratic routine and 
casual indifference enable even the humblest functionaries to cause enormous suffering, 
permitting barbarity to become widespread.”674 Prosecutorial strategies in which 
important aspects of the criminality are concealed may hence send problematic signals. 
They may, for example, exaggerate the blameworthiness of the leaders and downplay 
the role played by the followers.675 For the audience, this may entail that the case law 
becomes “politically unpersuasive”.676 
Regarding implications for substantive criminal law, one should note the following: 
Firstly, for international criminal law to become a coherent system the prosecution of 
different types of cases is essential. For example, a central criminal law principle is that 
671 P. M. Wald, ‘Foreword: War Tales and War Trials’, 106 Michigan Law Review (2008), at 915.
672 On the use of prosecutorial discretion within international criminal law, see e.g., R. Kerr, The 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: An Exercise in Law, Politics, and Diplomacy 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 175 ff., and Schabas 2008(c), at 731-761.
673 M. Osiel, Mass Atrocity, Collective Memory, and the Law (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 
1997), 100-103.
674 Osiel 2005(a), at 1817 (referring to Alvarez). 
675 Osiel 2005(a), at 1764. “Prosecutors choose defendants and construct their legal arguments 
accordingly, with a self-conscious view toward conveying a certain message about how the country came 
to suffer such an apocalypse.” Ibid., at 1806. “The law’s reach is thus at once too timid and too ambitious, 
both overinclusive and underinclusive vis-à-vis the actual distribution of moral responsibility.” Ibid., at 
1764.
676 Osiel 1997, at 164. 
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the sentence shall reflect the blameworthiness of the offender’s behaviour and to settle 
distinctions in comparative guilt both high-level and low-level actor cases are needed.677 
Secondly, due to the fact that certain types of factual circumstances only are typical in 
particular types of cases,678 the selectivity may entail that there is no or very little case 
law on particular questions. For example, as duress generally is something that low-
level actors are likely to meet, the international case law focusing on more high-level 
and eager actors rarely has dealt with duress. Thirdly, Schabas has argued that ICTY’s 
initial focus on low-level actors to some extent has distorted its case law. He, for example, 
finds that the cases against the “thugs and hooligans” (Tadić, Kunarac and Jelisić) have 
brought about a problematic approach to the requirement of a policy behind crimes 
against humanity.679 It is, in fact, an intriguing question to what extent the cases chosen 
for prosecution can affect the content of the law. 
5.3.  Concluding Remarks
It has been argued that international criminal law is criminal law with some special features, 
such as unusual legal sources and an uncommon selectivity as regards enforcement. In 
comparison to most domestic criminal law, international criminal law is both imprecise 
and unsettled. How international criminal law “as an instrument” addresses international 
criminality will be considered next. 
677 Coherence problems may also occur if connected cases are tried in individual trials instead of in joint 
trials with multiple accused. Sloane has, e.g., argued that Ruzindana likely received a 25-year sentence 
rather than life imprisonment because ICTR tried him jointly with Kayishema, who was a former prefect. 
R. D. Sloane, ‘Sentencing for the ‘Crime of Crimes’: The Evolving ‘Common Law’ of Sentencing of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’, 5 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2007), at 728. Due 
to the collective nature of international crimes, the question of joint v. individual trials often raises, and 
individual cases may be connected to each other in factual terms. 
678 Wald has observed that the big fish strategy has had as an unintended consequence the concentration of 
indictments and trials on the legal theories dealing with individuals remote from the scenes of the crimes 
and the physical acts constituting the underlying offences to the crimes. Wald 2008, at 916-917. 
679 W. A. Schabas, ‘Prosecuting Dr Strangelove, Goldfinger, and the Joker at the International Criminal 
Court: Closing the Loopholes’, 23 Leiden Journal of International Law (2010), at 853. See also Schabas 
2009, at 244-245, and W. A. Schabas, ‘State Policy as an Element of International Crimes’, 98 The Journal of 
Criminal Law & Criminology (2008), at 953 ff.  

PART III:  
 
THE LEGAL SOLUTIONS 

117
6.  THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 
6.1.  A Short Historical Expose 
War crimes or “violations of the laws and customs of armed conflict” is the international 
core crime680 with the longest history. It is possible to find examples of criminalized 
behaviour during armed conflicts that date far back in time as well as evidence on 
occasional prosecutions of individuals who violated the norms. The development of 
international criminal responsibility, however, essentially began in the early 20th century, 
when suggestions of multi-national war crimes prosecutions were put forward after 
World War I.681 The first time individuals de facto were internationally prosecuted for 
war crimes was, however, after World War II.682 In these post-World War II trials, the 
understanding of what acts could be characterized as internationally prosecutable war 
crimes reflected the prevailing international law. In the early 1940s, international law 
was a branch of law that focused on regulating inter-State affairs and what happened 
within a country was not of international concern. For war crimes, this entailed that a 
war crime could only be committed in inter-State (international) armed conflicts and 
against individuals of another nationality. 
For international law, World War II entailed a turning-point in that the law from 
the mid-1940s increasingly started to concern itself with things that happen within 
national borders.683 Most notably, human rights law began to develop during that time 
period. In international criminal law, World War II also started a development which 
has been characterized as the “international criminalization of internal atrocities.”684 
The Nuremberg Charter namely contained the crime crimes against humanity, which 
essentially was included to allow prosecutions of atrocities committed by the Nazis 
against their own citizens.685 It has been argued that the adoption of this crime 
category constituted retroactive creation of criminal law and that the drafters of the 
charter attempted to “blur” this issue by including a war nexus requirement, that is, 
by defining crimes against humanity as a crime connected to the waging or initiation 
680 The concept of international core crimes hence here refers to war crimes, crimes against humanity and 
genocide. 
681 See further e.g., Meron 2006, at 553-559, and Schabas 2006(b), at 226-227. 
682 On the post-World War II prosecutions on war crimes, see further e.g., N. F. Chistiakov, ‘The Question 
of War Crimes at the Nuremberg Trial’, in G. Ginsburgs & V. N. Kudriavtsev (eds.), The Nuremberg 
Trial and International Law (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1990), at 155-166, I. A. Reshetov, 
‘International Law and Crimes against the Laws and Customs of War’, in G. Ginsburgs & V. N. Kudriavtsev 
(eds.), The Nuremberg Trial and International Law (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1990), at 167-
176, and Y. Totani, ‘The Case against the Accused’, in Y. Tanaka, T. McCormack & G. Simpson (eds.), 
Beyond Victor’s Justice? The Tokyo War Crimes Trial Revisited (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2011), 
at 152-154. 
683 See further e.g., A. Rosas, ‘Suvereenisuuden kuolema’, in P. Länsineva & V.-P. Viljanen (eds.), Juhlajulkaisu 
Antero Jyränki 1933 – 9/8 – 1993 (Turku: Turun yliopisto, 1993), at 173. 
684 Meron 2006, at 568. 
685 Article 6(c), Nuremberg Charter. See also Article 5(c), Tokyo Charter, Article II (c), Control Council 
Law No. 10, and Meron 2006, at 564.  
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of war.686 The war nexus was hence considered necessary to allow the interference 
with State sovereignty.687 In 1948, the UN General Assembly adopted the Genocide 
Convention. One aim of the convention was to clearly spell out the international 
illegality and criminality of genocides, such as the Holocaust. Schabas has, however, 
also argued that adoption of the convention can be seen as a reaction to the Nuremberg 
Tribunal’s failure to recognize “the reach of international criminal law into peacetime 
atrocities”.688   
The law applied by the ICTY and ICTR is largely based on the international criminal 
law that emerged or crystallized in the 1940s. One may, however, identify two significant 
developments in the ad hoc tribunals’ statutes and case law. Firstly, there has been a trend 
towards increasingly recognizing that crimes of international concern do not have to 
have an inter-State dimension, but may be intra-State. This trend is reflected in the fact 
that crimes against humanity do not require a war nexus of any kind, and, most notably, 
in the recognition that war crimes can also be committed in internal armed conflicts.689 
Secondly, there has been a trend towards construing the crimes so that the crimes have 
become more distinguishable from each other. In this regard, whereas crimes against 
humanity historically emerged from the humanitarian principles contained in the 
laws and customs of war, the crime today is not anymore linked to jus in bello or war 
crimes.690 Also genocide, which historically often has been viewed as a type of crimes 
against humanity, has in the case law of the tribunals been clearly distinguished from 
crimes against humanity. The fact that the modern ad hoc tribunals’ understanding of 
686 Crimes against humanity were thus connected to war crimes and crimes against peace. M. J. Kelly & T. 
L. H. McCormack, ‘Contributions of the Nuremberg Trial to the Subsequent Development of International 
Law’, in D. A. Blumenthal & T. L. H. McCormack (eds.), The Legacy of Nuremberg: Civilising Influence or 
Institutionalised Vengeance? (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008), at 107-108. In the Nuremberg 
Charter (Article 6) crimes against humanity was defined as “murder, extermination, enslavement, 
deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the 
war; or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any 
crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country 
where perpetrated” (emphasis added). See also e.g., M. C. Bassiouni, Crimes against Humanity – Historical 
Evolution and Contemporary Application (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 33-34, and R. S. 
Clark, ‘Crimes against Humanity at Nuremberg’, in G. Ginsburgs & V.N. Kudriavtsev (eds.), The Nuremberg 
Trial and International Law (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1990), at 177-199.
687 G. Boas, J. L. Bischoff & N. L. Reid, International Criminal Law Practitioner Library, Volume II, Elements 
of Crimes under International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 24. 
688 W. A. Schabas, ‘Origins of the Genocide Convention: From Nuremberg to Paris’, 40 Case Western 
Reserve Journal of International Law (2007-2008), at 36. The same point is also made by King in H. T. King, 
B. B. Ferencz and W. R. Harris, ‘Origins of the Genocide Convention’, 40 Case Western Reserve Journal of 
International Law (2007-2008), at 13-14.
689 Tadić, Decision (jurisdiction), AC, ICTY, 2 October 1995, paras 137 and 141. See also e.g., Schabas 
2006(b), at 231-236. 
690 P. Akhavan, ‘Reconciling Crimes against Humanity with the Laws of War – Human Rights, Armed 
Conflict, and the Limits of Progressive Jurisprudence’, 6 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2008), at 
25-26, and K. Ambos & S. Wirth, ‘The Current Law of Crimes against Humanity – An Analysis of UNTAET 
Regulation 15/2000’, 13 Criminal Law Forum (2002), at 24. Most notably, crimes against humanity do not 
have to have an armed conflict nexus, which has entailed that crimes against humanity have been divorced 
from war crimes. Tadić, Decision (jurisdiction), AC, ICTY, 2 October 1995, para. 141. It is unclear exactly 
when the nexus requirement disappeared. See further e.g., Cassese 2006, fn 5, and Schabas 2006(b), at 
187-189.
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the international crimes, and especially crimes against humanity, departs from the post-
World War II tribunals’ is interesting in that during the Cold War period international 
criminal law did not really develop. The case law of the ad hoc tribunals has therefore 
been very progressive, some would even say law-making.691 
When the ICC Statute was negotiated in 1998, the statutes of the ad hoc tribunals 
already existed and some case law by these tribunals. In the ICC negotiations, the 
development of international criminal law suggested by the ad hoc tribunals was largely 
accepted and codified. On some points, the ICC Statute, however, differs from the law 
applied by the ad hoc tribunals (or customary international law).692  
This chapter will begin with the identification of the current crime elements of 
war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. To the extent there is a significant 
difference in the customary international criminal law and the ICC Statute this will be 
mentioned. As much has already been written on the crimes as such, this analysis will 
be short. The focus in this chapter will instead be placed on looking at the elements 
from the point of view of the phenomenology of the crimes. It is argued that the crimes 
clearly reflect many typical features of the criminality. At the same time, however, the 
uncertainty surrounding some crime elements has been significant. This can largely 
be explained with the legal sources of international criminal law. The present author, 
however, also believes that some uncertainty is due to disagreement on what the legally 
relevant features of international criminality should be. 
6.2.  The Elements of the Crimes
6.2.1.  Different Types of Crime Elements 
In the ICC Statute, a difference is made between the material and mental elements of 
the crimes over which the court has jurisdiction. Article 30 of the Statute stipulates 
that, unless otherwise provided, a person shall be criminally responsible and liable 
for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court only if the material 
elements are committed with intent and knowledge.693 In a commentary to the Statute, 
Piragoff and Robinson have noted that the term “material elements” refers to the crime 
definitions in the Statute and hence to the “conduct or action described in the definition, 
any consequences that may be specified in addition to the conduct, and any factual 
circumstances that qualify the definition.”694 
691 E.g., A. Marston Danner, ‘When Courts Make Law: How the International Criminal Tribunals Recast 
the Laws of War’, 59 Vanderbilt Law Review (2006), at 1 ff., Robinson 2008, at 927, and Zahar & Sluiter 
2008, at 105. 
692 See further e.g., L. N. Sadat, ‘Custom, Codification and Some Thoughts about the Relationship between the 
Two: Article 10 of the ICC Statute’, 49 DePaul Law Review (2000), at 909 ff., and Schabas 2010(a), at 269-272.
693 The question of the general mental state requirements for criminal responsibility for international 
crimes will not be considered in this study. See further e.g., M. E. Badar, ‘The Mental Element in the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary from a Comparative Criminal Law 
Perspective’, 19 Criminal Law Forum (2008), at 473 ff. 
694 D. K. Piragoff & D. Robinson, ‘Article 30 – Mental Element’, in O. Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court – Observers’ Notes, Article by Article, 2nd ed. (München: 
C. H. Beck, 2008), at 851-852. 
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Regarding the crime definitions in the statutes of the ICC and the ad hoc tribunals, 
it should, however, be noted that the crime definitions sometimes contain both objective/
material and subjective/mental elements. As regards the mental elements, some establish 
particular mental requirements whereas others only reaffirm the generally demanded 
intent and knowledge. For example, the crime definition of genocide requires genocidal 
intent which is a special mental element, whereas the reference to wilful killing in relation 
to the war crime of grave breaches generally merely is seen as a reaffirmation of the 
general requirement of intent.695 
In the crime definitions, the material elements generally consist of conduct (act) 
elements and/or consequence (result/harm) elements. In this respect, the international 
crimes are similar to most ordinary domestic crimes, where it common to require both a 
certain conduct and a certain end-result.696 The international crime definitions, however, 
also often contain contextual or circumstantial elements,697 which are unusual in domestic 
criminal law. 
6.2.2. War Crimes 
6.2.2.1.  Material Elements
War crime is (as noted above) the international core crime with the longest history, 
and as such the controversial question is not whether the crime is internationally 
criminalized or not, but rather which all acts can constitute war crimes. The crime has 
been defined differently in the statutes of all modern international criminal tribunals.698 
The uncertainty about the scope of the international criminalization of war crimes 
is connected to the legal sources: Much of the law of armed conflicts is customary 
law or treaty law which does not contain explicit criminalizations. The only specific 
characterisations of certain acts as criminal (before the ICC Statute) can be found in 
the 1949 Geneva Conventions and in the 1977 AP I, which contain so-called grave 
695 See e.g., K. Dörmann, ‘(a) Grave Breaches’, in O. Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court – Observers’ Notes, Article by Article, 2nd ed. (München: C. H. Beck, 
2008), at 306. 
696 It should, however, here be noted that there are today increasingly crimes that have a different “style”. 
Ashworth, e.g., notes that some criminalizations aim at conduct which in itself causes no harm and that, 
inter alia, the creation of risks is increasingly criminalized. A. Ashworth, ‘Criminal Justice and Civilization’, 
in A. Snare (ed.), Beware of Punishment: On the Utility and Futility of Criminal Law (Oslo: Pax Forlag 
A/S, 1995), at 13. Cassese has in relation to international criminal law noted that also this branch of law 
criminalizes conduct creating an unacceptable risk of harm. E.g., it is possible to find criminalizations of 
early stages of commission or preparation. Cassese 2008, at 10. 
697 In the ICC Elements of Crimes, it is pointed out that the elements have been structured according to 
the following principles: “As the elements of crimes focus on the conduct, consequences and circumstances 
associated with each crime, they are generally listed in that order; − When required, a particular mental 
element is listed after the affected conduct, consequence or circumstance; − Contextual circumstances are 
listed last.” ICC Doc. ICC-ASP/1/3 (Part II-B).
698 Articles 2 and 3, ICTY Statute, Article 4, ICTR Statute, and Article 8, ICC Statute.
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breach provisions.699 The content of the other types of war crimes have to a large degree 
been settled by customary law. War crimes committed during armed conflicts should 
be distinguished from the crime of aggression (simplifying, the crime of starting an 
armed conflict).700
Generally speaking, war crimes can be defined as acts criminalized in jus in bello 
(underlying offences) which are committed during an armed conflict and which are 
associated with the conflict (nexus with armed conflict).701 The main characteristics of war 
crimes are thus: (a) the fact that the illegality of certain behaviour is regulated in a special 
legal order, viz., the law of armed conflict, and (b) the environment or context to which 
the criminal acts are connected.702 Certain types of war crimes have additional elements 
that must be proven, for example, that the crimes are committed against protected 
property or persons (grave breaches)703 or that the crimes are committed against persons 
no longer taking active part in hostilities (violations of common Article 3 in the 1949 
Geneva Conventions).704 It has been observed that these types of victim requirements can 
be necessary in the context of armed conflicts in that certain acts are not criminal when 
committed against combatants or others taking active part in the hostilities.705
As regards the underlying offences of war crimes, they are numerous and it is 
not meaningful to consider them all here separately.706 They contain both acts which 
criminalization aims at protecting those not taking active part in the hostilities (for 
example, intentionally directing attacks against civilians) and acts which criminalization 
aims at humanizing the fighting in general (for example, criminalization of the use of 
poisonous gases). Certain of the prohibited acts are such that they clearly demand the 
existence of an armed conflict and are directly connected to regulating the fighting (for 
example, criminalization of declaring that no quarter will be given), whereas other war 
crimes constitute acts that also are prohibited in peacetime. Of the underlying offences 
that also are prohibited in peacetime, some constitute ordinary domestic crimes (for 
699 Article 50, GC I, Article 51, GC II, Article 130, GC III, Article 147, GC IV, and Article 85, AP I. Grave 
breaches are a special type of war crimes. Grave breaches can only be committed in international armed 
conflicts and against so-called protected persons or property. Tadić, Decision (jurisdiction), AC, ICTY, 2 
October 1995, paras 80-84. See also e.g., Tadić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 15 July 1999, para. 80, and Blaškić, 
Judgement, AC, ICTY, 29 July 2004, para. 170. On grave breaches generally, see e.g. H. Fischer, ‘Grave 
Breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions’, in G. Kirk McDonald & O. Swaak-Goldman (eds.), Substantive 
and Procedural Aspects of International Criminal Law: The Experience of International and National Courts, 
Volume I (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000), at 67-93.
700 In connection to war crimes, the prevailing legal assumption is therefore that fighting in the armed 
conflict per se is legal. It should be noted that civilian direct participation in hostilities has not in itself 
been defined as a war crime in international criminal law. See further D. J. R. Frakt, ‘Direct Participation 
in Hostilities as a War Crime: America’s Failed Efforts to Change the Law of War’, 46 Valparaiso University 
Law Review (2012), at 732-733.    
701 E.g., Tadić Decision (jurisdiction), AC, ICTY, 2 October 1995, para. 70, and Kunarac et al., Judgement, 
TC, ICTY, 22 February 2001, para. 402.
702 E.g., Kunarac et al., Judgement, AC, ICTY, 12 June 2002, para. 58, and Rutaganda, Judgement, AC, 
ICTR, 26 May 2003, paras 569-570.
703 Tadić, Decision (jurisdiction), AC, ICTY, 2 October 1995, para. 81. See also e.g., Tadić, Judgement, AC, 
ICTY, 15 July 1999, para. 80, and Blaškić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 29 July 2004, para. 170.
704 E.g., Delalić et al., Judgement, AC, ICTY, 20 February 2001, para. 420.  
705 Cryer et al. 2010, at 287.
706 See e.g., Article 8, ICC Statute.
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example, rape), whereas others are international crimes or crimes with an international 
pedigree (for example, torture or terroristic acts such as the taking of hostages).707 It 
has been pointed out that the list of criminalized acts is not always logical in that, for 
instance, the list of prohibited weapons is not necessarily connected to the inhumanity 
of the weapons, but rather to whether States have agreed to prohibit the use of particular 
weapons.708 Another illogicality of the war crime definition has been found to be that 
there are more war crimes (underlying offences) that can be committed in international 
armed conflicts. 
As regards the requirement of an armed conflict, the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the 
Tadić case established that an armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed 
force between States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities 
and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State.709 This test, which 
has been reaffirmed in numerous later cases, in essence, requires that an investigation is 
made into the intensity of the conflict and the organization of the parties in the conflict.710 
Neither the ICC Statute nor the Elements of Crimes define what an armed conflict stands 
for. In the Lubanga judgement, the definition put forward in the Tadić case was, however, 
quoted with approval.711 Certain types of war crimes (most notably grave breaches) 
demand that the armed conflict is international.712 Armed conflicts have by ICTY been 
deemed to be international when the conflict takes place between two or more States, 
when an another State intervenes in non-international armed conflict through its 
troops, or when some of the participants in the internal armed conflict act on behalf of 
707 Cf. the fact that the underlying offences in relation to terrorism and war crimes often are similar (e.g., 
murder, the taking of hostages). M. P. Scharf, ‘Defining Terrorism as the Peacetime Equivalent of War 
Crimes: Problems and Prospects’, 36 Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law (2004), at 359 ff.  
708 Cf. May who asks why the principle of discrimination prohibits the use of poison, but allows the use 
of most bombs. May 2007, at 122 (see also at 120). In relation to the adoption process of the ICC Statute, 
Tallgren has observed that: “For the days ahead, the Conference will be striving for the completion of 
the six pages of definitions of war crimes. [...] The choice is, among others, between chemical weapons, 
biological weapons, land mines, blinding lasers, various types of bullets, and nuclear weapons. Hardly any 
state is without a weak point: a producer here, a buyer there, a non-ratified treaty on the left, a ‘specific 
geopolitical aspect’ on the right. [...] The preparation, negotiation and acceptance of the ICC Statute start to 
resemble the very crimes the Statute defines: the same large-scale activity, wealth of planning, secret deals, 
remarkable masses involved, wide-ranging effects and international concern.” I. Tallgren, ‘We Did It? The 
Vertigo of Law and Everyday Life at the Diplomatic Conference on the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court’, 12 Leiden Journal of International Law (1999), at 695-697.
709 Tadić, Decision (jurisdiction), AC, ICTY, 2 October 1995, para. 70.
710 Tadić, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 7 May 1997, para. 562. See also e.g., Mrkšić et al., Judgement, TC, ICTY, 
27 September 2007, para. 407. 
711 Lubanga, Judgement, TC, ICC, 14 March 2012, para. 533. Furthermore, in connection to armed 
conflicts not of an international character, the ICC Statute establishes that this concept refers to “protracted 
armed conflict between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups”. 
“[S]ituations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence or 
other acts of a similar nature” have explicitly been defined outside the concept. Article 8(2)(f), ICC Statute. 
See also Lubanga, Judgement, TC, ICC, 14 March 2012, paras 537-538. On the initial ICC case law, see 
further e.g., R. Cryer, ‘The Definitions of International Crimes in the Al Bashir Arrest Warrant Decision’, 7 
Journal of International Criminal Justice (2009), at 285-286. 
712 Tadić, Decision (jurisdiction), AC, ICTY, 2 October 1995, paras 80-84. See also e.g., Tadić, Judgement, 
AC, ICTY, 15 July 1999, para. 80, and Blaškić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 29 July 2004, para. 170.
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another State.713 The ICC Lubanga Trial Chamber also accepted this finding.714 The ICC 
Elements of Crime, furthermore, establish that the term “international armed conflict” 
encompasses military occupation.715 The Bemba Pre-Trial Chamber defined armed 
conflict not of an international character as “outbreak of armed hostilities of a certain 
level of intensity, exceeding that of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, 
isolated and sporadic acts of violence or other acts of a similar nature, and which takes 
place within the confines of a State territory”.716 The Pre-Trial Chamber also noted that 
the hostilities may take place between government authorities and organized dissident 
armed groups, or between organized armed groups.717 An organized armed group must 
be able “to plan and carry out military operations for a prolonged period of time”.718
Secondly, the underlying offence must be “closely related to the hostilities“719, that 
is, a link must be established between the accused person’s acts and the armed conflict. 
In the Kunarac et al. case, the ICTY Appeals Chamber specified this nexus requirement 
by finding that the armed conflict need not have been causal to the commission of 
the crime, but the existence of an armed conflict must, at a minimum, have played a 
substantial part in the perpetrator’s ability to commit it, his decision to commit it, the 
manner in which it was committed or the purpose for which it was committed.720 The 
Appeals Chamber furthermore identified as factors indicating a nexus the fact that the 
perpetrator is a combatant, the fact that the victim is a non-combatant, the fact that the 
victim is a member of the opposing party, the fact that the act may be said to serve the 
ultimate goal of a military campaign and the fact that the crime is committed as part of 
or in the context of the perpetrator’s official duties.721 
From the point of view of this study, it is also interesting to note what kinds of 
elements are not included in the crime definitions. Fenrick, for example, has stressed 
that plan, policy and scale are not elements of war crimes.722 There are no requirements 
of a pattern of conduct and a single independent act can constitute a war crime. In this 
regard, the context element of war crimes is different from the context element of crimes 
against humanity, which function is to exclude random violence. It should, however, be 
noted that the ICC Statute contains a so-called jurisdictional threshold, which function 
is to exclude isolated acts of violence from the Court’s jurisdiction. The Statute namely 
stipulates that the Court shall have jurisdiction over war crimes in particular when 
committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such 
713 Tadić Judgement, AC, ICTY, 15 July 1999, para. 84. See also Lubanga, Decision (confirmation of 
charges), PTC, ICC, 29 January 2007, paras 208-211. 
714 Lubanga, Judgement, TC, ICC, 14 March 2012, para. 541. See also Bemba, Decision (confirmation of 
charges), PTC, ICC, 15 June 2009, paras 220-223. 
715 ICC Doc. ICC-ASP/1/3 (Part II-B), fn 34. 
716 Bemba, Decision (confirmation of charges), PTC, ICC, 15 June 2009, para. 231. 
717 Bemba, Decision (confirmation of charges), PTC, ICC, 15 June 2009, para. 231. 
718 E.g., Mbarushimana, Decision (confirmation of charges), PTC, ICC, 16 December 2011, para. 103. 
719 Tadić, Decision (jurisdiction), AC, ICTY, 2 October 1995, para. 70.
720 Kunarac et al., Judgement, AC, ICTY, 12 June 2002, para. 58.
721 Kunarac et al., Judgement, AC, ICTY, 12 June 2002, para. 59. 
722 W. J. Fenrick, ‘B. Analysis and Interpretation of Elements’ [Article 8, War Crimes], in Commentary on 
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court – Observers’ Notes, Article by Article, O. Triffterer 
(ed.) (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1999), at 181. See also Bassiouni & Manikas 1996, at 514 
(regarding state policy).  
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crimes.723 In its case law, the ICC has, however, held that the term “in particular” “makes 
it clear that the existence of a plan, policy or large-scale commission is not a prerequisite 
for the Court to exercise jurisdiction over war crimes but rather serves as a practical 
guideline for the Court.”724 Also a single act can therefore amount to a war crime within 
the ICC context.725 (The single violation must, however, presumably constitute a serious 
violation of international humanitarian law.)726 Secondly, it is noteworthy that the 
crime elements of war crimes do not contain crime elements that restrict the group of 
possible perpetrators to, for example, State representatives or soldiers. In the Akayesu 
Appeal Judgement, the ICTR noted that while the perpetrators of war crimes in most 
cases are commanders, combatants and other members of the armed forces due to the 
nexus requirement of war crimes, a special relationship with one party to the conflict 
is not a precondition for the applicability of the tribunal’s war crime provision.727 In 
relation to war crimes that only can be committed in international armed conflicts State 
involvement in the conflict is required, but there is no requirement that the individual 
perpetrators have a State affiliation. 
6.2.2.2.  Mental Elements
The international war crime definitions do not explicitly provide for special mental 
elements that would apply to all war crimes.728 In case law, it has, however, been asked 
what the required mental state is in relation to the contextual crime element, that is, the 
armed conflict. It appears clear that the accused person must not have made the correct 
legal evaluation of the existence of an armed conflict or, for example, its international 
nature. Instead, the person must only be aware of the factual circumstances that determine 
the existence of the conflict and its nature. In the Kordić and Čerkez case, the ICTY 
Appeals Chamber namely laid down that: 
The nullum crimen sine lege principle does not require that an accused knew the 
specific legal definition of each element of a crime he committed. It suffices that 
he was aware of the factual circumstances, e.g. that a foreign state was involved in 
the armed conflict. It is thus not required that Kordić could make a correct legal 
evaluation as to the international character of the armed conflict.729 
Likewise, in the Naletilić and Martinović Appeal Judgement, the Appeals Chamber put 
forward that: “The perpetrator only needs to be aware of factual circumstances on which 
the judge finally determines the existence of the armed conflict and the international (or 
internal) character thereof.”730 In the Elements of Crimes of the ICC, it is suggested that: 
723 Article 8(1), ICC Statute. On the background of this provision, see e.g., Boas, Bischoff & Reid 2008, at 
293-294.
724 Bemba, Decision (confirmation of charges), PTC, ICC, 15 June 2009, para. 211.
725 Mbarushimana, Decision (confirmation of charges), PTC, ICC, 16 December 2011, para. 94. 
726 Cf. Tadić, Decision (jurisdiction), AC, ICTY, 2 October 1995, para. 94.
727 Akayesu, Judgement, AC, ICTR, 1 June 2001, para. 444. See also Boas, Bischoff & Reid 2008, at 242. 
728 Some of the underlying offences, however, have special mental elements. E.g., the underlying offence 
“acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population” 
require the specific intent to spread terror among the civilian population. Galić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 30 
November 2006, para. 104. 
729 Kordić & Čerkez, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 17 December 2004, para. 311. 
730 Naletilić & Martinović, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 3 May 2006, para. 119.
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“there is no requirement for awareness by the perpetrator of the facts that established 
the character of the conflict as international or non-international. [...] There is only a 
requirement for the awareness of the factual circumstances that established the existence 
of an armed conflict that is implicit in the terms “took place in the context of and was 
associated with”.”731
6.2.3.  Crimes against Humanity
6.2.3.1.  Material Elements
Crimes against humanity entered the international criminal law scene as a crime connected 
to war crimes and crimes against peace, but has during the last decades developed into a 
crime that is clearly distinguishable from these two crimes. The crime elements of crimes 
against humanity were for a long time unsettled. This is reflected in the fact that the 
crime has been defined differently in the statutes of all modern international criminal 
tribunals.732 The case law of the ad hoc tribunals and the ICC Statute have, however, 
entailed that the crime elements today have become solidified. Crimes against humanity 
nowadays refer to certain inhumane acts (underlying offences) committed as part of a 
widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge 
of the attack. The list of possible underlying offences varies somewhat from one tribunal 
to another, but includes serious inhumane acts such as murder, torture, and rape. It is the 
attack that must be widespread or systematic according to the crime definition, and not 
the underlying offences.733 Some underlying offences are, however, such that they imply 
a pattern of conduct (most notably extermination, persecution, and apartheid).734 To be 
731 ICC Doc. ICC-ASP/1/3 (Part II-B). Decœur finds it problematic that the ICC follows a different approach 
than the ad hoc tribunals, that is, that a person only must be aware of the facts determining the existence 
of a conflict and not of facts establishing its nature. More specifically he argues that: “the mens rea should 
encompass the nature of the conflict and, as a result, the plea of mistake should be an admissible defence 
before the ICC.” H. Decœur, ‘Avoiding Strict Liability in Mixed Conflicts: A Subjectivist Approach to the 
Contextual Element of War Crimes’, 13 International Criminal Law Review (2013), at 482-484. See also E. 
La Haye, War Crimes in Internal Armed Conflicts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) 113-114. 
732 Article 5, ICTY Statute, Article 3, ICTR Statute, and Article 7, ICC Statute.
733 E.g., Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Decision (investigation), PTC, ICC, 31 March 2010, para. 94.
734 Of these, extermination refers to the killing or intentional infliction of conditions of life calculated to 
bring about the destruction of part of a population, persecution to the intentional and severe deprivation 
of fundamental rights contrary to international law by reason of the identity of the group or collectivity, 
and apartheid to the commission of inhumane acts committed in the context of an institutionalized regime 
of systematic oppression and domination by one racial group over any other racial group or groups and 
committed with the intention of maintaining that regime. See Article 7, ICC Statute, and ICC Doc. ICC-
ASP/1/3 (Part II-B). Boot and Hall note that the purpose of the distinction between groups and collectivities 
is not evident. M. Boot & C. K. Hall, ‘Persecution’, in O. Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court – Observers’ Notes, Article by Article, 2nd ed. (München: C. H. Beck, 
2008), at 217. In the ad hoc tribunals’ jurisprudence, extermination has been defined as acts or omissions 
which contribute directly or indirectly to the killing of a large number of individuals with the intent to kill 
or to subject the individuals to deadly life conditions. See e.g., Popović et al., Judgement, TC, ICTY, 10 June 
2010, paras 800-801. Persecution, on the other hand, has been defined as “an act or omission which: (a) 
discriminates in fact and denies a fundamental human right laid down in international law; and (b) is carried 
out with the intention to discriminate on political, racial, or religious grounds.” Gotovina et al., Judgement, 
TC, ICTY, 15 April 2011, para. 1802. See also e.g., Krnojelac, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 15 March 2002, para. 431. 
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committed, these kinds of “pattern underlying offences” generally demand extensive 
cooperation between individuals. 
In crimes against humanity, the underlying offence must thus be committed in a 
particular context. This context element has two sub-components: (1) the underlying 
offence must be part of a widespread or systematic attack; and (2) the attack must be 
directed against any civilian population. The requirement that the act must be part of a 
widespread or735 systematic attack is often called the nexus element of crimes against 
humanity. The aim of this requirement is to exclude isolated and random acts from 
the scope of the crime. The words “widespread,” “systematic” and “attack” have all 
been interpreted in case law. Widespread has been understood in different ways, but 
essentially the term refers to the number of victims and the large-scale nature of the 
attack.736 Likewise, the adjective “systematic” has been given alternative definitions, but 
it connotes that there has been a pattern or a methodological plan or that the attack can 
be called organized.737 Finally, “attack” has been understood to refer to a course of conduct 
involving the multiple commissions of prohibited acts.738 In an attack, there has to be a 
certain connection or link between the various isolated acts. The fact that numerous 
violent crimes are committed in a certain geographic area is thus not in itself equivalent 
to an attack.
Secondly, the attack must be directed against any civilian population. This 
requirement emphasizes the humanitarian origin of the criminalization of crimes 
against humanity. It is not only enemy civilians that are protected, but any civilian 
population. In relation to crimes against humanity, the nationality or affiliation of 
the victim is thus irrelevant.739 In the Martić Appeal Judgement, ICTY put down 
that the concept of “civilian” in context to crimes against humanity should be given 
the same meaning as in international humanitarian law in general.740 The Appeals 
Chamber hence referred to Article 50(1) of AP I, which defines civilians as persons 
735 At one point, it was unclear whether the requirement was a widespread OR systematic attack, or a 
widespread AND systematic attack. Today, it is, however, clearly established that the test is disjunctive. 
E.g., Tadić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 15 July 1999, para. 248. 
736 E.g., Akayesu, Judgement, TC, ICTR, 2 September 1998, para. 580, Tadić, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 7 May 
1997, para. 648, Blaškić, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 3 March 2000, para. 206, and Kunarac et al. Judgement, TC, 
ICTY, 22 February 2001, para. 428. Regarding the ICC, see e.g., Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Decision 
(investigation), PTC, ICC, 31 March 2010, para. 95, and Bemba, Decision (confirmation of charges), PTC, 
ICC, 15 June 2009, para. 83. 
737 E.g., Akayesu, Judgement, TC, ICTR, 2 September 1998, para. 580, Tadić, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 7 May 
1997, para. 648, Blaškić, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 3 March 2000, para. 203, and Kunarac et al. Judgement, TC, 
ICTY, 22 February 2001, para. 429. Regarding the ICC, see e.g., Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Decision 
(investigation), PTC, ICC, 31 March 2010, para. 96. 
738 E.g., Kunarac et al. Judgement, TC, ICTY, 22 February 2001, para. 415-416, and Nahimana et al., 
Judgement, AC, ICTR, 28 November 2007, paras 916-918. 
739 Cryer et al. 2010, at 241. 
740 In some earlier case law, it was suggested that the term “civilian” in the context of crimes against 
humanity should be given a broader meaning. See e.g., Tadić, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 7 May 1997, para. 637 
ff. See also O. Swaak-Goldman, ‘Crimes against Humanity’, in G. Kirk McDonald & O. Swaak-Goldman 
(eds.), Substantive and Procedural Aspects of International Criminal Law – The Experience of International 
and National Courts, Volume I (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000), at 153-155. 
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not belonging to the armed forces.741 The Appeals Chamber, however, stressed that it 
is the population that must be civilian, not necessarily the individual victims. Persons 
hors de combat may hence be the individual victims of crimes against humanity.742 
It has also been established that it is enough that the population is predominantly 
civilian, that is, the presence of certain non-civilians in their midst does not change 
the character of the population.743 The rationale behind the population requirement 
has also been found to exclude isolated/random acts from the scope of crimes 
against humanity.744 In the Tadić case, the Trial Chamber, for example, pointed out 
that the population element is intended to imply crimes of a collective nature.745 The 
requirement does not, however, mean that the entire population of a given State or 
territory must be victimized.746 The requirement that the attack be “directed against” 
has been interpreted to mean that the civilian population must be the primary (and 
not incidental) target of the attack.747
In the ICC Statute, an additional crime element can be found as the Statute demands 
that the course of conduct is pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational 
policy to commit such attack.748 The ICC Elements of Crimes put forward that: “It is 
understood that policy to commit such attack requires that the State or organization 
actively promote or encourage such an attack against a civilian population.”749 Such 
a policy element has also been suggested before the ad hoc tribunals, but it has been 
rejected by them. In Kunarac et al. case, the ICTY Appeals Chamber found that “the 
existence of a policy or plan may be evidentially relevant, but it is not a legal element 
of the crime.”750 
A difficult legal question is what the ICC policy element exactly stands for. The concept 
of a policy can be given a maximalist interpretation making the requirement equivalent to 
the requirement of an agreement or plan to commit a systematic attack. This, however, 
741 Martić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 8 October 2008, paras 291-302. See also J. Dungel, ‘Defining Victims of 
Crimes against Humanity: Martić and the International Criminal Court’, 22 Leiden Journal of International 
Law (2009), at 727-752. 
742 Martić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 8 October 2008, paras 303-314. A pre-trial chamber of the ICC has, 
however, held that when assessing whether an attack has been directed against a civilian population, it will 
take ‘into account the information relevant to the status of victims, their ethnic or political affiliation as 
well as the methods used during the attacks.’ Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Decision (investigation), 
PTC, ICC, 31 March 2010, para. 108.  
743 Tadić, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 7 May 1997, para. 638. 
744 Tadić, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 7 May 1997, para. 648. 
745 Tadić, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 7 May 1997, para. 644. 
746 Tadić, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 7 May 1997, para. 644.
747 E.g., Kunarac et al. Judgement, TC, ICTY, 22 February 2001, para. 421, and Kunarac et al., Judgement, 
AC, ICTY, 12 June 2002, para. 92. 
748 Article 7(2)(a), ICC Statute. 
749 ICC-ASP/1/3 (Part II-B). In footnote 6, it is furthermore established that: “A policy which has a civilian 
population as the object of the attack would be implemented by State or organizational action. Such a 
policy may, in exceptional circumstances, be implemented by a deliberate failure to take action, which 
is consciously aimed at encouraging such attack. The existence of such a policy cannot be inferred solely 
from the absence of governmental or organizational action.”
750 Kunarac et al., Judgement, AC, ICTY, 12 June 2002, para. 98. Likewise e.g., Blaškić, Judgement, AC, 
ICTY, 29 July 2004, paras 120 and 126, Gacumbitsi, Judgement, AC, ICTR, 7 July 2006, para. 84, and 
Nahimana et al., Judgement, AC, ICTR, 28 November 2007, para. 922. 
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did not appear to be the intention of the drafters of the ICC Statute.751 On the other hand, 
in a minimalist interpretation the policy requirement only excludes clearly random acts, 
that is, is equivalent to the requirement of an attack.752 Finally, the policy element can be 
viewed as an element which function is to exclude from the scope of the crime certain types 
of criminality, for example, the criminality of serial killers, motorcycle gangs and small 
terrorist groups, which according to Schabas can successfully be addressed by domestic 
legal systems.753 Robinson, on his part, has held that there are four possible approaches to 
the policy element and hence the “essence” of crimes against humanity, of which the two 
last ones appear to be available to the ICC due to the ICC Statute: 
(1) that there is no policy element (advanced by Guénaël Mettraux and others and 
adopted in [the ad hoc] Tribunal jurisprudence), (2) that there must be a State policy 
(advanced by Cherif Bassiouni and others), (3) the theory requiring ‘state-like’ 
organizations and (4) broader theories encompassing organizations with ‘capacity’ to 
direct CAH [= crimes against humanity].754 
So far, the ICC policy element has only been interpreted in a few decisions, originating 
from pre-trial chambers. In the Kenya authorization of investigation decision, the Pre-
Trial Chamber found that the requirement was fulfilled as “a number of attacks were 
planned, directed or organized by various groups including local leaders, businessmen 
and politicians associated with the two leading political parties, as well as by members 
of the police force.”755 In that decision, the pre-trial chamber also held that in the case 
of a State policy the policy does not necessarily need to have been conceived at the 
highest level of the State machinery (that is, a “policy adopted by regional or even local 
organs of the State could satisfy the requirement of a State policy”) and – the majority 
of the Pre-Trial Chamber – that in connection to organizatorial policy, “the formal 
nature of a group and the level of its organization should not be the defining criterion” 
but instead its “capability to perform acts which infringe on basic human values”.756 In 
other pre-trial decisions, it has been held that the policy requirement “implies that the 
attack follows a regular pattern” and that the policy may be “made by a group of persons 
who govern a specific territory or by any organization with the capability to commit a 
widespread or systematic attack”.757 So far, the majority of the ICC Pre-Trial Judges have 
751 E.g., D. Robinson, ‘Defining “Crimes against Humanity” at the Rome Conference,’ 93 American Journal 
of International Law (1999), at 50-51.
752 E.g., R. Dixon & C. K. Hall, ‘1. Chapeau [crimes against humanity]’, in O. Triffterer (ed.), Commentary 
on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court – Observers’ Notes, Article by Article, 2nd ed. 
(München: C. H. Beck, 2008), at 179-180. 
753 Schabas 2008(e), at 960 and 972-974.
754 D. Robinson, ‘Essence of Crimes against Humanity Raised by Challenges at ICC’, EJIL Talk! [blog], 27 
September 2011. 
755 Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Decision (investigation), PTC, ICC, 31 March 2010, para. 117.
756 Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Decision (investigation), PTC, ICC, 31 March 2010, paras 89-90. These 
opinions were quoted with approval in Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, Decision (investigation), 
PTC, ICC, 3 October 2011, paras 45-46. Judge Kaul dissented to the Kenya decision and wanted to give 
the concepts a more narrow reading. Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Decision (investigation, diss. op. 
of Judge Kaul), PTC, ICC, 31 March 2010.  
757 Bemba, Decision (confirmation of charges), PTC, ICC, 15 June 2009, para. 81. See also Katanga & 
Ngudjolo, Decision (confirmation of charges), PTC, ICC, 30 September 2008, para. 396. 
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hence adopted the “capacities approach” to the policy element, rather than the “State-like 
entity approach” advanced in minority.758 The initial case law has received both rather 
positive759 and very negative evaluations.760 The final ICC stand on the policy element 
remains to be seen. 
In the same way as in relation to war crimes, it should also be noted what does not 
constitute crime elements of crimes against humanity. To begin with, it is today clearly 
established that there does not have to be a nexus to an armed conflict.761 As noted above, the 
ad hoc tribunals have furthermore held that an underlying policy is not a requirement for 
the crime. Finally, the ICTR Appeals Chamber has established the existence of “substantial 
resources” is not necessary762 and neither is the toleration of the acts by the State.763 
6.2.3.2.  Mental Elements
In relation to the mental element of crimes against humanity especially two questions 
have attracted discussion: (1) what is the required mental element for the context element 
of the crime; and (2) whether crime against humanity requires a discriminatory intent 
or motive. In relation to the context element, it is today settled that the perpetrator must 
have knowledge of the broader context (that is, the attack against the civilian population) 
in which he/she participates through his/her underlying offence.764 He/she must hence 
be aware that “his acts fit into [...] a pattern”765 or, to say it another way, of the “broader 
context in which his actions occur”.766 The perpetrator need, however, not share the 
overall purpose or goal of the attack.767 
758 Robinson 2011 [blog].
759 Cupido finds that the initial ICC case law indicates that the inclusion of the policy element in the 
ICC Statute has not resulted in a more prominent role for the policy element. The reason for this is 
according to her that the “value of and need for an autonomous policy element are concordantly related 
to the interpretation and application of the widespread or systematic attack-requirement”. The existence 
of a policy has in the ICTY case law been central when assessing the systematic character of an attack. 
M. Cupido, ‘The Policy Underlying Crimes against Humanity: Practical Reflections on a Theoretical 
Debate’, 22 Criminal Law Forum (2011), at 275 ff. See also G. Mettraux, ‘The Definition of Crimes against 
Humanity and the Question of a ‘Policy’ Element’, in L. N. Sadat (ed.), Forging a Convention for Crimes 
against Humanity (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), at 153. 
760 E.g., Kress has found that the “customary definition of crimes against humanity includes the requirement 
of a policy by a state or a state-like organization” and that the ICC Statute should be construed accordingly. 
C. Kress, ‘On the Outer Limits of Crimes against Humanity: The Concept of Organization within the 
Policy Requirement: Some Reflections on the March 2010 ICC Kenya Decision’, 23 Leiden Journal of 
International Law (2010), at 871.  
761 E.g., Tadić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 15 July 1999, paras 249 and 251. See further Schabas, who notes that 
the Eichmann case was the first trial in which a conviction was entered for crimes against humanity without 
a formal link to armed conflict. W. Schabas, ‘The Contribution of the Eichmann Trial to International Law’, 
26 Leiden Journal of International Law (2013), at 676-680. 
762 Nahimana et al., Judgement, AC, ICTR, 28 November 2007, para. 922. 
763 Gacumbitsi, Judgement, AC, ICTR, 7 July 2006, para. 84. 
764 Article 7, ICC Statute, and e.g., Kupreškić et al., Judgement, TC, ICTY, 14 January 2000, para. 556, Tadić, 
Judgement, AC, ICTY, 15 July 1999, para. 248, and Kayishema & Ruzindana, Judgement, TC, ICTR, 21 
May 1999, paras 133-134.
765 Tadić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 15 July 1999, para. 248. 
766 Tadić, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 7 May 1997, para. 656. See also e.g., Kupreškić et al., Judgement, TC, ICTY, 
14 January 2000, para. 556. 
767 Tadić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 15 July 1999, para. 272. 
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As regards the discriminatory intent, the ICTR Statute stipulates that the underlying 
offences must be committed on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds.768 
In the Akayesu Appeal Judgement, the Appeals Chamber, however, found that “in light 
of the nature of the events in Rwanda (where a civilian population was actually the target 
of a discriminatory attack) [...] the Security Council decided to limit the jurisdiction of 
the Tribunal over crimes against humanity solely to cases where they were committed on 
discriminatory grounds”, and that “[i]n the opinion of the Appeals Chamber, except in the 
case of persecution, a discriminatory intent is not required by international humanitarian 
law [...].”769 The prevailing view is therefore today that crimes against humanity do not 
generally demand discriminatory intent. Only in connection to persecution does such 
a requirement exist.770 Crimes against humanity can thus generally be committed for 
“purely personal motives”.771
6.2.4.  Genocide 
6.2.4.1.  Material Elements 
Genocide departs from war crimes and crimes against humanity in that the definition 
of the crime has not varied or changed over time.772 This is due to the 1948 Genocide 
Convention that contains a definition of the crime, which has been embraced by later 
statute drafters.773 Through the case law of the ad hoc tribunals, the crime elements of 
genocide have, however, been interpreted and clarified. In the Akayesu case, the ICTR, 
for example, stressed that genocide has three central elements: (1) one of the listed 
prohibited acts (underlying offences) has been committed; (2) that the prohibited act has 
been committed against a national, ethnical, racial or religious group; and (3) that the 
prohibited act has been committed with the specific intent to destroy in whole or in part 
the group as such.774 At time being, there is only initial ICC case law on genocide. 
The genocide definition enumerates five possible underlying offences to genocide. 
Genocide can be committed by killing members of the group, by causing serious bodily or 
mental harm to members of the group, by deliberately inflicting on the group conditions 
of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part, by imposing 
measures intended to prevent births within the group and by forcibly transferring 
children of the group to another group. The prohibited acts make it clear that what is 
768 Article 3, ICTR Statute.
769 Akayesu, Judgement, AC, ICTR, 1 June 2001, para. 464. See also e.g., Boas, Bischoff & Reid 2008, at 33-
35, and Schabas 2006(b), at 196-197 and 219.
770 E.g., Akayesu, Judgement, AC, ICTR, 1 June 2001, para. 464, Blaškić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 29 July 
2004, para. 131, and Nahimana et al., Judgement, AC, ICTR, 28 November 2007, para. 985.
771 Tadić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 15 July 1999, para. 272. 
772 Article 4, ICTY Statute, Article 2, ICTR Statute, and Article 6, ICC Statute.
773 Article II, Genocide Convention, and UN Doc. G. A. Res. 260 (III) A, 9 December 1948. The term 
“genocide” has been ascribed to the Polish lawyer Raphael Lemkin, who in the 1940s combined the Greek 
word genos (family/tribe/race) with the Latin word cide (killing). After the Holocaust, the term quickly 
began to receive legal significance. In 1946, the UN General Assembly unanimously adopted resolution 
96 (I), in which genocide is characterized an international crime. UN Doc. G.A. Res. 96 (I), 11 December 
1946.
774 Akayesu, Judgement, TC, ICTR, 2 September 1998, para. 499.
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prohibited is the physical destruction of the group, and not, for example, the destruction 
of the language and culture of the group (“cultural genocide”).775 
The preparatory work of the [Genocide] Convention shows that setting out such a list 
was designed more to describe a single phenomenon, roughly corresponding to what 
was recognised, before the second world war, as “national minorities”, rather than to 
refer to several distinct prototypes of human groups. To attempt to differentiate each 
of the named groups on the basis of scientifically objective criteria would thus be 
inconsistent with the object and purpose of the Convention.776 
Cryer et al. argue that this approach “avoids the difficulties of fitting a group such as the 
Tutsis precisely into one of the listed categories, but ensures that it comes within the area 
of protection that was intended by the negotiators, while also respecting the negotiators’ 
intent that the list be a closed one.”777 
Even though the crime elements of genocide have remained unchanged in the various 
court statutes, it is noteworthy that an additional crime element has been introduced in 
the ICC Elements of Crime. The Elements namely require that the underlying offence 
takes place in the context of a manifest pattern of similar conduct directed against that 
group or that it could itself effect such destruction.778 The Elements of Crimes thus 
foresee that there has been a genocidal campaign to which individual crimes of genocide 
can be related.779 This has been called the contextual element or the quasi-contextual 
element of genocide.780 As the ICC Statute demands that the Elements of Crimes are 
consistent with the Statute (and as the Elements are not binding for the judges),781 it 
remains to be seen how the ICC will approach its non-statutory contextual element. In a 
pre-trial decision in the Al-Bashir case, the majority of the Pre-Trial Chamber held that 
the contextual element is fulfilled only when “the relevant conduct presents a concrete 
threat to the existence of the targeted group, or a part thereof.”782 Kreß finds this initial 
case law rather convincing in that it does not require a contextual element proper, but 
a sort of requirement that the genocidal intent is realistic. He, however, finds that the 
775 E.g., A. Cassese, ‘Genocide’, in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta & J.R.W.D. Jones (eds.), The Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court: A Commentary, Volume I (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), at 336. The 
question of whether forcible transfer of population, which is not really physical or biological destruction, can 
constitute genocide has, however, been the subject of conflicting case law at the ICTY. See e.g., Blagojević 
& Jokić, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 17 January 2005, paras 665-666, and Brđanin, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 1 
September 2004, paras 693-694. See also W. A. Schabas, ‘Genocide, Crimes against Humanity, and Darfur: 
The Commission of Inquiry’s Findings on Genocide’, 27 Cardozo Law Review (2006), at 1708. 
776 Krštić, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 2 August 2001, para. 556. 
777 Cryer et al. 2010, at 211. The Akayesu approach is, however, preferred by Kreß, who argues that that 
approach follows the internationally recognized rule of interpretation that each word used in a legal text 
carries its distinct legal meaning. C. Kreß, ‘The Crime of Genocide under International Law’, 6 International 
Criminal Law Review (2006), at 475-476.
778 ICC Doc. ICC-ASP/1/3(Part II-B). 
779 Cf. however, Cryer who argues that a genocidal policy is not required, but merely a pattern of similar 
conduct, which is a pattern of the underlying offences. Cryer 2009(a), at 291. 
780 E.g., Cryer et al. 2010, at 218, and C. Kreß, ‘The International Court of Justice and the Elements of the 
Crime of Genocide’, 18 European Journal of International Law (2007), at 622.
781 Article 9, ICC Statute.
782 Al Bashir, Decision (warrant of arrest), PTC, ICC, 4 March 2009, para. 124.  
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requirement of a “concrete threat” set by the majority is too high.783 The dissenting judge 
in the Al-Bashir pre-trial decision, Judge Ušacka, declined to consider the contextual 
element at the initial procedural stage, but implied that it could be considered as not 
supported by the statute.784
The applicability of the contextual element has also been suggested before the ad 
hoc tribunals.785 In the Krštić Appeal Judgement, the ICTY, however, found that context 
elements such as widespread or systematic attack on a civilian population or manifest 
pattern of similar conduct are not part of the customary international law criminalization 
of genocide.786 In principle, ICTY has therefore foreseen the possibility of genocides with 
very few victims. Noteworthy is, however, that both the ICTY and the ICTR have often 
considered whether a genocidal context has existed as a background factor when trying 
to establish the existence of individual genocidal intent.787  
With regard to other factors not considered as crimes elements of genocide, it should 
be noted that it in the drafting process of the Genocide Convention was considered to 
what extent it was necessary that the crime was committed “with the complicity of the 
Government”.788 This requirement did not make it to the convention, but the question 
of whether there should be a (State) plan or policy to commit genocide has continued 
to be contentious. For example, in 1996, the ILC seemed to assume that there had to be 
such a plan/policy before individuals could be held responsible for the crime.789 The ad 
hoc tribunals have, however, held that there is no requirement of a State or organizatorial 
783 C. Kreß, ‘The Crime of Genocide and Contextual Elements: A Comment on the ICC Pre-Trial 
Chamber’s Decision in the Al Bashir Case’, 7 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2009), at 297-
306. Likewise Kirsch has held that there must be an endeavour or plan that is capable of destroying 
the group as individual intent only gains relevance in criminal law if the individual believes that he/
she possesses the means to achieve the goal. He, however, finds that “the occurrence of a nationwide 
genocidal campaign is not a necessary element of the crime”. S. Kirsch, ‘The Two Notions of Genocide: 
Distinguishing Macro Phenomena and Individual Misconduct’, 42 Creighton Law Review (2009), at 352, 
354 and 358. 
784 Al Bashir, Decision (warrant of arrest, sep. and partly diss. op. of Judge Ušacka), PTC, ICC, 4 March 
2009, para. 20 (‘I consider that this element is met in the instant case, regardless of whether or not it 
should be applied. Accordingly, I would decline to settle the question of whether or not the contextual 
element is consistent with the statutory definition of genocide at the present stage, as it need not be 
addressed here.’) 
785 Krštić, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 2 August 2001, para. 682.
786 Krštić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 19 April 2004, paras 223-224. See also e.g., Popović et al., Judgement, TC, 
ICTY, 10 June 2010, paras 828-829. 
787 Bonafè has divided the ad hoc tribunals’ genocide cases into: (1) cases where neither a genocidal context 
or a genocidal intent has been found (e.g., the Stakić and Brđanin cases); (2) cases in which a genocidal 
context has been identified but individual genocidal intent has not been proven (e.g., the Krstić and 
Blagojević cases); and (3) cases in which both a genocidal context and genocidal intent has been established 
(e.g., many ICTR cases). B. I. Bonafè, The Relationship between State and Individual Responsibility for 
International Crimes (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009), 132-133.  
788 UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.4, 15 April 1948, at 3-6. 
789 UN Doc. A/51/10 (SUPP), at 89-90. Individuals would, according to the ILC, be connected to the 
genocide through their knowledge of the plan/policy. ILC argued that the crime definition “requires a 
degree of knowledge of the ultimate objective of the criminal conduct rather than knowledge of every 
detail” of the plan/policy. Ibid., at 90. 
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policy to commit genocide.790 This being said, it has, however, been found that “although 
a specific plan to destroy does not constitute an element of genocide, it would appear that 
it is not easy to carry out a genocide without such a plan, or organisation”791 and that “the 
existence of such a plan would be strong evidence of the specific intent requirement for 
the crime of genocide.”792 
6.2.4.2.  Mental Elements 
In genocide cases, both intent to commit the underlying offence and a special 
genocidal intent must be proven. In connection to intent and underlying offences, it 
has in case law been put forward that it is the perpetrator’s belief that an individual 
victim belongs to a protected group that is central (subjective approach), even though 
tangible evidence of group existence and belonging also seem to be required to ensure 
that the perpetrator’s identification of members is not completely fictitious (objective 
approach).793 
The specific intent (dolus specialis) of genocide is that the underlying offence 
must be committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial 
or religious group, as such. The intention must hence extend beyond the actus reus of 
the underlying offence. This is generally considered to be “the” characteristic feature 
of genocide, which significantly enhances its gravity.794 The specific intent has been 
interpreted to demand that the perpetrator seeks or aims at destruction of the group 
though his/her genocidal acts (purpose-based interpretation of the specific intent). 
It is thus not enough that the perpetrator commits the underlying offences with the 
knowledge that this leads to the destruction of a group or that it is foreseeable that the 
acts will have as a consequence destruction of a group (knowledge-based interpretation 
of the specific intent).795 
The word “destroy” in the specific intent definition has been interpreted to refer to 
the physical or biological destruction of the group.796 The case law of the ad hoc tribunals 
indicates that a group can be physically destroyed in two different ways. First, the 
physical destruction can manifest itself in an attempt to exterminate a very large number 
of the members of the group (quantitative approach). Second, the destruction may be 
790 E.g., Jelisić, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 14 December 1999, para. 100, and Jelisić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 5 
July 2001, para. 48. See also Nchamihigo, Judgement, AC, ICTR,18 March 2010, para. 363 (‘The Appeals 
Chamber recalls that proof of the existence of a “high level genocidal plan” is not required in order to 
convict an accused of genocide or for the mode of liability of instigation to commit genocide. Accordingly, 
the Appeals Chamber finds no error on the part of the Trial Chamber in considering as unnecessary proof 
of a nexus between the Appellant’s crimes and a national campaign.’)
791 Kayishema & Ruzindana, Judgement, TC, ICTR, 21 May 1999, para. 94. 
792 Kayishema & Ruzindana, Judgement, TC, ICTR, 21 May 1999, para. 276. 
793 E.g., Stakić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 22 March 2006, para. 25. See also e.g., Cryer et al. 2010, at 211-
213, Kreß 2006, at 474, L. May, ‘Identifying Groups in Genocide Cases’, in L. May & Z. Hoskins (eds.), 
International Criminal Law and Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), at 91-107, 
and Schabas 2006(a), at 1713-1714.
794 See e.g., Sikirica et al., Judgement (acquit), TC, ICTY, 3 September 2001, para. 89, and Schabas 2006(a), at 1716. 
795 Some, however, feel that a knowledge-based approach to genocidal intent would be more appropriate. See 
e.g., A. K. A. Greenawalt, ‘Rethinking Genocidal Intent: The Case for a Knowledge-Based Interpretation’, 
99 Columbia Law Review (1999), at 2288. 
796 E.g., Krštić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 19 April 2004, para. 25. 
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achieved by destroying a key segment of the group, such as all fertile women (qualitative 
or selective approach).797 
For genocide responsibility, the perpetrator must furthermore intend to destroy 
the protected group as such. This requirement shows that genocides primarily are crimes 
committed against groups, not individuals.798 
Finally, the requirement of “in whole or in part” has been important to clarify, 
as the content given to this requirement strongly influences the ambit of the genocide 
criminalization. This requirement has been interpreted especially by the ICTY in relation 
to the Srebrenica massacre. In the Krštić Appeal Judgement, the ICTY put forward that: 
The intent requirement of genocide [...] is [...] satisfied where evidence shows that 
the alleged perpetrator intended to destroy at least a substantial part of the protected 
group. The determination of when the targeted part is substantial enough to meet 
this requirement may involve a number of considerations. The numeric size of the 
targeted part of the group is the necessary and important starting point, though 
not in all cases the ending point of the inquiry. The number of individuals targeted 
should be evaluated not only in absolute terms, but also in relation to the overall 
size of the entire group. In addition to the numeric size of the targeted portion, its 
prominence within the group can be a useful consideration. If a specific part of the 
group is emblematic of the overall group, or is essential to its survival, that may 
support a finding that the part qualifies as substantial [...]
The historical examples of genocide also suggest that the area of the perpetrators’ 
activity and control, as well as the possible extent of their reach, should be considered. 
Nazi Germany may have intended only to eliminate Jews within Europe alone; that 
ambition probably did not extend, even at the height of its power, to an undertaking 
of that enterprise on a global scale. [...] The intent to destroy formed by a perpetrator 
of genocide will always be limited by the opportunity presented to him. While this 
factor alone will not indicate whether the targeted group is substantial, it can – in 
combination with other factors – inform the analysis.799 
Also other cases have indicated that when the intention is to destroy a group in part, this 
part must be substantial or considerable.800 
Regarding the ICC’s quasi-contextual element, no explicit requirement of individual 
knowledge of the context is demanded by the Elements of Crimes. The Elements instead 
put forward that: “Notwithstanding the normal requirement for a mental element 
797 Jelisić, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 14 December 1999, para. 82. See also Nersessian 2003, at 317. 
798 In the Niyitegeka Appeal Judgement, the ICTR clarified that: “The term “as such” has the effet utile of 
drawing a clear distinction between mass murder and crimes in which the perpetrator targets a specific 
group because of its nationality, race, ethnicity or religion. In other words, the term “as such” clarifies 
the specific intent requirement. It does not prohibit a conviction for genocide in a case in which the 
perpetrator was also driven by other motivations that are legally irrelevant in this context. Thus the Trial 
Chamber was correct in interpreting “as such” to mean that the proscribed acts were committed against the 
victims because of their membership in the protected group, but not solely because of such membership.” 
Niyitegeka, Judgement, AC, ICTR, 9 July 2004, para. 53.
799 Krštić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 19 April 2004, paras 12-13. See also Al Bashir, Decision (warrant of 
arrest), PTC, ICC, 4 March 2009, para. 146. 
800 See e.g., Kayishema & Ruzindana, Judgement, TC, ICTR, 21 May 1999, para. 97 (considerable), and 
Jelisić, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 14 December 1999, para. 82 (substantial). 
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provided for in article 30, and recognizing that knowledge of the circumstances will 
usually be addressed in proving genocidal intent, the appropriate requirement, if any, for 
a mental element regarding this circumstance will need to be decided by the Court on a 
case-by-case basis.”801 The mental state requirement in relation to this crime element is 
not yet settled.
6.3.  Analysis of the International Core Crime Criminalizations 
6.3.1.  Criminalization Technique: Chapeaus and Underlying Offences 
War crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide all have in common that they are 
generic crimes. The crimes namely “encompass a broad array of specific acts” (underlying 
offences or prohibited acts), but are “defined in terms of, and limited by, general elements” 
(chapeau elements).802 For a conviction for a generic crime, both the elements of the 
chapeau and one of the underlying offences must be proven. The opposite of generic 
offences are specific offences. The crime definitions of these crimes only contain specific 
enumerated acts, that is, underlying offences.803 It is often submitted that it is the chapeau 
elements which distinguish international crimes from ordinary domestic crimes and 
which transform the underlying offences into crimes of international concern. The 
underlying offence of torture is, however, as such an international crime and some of the 
underlying offences do not have domestic equivalents. 
The labelling of a crime as an international crime has both practical consequences 
and an expressive function. Firstly, the scope of the State obligation to cooperate in 
legal matters and the applicable jurisdictional rules are often dependent on whether 
the crime is an international crime or merely a domestic crime. Secondly, the general 
elements of the international crimes may have consequences for sentencing and the 
crime’s stigmatizing effect. It can namely be argued that through the chapeau element, 
the underlying offence becomes a more dangerous version of itself.804Another function of 
the chapeau elements is to distinguish the various international crimes from each other. 
In international criminal law, it is possible to distinguish between two types of chapeau 
elements. War crimes and crimes against humanity have chapeaus that require a certain 
context or environment for the individual action, whereas genocide requires a specific 
intent for the individual action.
801 ICC Doc. ICC-ASP/1/3(Part II-B). On the negotiations on this formulation, see V. Oosterveld, ‘The 
Context of Genocide’, in R. S. Lee (ed.), The International Criminal Court – Elements of Crimes and Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence (Ardsley: Transaction Publishers, 2001), at 48-49. Werle and Jessberger find 
that the element is a jurisdictional requirement for the ICC only, which is not subject to the requirement 
of individual knowledge. G. Werle & F. Jessberger, ‘“Unless Otherwise Provided”: Article 30 of the ICC 
Statute and the Mental Element of Crimes under International Criminal Law’, 3 Journal of International 
Criminal Justice (2005), at 51.
802 S. R. Ratner, J. S. Abrams & J. L. Bischoff, Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities in International 
Law: Beyond the Nuremberg Legacy, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) 14. 
803 Ratner, Abrams & Bischoff 2009, at 14. E.g., torture is a specific offence. 
804 G. P. Fletcher, ‘The Indefinable Concept of Terrorism’, 4 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2006), 
at 894 (regarding terrorism). This will be considered further in Chapter 9. 
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Of the chapeaus and underlying offences, it is generally the chapeaus that 
primarily reflect the special features of international criminality, and the focus in this 
analysis section will therefore be on those crime elements. This being said, there are, 
however, particular underlying offences that clearly reflect upon the phenomenology of 
international criminality. For example, the underlying offences of extermination (mass 
victimization) and persecution (discriminatory animus). Fletcher has also pointed out 
that certain underlying offences emphasize the collective animus of the criminality in 
that they cannot be committed by individual soldiers alone, for example, declaring that 
no quarter be given.805 To a limited extent, underlying offences will therefore also be 
considered. 
6.3.2.  Nexus to Armed Conflict
Immediately after the bombing of the twin towers, I realized that the basic issue of 
the times is distinguishing between crime and war.806
Historically, the existence of an international armed conflict was the factor that justified 
international intervention in the form of supranational criminal law. Originally, both 
war crimes and crimes against humanity therefore had a war nexus requirement, which, 
however, has been abandoned in relation to crimes against humanity and which has 
been altered in relation to war crimes to also include non-international armed conflicts. 
Even though crimes against humanity and genocides often are committed “veiled under 
the cover of war,”807 it is thus only war crime that today has as a crime element that the 
criminal behaviour must take place in the context of and be associated with an armed 
conflict. 
These legal developments can be explained with the perceived illogicality to treat 
similar behaviour as allowed in one context but as prohibited in another context. Why 
should it matter if a genocide has taken place in peacetime or in war?808 Or whether 
atrocities have been committed in international or internal armed conflicts?809 Ratner 
has, in this regard, talked about the historical “schizophrenias” of international criminal 
law.810 
The extending of the reach of international criminal law to peacetime and to non-
internal armed conflicts is by most legal scholars regarded as a desirable development 
of international criminal law, even though criticism has been raised against the way in 
805 Fletcher 2007(a), at 335. 
806 Fletcher 2007(a), at xix-xx.
807 C. Sinatra, ‘The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the Application of 
Genocide’, 5 International Criminal Law Review (2005), at 420.
808 Schabas has argued that the adoption of the Genocide Convention, which explicitly stipulates that genocide 
can be committed in times of peace, can be explained with the Nuremberg Tribunal’s refusal to address the 
violence against Jews that had taken place before the outbreak of the war. Schabas 2007-2008, at 36.
809 E.g., Mettraux 2005, at 34. 
810 S. R. Ratner, ‘The Schizophrenias of International Criminal Law,’ 33 Texas International Law Journal 
(1998), at 237. See also S. R. Ratner, ‘Why Only War Crimes? De-Linking Human Rights Offenses from 
Armed Conflict’, 3 Hofstra Law and Policy Symposium (1999), at 76. 
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which the development has occurred.811 Akhavan has, however, pointed out that the legal 
non-recognition of an armed conflict nexus requirement in relation to crimes against 
humanity is not completely unproblematic. More specifically, he asks whether conduct 
that is allowed according to the laws of war nonetheless may constitute crimes against 
humanity during an armed conflict.812 Due to the fact that armed conflicts are governed 
by an alternative legal order, the non-recognition this alternative legal order may result in 
disruption of the delicate balance between military necessity and humanitarian concerns 
that the laws of armed conflict has tried to establish. While Akhavan’s point is interesting 
in theory, its practical relevance is not significant. As the law of armed conflicts prohibits 
attacks against non-military objects and crimes against humanity must be directed 
towards a civilian population, the risk that the laws of war would allow crimes against 
humanity is, in practice, non-existent. 
The question to what extent the international crime definitions should recognize 
the alternative legal order of war (which is Akhavan’s fundamental point) is, however, 
important. By limiting the applicability of criminalizations to armed conflicts or 
peacetime, it is possible to stress that there are two alternative legal orders in which 
different rules apply. At the same time, the rules applicable in the two legal systems are 
not completely different, which makes it artificial to create two completely separate 
regulative systems. The present system of international criminal law, in which the 
criminalization of war crimes essentially reflects the content of the alternative legal 
order of armed conflicts and where the criminalizations of crimes against humanity 
and genocide represent rules that apply in both legal orders, therefore reflects both 
the differences and similarities between the legal orders. The distinction between 
absolute and context-dependant criminalizations could, however, be made clearer in 
international criminal law. 
6.3.3.  Nexus to Collective Action 
6.3.3.1.  Introductory Remarks 
Fletcher has argued that armed conflicts are characterized by collective action in which 
“individuals are beside the point.” “No one cared about the Japanese pilots who returned 
safely from the attack on Pearl Harbor. They were not criminals but rather agents of an 
enemy power”, he continues.813 War crimes are therefore for him something that exists 
“at the frontier between two legal orders”, viz. the collective legal order of war and 
the individual-focused legal order of criminal law.814 In connection to war crimes, the 
fact that an individual’s conduct has to have a nexus to an armed conflict therefore, in 
practice, entails that a nexus to a collective happening has to be established. In relation 
to crimes against humanity, the requirement that the underlying offence must be part 
of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population entails a 
811 E.g., Marston Danner 2006, at 1 ff. 
812 Akhavan 2008, at 22. 
813 G. P. Fletcher, Romantics at War – Glory and Guilt in the Age of Terrorism (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2002), 5.
814 Fletcher 2002(a), at 54. 
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similar requirement of a connection to collective action.815 Also genocide has today 
the (debated) quasi-contextual element in the legal regime of the ICC.816 Finally, some 
underlying offences, such as attack on a civilian population as a war crime, foresee a 
broader criminal context.817 
In German, the chapeau elements of the international crimes are sometimes referred 
to as the “common act” (Gesamttat).818 According to Ambos, the existence of Gesamttaten 
requires a double perspective on the criminal event. More concretely, he puts forward that: 
“First, the collective perspective focuses on the context element belonging to all participants; 
that is, the supra-individual objective criminal context or situation. Secondly, this context 
may be attributed as a whole or in part(s) to the individual participants by recourse to the 
concrete rules of attribution that are yet to be established.”819 A difficult legal question is 
thus how to connect individual actors to contextual crime elements. 
6.3.3.2.  Connecting Individuals to Contexts through Knowledge of the Context
As was noted in connection to the crime definitions of war crimes and crimes against 
humanity,820 individuals are connected to the contextual chapeau elements through their 
individual knowledge of the context.821 It is, however, not necessary that the individuals 
make a correct legal evaluation of the context. It is enough that they are aware of the 
factual circumstances constituting the context.822 Sluiter has pointed out that the 
knowledge requirement in connection to crimes against humanity is more demanding 
than in connection to war crimes in that for “war crimes, it is not required that the 
accused knew of the nexus between his acts and the armed conflict, whereas knowledge 
that the acts are part of the attack is required for crimes against humanity.”823 
815 Osiel notes that in the wake of World War II, “international law soon began to take on board the idea 
that the victim of crime could be understood as a group, independent of attendant suffering by particular 
members.” In connection to collective action, he, however, observes that: “International law has been 
much slower [...] to grapple seriously with the notion that crime’s perpetrators might also be groups.” 
Osiel 2005(a), at 1751-1752. In this regard, it is noteworthy that in domestic criminal law, offences are 
sometimes defined so that “they can only be committed by two or more co-principals” (e.g., riot and 
violent disorder). Ashworth 2006, at 411. Also some international crimes are by their nature such that 
they demand more than one participant (e.g., persecution). In the crime definitions, the requirement of 
collective action is hence sometimes indirect. See also Section 6.3.4.4. on policy requirements. 
816 See further Section 6.2.4.
817 Cf. Bonafè 2009, at 93. 
818 K. Ambos, ‘Remarks on the General Part of International Criminal Law’, 4 Journal of International 
Criminal Justice (2006), at 663. And the underlying offences are referred to as the Einzeltaten or “individual 
acts. Ibid. 
819 Ambos 2006, at 663-664. 
820 In connection to genocide and the ICC, the mental element connected to the contextual element has 
not yet been elaborated upon. See further Section 6.2.4.2.
821 In this regard, Werle and Jessberger have pointed out that the contextual/circumstantial crime elements 
appear to be an exception to the general ICC requirement that all material crime elements must be covered 
by intent and knowledge. Werle & Jessberger 2005, at 38 (see also 42-43 and 49-51). See also Piragoff & 
Robinson 2008, at 857.
822 Kordić & Čerkez, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 17 December 2004, para. 311. See also Naletilić & Martinović, 
Judgement, AC, ICTY, 3 May 2006, paras 113 and 119. La Haye has observed that in early case law, proof 
of knowledge was not required. La Haye 2008, at 112.  
823 Sluiter 2011, at 137. 
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Boas et al. have pointed out that the ad hoc tribunals have not always been clear 
on who should have knowledge of the context of action. More specifically, they argue 
that the physical perpetrators are not necessarily the accused persons, which raises both 
the question of whose action must have a nexus to the context and who must be aware 
of this nexus. While it is settled that the underlying offences must form part of the 
context, that is, the physical perpetrator’s acts must be part of the context, the question 
of who should be knowledgeable of this fact is more complicated. Boas et al. find that 
the physical perpetrator knowledge is only relevant in situations where it is the physical 
perpetrator who stands trial, while it in other cases is the knowledge of the accused 
person that is legally significant.824 In relation to war crimes requiring a connection 
to an international armed conflict, it is thus the accused person who must be aware 
of the foreign involvement in the conflict, not necessarily the foot soldiers physically 
committing the underlying offences. This is indeed the approach the ad hoc tribunals 
implicitly have adopted. 
6.3.3.3.  Establishing the Context
To ensure a conviction for war crimes the existence of an armed conflict must be proven, 
and to secure a crimes against humanity conviction the existence of widespread or 
systematic attack against a civilian population.825 In connection to genocide, the ad hoc 
tribunals have not found a genocidal context to be a crime element, but have found it 
evidentiary significant when establishing genocidal intent. Before the ICC, a genocidal 
context must explicitly be proven. It is thus often necessary for international criminal 
tribunals to establish contexts. (It has furthermore been put forward that international 
criminal tribunals sometimes voluntarily establish additional contexts that do not 
directly relate to the crimes charged “to lend credibility to their subsequent findings with 
respect to the defendant.”826) A legally significant question is therefore how these contexts 
are defined and established. In this regard, it is important to note that the establishment 
of a context may entail that a tribunal has to take a stand regarding disputed historical 
824 Boas, Bischoff & Reid 2008, at 35-41, 236-239, and 249-250. Boas et al. argue that in international 
crimes, the physical perpetrators and more high-level actors can together satisfy the crime elements. For 
an individual to be criminally responsible, he/she must namely furthermore satisfy the elements of at least 
one form of responsibility. Ibid., at 39-40.
825 Fletcher and Ohlin have criticized the Report of the International Commission of Inquiry regarding 
the Darfur region for focusing on Sudan’s human rights violations that are “irrelevant and potentially 
prejudicial for the ICC prosecutions” and they put forward that: “The degree of Sudan’s violation of 
international human rights law is a question of collective responsibility for the entire nation [..., which] 
has little bearing on the individual responsibility of individual actors indicted and standing trial before the 
ICC.” They also find that: “To suggest that the former is relevant for the latter is to punish the individual for 
the crimes of his nation as a collective or, by association, for the actions of other citizens in the same nation.” 
G. P. Fletcher & J. D. Ohlin, ‘Reclaiming Fundamental Principles of Criminal Law in the Darfur Case’, 3 
Journal of International Criminal Justice (2005), at 544. This criticism of Fletcher and Ohlin is, however, 
problematic. As crimes against humanity, e.g., demands the existence of a widespread or systematic attack 
against any civilian population, the existence of proof of large-scale human rights violations is indicative 
of the fact that crimes against humanity have been committed. The existence of factors that speak for State 
responsibility can thus at the same time also speak for individual responsibility, even though individual 
responsibility obviously demands that further criteria are fulfilled.  
826 Alvarez 1998, at 2044-2045 (regarding the Tadić case before the ICTY).  
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facts. The outcome of international criminal trials is often a (controversial) historical 
record.827
As regards the question of how the contexts are defined, Mettraux has in relation to 
war crimes observed that it is possible to take both a micro and a macro approach to armed 
conflicts.828 In a macro approach, the focus is on whole countries and the existence of an armed 
conflict in these countries, whereas in a micro approach the focus is on the existence of armed 
conflicts in more limited geographical areas. The ICTY has opted for the micro approach and 
has hence considered that the Balkan conflict consisted of several geographically more limited 
armed conflicts.829 Mettraux notes that this approach has allowed the trial chambers to limit 
the scope of relevant evidentiary considerations to the material directly pertinent to the case 
at hand, without having to review evidence not remotely related to the case.830 Also in relation 
to genocide, the international criminal tribunals have sometimes only considered limited 
geographical areas when considering whether there has been an intent to destroy a group in 
whole or in part.831 This being said, compared to most domestic criminal trials, the war crime 
trials before the ICTY still concern “large political events” and a difficult “interpretation of 
the context”, which, as noted by Koskenniemi, can be as disputed as the individual actions 
that should be the main object of the trial.832 
While the international criminal tribunals often have taken a rather micro approach 
to contexts, it is also possible to find examples of the opposite macro approach. In the 
Bagosora and Nsengiyumva case, Nsengiyumva argued that the Trial Chamber had 
erred in “taking the country of Rwanda as one crime scene” in relation to crimes against 
humanity instead of focusing on the Gisenyi area. The Appeals Chamber dismissed the 
complaint by noting that the legal element is simply that the acts form part of a widespread 
or systematic attack.833 It is therefore important to note that the crime definitions do not 
per se determine whether a micro or macro approach to contexts should be adopted. This 
may be found problematic from the point of view of equality between the defendants, as 
prosecutorial and judicial choices regarding the contexts may affect outcomes in cases. 
Different outcomes may also be the result of different evaluations of the facts. The 
question can and should the tribunals “retry” contextual elements is therefore of great 
827 The establishment of such a record has, in fact, been identified as one of the goals of international criminal 
justice. E.g., ‘Achievements’ [ICTY] http://www.icty.org/sid/324 (last visited 16 September 2012) (‘The 
Tribunal has established beyond a reasonable doubt crucial facts related to crimes committed in the former 
Yugoslavia. In doing so, the Tribunal’s judges have carefully reviewed testimonies of eyewitnesses, survivors 
and perpetrators, forensic data and often previously unseen documentary and video evidence. The Tribunal’s 
judgements have contributed to creating a historical record, combatting denial and preventing attempts at 
revisionism and provided the basis for future transitional justice initiatives in the region.’)
828 Mettraux 2005, at 30-33. 
829 E.g., Tadić, Decision (jurisdiction), AC, ICTY, 2 October 1995, para. 77 (‘On the basis of the foregoing, 
we conclude that the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia have both internal and international aspects, that the 
members of the Security Council clearly had both aspects of the conflicts in mind when they adopted the Statute 
of the International Tribunal, and that they intended to empower the International Tribunal to adjudicate 
violations of humanitarian law that occurred in either context. To the extent possible under existing international 
law, the Statute should therefore be construed to give effect to that purpose.’) See also Mettraux 2005, at 32.
830 Mettraux 2005, at 32. 
831 See further Section 6.2.4.
832 Koskenniemi 2002, at 16 (referring to Leben).
833 Bagosora & Nsengiyumva, Judgement, AC, ICTR, 14 December 2011, para. 390. 
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practical significance, as many of the court cases are related to each other. For example, 
in relation to ICTR, it has been questioned to what extent the existence of a widespread 
and systematic attack against the Tutsi group in Rwanda in 1994 is something that must 
be established again in each case. 
Rule 94 of ICTY and ICTR establish that the tribunals shall not require proof of 
facts of common knowledge but shall take judicial notice of them and that the tribunals 
may decide to take judicial notice of adjudicated facts from other proceedings of the 
tribunal relating to matters at issue in the current proceedings.834 As regards facts of 
common knowledge, it has in the case law of the tribunals been put forward that facts 
of common knowledge include “notorious historical events and phenomena,” such as, 
the Holocaust and the South African system of apartheid.835 In the Karemera case, the 
ICTR Appeals Chamber controversially established that also crime elements, such as 
the existence of a widespread or systematic attack or an armed conflict, can constitute 
common knowledge, in which case the tribunal is required to take judicial notice 
of them.836 In the particular case, the Appeals Chamber argued that the existence of 
widespread or systematic attacks against a civilian population based on Tutsi ethnic 
identification and the existence of a non-international armed conflict in Rwanda were 
facts of common knowledge, as well as the 1994 genocide in Rwanda.837 The Karemera 
decision has by scholars been criticized from the point of view of the presumption 
of innocence. For example Jørgensen has argued that “since international tribunals 
rely heavily on inferences, in particular as it concerns findings related to the mental 
element for crimes [...], the danger that a judicially noticed fact could end up forming 
the basis for a conviction [..., is] apparent.”838 Some ad hoc tribunal trial chambers have, 
however, before and after the Karemera decision refused to regard complex historical 
events as facts of common knowledge.839 Most scholars and trial chambers have instead 
found that, if these types of facts shall at all be considered as facts of which judicial 
834 On interpretation of these rules, see further e.g., N. H. B. Jørgensen, ‘Judicial Notice’, in K. A. A. Khan, 
C. Buisman & C. Gosnell (eds.), Principles of Evidence in International Criminal Justice (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010), at 695-722, J. G. Stewart, ‘Judicial Notice in International Criminal Law: A 
Reconciliation of Potential, Peril and Precedent’, 3 International Criminal Law Review (2003), at 245-274, 
and J. Stewart, ‘Judicial Notice’, in A. Cassese (ed.), The Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), at 397-399.
835 Karemera et al., Decision (judicial notice), AC, ICTR, 16 June 2006, para. 30. See also Stanišić, Decision 
(judicial notice), TC, ICTY, 14 December 2007, para. 12. 
836 “It is true that “widespread and systematic attack against a civilian population” and “armed conflict 
not of an international character” are phrases with legal meanings, but they nonetheless describe factual 
situations and thus can constitute “facts of common knowledge”. [...] Likewise, it is not relevant that these 
facts constitute elements of some of the crimes charged and that such elements must ordinarily be proven 
by the Prosecution. There is no exception to Rule 94(A) for elements of offences.” Karemera et al., Decision 
(judicial notice), AC, ICTR, 16 June 2006, paras 29-30. 
837 Karemera et al., Decision (judicial notice), AC, ICTR, 16 June 2006, paras 29 and 35. 
838 N. H. B. Jørgensen, ‘Genocide as a Fact of Common Knowledge’, 56 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly (2007), at 895. 
839 See e.g., Stanišić Trial Chamber, which did not regard the existence of an armed conflict in the territory of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina during the relevant time period to be a fact of common knowledge nor the existence 
of a widespread or systematic attack against the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat population on the 
territory of the Republika Srpska. Stanišić, Decision (judicial notice), TC, ICTY, 14 December 2007, paras 15, 
20, 21 and 27. See also Semanza, Decision (judicial notice), TC, ICTR, 3 November 2000, para. 36. 
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notice can be taken, the judicial notice should be taken based on Rule 94(B) on already 
adjudicated facts.840 
Rule 94(B) of the ad hoc tribunals stipulate that a trial chamber, after hearing the 
parties, may decide to take judicial notice of adjudicated facts from other proceedings of 
the tribunal relating to matters at issue in the current proceedings. The goal of the rule 
is, inter alia, to avoid the need to rehear witnesses on the same facts in multiple cases 
and to foster “consistency and uniformity of decisions on factual issues where diversity 
in factual findings would be unfair.”841 The problem with judicial notice on adjudicated 
facts is, however, that defendants in different cases may have different interests which 
is reflected in different defence strategies and that the rule limits an accused person’s 
possibility to confront witnesses against him/her.842 Kwon has observed that whereas 
the judges initially were reluctant to apply the rule, the trial chambers have started to 
increasingly take judicial notice of adjudicated facts since 2003.843 In the Milošević case, 
the Appeals Chamber held that the effect of taking judicial notice is that a “well-founded 
presumption for the accuracy” of a fact is created, which, however, may be challenged by 
the opposing party.844 In the case law, criteria for what kinds of facts can be taken judicial 
notice of have also been established. These criteria include that the fact must not contain 
characterisations of an essentially legal nature and that the fact proposed for notice must 
not relate to acts, conducts or mental states of the accused.845 As regards the question of 
what facts relate to the acts, conducts or mental states of the accused, it was in the case 
concerning Dragomir Milošević questioned whether the fact that the crimes committed 
by his predecessor, namely Stanislav Galić, had a strong link with the crimes Milošević 
was charged with prevented the tribunal from taking judicial notice of the already 
adjudicated facts. The ICTY Appeals Chamber in that case found that it saw “no reason 
why judicial notice could not be taken of adjudicated facts providing evidence as to the 
existence of crimes committed by others and which the accused is not even charged 
with [...] as long as the burden remains on the Prosecution to establish, by means other 
than the judicial notice, that the accused had knowledge of their existence.”846 Due to the 
interconnectedness of many cases before the tribunals, this ruling is of great significance.
Article 69(6) of the ICC Statute establishes that the “Court shall not require proof of 
facts of common knowledge but may take judicial notice of them.” The procedural rules 
840 E.g., R. Mamiya, ‘Taking Judicial Notice of Genocide? The Problematic Law and Policy of the Karemera 
Decision’, 25 Wisconsin International Law Journal (2007), at 20. There are, however, also scholars who 
support the Karemera appeal approach. See e.g., R. Faulkner, ‘Taking Judicial Notice of the Genocide in 
Rwanda: The Right Choice’, 27 Penn State International Law Review (2009), at 895 ff. 
841 Semanza, Decision (judicial notice), TC, ICTR, 3 November 2000, para. 20 (referring to Cross and 
Tapper). See also O-G. Kwon, ‘The Challenge of an International Criminal Trial as Seen from the Bench’, 5 
Journal of International Criminal Justice (2007), at 369-372. 
842 Kwon 2007, at 370, and P. M. Wald, ‘The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
Comes of Age: Some Observations on Day-to-Day Dilemmas on an International Court’, 5 Washington 
University Journal of Law and Policy (2001), at 111. See also e.g., M. Damaška, ‘What Is the Point of 
International Criminal Justice?,’ 83 Chicago-Kent Law Review (2008), at 341. 
843 Kwon 2007, at 371. 
844 Milošević, Decision (judicial notice), AC, ICTY, 28 October 2003. 
845 E.g., Popović et al., Decision (judicial notice), TC, ICTY, 26 September 2006, paras 10 and 12, and 
Stanišić, Decision (judicial notice), TC, ICTY, 14 December 2007, para. 34. 
846 Milošević, Decision (judicial notice), AC, ICTY, 26 June 2007, para. 16. 
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of the ICC do hence not explicitly provide for the taking of judicial notice of already 
adjudicated facts. Jørgensen has, however, held that: “the goal of expediting cases while 
ensuring that no party is impaired in the presentation of its case renders almost inevitable 
a development of the jurisprudence on judicial notice by the ICC.”847
6.3.3.4.  The Legal Relevance of Contextual Crime Elements 
It is sometimes asserted that contextual crime elements involve a risk that individuals are 
not merely held responsible for their own behaviour, but also are blamed for the context 
or the “acts of others”.848 This has been found especially problematic in relation to low- 
and mid-level actors, who cannot readily be blamed for creating or maintaining large-
scale contexts.849 In this vein, an accused in the Naletilić and Martinović case before the 
ICTY, asserted that it was wrong that they were held responsible for the character of the 
armed conflict. The argument of the accused was, however, not accepted by the Appeals 
Chamber, which noted that the accused were “not found responsible for the fact that 
the conflict was international, but rather for the crimes committed in the context of the 
international armed conflict.”850 Individuals are hence, according to prevailing case law, 
blamed for committing criminalized acts in particular contexts, and not for the contexts 
themselves. The approach of international criminal tribunals to contexts of action has 
been described by Bonafè in the following terms: 
Due to the kind of jurisdiction they exercise, international criminal tribunals take 
into account the general criminal context as a sort of preliminary issue which is 
necessary to ascribe individual liability. They do not investigate whether the collective 
criminal phenomenon is the result of a state conduct or of the conduct of group of 
private individuals, because this is not required under international criminal law. 
International criminal tribunals focus on collective criminality with the specific 
purpose of identifying a nexus with the conduct of the accused.851 
The contexts are hence primarily pre-requisites for individual responsibility. This being 
said, the legal relevance of the contextual elements needs closer scrutiny. 
There appears to two main strands of thought on the legal relevance of contextual 
elements among scholars. Some think that international crimes generally are more 
blameworthy than the corresponding ordinary domestic crimes due to the individual 
knowledge of the danger-increasing context of action.852 Others, on the other hand, 
find that the function of the contextual elements primarily is jurisdictional, that is, 
847 Jørgensen 2010, at 720.
848 E.g., Drumbl who argues that individuals in international criminal law must bear responsibility for 
the “myriad political, economic, historical, and colonial factors that facilitate the violence” that may have 
pushed them towards the criminality. Drumbl 2003, at 277. 
849 Cf. Tallgren who speaks of offenders who “have little or no influence on those features of the crimes that 
actually make them international”. Tallgren 2002(b), at 572.
850 Naletilić & Martinović, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 3 May 2006, para. 109.
851 Bonafè 2009, at 103. 
852 E.g., Marston Danner 2001, at 488-489 (‘In all likelihood, the best description of international 
criminalization incorporates substantive and procedural components. An international crime, especially 
the particular crimes within the jurisdiction of the Tribunals and the ICC, connotes a greater degree of 
seriousness than does a domestic crime. [...] [T]he chapeau elements of the crimes within the Tribunals’ 
jurisdictions should be considered when assessing the harm caused by the defendant’s actions.’)
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to distinguish crimes that are of international concern from crimes that only can be 
prosecuted in domestic legal systems. For example, Piragoff and Robinson have put 
forward that the “contextual elements do not relate directly to the conduct of the 
accused, but rather to the context creating an international dimension”.853 Also Haque 
has held that the contextual element of war crimes “does not directly contribute to their 
wrongfulness.”854 Especially some chapeau elements, such as the requirement of an 
international armed conflict, have been found to be mere “legal prerequisites” that “do 
not have a bearing on the accused’s conduct.”855 
The content-wise approach to contextual crime elements can be found problematic 
in that it assumes the greater blameworthiness of international criminality in relation to 
ordinary criminality. While international criminality generally causes more harm than 
ordinary criminality,856 it may namely be asked whether not international criminality 
sometimes is characterized by lesser culpability. As was noted in the criminological 
investigation of international criminality, situational factors have been found to have a 
significant impact on individual behaviour in connection to international criminality. 
Furthermore, one may ask whether not, for example, a rape is a rape regardless of in 
what context it is committed.857 The idea of merely jurisdictional contextual crime 
elements, however, seems to understate the relevance of contextual elements. As was 
noted in the phenomenological survey, identical physical acts may be evaluated morally 
differently depending on in which context they take place. Furthermore, the context of 
action may give the underlying offences “special features”. For example, rapes that are 
853 Piragoff & Robinson 2008, at 857. The same opinion is expressed by Kirsch regarding the chapeau 
element of crimes against humanity. S. Kirsch, ‘Two Kinds of Wrong: On the Context Element of Crimes 
against Humanity’, 22 Leiden Journal of International Law (2009), at 525 and 539.    
854 A. A. Haque, ‘International Crime: in Context and in Contrast’, in R. A. Duff et al. (eds.), The Structures 
of the Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), at 114. According to him, the function of the 
nexus requirement is either: a) to exempt certain acts from a lawful combatant’s “general immunity from 
prosecution in national courts”, or b) to recognize the contexts wrong-enabling function. Ibid., at 111-112. 
Also regarding crimes against humanity, he emphasis the jurisdictional nature of the chapeau element. 
Ibid., at 117. The genocidal intent requirement, he, however, concedes a blameworthiness increasing 
function. Ibid., at 125. 
855 Delalić et al., Judgement (sep. and diss. op. of Judges Hunt and Bennouna), AC, ICTY, 20 February 
2001, para. 26. Cf. L. Arbour, War Crimes and the Culture of Peace (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
2002) at 38. 
856 There are different viewpoints on the nature of, e.g., the contextual crime element of crimes against 
humanity, and of its dangerousness. May essentially regards the context as the aggregation of the individual 
acts. He notes that: “In crimes against humanity, an individual human person cannot commit the mass 
crime, the mass murder for instance, only lots of such persons can do so by their acts of murder. But then 
the problem is merely an aggregation problem. The individuals act wrongly, by murdering say, and the 
conceptual problem is how to link these already wrongful acts to the larger wrongs, which are only the 
aggravated wrongful acts of lots of people.” L. May, ‘State Aggression, Collective Liability, and Individual 
Mens Rea’, 30 Midwest Studies in Philosophy (2006), at 314. Drumbl, on his part, however finds that: “The 
prevailing paradigm views mass atrocity as something greater than the sum of its parts, namely each of its 
ordinary constituent murders.” Drumbl 2005(a), at 540.
857 Bassiouni makes a distinction between a victim-centric perspective and a conflict-centric perspective, 
and argues that the suffering experienced by the victims should be given a more prominent role than the 
context in which the suffering has taken place. M. C. Bassiouni, ‘International Recognition of Victims’ 
Rights’, 6 Human Rights Law Review (2006), at 204.
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underlying offences to international crimes often differ from domestic rapes in that they 
are public, very brutal and regularly connected to other types of victimization. For a 
content-wise approach also speaks the fact that it appears that contextual crime elements 
have been adopted both to counteract impunity (procedural reasons) and to stigmatize 
certain behaviour in a particular way (substantive reasons). In this regard, it should 
also be noted that many domestic legal systems today have criminalized international 
crimes, and at least in those legal systems where an act constituting an international 
crime can be prosecuted both as an ordinary crime and an international crime, it must be 
considered what it from a blameworthiness perspective means that the acts are labelled 
as international crimes with contextual elements.
When international criminalizations have been adopted (or they have emerged), 
it has thus not been explicitly regulated what the role of the contextual element should 
be. This is problematic in that the function of contextual elements may be many: Their 
role may, for example, be to: (a) stress that a particular behaviour also is criminal in 
a “new” or alternative context;858 (b) to clarify that certain acts merely are criminal in 
particular contexts; or (c) to signal that the behaviour is especially reprehensible or less 
reprehensible in particular contexts. An especially significant distinction in this regard 
appears to be whether the international criminalization with a contextual crime element: 
(1) makes previously non-criminal behaviour criminal; or (2) merely affects the labelling 
of already criminal behaviour.859 Judge Shahabuddeen has, in this regard, noted that 
“[i]n general, there is a difference between saying an “act” becomes a certain crime 
“when” committed in specified circumstances and saying that a “crime” becomes another 
crime “when” committed in specified circumstances.”860 When it is the context of action 
that transforms previously non-criminal behaviour into criminal behaviour, the context 
clearly has an effect on blameworthiness evaluations. 
Contexts that “merely” transform previously criminal acts into international crimes 
are, however, more difficult to assess legally. First, there is the question of whether and how 
the blameworthiness of individual behaviour is altered due to the contextual elements. 
This will be considered further in Chapter 9, where it will be asked whether there is a 
hierarchy between the different international crimes. Second, there is the question of 
how the previous criminality of the underlying offence affects the applicability of the 
principle of legality. If a person knows that it is criminal to rape in peacetime, should he/
she also automatically know that it is criminal to rape in wartime?  
As was noted in the introductory chapter, much international criminality consists 
of acts that in peacetime are criminalized as ordinary crimes: Murder, rape, assault, etc. 
Often they even represent criminality that is characterized as mala in se criminality in 
domestic legal systems. As was noted in the phenomenological chapter, the alternative 
858 Cf. rapes have for a long time been universally criminalized, but rapes committed in armed conflicts 
have historically rarely been prosecuted. This made some distinguish between “criminal” peace-time 
rapes and “acceptable” war-time rapes. The development of international criminal law, which clearly also 
criminalizes war-time rape, has made many regard rape as criminal in all contexts. 
859 Cf. A difference has been made between hate crimes and parallel crimes. The hate crimes are otherwise 
defined identically to the parallel crimes, but they have an additional requirement of bias. V. Jenness, ‘The 
Hate Crime Canon and Beyond: A Critical Assessment’, 12 Law and Critique (2001), at 295 (referring to 
Lawrence). Many international crimes also have parallel crimes in domestic criminal law. 
860 Tadić, Judgement (sentencing, sep. op. of Judge Shahabuddeen), 26 January 2000, at 39. 
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legal order of war, however, entails that much behaviour that usually is regarded as criminal 
becomes legal and sometimes even expected behaviour.861 This raises the question of 
whether certain contexts of action may affect evaluations of whether particular crimes 
are mala in se or mala prohibita. Whereas individuals generally are assumed to know that 
mala in se criminality is criminal, the same presumption cannot be made regarding mala 
in prohibita criminality. As such, the question of whether particular international crimes 
and/or underlying offences are mala in se or mala prohibita is legally significant.  
The prevailing assumption in international criminal law appears to be that most 
of international criminality is mala in se criminality despite the abnormal contexts 
of individual action.862 This is, for example, reflected in the acceptance of ad hoc 
tribunals’ “law-making” jurisprudence (for example, the broadening of the war crime 
criminalization to cover violations of international humanitarian law during non-
international armed conflicts)863 as well as in the acceptance of open criminalizations 
(for example, the underlying offence of “other inhumane acts” in connection to crimes 
against humanity). As such, it may be said that international criminal law has not been 
willing to generally recognize that different moral codes would apply in the contexts in 
which international crimes usually are committed. 
6.3.3.5.  The Contextual Crime Elements as Factors Contextualizing Individual 
Behaviour?
Finally as regards the contextual crime elements, it must be asked whether they entail 
that international criminal law to a greater extent than ordinary criminal law takes into 
consideration the context in which the individual acts or his/her “life circumstances”. 
As was noted in Chapter 4, domestic criminal law has been criticized for not taken into 
consideration such factors. For example, Norrie has argued that: “Law is concerned 
with a dehumanised form of individualism which ignores the context of individual 
action.”864 In a similar vein, he notes that: “Law is inherently concerned with individual 
responsibility and individual blame, and therefore it must focus on individual agency 
to the exclusion of its existence: law must decontextualize action if it is to attribute 
responsibility to individuals.”865 Criminal law does therefore not generally care if an 
individual perpetrator has been poor, unemployed, brought up in deprivation, etc.866 The 
861 Contextual crime elements may hence be connected to alternative legal orders. As has been noted before, 
in armed conflicts different rules apply than in times of peace. It is, however, not legally self-evident, that 
the distinction between peace and armed conflicts is substantially relevant, whereas the distinction between 
internal and non-international armed conflicts is purely jurisdictional. Alternative legal orders may be defined 
in different ways, and even though the difference between war and peace is established, it is not absolute. In 
connection to societal evaluations of the context, it is also noteworthy that the moral evaluations may be so 
diverse that a codification is difficult (e.g., some feel that terroristic violence committed in a freedom fight 
context should be covered by an alternative legal order similar to that of armed conflicts, whereas others feel 
that the context of action in connection to terrorism is rather an aggravating factor).
862 E.g., Fletcher 2007(a), at 31 and 82. There are, however, some war crimes that more readily can be 
characterized as malum prohibitum. In this regard, Fletcher mentions the war crimes of transferring own 
population to occupied territories and of declaring that no quarter will be given. Ibid., at 31.
863 See further Section 5.1.2.3.
864 Norrie 1991, at 165.
865 Norrie 1991, at 164.
866 Norrie 2001, at 23.
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law is thus only interested in a very small piece of what many view as a much larger 
puzzle.867 
Marston Danner has regarding the contextual crime elements held that they 
import the concept of group perpetration into some of the international crimes.868 
To some extent, the contextual crime elements indeed shed light on the context 
in which individuals act in connection to international criminality. It is, however, 
important to recognize that international criminal law does not contextualize 
the action of individuals in the way desired by, for example, Norrie. The goal of 
the contextual crime elements is namely not to better understand why particular 
atrocities take place or why particular individuals participate in them. The approach 
of international criminal law is clearly reflected in the following statement by the 
Delalić et al. Trial Chamber:   
It is important to note that the Trial Chamber does not seek to identify causal factors, 
nor through history explain why the conflict with which we are concerned occurred. 
It would indeed do no justice to the victims of this conflict to attempt to explain their 
suffering by proffering historical “root causes” which somehow inexorably led to the 
violence which engulfed them. Such an endeavour would, in any case, be an exercise 
in futility.869
International criminal law therefore essentially follows the traditional decontextualized 
approach to individual criminal responsibility.870  
6.3.4.  Possible Perpetrators and State Involvement 
6.3.4.1. Introduction
Critical criminologists have pointed out that criminal law traditionally has directed 
its attention towards the criminal behaviour of the “problematic classes” of society, 
whereas the harmful behaviour of the powerful has been given little attention. As was 
noted in connection to the phenomenology of international crimes, one characteristic of 
international criminality is that high-level politicians and military leaders often take part 
in it. As such, international criminal law is a branch of criminal law where the criminality 
of the powerful potentially could be given a lot of attention. An interesting question is 
therefore whether the international crime definitions reflect the “white collar nature” of 
international criminality. 
Possible ways to take into account State involvement in the criminality at the level 
of crime definitions is, for example: (a) to require that the perpetrator is a public official 
or State representative; (b) to demand that a State policy lies behind the criminality; or 
(c) to demand that a prohibited act by a State has been established before the question 
867 Osiel 1997, at 61. 
868 Marston Danner 2001, at 465-466.
869 Delalić et al., Judgement, TC, ICTY, 16 November 1998, para. 89.
870 The question of whether individual life circumstances can be considered as defences or as sentencing 
factors is elaborated in Chapters 8 and 9 respectively. 
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of individual criminal responsibility can be considered.871 The downside of these kinds 
of crime elements is, however, that they exclude from the scope of the crimes acts 
committed by non-State actors. As was noted in Chapter 2, even though international 
criminality often is characterized by State-involvement, the role of non-State actors has 
changed in relation to international criminality.872 
The special role played by high-level actors in international criminality, on the other 
hand, can be legally recognized in the crime definitions by making a difference between 
crimes of authority and crimes of obedience,873 and hence by including crime elements 
that entail that leaders and followers are convicted for different crimes in relation to 
common acts.
6.3.4.2.  Restrictions Regarding Possible Offenders 
The crime definitions of war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide do 
not restrict the group of possible perpetrators to individuals holding particular 
positions or to individuals having particular affiliations. Also the case law of the 
ad hoc tribunals has constantly stressed that when an individual possesses ability 
to commit particular crimes, he/she should also be held responsible for them.874 In 
relation to war crimes, there is, for example, no requirement that the perpetrator is 
a commander, a combatant or other member of an armed force.875 War crimes can 
thus be committed by civilians but due to the armed conflict nexus requirement this 
is rarely the case in practice.876 
871 Cf. The crime of aggression requires an act of aggression by a State before an individual can be held 
responsible for the crime of aggression. ICC Doc. RC/Res.6 (‘“act of aggression” means the use of armed 
force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or 
in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations.’).
872 See further e.g., M. C. Bassiouni, ‘The New Wars and the Crisis of Compliance with the Law of Armed 
Conflict by Non-State Actors’, 98 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology (2008), at 711 ff. 
873 Cf. H. C. Kelman, ‘The Policy Context of International Crimes’, in A. Nollkaemper & H. van der Wilt 
(eds.), System Criminality in International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), at 26-28. 
874 This approach is, e.g., reflected in the following statement of the Kunarac et al. Trial Chamber: “A 
violation of one of the relevant articles of the Statute will engage the perpetrator’s individual criminal 
responsibility. In this context, the participation of the state becomes secondary and, generally, peripheral. 
With or without the involvement of the state, the crime committed remains of the same nature and bears 
the same consequences. The involvement of the state in a criminal enterprise generally results in the 
availability of extensive resources to carry out the criminal activities in question and therefore greater 
risk for the potential victims. It may also trigger the application of a different set of rules, in the event that 
its involvement renders the armed conflict international. However, the involvement of the state does not 
modify or limit the guilt or responsibility of the individual who carried out the crimes in question. [...]”. 
Kunarac et al. Judgement, TC, ICTY, 22 February 2001, para. 493. The Trial Chamber made a reference 
to the Flick judgment, where it was observed that: “Acts adjudged criminal when done by an officer of the 
Government are criminal also when done by a private individual. The guilt differs only in magnitude, 
not in quality. The offender in either case is charged with personal wrong [...].” Flick, Judgment, CCL, 22 
December 1947, at 1192.
875 Akayesu, Judgement, AC, ICTR, 1 June 2001, para. 444. 
876 In relation to certain war crimes, it is not only typical that the perpetrators are soldier, but that they are 
members of a State army. It is, e.g., usually only well-equipped State military apparatuses that have access 
to certain types of weapons. Bonafè 2009, at 92. 
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In connection to two international crimes, the question of whether only 
particular types of individuals can commit these crimes has, however, been topical.877 
Regarding torture (which is both an independent international crime and a possible 
underlying offence to war crimes and crimes against humanity) a contested question 
has been whether the perpetrator must be a public official or another person acting in 
an official capacity. Such a requirement is suggested by the Torture Convention.878 In 
the ad hoc tribunals’ case law, it has, however, been held that in international criminal 
law there is no requirement of State involvement. More specifically, the Kunarac et al. 
Trial Chamber found that: “The characteristic trait of the offence in [the context of 
international criminal law, ...] is to be found in the nature of the act committed rather 
than in the status of the person who committed it.”879 The public official requirement 
can neither be found in the ICC Statute or the ICC Elements of Crimes. According 
to Gaeta, it is justified to not have the public official requirement when torture is the 
underlying offence of war crimes or crimes against humanity, as the chapeau elements 
of these crimes already contain factors that transform an “ordinary crime” into a 
concern of the international community.880 
Secondly, the crime of aggression (which is not studied in detail in this study) is 
generally characterized as a leadership crime. Only individuals who are “in a position 
effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a State” 
can, according to the ICC definition of aggression, be held individually responsible for 
the crime.881 Meron has in this regard noted that: “Aggression is an act of state” and the 
crime of aggression involves “state responsibility to a far greater degree than the other 
[international crimes, ...].”882 This limitation is interesting as the crime of aggression 
in the same way as the other international crimes also is characterized by collective 
action. For example, the Nuremberg Tribunal famously remarked that: “Hitler could 
not make aggressive war by himself. He had to have the co-operation of statesmen, 
877 A third possible example is the war crime of denying quarter, in connection to which the ICC Elements 
of Crimes demand that the “perpetrator was in a position of effective command or control over the 
subordinate forces to which the declaration or order was directed.” ICC Doc. ICC-ASP/1/3 (Part II-B). 
Triffterer has questioned whether this kind of crime elements legally can be introduced in the Elements of 
Crimes. Triffterer 2009, at 383-384. 
878 Article 1, Torture Convention. 
879 Kunarac et al., Judgement, TC, ICTY, 22 February 2001, para. 495. See also Kunarac et al., Judgement, 
AC, ICTY, 12 June 2002, para. 148. For references to further case law, see e.g., Boas, Bischoff & Reid 2008, 
at 78-79.
880 P. Gaeta, ‘When Is the Involvement of State Officials a Requirement for the Crime of Torture?’, 6 Journal 
of International Criminal Justice (2008), at 183 and 190.  
881 ICC Doc. RC/Res.6. On the leadership requirement, see further e.g., K. J. Heller, ‘Retreat from 
Nuremberg: The Leadership Requirement in the Crime of Aggression’, 18 European Journal of International 
Law (2007), at 477 ff. There are different opinions on whether the leadership requirement should be a crime 
element (always applicable) or a jurisdictional element (e.g., ICC-specific). N. Weisbord, ‘Prosecuting 
Aggression’, 49 Harvard International Law Journal (2008), at 194. 
882 T. Meron, ‘Defining Aggression for the International Criminal Court’, 25 Suffolk Transnational Law 
Review (2001), at 3 and 13.
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military leaders, diplomats, and business men.”883 The crime of aggression hence in the 
same way as the other international crimes demands hands-on criminals.884 
The leadership requirement of aggression, in practice, entails that the role played 
by the State and influential persons is stressed, whereas the role played by the hands-on 
criminals is ignored. In this regard, the crime of aggression differs from war crimes, 
crimes against humanity and genocide, in which case there is no requirement of ability 
to affect the context in order for individual criminal responsibility to arise. For example, 
foot soldiers can be convicted for crimes against humanity in the same way as the 
architects behind the attack against the civilian population. The fact that a perpetrator is 
a high-level actor is instead taken into consideration when considering the nature of the 
participation and/or at sentencing. In relation to genocide, the ICTR Appeals Chamber 
in the Semanza case stressed that it is not necessary that a person has fulfilled a “key 
coordinating role” to be convicted for genocide as a perpetrator.885
6.3.4.3.  More Offender-Specific Crime Definitions?
Kreß finds it “perhaps unfortunate” that the definitions of genocide and crimes against 
humanity have not been “drafted from the perspective of the leadership level of a criminal 
regime, i.e. from the perspective of those persons who direct the overall collective 
activity from behind, and who are considered to be most responsible for the commission 
of the crimes and therefore the primary if not the exclusive targets of international 
prosecutions.”886 More specifically, he finds in connection to genocide that the 
combination of (a) actus reus elements that typically reflects the conduct of subordinate 
participants with (b) mens rea requirements that usually only the leadership stratum of 
participants possess is prone to cause “conceptual problems”.887
Kreß’ argumentation is based on the phenomenological fact that whereas the 
criminal behaviour of low-level actors generally has a much closer relationship to the 
specific underlying offences, the criminal behaviour of high-level actors is often different. 
Leaders rather create contexts and affect the behaviour of others. At present, high-level 
actors are, however, generally888 not punished for creating the context, but for their 
involvement in their subordinates’ underlying offences.  
A difficult question is, therefore, whether the crime definitions should be 
adapted to meet the fact that different types of actors in the crimes often play 
different roles in them and, for example, can have different degrees of knowledge of 
883 Göring et al., Judgment, IMT, 1 October 1946, at 226. 
884 E.g., D. Rodin, ‘The Liability of Ordinary Soldiers for Crimes of Aggression’, 6 Washington University 
Global Studies Law Review (2007), at 591. 
885 Semanza, Judgement, AC, ICTR, 20 May 2005, para. 260.
886 Kreß 2006, at 472-473. Instead, he notes, “the prohibited acts within the definition of genocide as much 
as those within the definition of crimes against humanity describe the typical conduct of those who execute 
the overall plan.” Ibid., at 473. 
887 C. Kreß, ‘The Darfur Report and Genocidal Intent’, 3 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2005), at 575. 
888 E.g., the crime of aggression through which an armed conflict often is created (see further Section 
6.3.4.2) and incitement to genocide (see further Section 7.2.2) could, however, be regarded as crimes in 
which the perpetrator creates or tries to create a “criminogenic context”. Cf. Sunga who argues that: “As 
most abuses occur in the context of armed conflict, omitting the crime of aggression from the [ICC] 
Statute would be tantamount in many cases to treating mere symptoms while ignoring the pathogenic 
cause.” Sunga 1998, at 380.
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the more large-scale happenings. The fact that the crimes can be committed through 
different underlying offences and through different modes of participation (see 
further Chapter 7) already to some extent recognizes the existence of different types 
of participants. Ambos has, however, suggested that the mental element of genocide 
should be defined differently depending on the type of offender.889 It, however, appears 
that this suggestion has not found broader resonance. While the suggestion would 
entail an adaptation of the crime definition to the social reality of the criminality, 
it would at the same time make the crime definition complicated. It would namely 
become necessary to legally define the different categories of perpetrators to which 
the different crime definitions apply.  
6.3.4.4.  Policy Requirements in the Crime Definitions
While it is today clearly established that war crimes, crimes against humanity and 
genocide can have both high-level and low-level perpetrators, the question of to what 
extent the existence of a State policy or another policy to commit these crimes is a 
precondition for criminal responsibility has been more debated regarding crimes against 
humanity and genocide. Historically, crimes against humanity namely had such a policy 
requirement.890 Regarding genocide, it has been submitted that genocides hardly as a 
matter of fact can occur without an underlying policy.891 In relation to genocide, Rummel 
has even argued that genocide is a “confused and confusing concept” and that it would 
be more useful to have an international crime called “democide”, which would stand for 
murder by government.892 In the case law of the ICTY and ICTR, the existence of policy 
requirements for crimes against humanity and genocide has, however, been negated.893 
Before the ICC, the Statute and the Elements of Crimes seem to demand some policy 
889 Ambos has suggested that the mental elements (intent/knowledge) for genocide should differ depending 
on whether the perpetrator is a high-, mid-, or low-level actor and depending on whether he/she is a 
State agent or a private actor. He bases his suggestion on criminological research and the idea that adding 
categories of imputation would make the approach more realistic. K. Ambos, ‘Criminologically Explained 
Reality of Genocide, Structure of the Offence and the “Intent to Destroy” Requirement’, in A. Smeulers 
(ed.), Collective Violence and International Criminal Justice – An Interdisciplinary Approach (Antwerp: 
Intersentia, 2010), at 153 ff. (see especially at 163-165). He, e.g., notes that whereas low-level stage agents 
generally know about a genocidal State plan, low-level private actors are generally not informed. Ibid., at 
168. More specifically, Ambos suggests a mix of a purpose and knowledge-based approach to genocidal 
intent. See further Section 6.3.5.3. See also K. Ambos, ‘What Does “Intent to Destroy” in Genocide Mean?’, 
91 International Review of the Red Cross (2009), at 833-858. 
890 E.g., Tadić, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 7 May 1997, para. 654, and W. A. Schabas, ‘Punishment of Non-State 
Actors in Non-International Armed Conflict’, 26 Fordham International Law Journal (2003), at 925. 
891 A proposal to include “with the complicity of the Government” as a crime element of genocide was 
explicitly rejected in the Genocide Convention negotiations. Most delegates in the Ad Hoc Committee on 
Genocide, however, recognized that, in practice, a certain amount of government participation often is 
characteristic for genocide. UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.4, at 3 ff. Fletcher and Ohlin have also emphasized that 
genocides are not planned at the level of active military operations, but that the ethnic hatred at the heart 
of genocide stems from the intent of nations. Fletcher & Ohlin 2005, at 548.
892 R. J. Rummel, ‘When and Why to Use the Term Democide for “Genocide”,’ 6 Idea (2001).
893 E.g., Jelisić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 5 July 2001, para. 48, Kunarac et al., Judgement, AC, ICTY, 12 June 
2002, para. 98, Semanza, Judgement, AC, ICTR, 20 May 2005, para. 260, and Simba, Judgement, AC, 
ICTR, 27 November 2007, para. 260. 
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behind the crimes,894 but the exact scope of these policy requirements has not yet been 
clarified by the Court through case law. In relation to war crimes, no requirement of a 
State policy or plan exists,895 and there has not even been a serious discussion about the 
existence of such a requirement. The ICC Statute, however, contains the jurisdictional 
clause that the “Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of war crimes in particular when 
committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such 
crimes.”896
The ad hoc tribunals’ rejection of policy requirements for crimes against humanity 
and genocide has been strongly criticized by Schabas who finds that the case law both 
conflicts with the history of the crimes and with the international criminalization 
rationale.897 Especially regarding crimes against humanity he is worried that the 
elimination of the State plan or policy element has the prospect of making the concept 
applicable to a wide range of criminal acts, such as crimes committed by motorcycle 
gangs.898 Schabas finds that international criminal tribunals should address criminality 
which traditionally has been met with impunity, which often has been the case in relation 
to criminality that has a State connection.899 Schabas criticism clearly deserves merit, 
but from the point of view of the ad hoc tribunals’ other practice the rejection of a State 
policy requirement is logical. An underlying assumption in the case law of the ad hoc 
tribunals has been that all individuals who are capable of committing particular crimes 
also should be held responsible for them.900 
It should also be noted that even though the ad hoc tribunals have not recognized 
policy elements or limitations regarding prosecutable persons, the existence of a State 
policy or the fact that a perpetrator has been a public official have not been insignificant 
when the tribunals have investigated the occurrence of particular crimes. For example, 
in the Jelisić case, the ICTY Appeals Chamber held that even though the existence of 
a plan or policy is not a legal ingredient of genocide, in the context of proving specific 
intent, the existence of a plan or policy may become an important factor.901 In relation to 
894 Article 7, ICC Statute on crimes against humanity namely stipulates that an attack directed against any 
civilian population means a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of the prohibited acts 
against any civilian population pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit 
such attack. In relation to genocide the Elements of Crimes suggest that the individual conduct should take 
place in the context of a manifest pattern of similar conduct or be conduct that could itself effect destruction. 
ICC Doc. ICC-ASP/1/3(Part II-B).
895 E.g., Kunarac et al., Judgement, AC, ICTY, 12 June 2002, para. 58. 
896 Article 8(1), ICC Statute.
897 E.g., Schabas 2008(e), at 959-960, and W. A. Schabas, ‘Crimes against Humanity: The State Plan or Policy 
Element’, in L. N. Sadat & M. P. Scharf (eds.), The Theory and Practice of International Criminal Law – Essays 
in Honor of M. Cherif Bassiouni (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008), at 347 ff.. See also e.g., M. C. 
Bassiouni, ‘Revisiting the Architecture of Crimes against Humanity: Almost a Century in the Making, with 
Gaps and Ambiguities Remaining – the Need for a Specialized Convention’, in L. N. Sadat (ed.), Forging a 
Convention for Crimes against Humanity (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), at 54-55. 
898 E.g., Schabas 2003(c), at 922 ff., and Schabas 2008(e), at 960. 
899 Schabas 2008(e), at 974. 
900 This approach has been received favourably by some scholars, e.g., J. K. Kleffner, ‘The Collective 
Accountability of Organized Armed Groups for System Crimes’, in A. Nollkaemper & H. van der Wilt (eds.), 
System Criminality in International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), at 248-250.
901 Jelisić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 5 July 2001, para. 48.
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crimes against humanity, the Limaj Trial Chamber noted that “the existence of an attack 
is most clearly evident when a course of conduct is launched on the basis of massive state 
action.”902 Likewise, in relation to war crimes the facts that the perpetrator is a combatant 
and that the crime is committed as part of or in the context of the perpetrator’s official 
duties are factors that speak for the existence of a nexus between the individual conduct 
and an armed conflict.903 State participation may thus be legally relevant despite not 
constituting a crime element per se. 
6.3.5.  The Discriminatory Animus of the Violence
6.3.5.1.  Victim Requirements 
The typical environments in which international crimes occur are: (1) armed conflicts, 
where strong we-they constellations are the norm; and (2) totalitarian regimes, in which 
certain segments of the population often are singled out as the regime’s enemies. The 
perpetrators and victims of international crimes therefore typically belong to different 
population groups and the victims of the crimes are generally not selected based on 
individual criteria but rather based on group belonging. International criminality 
is therefore by its nature often discriminatory. International criminality can also be 
characterized as symbolic, in that the victims often are chosen based on what they 
symbolize, rather than, for example, the actual threat they pose to the opponent.904 
The crime definitions of international crimes contain numerous victim requirements. 
These requirements may be categorized into: (a) such where the “objective” fact that 
the perpetrator selected his/her victims discriminatory is given legal significance (that 
is, regardless of why such a selection was made); and (b) such where the subjective 
states of mind associated with the discriminatory selection of victims are given legal 
significance.905 The subjective victim criteria will be considered in next Section on 
specific intent requirements. The various victim requirements in practice entail that 
certain individuals and groups are given protection through the international criminal 
law whereas others are excluded from the protection. The legal choices made in this 
regard have not escaped criticism.906 Besides normative victim requirements (such that 
the victim is a protected person), some underlying offences of international crimes have 
factual victim requirements (such as the age of the victim).907
902 Limaj, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 30 November 2005, para. 194. 
903 Kunarac et al., Judgement, AC, ICTY, 12 June 2002, para. 59. 
904 Symbolic crimes are sometimes distinguished from actuarial crimes. In actuarial crimes, the victims 
are chosen for their real or imagined social characteristics for instrumental reasons (e.g., the victims are 
persons in a wheelchair, because they are presumed to be easier to rob). E.g., Jenness 2001, at 295-296.
905 Jenness 2001, at 297-298. 
906 E.g., the fact that genocide does not protect political groups or women as a class has been criticized  Note 
also that feminist legal scholars have pointed out that the focus on the protected groups may entail that the 
fact that women are targeted because of their gender is concealed. C. A. MacKinnon, ‘Rape, Genocide, and 
Women’s Human Rights’, in A. Stiglmayer (ed.), Mass Rape – The War against Women in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1994), at 188 (‘Attacks on women, it seems, cannot define attacks on 
people. If they are gendered attacks, they are not ethnic; if they are ethnic, they are not gendered.’) 
907 E.g., forcibly transferring children of the group to another group in connection to genocide and conscripting 
or enlisting children as a war crime. G. Werle, ‘General Principles of International Criminal Law’, in A. Cassese et 
al. (eds.), The Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), at 56.
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Regarding objective victim requirements it may, for example, be noted that so-
called common Article 3 war crimes only can be committed against persons no longer 
taking active part in hostilities, that is, individuals hors de combat.908 In relation to grave 
breach war crimes, on the other hand, the victims must be so-called protected persons, 
that is, belong to the categories of individuals who in the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
have been provided special protection. For example, GC IV defines as protected persons 
“those who, at a given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in 
case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a party to the conflict or occupying 
power of which they are not nationals” (Article 4). The prevailing idea in international 
humanitarian law that enemy combatants has been questioned by May who asks whether 
the distinction made not rather should be between those guilty (participants in an 
unjust war) and those innocent.909 More specifically, he finds argues that: “When we 
make moral judgments on the basis of rough-grained markers, such as large social group 
membership, we necessarily must eliminate or diminish morally relevant differences 
among members of a group. Individual combatants are not all guilty to the same extent, 
even if the basis of their guilt is that they are representing an aggressing State.”910 In 
international humanitarian law, the focus is hence often on victim status rather than on 
victim behaviour.911 
Also the crime “crimes against humanity” has victim requirements in that the 
crime definition demands that the attacks are directed towards a civilian population. 
In relation to crimes against humanity, the nationality of the civilian population 
is, however, irrelevant. The crime definition speaks of any civilian population. It 
is the population that must be civilian, not necessarily all individual victims.912 
Also in relation to war crimes, the significance attached to the victim’s nationality 
has decreased. For example, the requirement that the victim must be of another 
nationality in relation to grave breaches has been interpreted to be satisfied when the 
victim has an allegiance to another party to the conflict.913 The focus of war crimes 
and crimes against humanity on civilians and/or persons hors de combat reflects the 
crimes background in the law of armed conflict. In this regard, it should be noted 
908 E.g., Delalić et al., Judgement, AC, ICTY, 20 February 2001, para. 420.
909 May 2007, at 104.
910 May 2007, at 108. 
911 May 2007, at 168. 
912 E.g., Martić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 8 October 2008, paras 303-314.
913 “This legal approach, hinging on substantial relations more than on formal bonds, becomes all the more 
important in present-day international armed conflicts. While previously wars were primarily between 
well-established States, in modern inter-ethnic armed conflicts such as that in the former Yugoslavia, new 
States are often created during the conflict and ethnicity rather than nationality may become the grounds 
for allegiance. Or, put another way, ethnicity may become determinative of national allegiance. Under 
these conditions, the requirement of nationality is even less adequate to define protected persons. In such 
conflicts, not only the text and the drafting history of the Convention but also, and more importantly, the 
Convention’s object and purpose suggest that allegiance to a Party to the conflict and, correspondingly, 
control by this Party over persons in a given territory, may be regarded as the crucial test.” Tadić, Judgement, 
AC, ICTY, 15 July 1999, para. 166. 
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that in connection to genocide there is no requirement that “the perpetrator seeks to 
destroy only civilians”.914  
Even though it is sometimes argued that genocide derives from crimes against 
humanity, its protected victims, however, indicate that the crime follows another 
criminalization rationale. The origin of genocide is clearly in human rights law. The UN 
General Assembly, in this regard, in 1946 noted that: “Genocide is a denial of the right 
of existence of entire human groups, as homicide is the denial of the right to life of 
individual human beings”.915 To goal of the criminalization is explicitly to protect supra-
individual group interests.916 A question of contention in the case law has been whether 
the victims de facto must be members of the protected groups or whether it is enough that 
the perpetrator perceives them to be members of the group. The prevailing interpretation 
appears to be that the perpetrator’s subjective perception is most significant although this 
perception must have some objective founding.917 In relation to persecution as a crime 
against humanity, which requires a discriminatory act, the ICTY Appeals Chamber 
has also argued that the fact that the perpetrator errs in relation to, for example, the 
real ethnicity of a victim does not per se mean that the act cannot be categorized as 
persecution.918 
6.3.5.2.  Specific Intent and Motive Requirements 
In relation to most crimes so-called general intent is enough, that is, in relation to conduct 
that the individual means to engage in the conduct and in relation to a consequence that the 
individual means to cause that consequence or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary 
course of events.919 The consequence or harm that in fact has been produced does thus 
not have to be meant. It is enough that it has been reasonably foreseen.920 In relation to 
certain crimes, there is, however, an additional requirement that the perpetrator must 
have meant to cause a certain specific consequence or harm. These crimes are often called 
specific intent crimes. In relation to these crimes, a central question is therefore what 
goal or purpose the conduct of the perpetrator has had. This question is very similar to 
the question of why the perpetrator acted as he/she did. The questions are, however, not 
914 Krštić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 19 April 2004, para. 226 (‘Finally, the intent requirement of genocide is 
not limited to instances where the perpetrator seeks to destroy only civilians. Provided the part intended 
to be destroyed is substantial, and provided that the perpetrator intends to destroy that part as such, there 
is nothing in the definition of genocide prohibiting, for example, a conviction where the perpetrator killed 
detained military personnel belonging to a protected group because of their membership in that group.’)
915 UN Doc. GA Res. 96(I) of 11 December 1946. 
916 See e.g., Werle 2009(b), at 256-257. Additionally to this, the Werle argues that “the human dignity of the 
individual victim is also protected.” Ibid., at 257. 
917 See further Section 6.2.4. See also Boas, Bischoff & Reid 2008, at 173-176, and K. Roberts, ‘Striving for Definition: 
The Law of Persecution from Its Origins to the ICTY’, in H. Abtahi & G. Boas (eds.), The Dynamics of International 
Criminal Justice – Essays in Honour of Sir Richard May (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006), at 279-280.     
918 Krnjolelac, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 17 September 2003, para. 185.
919 Article 30(2), ICC Statute. See also G. Binder, ‘The Rhetoric of Motive and Intent’, 6 Buffalo Criminal 
Law Review (2002), at 27.  
920 Sometimes the concept of dolus eventualis is used to denote this type of intent. Fletcher, however, argues 
that the concepts are not identical as dolus eventualis refers to a negative attitude towards causing harm 
(a certain attitude), but recklessness only requires the conscious running of an unjustified risk (a certain 
knowledge). Fletcher 2007(a), at 317.    
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identical. People that desire the same outcome may namely act for different reasons. In 
specific intent crimes, it is thus not necessary to prove that the perpetrator, for example, 
hated his/her victims or that certain political views motivated the act. What is required 
is proof of that the victims were selected due to a certain characteristic and that a certain 
outcome was meant.921 In criminal law, specific intent therefore refers to the mental 
resolution to cause particular harm, whereas motive refers to the inducement behind the 
behaviour.922 This differentiation between intentions and motives is a historical923 and 
difficult one.924 
Whereas objective selection requirements are common in international criminal law, 
the subjective state of mind associated with the discriminatory selection of victims is not 
always given legal significance. In international criminal law, it is the criminalization of 
genocide and persecution as a crime against humanity that demands particular subjective 
states of mind associated with the discriminatory selection. Genocide requires intent to 
destroy in whole or in part a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, and persecution 
discriminatory intent. In the Blaškić case, the Appeals Chamber of ICTY clarified that 
discriminatory intent entails that there must be intent to cause injury to a human being 
because he/she belongs to a particular community or group.925 These types of purpose-
based specific intent requirements come very close to requiring a discriminatory motive 
behind the crimes. The ad hoc tribunals have, however, constantly emphasized that 
there is a difference between specific intent and motive.926 In international criminal law, 
there are hence no crimes with discriminatory motive as a crime element. In that sense, 
921 Jenness notes that a similar development can be seen in so-called hate crime legislation, and that the 
term “bias crime” therefore often is preferred today. Jenness 2001, at 301. 
922 Cf. Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th ed. (2009) (‘intent’). 
923 Binder notes that legal scholars began to distinguish motive from intent in the late 18th century, and the 
goal was then to reduce the discretionary powers of judges. The legal reformers namely then associated 
intentions with behaviour, which could be compared to rules of conduct, whereas they associated motives 
with character, which only could be evaluated by discretionary moral judgment. Later on, when the role 
of the legislators had become stronger, the distinction between intentions and motives did not disappear, 
but it was reinterpreted. It then became a psychological distinction between different mental states. Binder 
2002, at 3-4.
924 Binder argues that 20th century legal scholars have essentially made three different types of distinctions 
between intentions and motives: (1) intentions are cognitive states of mind (like expectations or 
perceptions of risk), whereas motives are desiderative states of mind (desires, purposes, or ends); (2) 
intentions are connected to immediate goals and motives with remote goals; and (3) intentions are 
those goals that are offence elements, while motives are more remote goals. All distinctions, however, 
have their own problems. Alternative 1 does not correspond to reality as criminal law is interested in 
desiderative states, alternative 2 does not recognize that there may be numerous goals, and alternative 3 
is a tautology. Binder 2002, at 4-5.
925 Persecution does thus not require persecutory intent or the intent to remove targeted persons from 
society or humanity. E.g., Blaškić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 29 July 2004, para. 165. Cf. however, Kordić & 
Čerkez, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 26 February 2001, paras 214 and 220. On the ICTY case law on persecution, 
see further Roberts 2006, at 270 ff. In the ICC Elements of Crimes, it is suggested that in relation to 
persecution the perpetrator shall target persons by reason of the identity of a group or collectivity or 
targeted the group or collectivity as such and that such targeting was based on political, racial, national, 
ethnic, cultural, religious, gender or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under 
international law. ICC Doc. ICC-ASP/1/3(Part II-B). 
926 E.g., Jelisić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 5 July 2001, para. 49, Kayishema & Ruzindana, Judgement, AC, 
ICTR, 1 June 2001, para. 161, and Simba, Judgement, AC, ICTR, 27 November 2007, para. 269. 
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international criminal law follows the usual criminal law approach to motives at the 
conviction stage.927 
The question of whether it in international criminal law is desirable to uphold the 
distinction between specific intent and motives can be discussed from different perspectives. 
From a more practical perspective, it may be questioned whether it in reality is possible 
to completely distinguish the two. While specific intent requirements legally speaking do 
not attach importance to individual reasons for action, the fact that the individual goals of 
action are significant, however, indirectly make the reasons relevant. Partly this has to do 
with the question of evidence. To prove specific intent, evidence on related motives is often 
significant. As both intentions and motives are internal states of minds, it is not surprising 
that the available evidence to prove both often is the same. In the absence of direct evidence 
(for example, confessions regarding intentions or motives), the tribunals often deduce 
specific intent from circumstantial evidence. Secondly, as mental processes intentions and 
motives are connected. Norrie has in this regard noted that it is “as impossible in practice to 
image people forming intentions without having motives as it is to imagine them developing 
motives without creating intentions to put them into effect.“928 Various inducements or 
motives to commit criminal acts, such as personal feelings, life conditions, superior orders, 
thus precede intentions. The inducements can thus be seen as intent causes.929 At the same 
time, the personal feelings, life conditions, etc. usually continue to exist at the point in time 
when the crime is committed, and they are hence not only the background to the action 
but a part of it. It is, therefore, also possible to view motives as a form of intention (known 
as ulterior intention).930
Secondly, it has been put forward that motives are morally highly relevant, which 
can make it problematic to completely disregard motives at the conviction stage. For 
example, people generally regard euthanasia killings as clearly less blameworthy than 
racist killings.931 As regards the international specific intent crimes, viz. genocide and 
persecution, some therefore feel that their real blameworthiness lies in the real (or 
imagined) detestable inducements. Genocides and crimes of persecution should thus 
be committed due to anti-Semitic attitudes, bigotry, etc. and not due to, for example, 
unhappy childhoods or poverty. For example, Schabas has regarding genocide argued 
that the “organizers and planners must necessarily have a racist or discriminatory motive, 
that is, a genocidal motive, taken as a whole. Where this is lacking, the crime cannot be 
genocide.”932 To consider the motives merely at the sentencing stage could therefore be 
viewed as giving motives both too little and too late attention. 
927 Motives can, however, be considered at the sentencing stage. An interesting fact is that the ad hoc tribunals 
have held that in relation to specific intent crimes that require discriminatory intent, discriminatory motives 
cannot be regarded as aggravating factors at the sentencing stage as this would result in double-counting of 
the same aggravating fact. See further Section 9.2.4.2. It is noteworthy that while intentions and motives at 
the conviction stage are distinguished from each other, they are not clearly separated at the sentencing stage.
928 Norrie 2001, at 36.
929 Norrie 2001, at 37. 
930 Norrie 2001, at 37. 
931 Fletcher 1998, at 124. 
932 Schabas 2009, at 305. More specifically, Schabas argues that genocide in its collective dimension must 
be committed with genocidal motives, whereas it is possible that individual participants may be motivated 
by other types of motives. Ibid., at 305-306. See also Krštić, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 2 August 2001, para. 549. 
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While many intuitively feel that evil motives must lie behind international 
atrocities, criminology, however, indicates that this is not always the case. For 
international criminal law this presents a moral dilemma. One the one hand, 
criminology suggests that individual life circumstances to a great extent can explain 
individual decisions to participate in international criminality, which could morally 
make it justified to consider motives behind the conduct already at the conviction 
stage. When non-racists are convicted for specific intent crimes such as genocide and 
persecution their possible more acceptable motives are not given legal relevance. On 
the other hand, however, it is not unproblematic to give motives legal significance. 
To begin with, not everybody wants the possible banality of evil to be discovered and 
endorsed. If evil motivations would be demanded, individuals who commit atrocities 
without evil motivations should namely be acquitted. Secondly, if the question of 
why a person has committed a crime becomes legally relevant, it is necessary to allow 
evidence through which the perpetrator can show that he/she did not commit the 
crime due to him/her being a wicked person with evil motives, but that the crime 
can be explained with poverty or, for example, tragic family history. This is, however, 
not the type of evidence that everybody finds desirable in international criminal 
trials.933 In relation to serious criminality, such as genocide, this type of evidence 
has, for example, been found offensive from a victim perspective.934 Finally, it has 
been argued that many evil motives, such as feelings of hate, are difficult to define 
and prove.935 To take motives into consideration could therefore make international 
criminal trials even longer and more complicated. The legal assumption underlying 
international criminal law is therefore rational individuals who make good and 
bad choices, not evil individuals or individuals who have been formed by the 
environment. In this regard, international criminal law follows the model suggested 
by modern criminal law in general.
Even though international crimes often have political and/or ideological goals, 
such specific intent elements have not been included in the crime definitions. In this 
regard, the international core crimes depart from terrorism, in connection to which 
it sometimes is suggested that political or ideological goals are a possible crime 
element.936   
933 Norrie has argued that it is the link between social causes and individual motives that lies behind the 
exclusion of motive from the consideration of legal responsibility. Norrie 2001, at 37.
934 E.g., Schabas has argued that: “Individual offenders should not be entitled to raise personal motives as 
a defence to genocide, arguing for instance that they participated in an act of collective hatred but were 
driven by other factors.” Schabas 2009, at 306. 
935 Marston Danner uses the concept of “bias crimes” instead of “hate crimes”, and notes in a footnote 
that psychologists have pointed out that the term “hate crime” is inaccurate because little is known about 
the emotion of hatred. A. Marston Danner, ‘Bias Crimes and Crimes against Humanity: Culpability in 
Context’, 6 Buffalo Criminal Law Review (2002), at fn 6.
936 E.g., in the 2002 EU Council Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism a possible element of 
terrorism is that an act has been performed with the aim of “unduly compelling a Government or 
international organisation to perform or abstain from performing any act”.  EU Doc. OJ L 164, 22 June 
2002, at 4. 
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6.3.5.3.  Are the Specific Intent Crimes Overly Individualistic? 
The specific intent of genocide has been interpreted to require that the prosecuted 
individual individually desire the destruction of the protected group.937 It has therefore 
been put forward that genocide lacks a crime element that demands collective action and 
that genocide, in principle, can be committed by an individual acting alone. For example, 
in the Jelisić case, a Trial Chamber of ICTY held that: 
The murders committed by the accused are sufficient to establish the material 
element of the crime of genocide and it is a priori possible to conceive that the 
accused harboured the plan to exterminate an entire group without this intent having 
been supported by any organisation in which other individuals participated. In this 
respect, the preparatory work of the Convention of 1948 brings out that premeditation 
was not selected as a legal ingredient of the crime of genocide [...]. It ensues from 
this omission that the drafters of the Convention did not deem the existence of an 
organisation or a system serving a genocidal objective as a legal ingredient of the 
crime. In so doing, they did not discount the possibility of a lone individual seeking 
to destroy a group as such.938
This individualistic interpretation of genocide has been much criticized.939 May, for 
example, has argued that: 
Individuals can hate whole groups, and even intend to discriminate against all of the 
members of a group. But individuals generally do not intend to destroy whole groups. 
Individuals may wish that whole groups would be destroyed. Yet intending their 
destruction is a different matter. To intend to destroy a group, it must be plausible to 
think that one can do so. It does not make sense to say that one intends to do what 
one knows one could not do [...].940 
937 The question to what extent also the physical perpetrator must have had genocidal intent in the case 
where the accused person and the physical person are not the same has resulted in conflicting case law. 
E.g., Krajišnik, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 27 September 2006, para. 857 (‘A peculiarity of the present case, 
which involves multiple levels of actors, is that a crime committed by a person of low political or military 
rank without genocidal intent may nevertheless be characterized as an act of genocide if it was procured 
by a person of higher authority acting with that intent.’), and Nahimana et al., Judgement, AC, ICTR, 28 
November 2007, para. 523 (‘It is the person who physically commits one of the enumerated acts in Article 
2(2) of the Statute who must have such intent. However, an accused can be held responsible not only for 
committing the offence, but also under other modes of liability, and the mens rea will vary accordingly.’) 
See also Boas, Bischoff & Reid 2008, at 157-159. 
938 Jelisić, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 14 December 1999, para. 100. See also Jelisić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 5 July 
2001, para. 48. 
939 E.g., J. R. W. D. Jones, ‘“Whose Intent Is It Anyway?” Genocide and the Intent to Destroy a Group’, in 
L. C. Vohrah et al. (eds.), Man’s Inhumanity to Man – Essays on International Law in Honour of Antonio 
Cassese (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2003), at 468, and Schabas 2008(a), at 354-355.
940 L. May, Crimes against Humanity: A Normative Account (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) 
168-169. Vest has argued that the contextual element is inherent in the mens rea requirement of genocide, 
as the individual perpetrator in fact must intend “that the own conduct in combination with the conduct 
of some other persons produce a certain consequence”. H. Vest, ‘A Structure-Based Concept of Genocidal 
Intent’, 5 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2007), at 785. The genocidal intent requirement 
suggested by Vest is, however, not the one to be found in the in the case law of the ad hoc tribunals.
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As an alternative to the individual purpose-based conception of genocidal intent, some 
legal scholars have suggested a knowledge-based approach to genocidal intent. For 
example, Greenawalt has argued that the requirement of genocidal intent should be 
satisfied when “the perpetrator acted in furtherance of a campaign targeting members 
of a protected group and knew that the goal or manifest effect of the campaign was the 
destruction of the group in whole or in part.”941 In essence, these scholars argue that what 
is required is evidence of a genocidal plan or campaign, in which a collective genocidal 
intent is manifested, and evidence of that the accused participated in this plan or campaign 
knowingly. The specific intent would thus be an attribute of the plan or campaign and 
not a mens rea requirement that must be proved in relation to an individual accused.942 
The knowledge-based approach has been found to stress that it is the collective genocidal 
goal that hallmarks genocide as the horrible crime it is.943 It has also been noted that 
this approach better reflects the nature of genocide as a collective crime, as genocidal 
goals cannot be realized by individuals acting alone, and the fact that the executors of 
the crime are not always “personally imbued with [the collective] intention.”944 While 
the knowledge-based approach has been given limited support in the case law of the ad 
hoc tribunals945 and the ICC Elements of Crimes946 the prevailing approach to genocide, 
however, emphasizes individual states of mind. 
The individual specific intent requirement can furthermore from a criminal law 
perspective be criticized for being a crime element that often is difficult to prove in a 
sound way. As the genocidal intent is a personal state of mind and direct evidence of the 
state of mind rarely is available, much weight is often in practice given to the behaviour of 
the accused and the context in which his/her behaviour takes place.947 The ICTY has, for 
example, found that it is very difficult to prove individual genocidal intent if the crimes 
committed are not widespread and if the crime charged is not backed by an organization 
or a system.948 This idea of an individual guilty mind, which essentially is proved through 
evidence of the context and criminal behaviour of others has been criticized by, inter alia, 
941 Greenawalt 1999, at 2288.
942 Jones 2003, at 468. Schabas has, however, rightly pointed out that “States [...] do not have specific 
intent. Individuals have specific intent. States have policy.” Schabas 2008(e), at 970. Also Schabas finds that 
knowledge of policy would be a more appropriate legal requirement. Ibid., at 971
943 Kreß 2006, at 497.
944 Kreß 2006, at 496 (referring to the Eichmann case). 
945 In the sense that intent may be inferred from circumstantial factors, such as, the existence of a genocidal 
context. E.g., Popović et al., Judgement, TC, ICTY, 10 June 2010, para. 823. In the Krštić Appeal Judgement, 
ICTY, however, emphasized that knowledge of genocide alone ‘cannot support an inference of genocidal 
intent.’ Krštić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 19 April 2004, para. 134. 
946 Through the quasi-contextual element. ICC Doc. ICC-ASP/1/3 (Part II-B). Kreß finds that the quasi-
contextual element may be justified with the argument that without a genocidal campaign, realistic 
individual genocidal intent is impossible. Kreß 2007, at 622.
947 E.g., Akayesu, Judgement, TC, ICTR, 2 September 1998, para. 523, and Stakić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 
22 March 2006, para. 40.
948 E.g., Jelisić, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 14 December 1999, para. 101. Malmström, in this regard, interestingly 
points out that the ICTY has not found that an accused personally has possessed genocidal intent (except 
in the overturned Krstić trial judgement). The Krstić and Blagojević genocide convictions were based on 
“findings of the intent of other individuals in the VRS Main Staff.” S. Malmström, ‘Genocide Case Law at 
the ICTY’, in R. Bellelli (ed.), International Criminal Justice: Law and Practice from the Rome Statute to Its 
Review (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010, at 283. 
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Jones.949 At present, the law on genocide therefore recognizes the collective dimension of 
the criminality “through the evidentiary backdoor.”950 
6.3.6.  The Scope of Harm Caused and the Crime Definitions 
The genocidal intent requirement has from a phenomenological perspective 
been criticized for directing the attention away from the outcome of the criminal 
behaviour. Genocide is namely phenomenologically “a mass-crime and a collective 
phenomenon,”951 often entailing serious consequences such as mass deaths. The 
specific intent requirement of genocide entails that the crime follows the intentionalist 
approach, in which the mental states of the perpetrator are strongly stressed, in 
contrast to a consequentalist approach, in which the focus is on the harm caused. It has 
therefore been suggested that the crime should have a requirement of an expectation 
that the collective goal of destruction will actually be realized, that is, that the intended 
outcome is more than a vain hope.952 Also in relation to persecution (as a crime against 
humanity), scholars have criticized the trend in the jurisprudence to emphasize the 
presence of a discriminatory intent rather than the seriousness of the underlying 
offences. For example, Sluiter and Zahar have questioned to what extent persecution 
should include “peripheral acts of persecution” (such as exclusion from professions and 
burnings of book symbolizing a particular culture) in addition to “core persecutory 
acts” (such murder and enslavement).953
Fletcher has argued that specific intent crimes are examples of a more general trend 
in modern criminal law “which de-emphasize[s] the context and objective contours of 
criminal acts for the sake of the mens rea as the essence of criminal behaviour.”954 Fletcher 
calls the alternative traditional approach the principle of objective criminality, which does 
not make the perpetrator’s intent irrelevant, but which takes the issue of intent to be a 
subsidiary question, dependent upon a preliminary finding of a manifestly incriminating 
act. In the traditional approach, a particular act thus gives rise to a presumption of a 
particular intent. In the modern approach, the focus is instead on establishing intent. 
Fletcher thus argues that while both traditional and modern criminal law generally 
require that both actus reus and mens rea requirements are fulfilled, the focus has shifted 
from a strong emphasis on the actus reus to a mens rea orientation.955 
While the focus on mens rea is especially evident in connection to specific intent 
crimes, such as genocide and persecution, it may be asked to what extent the definitions 
of the other international crimes emphasize the mass harm often caused by international 
criminality. Interestingly, of the chapeau elements, it is only the crime definition of 
crimes against humanity which reflects this feature of the criminality by requiring 
949 Jones 2003, at 473. 
950 Cf. Kreß 2005, at 571. See also Vest 2007, at 796. 
951 E. Fronza, ‘Genocide in the Rome Statute’, in F. Lattanzi & W. A. Schabas (eds.), Essays on the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court, Volume 1 (Ripa Fagnano Alto: il Sirente, 1999), at 117. 
952 Kreß 2006, at 497-498. 
953 Zahar & Sluiter 2008, at 212-215. 
954 Fletcher 2006, at 903.
955 G. P. Fletcher, ‘The Metamorphosis of Larceny’, 89 Harvard Law Review (1976), at 476 and 502 (the 
article focuses on larceny).
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that individual underlying offences must be part of a widespread or systematic attack 
against a civilian population. Cryer et al. therefore in relation to crimes against humanity 
speak of a contextual threshold.956 There are also some underlying offences that stress 
the mass victimization aspect of the criminality, such as extermination (which demands 
the killing or intentional infliction of conditions of life calculated to bring about the 
destruction of part of a population), persecution (which demands a pattern of conduct 
that de facto discriminates) and apartheid. In relation to war crimes, for example, war 
crimes involving attacks on civilian populations or bombing of towns by their nature 
entail that more large-scale harm is caused. 
As presently construed, genocide and war crimes convictions are thus in theory 
possible in cases where very little or none actual harm has been caused. The chapeaus 
of these crimes do not demand the causation of actual harm and this also applies to 
certain underlying offences. The taking of hostages and declaring that no quarter will be 
given, which both are possible underlying offences to war crimes, do not, for example, 
require that anybody is physically harmed.957 Certain scholars have therefore found 
that there are some war crimes that can be categorized as mala prohibita, that is, as acts 
which criminality is not self-evident, but the result of legislative activity.958 In relation 
to these types of war crimes, Fletcher has argued that the “relevant standard defining 
liability” does not have to be “harm but generally accepted norms in the conduct of 
warfare.”959 Also May has emphasized that in connection to war crimes, the international 
criminalization is not always connected to the harm caused or the feelings of revulsion 
caused by the conduct. He notes that: 
death by poison, long prohibited by the law of war, strikes few contemporaries as 
much more terrible than death by any number of other weapons, many of them lawful. 
[...] For these reasons, it would be wrong to seek a litmus test of manifest criminality 
in the moral revulsion allegedly felt by soldiers in response to particular orders. Such 
a test would be radically underinclusive of the universe of misconduct for which 
soldiers should be held responsible. The test would be radically overinclusive as well. 
Many actions in combat, including many that are entirely lawful, often evoke in 
soldiers intense feelings of revulsion or closely related emotions, such as anticipation 
of remorse, disgust, or horror.960  
For the individual victims of crimes, it may be difficult to understand why similar harm, 
but caused by different types of weapons, may be legally evaluated completely differently. 
956 Cryer et al. 2010, at 234. 
957 Fletcher 2007(a), at 109. A difference may be done whether crime elements requiring particular: (a) 
conduct; (b) consequence; and (c) circumstances. It has been observed that most international underlying 
offences in international criminal law also require consequences. Werle 2009(a), at 56. 
958 K. Ambos, ‘Current Issues in International Criminal Law’ [book review], 14 Criminal Law Forum (2003), 
at 248, and Fletcher 2007(a), at 31. Other examples, of such war crimes are compelling a prisoner of war or 
other protected person to serve in the forces of a hostile power and making improper use of a flag of truce.
959 Fletcher 2007(a), at 109. Fletcher distinguishes between: (1) crimes as violations of duties; (2) crimes 
as causing harm; and (3) crimes as violations of norms, and argues that as all international crimes do not 
require the causation of actual harm, the starting-point of some international criminalizations is rather the 
duties of the actors. Ibid., at 40-41 and 109.
960 Osiel 1999, at 116. 
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6.3.7.  The Time Perspective Inherent in the Crime Definitions 
International crimes are often characterized by patterns of conduct that take place over 
a longer period of time. In criminal law, it is often possible the focus either on particular 
moments in time or to instead consider sequences of happenings. This may change how 
the seriousness of the criminality is perceived. In connection to domestic criminal law, 
feminist scholars have, for example, pointed out that there is a difference whether one 
regards wife battering as a number of minor cases of assault (short-time perspective) or 
as a pattern of abuse (long-term perspective). 
In international criminal law, the nature of certain underlying offences is such that 
they usually take a longer period of time to accomplish. For example, deliberately inflicting 
on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole 
or in part (genocide), persecution, enforced disappearance of persons, and apartheid 
(crimes against humanity), and starvation (war crimes). Also the chapeau elements of 
crime against humanity (requiring a pattern of conduct) and war crimes (not regarding 
isolated and sporadic acts of violence as armed conflict) can be said to consider the fact 
that international crimes often are committed as part of a longer process, even though 
the underlying offences of both these crimes can be isolated acts committed in a short 
period of time. In pattern crimes, such as persecution, it is usually possible to legally 
take into consideration lesser incidents that do not by themselves rise to the level of 
international crimes.
6.3.8.  On the Relationship between the Different Crimes
Horder observes that “the theory of the special part of criminal law divides into a 
normative theory of criminalisation (a theory explaining which wrongs should, and 
which should not, be criminal), and a theory of the classification of criminal wrongs.”961 
In criminal law, it is hence usual to categorize crimes into different groups. Regarding 
these categorizations, Horder further notes that: “In the criminal law, sound classification 
may act (inter alia) as a heuristic guide to what is, morally speaking, at stake in the crimes 
classified in a given way. Crimes fall to be classified in different ways, ways that will 
give salience to different kinds of moral distinction between them.”962 In international 
criminal law, the idea of categorization of crimes raises the following questions: What 
kinds of crimes are international crimes, and what is their internal relationship? 
In domestic criminal law, it is common to distinguish between, for example, mala 
in se crimes and mala prohibita crimes, property crimes and violent crimes, and inchoate 
crimes and completed crimes.963 As has been discussed earlier, in relation to international 
crimes it is difficult to say whether they constitute mala in se or mala prohibita crimes.964 
The criminalization technique of the crimes also makes it impossible to meaningfully 
961 J. Horder, ‘The Classification of Crimes and the Special Part of the Criminal Law’, in R. A. Duff & S. P. 
Green (eds.), Defining Crimes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), at 23. 
962 Horder 2005, at 21. 
963 Cf. Horder 2005, at 21 (fn 1).
964 See further Section 6.3.3.4. 
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categorize them into property crimes/violent crimes, and inchoate crimes/completed 
crimes, as most crimes can due to the different underlying offences be both.965 
Professor Bassiouni has put forward that when analyzing international crime 
elements, the following questions are central: “1. What is the social/human interest 
sought to be protected? 2. What is the category of persons sought to be protected? 3. 
What is the category of perpetrators sought to be deterred?”.966 To answer these questions 
are, however, not easy in connection to international crimes: often the interests sought 
to be protected are many and have (due to the unusual criminalization process in 
international criminal law) not always been clearly articulated.967 In this regard, it is, 
however, noteworthy that the international criminal tribunals sometimes have used 
teleological arguments when considering the content of international criminalizations. 
The ICTR has, for example, noted that the criminalization rationale behind certain war 
crimes is the protection of people as victims of armed conflicts, not the protection of 
people against crimes unrelated to the conflict, however reprehensible such crimes may 
be.968 
As was noted in connection to the phenomenology of the international crimes,969 
their phenomenology is very similar even though they legally have been distinguished 
from each other. This reflects the fact that it is often impossible to take into account all 
typical features in a single crime definition, especially if the for the social problem that the 
criminalization tries to address is complex. Mettraux has in this regard noted that: “No 
criminal offense can claim to capture each and every factual aspect of the context that 
characterizes a particular type of criminal conduct. Instead, criminal law provides for 
those elements that, if met, would bring that conduct into the realm of the law.”970 Too 
complex crime definitions may (due to evidentiary difficulties) entail that convictions 
cannot be ensured in cases where they would be merited.971 Furthermore, it is not 
usually legislatively meaningful to create crime definitions which an excessive number 
of crime elements. The crime elements must namely be proven by the prosecutors to 
ensure convictions, and if the crime definitions are too complex the prosecutors may 
965 Cf., however, the German domestic criminalization of war crimes that distinguishes between war 
crimes against persons, war crimes against property and other rights, war crimes against humanitarian 
operations and emblems, war crimes consisting in the use of prohibited methods of warfare, and war 
crimes consisting in employment of prohibited means of warfare. Völkerstrafgesetzbuch (2002). As such, it 
is not impossible to make such distinction if the legislator so desires. 
966 Bassiouni 2011(b), at 44  
967 See further Section 2.8.
968 Semanza, Judgement, TC, ICTR, 15 May 2003, para. 368. 
969 See further Chapter 2. 
970 Mettraux 2011, at 152. 
971 Cf. “Early legal analysts of the Holocaust defined “crimes against humanity” as involving ordinary crimes 
committed for particular motives. Underlying this doctrinal move was a normative concern with stripping 
high-ranking officials of their asserted immunity under international law, by depicting them as “common 
criminals” – no different in nature from garden variety murderers, despite their statesmanlike air and 
plumage. This way of cognizing their conduct, however, came to be seen as “banalizing” or trivializing the 
historically unprecedented features of their wrong. Additionally, jurisprudential efforts to reconceptualize 
crimes against humanity in more limited ways greatly impeded effective prosecution of their perpetrators, 
by introducing doctrinal requirements that are exceedingly difficult to meet, as the prosecution of Paul 
Touvier abundantly revealed.” Osiel 1995, at 552-553 (referring to Herzog and Wexler).
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opt to prosecute the criminal behaviour with criminal labels that are less challenging to 
establish.972 Good criminalizations therefore capture the essence of the criminality, but 
still allow for convictions. 
As regards “the” essence of the various international criminalizations, it is often 
put forward that whereas the rationale of war crimes is the “duty of humane treatment 
of soldiers and civilians during war”, the rationale of crimes against humanity is rather 
the “duty of a sovereign State to protect its citizens”.973 By stressing different things, the 
different international crimes highlight different typical aspects of the criminality and 
complement each other. This essence is reflected in certain paradigm examples of the 
crimes, for example, the killing of prisoners of war as a war crime and ethnic cleansing as 
crimes against humanity. The broadening of the scope of war crimes to crimes committed 
during internal armed conflicts has, however, made the distinction between war crimes and 
crimes against humanity “less neat”.974 There has been a general move within international 
criminal law away from the logic of the law of armed conflict (emphasizing reciprocity and 
allowing particular violence in particular contexts) towards the logic of human rights law 
(emphasizing the inviolability of particular rights, such as the right to life, and humanitarian 
concerns). The rationale of genocide is generally recognized to be the protection of societal 
groups from destruction and it is also a human rights-oriented criminalization. 
There is, however, much internationally criminal conduct that is not paradigm 
examples of the various crimes and in these situations it is not so clear how the behaviour 
should be legally addressed. It is, in fact, common that a single act or transaction 
connected to an armed conflict can be prosecuted and adjudicated as more than one 
crime. This is often referred to as the inter-article multiplicity of offences in international 
criminal law. A rape committed against a civilian during an armed conflict, which is part 
of a systematic attack against a civilian population, may for example be characterized 
both as a war crime and as a crime against humanity. The same factual conduct may also 
fulfil the crime elements of more than one underlying offence (intra-article multiplicity 
of offences). For example, mass killings may possibly be characterized both as murders 
and as extermination. The ad hoc tribunals have addressed this multiplicity of offences by 
adopting a complicated case law on concurrence of offences, which will not be considered 
in detail here.975 Sufficient to note in this study is that the relationship between the various 
crimes and underlying offences is sometimes everything but clear-cut. 
972 Cf. “It should be noted that the clarity in the jurisprudence with respect to the requirement that the 
conflict be international in order for the grave breach regime to apply may have had the unintended 
consequence of reducing the number of grave breach charges brought by the prosecution, due to the heavy 
evidentiary burden of proving the international nature of the conflict.” K. Roberts, ‘The Contribution of 
the ICTY to the Grave Breaches Regime’, 7 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2009), at 760. 
973 Cf. May 2007, at 15. 
974 May 2007, at 13. Minow has made an interesting comparison between the development of domestic and 
international criminal law: “A conception of inviolable boundaries is used to shield both the intimate and 
intergroup violence from public scrutiny and intervention. For husbands and wives, it was the boundary of 
the home [...]. For conflicting ethnic and religious groups, it was the boundary of the state; no one outside 
could be heard on matters within without triggering claims that the nation’s sovereignty was at stake.” M. 
Minow, ‘Between Intimates and Between Nations: Can Law Stop the Violence’, 50 Case Western Reserve 
Law Review (2000), at 852.
975 See further e.g., S. Walther, ‘Cumulation of Offences’, in A. Cassese et al. (eds.), The Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court: A Commentary, Volume I (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), at 475-495.
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6.4.  Concluding Evaluative Remarks 
6.4.1.  On Different Types of Criticism and Evaluative Tools
When criticizing the international criminal law on international crimes, scholars usually 
do this from two different perspectives. Firstly and most commonly, scholars criticize 
the identifications and interpretations made with arguments deriving from the sources 
of law and the legal history of the crimes. A clear difference is made between lex lata 
and lex ferenda, and it is stressed that the nullum crimen sine lege principle demands that 
the interpretation of the law is not law-making. In international criminal law, the legal 
sources of the law, however, make the identification of the law especially challenging. 
For example, the fact that the law derives from legislative processes that are more 
characterized by political compromises than in-depth theoretical analysis gives rise to 
difficulties.976 The legal sources of international criminal law hence explain why leading 
scholars may have very different opinions about the content of the law. 
Secondly, teleological arguments are often used when trying to establish the correct 
interpretation of the law. Mettraux has, for example, regarding crimes against humanity 
pointed out that the “debate over the definition of that crime is also a debate over its soul, 
over what it should be, as much as over what it is.”977 Often these teleological arguments are 
connected to the legislator’s will, that is, the question of why a particular criminalization 
has been adopted. Teleological argumentation is, however, plagued by the fact that 
there is not always agreement on what the rationale of a particular criminalization is. 
For example, in the Aleksovski Appeal Judgement, the ICTY argued that the goal of GC 
IV was to ensure the protection of civilians to the maximum extent possible.978 This 
interpretation of the goal of the GC has, however, been put in question by some scholars 
who find that the rationale rather is to balance military and humanitarian needs.979 These 
different opinions about the rationale of the law add to the difficulty to find “the” correct 
interpretation of the law.  
As was noted in the introductory chapter, the primary goal of this study is, however, 
not to find “the” correct interpretation of the law. Rather, the study aims at considering 
more fundamentally the nature of the criminality and its reflection in the law. For this 
study, two other ways to evaluate the law regulating international crimes are therefore 
of greater interest. Firstly, there is criticism deriving from the type of instrument used to 
address international criminality, that is, criticism that has its basis in established criminal 
law doctrines and thinking. Do the international crime definitions constitute “good criminal 
law”? When making these types of assessments also human rights law can be relevant in 
that also it contains some criteria that the instrument of criminal law should fulfil. 
The second important evaluative perspective for this study is the fair labelling 
perspective. Ashworth has regarding the principle of fair labelling noted that this 
976 Cf. the discussion on how the creation of criminal law has changed in Sweden from a process in which 
lawyers played the central role to a process in which political parties are the main actors. D. Victor, ‘Politics 
and the Penal System – A Drama in Progress’, in A. Snare (ed.), Beware of Punishment – On the Utility and 
Futility of Criminal Law (Oslo: Pax Forlag, 1995), at 68-69.
977 Mettraux 2011, at 145.
978 Aleksovski, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 24 March 2000, para. 146.
979 Marston Danner 2006, at 32, and Robinson 2008, at 935. 
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principle requires that “widely felt distinctions between kinds of offences and degrees 
of wrongdoing are respected and signalled by the law” and that where “people generally 
regard two types of conduct as different, the law should try to reflect that difference.”980 
The fair labelling perspective hence raises questions about the phenomenological “reality” 
of the criminality and its reflections in the legal responses to it. It is important to note 
that the principle of fair labelling is a principle (and not an absolute rule) and it does not 
as such provide an answer to the question of what “the” right definition of a crime is. To 
some extent, the fair labelling perspective is, however, connected to teleological thinking 
in that when assessments are made about fair labelling, it often becomes necessary to 
consider what one aims at with a criminalization.  
6.4.2.  The International Crime Definitions and the Ideal of “Good Criminal Law”
Criminal law criticism against international criminal law has often been directed against 
the general part of the law (that is, the modes of participation and defences), whereas 
the special part largely has escaped this type of criticism. This may be explained with 
the fact that the general principles of criminal law do not as such “regulate” the content 
of the special part of criminal law. Many different legislative choices are often possible. 
As criminal law is connected to the intentional infliction of pain, not every type of 
behaviour can, however, be criminalized. Criminalized behaviour should be harmful 
or at least dangerous, or to put it another way: threaten legally protected interests.981 As 
international crimes often cause considerable harm, the international criminalizations 
are from this perspective unproblematic. Furthermore, human rights law contains 
certain criteria that the criminalization process and outcome must fulfil.982 More 
specifically, human rights law demands that the criminal responsibility through the 
crime definition is foreseeable to the accused person and that the crime definition has 
a certain precision.983 
It is clearly possible to criticize the special part of international criminal law from a 
lex certa perspective. The crime definitions contain both open formulations (for example, 
the underlying offence to crimes against humanity of “other inhumane acts of a similar 
character”) and crime elements that have attracted considerable legal debate (for example, 
the policy element in connection to crimes against humanity). In the last two decades, 
international criminal law has become much more settled, but uncertainties and disputes 
remain. Many of these can (as note above) be explained with the legal sources of the law. 
980 Ashworth 2006, at 88-89. 
981 According to the so-called harm principle, criminal law should primarily address conduct that causes 
harm to others or creates an unacceptable risk of harm to others. Ashworth 2006, at 30.
982 E.g., the nullum crimen sine lege principle (containing e.g., the prohibition of retroactive criminal law to 
the detriment of the accused person). The application of the legality principle in international criminal law 
has attracted much debate and criticism. See further e.g., S. Lamb, ‘Nullum Crimen, Nulla Poena Sine Lege in 
International Criminal Law’, in A. Cassese et al. (eds.), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A 
Commentary, Volume I (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), at 733 ff., and B. Van Schaack, ‘Crimen Sine 
Lege: Judicial Lawmaking at the Intersection of Law and Morals’, 97 Georgetown Law Journal (2008), at 119-192. 
983 On the foreseeability requirement and the application of the legality principle in connection to 
international crimes, see e.g., Van Anraat v. The Netherlands, Decision (admissibility), Third Section, 
ECtHR, 6 July 2010, paras 81-96. 
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The process of establishment is by many – including the present author – seen as 
something positive. It is, however, important to note that it in connection to international 
criminal law sometimes has been deemed advisable to deliberately leave a certain amount 
of openness into the crime definitions.984 New ways to commit atrocities can be invented 
and if the crime definitions are construed too narrowly the new atrocities can escape 
punishment. As such, a good international crime definition appears to be one which 
entails that an accused person can foresee his/her criminal responsibility but which still 
covers all “relevant” criminal behaviour. 
The international crime definitions are, however, not “open” only due to the 
legal sources of the branch of law or due to deliberate legal choices. The international 
criminalizations address unusually complex societal phenomena and this is reflected 
in the crime definitions. War crimes and crimes against humanity, for example, have 
contextual crime elements that must be proven before a conviction can be entered. As 
the contextual crime elements are non-existent or very rare in domestic criminal law 
their compatibility with the basic tenets of criminal law has not been much debated 
in domestic criminal law scholarship. In this regard, it is noteworthy that Ashworth 
has argued that criminalizations should respect the principle of individual autonomy, 
that is, that “each individual should [only] be treated as responsible for his or her 
own behaviour.”985 To avoid collective responsibility accusations, the contextual crime 
elements of international crimes have been construed in a way that entails that nobody 
is directly are blamed for the context, but rather for individually committing crimes in 
the context. From an attribution perspective, this solution is satisfactory. What, however, 
from a legal certainty perspective is problematic is that the contexts often can be defined 
in very different ways by the prosecutors and judges, and that the legal relevance of the 
contextual elements is not completely settled.986 
As the present author sees it, the main problem of the international crime 
definitions is, however, that they with their chapeaus and underlying offences all-in-all 
are very complex. The relationship between the different crimes/underlying offences 
is not always clearly settled and in many cases alternative convictions are possible. In 
connection to complexity of crime definitions, Jareborg has noted that: “If a legal rule 
is difficult to interpret and contains terms that refer to phenomena that are difficult to 
prove, the application of the rule becomes uneven and the criminalization can appear 
ineffective and unjust (for example, because the rules involves a risk that many guilty 
ones are acquitted and many innocents are punished).”987 A central question is therefore 
why it is necessary to have complex generic international crimes, when many of the 
criminal deeds, in practice, could be prosecuted as ordinary simple crimes, such as 
murder or assault. This is, however, a fair labelling question, which will be considered 
below. 
984 E.g., the underlying offence of “other inhumane acts” in connection to crimes against humanity. 
985 Ashworth 2006, at 25.
986 See further Section 6.3.3.4. 
987 Jareborg 1994, at 341 [originally in Swedish, translated to English by the present author].
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6.4.3.  A Fair Labelling Evaluation of the International Crime Definitions 
6.4.3.1.  Generally on Fair Labelling and Crime Definitions 
When a societal problem is transformed into a crime, a decision has to be made what 
typical features of the phenomena are included in the crime definition and in what way. 
If the societal phenomenon is multidimensional, there are often many possible ways to 
do this. In this regard, terrorism serves as a good example, as the legal definition of that 
phenomenon has been much debated. Schmid has, for example, argued that terrorism 
often is characterized by the demonstrative use of violence against human beings, the 
threat of more violence, the deliberate production of terror or fear in a target group, 
the targeting of civilians, non-combatants and innocents, the purpose of intimidation, 
coercion and propaganda, etc.988 Fletcher has identified similar typical variables.989 The 
definitional problem is, however, that all key characteristics do not necessarily apply all 
the time,990 which raises the question of what typical features should be included in a 
crime definition and which should be left outside. Also in connection to international 
core criminality it is possible to identify typical variables, which apply often, but not 
always.991 
It has been observed that when a real-life phenomenon is made into a legal 
phenomenon, the legal definition can generally be characterized as a stipulative definition, 
that is, as a definition which function is to settle how a term shall be used in a particular 
context.992 A criminalization decision or process therefore, in practice, entails giving 
legal significance to certain aspects of a real-life phenomenon. Crime definitions are 
therefore always socially construed and as such not self-evident or immutable.993 Or to 
put it another way, criminalizations are “time- and place bound” rather than absolute.994 
This is true also in connection to globally condemned mala in se criminality995 and in 
connection to international crimes. 
As the legal definitions bear some relationship to reality, they can, however, also 
be characterized as precising definitions. Depending on how a term is legally defined, 
the legal definition may be more or less inclusive than the term’s common usage (lexical 
definition) or how, for example, individual scholars feel that a term should be defined. 
The stipulative character of crime definitions entail that they cannot be right or wrong as 
such. As the crime definitions, however, also are precising definitions they may, however, 
be evaluated based on to what degree they reflect the features of the social problem that 
has given rise to the impulse to criminalize. The fair labelling principle hence makes it 
possible to criticize the crime definitions to the extent that they do not recognize widely 
felt distinctions between different types of wrongdoing. In the following, the international 
crime definitions are considered from this perspective.  
988 A. Schmid, ‘Terrorism – The Definitional Problem’, 36 Case Western Reserve Journal of International 
Law (2004), at 403-404. 
989 Fletcher 2006, at 894.
990 Fletcher 2006, at 894. 
991 This is what has been done in Chapter 2 of this study. 
992 Cf. Fletcher 2006, at 901. 
993 Cf. Ashworth 2006, at 90. 
994 Cf. May 2007, at 119. 
995 The crimes of murder and rape can, e.g., be defined in many different ways. 
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6.4.3.2.  International Crimes and the Typical Features of International Criminality 
While it sometimes has been put forward that international crimes (or at least some parts 
of them) can or should be addressed through ordinary criminal law,996 it appears evident 
that international criminality is a societal phenomena with its own special characteristics 
that demand legal recognition.997 The question is, however, how the societal phenomenon 
of international criminality should be transformed into legal offences. In the lex lata 
of international criminal law, the social phenomenon of international criminality has 
been divided into three legal categories or crimes: war crimes, crimes against humanity 
and genocide.998 In theory, there is no reason why there could not be more or less 
international crimes having the phenomenological reality of international criminality as 
their background. Or that the crimes would be defined differently and hence that their 
internal relationship would be different.999 With this in mind, some consideration should 
be given to whether the established crimes reflect widely felt distinctions regarding 
wrongdoing. 
War crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide have all become established 
concepts that are used in everyday speech, including, for example, in mass media 
reporting. This mass media reporting, however, reveals that the distinction between the 
three crimes often appears to be unclear to non-lawyers. Sometimes all three crimes 
are characterized as types of war crimes.1000 If mass killings have occurred this is often 
characterized as genocide (irrespectively whether the attack has been directed towards 
a protected group) to signal the severity of the happening.1001 In fact, what appears 
clear is that of the three crimes, genocide is the crime with a special societal stigma, 
that is, governments, NGOs and the public generally perceive genocide as the worst 
international crime.1002 All in all, it may be concluded that while the public generally 
perceives the difference between international and ordinary crimes, the distinction 
between the three international crimes is less known. Also the relationship between 
other established concepts, such as torture, persecution, and ethnic cleansing, and the 
crime definitions appears to be unclear to many non-legally trained people, as well as the 
996 See further e.g., the discussion whether crimes against humanity should have a State-policy element 
and whether hence crimes committed by non-State actors should be addressed as ordinary domestic 
crimes. Section 6.3.4.4.
997 See further Chapter 2. See also the discussion on impunity, in Chapter 1.
998 Or four-five, if the crimes of aggression and torture are included. 
999 In sociological contexts, distinctions between different types of genocides have, e.g., been put forward. It 
would, in theory, be possible to reflect these distinctions in the law too. See e.g., F. Chalk & K. Jonassohn, The 
History and Sociology of Genocide – Analyses and Case Studies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), at 9 ff. 
1000 An illustrative example of this is a claim made in a BBC article: “Genocide, crimes against humanity, 
mistreatment of civilians or combatants during war can all fall under the category of war crimes.” T. Kafala, 
‘What Is a War Crime?,’ BBC News, 22 July 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk (last visited 23 June 2009).
1001 Nersessian has likewise noted that: “The common label for these mass slaughters is “genocide”.” D. L. 
Nersessian, ‘The Contours of Genocidal Intent: Troubling Jurisprudence from the International Criminal 
Tribunals’, 37 Texas International Law Journal (2002), at 233.
1002 S. R. Ratner, ‘Can We Compare Evils? The Enduring Debate on Genocide and Crimes against Humanity’, 
6 Washington University Global Studies Law Review (2007), at 583-584. Ratner also argues that governments, 
NGOs and the public generally perceive genocide and crimes against humanity as distinct crimes. Ibid, at 
583. The present author is, however, not convinced that the public always distinguishes the two crimes. 
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difference between different types of war crimes (grave breaches, violations of common 
article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions etc.). 
One may find that it is not necessary for legal concepts to be mastered by ordinary 
citizens, but as the present author sees it, if legal concepts often are misunderstood (or 
if they appear completely superfluous from a labelling perspective) one should consider 
whether alternative legal solutions would better reflect widely felt distinctions between 
different types of wrongdoing. In connection to international criminal law, it is, however, 
important to note that the nature of international law (and especially customary 
international law), makes it difficult, if not impossible, to adopt new criminal legislation 
that would repeal all earlier regulation. This being said, some alternatives to current 
solutions will be put forward.
As has been noted in this study, the typical variables of international criminality are: 
(a) the crimes often take place in armed conflicts; (b) State involvement in the criminality 
is common; (c) the criminality is often collective in nature; (d) the criminality often has 
a political/ideological component or a bias element; and (e) the crime often result in 
different types of severe victimization.1003 Simplifying, it may be said that of the existing 
international crimes, war crimes emphasizes the armed conflict context, crimes against 
humanity the collective action context, and genocide the bias elements. All three crimes, 
however, also to varying degrees give legal recognition to other typical features, which 
increases their reflection of the social reality, but which at the same time makes the 
difference between the three crimes less clear-cut. State involvement in the criminality 
and the political/ideological background of the criminality are, however, two typical 
features of the criminality that have not found their way into the crime definitions. 
As regards connection to armed conflicts, it appears evident that armed conflicts 
still constitute alternative legal orders. Most people hence morally perceive acts of 
violence connected to armed conflicts differently from peacetime violence. At the 
same time, human rights thinking has gained ground, which has made many people 
regard particular acts (for example, acts of torture and rape) as prohibited wherever 
and whenever committed. The alternative legal order of war has hence shrink. As long 
as fighting in armed conflict is not completely outlawed, it is, however, impossible to 
completely get rid of the “schizophrenias of international criminal law”, that is, the fact 
that the same behaviour is treated differently depending on the context of action. The 
schizophrenias may, however, still be lessened. It namely appears that “war is war” for 
most people,1004 and that the different types of war crimes are legislative relicts that derive 
from the public international law background of the crimes rather than meaningful 
criminal regulation. From a labelling perspective, it is therefore positive that there in 
international criminal law has been a trend towards harmonizing the regulation of 
international and non-international armed conflicts. From the same perspective, it is, 
however, disappointing that the Rome Statute of the ICC has maintained the historical 
difference between different types of war crimes. ICC Article 8 on war crimes represents 
unnecessarily complex legal regulation. 
1003 See further Chapter 2. 
1004 In the same way as war crimes committed in international armed conflicts often have been met with 
impunity, war crimes in non-international armed conflicts have also traditionally escaped punishment. In 
contrast, murders during peacetime are generally prosecuted. La Haye 2008, at 121. 
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Due to the development of the international criminalization of war crimes into a 
direction where the nature of the armed conflict has lost in significance, the function of 
the international criminalization of crimes against humanity cannot anymore be said 
to be only to fill gaps in the war crime criminalization. The “soul” of crimes against 
humanity has hence changed, but exactly what it is today is not completely settled, which 
is problematic from a labelling perspective. What a message does one hence send with 
a crimes against humanity conviction?  The requirement of a widespread or systematic 
attack directs the attention to the collective aspect of international criminality. Some, 
however, feel that the more typical feature of crimes against humanity is the frequent 
State-involvement in it.1005 In this regard, it should be noted that a requirement of State 
involvement or the involvement of a State-like entity has been put forward to ensure 
that the violence really meets the requirement of severity and to ensure that there is 
an international interest in its prosecution. While it is true that State-involvement 
often is usual in international criminality, the present author, however, believes that 
all individuals belonging to collectives that have the capability to cause widespread or 
systematic harm should continue to be potential perpetrators of the crime.1006 For the 
present author, the collect aspect of the criminality is hence more significant than the 
State involvement aspect. This is, however, essentially a question of legal choice: What 
aspect of the criminality does one want to emphasize in the criminalization? To send 
many different messages can be possible, but multiple simultaneous messages may also 
confuse those who are the addressees of the message. Furthermore, when the amount of 
crime elements increases, the possibility to ensure convictions decreases. One therefore 
has to consider which those crime elements are that are central for the criminality in 
question. 
More generally, it may be found problematic that there today does not appear to be 
clear “division of work” between the various international crimes, but that in many cases 
it is up to the prosecutor to decide which crime label he/she finds suits the case best, 
especially as regards war crimes and crimes against humanity. It is, for example, not so 
that war crimes only focuses on settling what violence is accepted in wartime, but in the 
same way as crimes against humanity and genocide contains absolute prohibitions also 
applicable in peacetime (for example, the war crimes of torture and rape). Many of the 
underlying offences of war crimes and crimes against humanity are the same or similar. 
The relationship between some forms of crimes against humanity and genocide is also 
from a labelling perspective unnecessarily unclear. 
More specifically, in persecution as a crime against humanity, the bias element 
of the criminality is significant, but as a whole, crimes against humanity do not 
emphasize the discriminatory nature of international criminality. Rather, genocide is the 
international crime where that feature is put in the forefront. If international criminality 
has a strong bias element, laymen often characterize the violence as genocide, even 
though genocide legally speaking is both narrower (requiring the intent to physically 
destroy the group) and broader (not requiring mass killings) than generally perceived. 
1005 See further Section 6.3.4.4.
1006 The principle of complementarity and the possibilities of international criminal prosecutor’s to chose 
which cases they prosecute generally ensures that cases that have no international dimensions are not 
prosecuted before international criminal tribunals.
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The difference between the legal concepts persecution (as a crime against humanity) 
and genocide is hence difficult for people not familiar with international criminal law. 
The non-legal, but popular, concept of “ethnic cleansing” adds to the confusion. From 
a labelling perspective, it could therefore be advisable to internationally address bias 
criminality differently. A difference could, for example, be made between persecution 
and aggravated persecution, so that the common feature of both crimes would be “the 
intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to international law by 
reason of the identity of the group or collectivity”1007 and so that aggravated persecution 
would largely correspond with the current criminalization of genocide. In both forms 
of bias criminality, actual large-scale or systematic causation of harm to the persecuted 
group should be a legal criterion. The present author therefore agrees with those who 
argue that the purpose-based conception of genocidal intent does not in a satisfactory 
way reflect why genocide has been internationally criminalized nor the phenomenology 
of genocidal violence. 
Finally, it is submitted that the present criminalization technique used in 
international criminal law to a very limited extent differentiates between different 
degrees of wrongdoing. In this regard, it has been noted that:  “one of the main 
functions of criminal law is to express the degree of wrongdoing, not simple the fact 
of wrongdoing”.1008 Regarding the international crime definitions, it is noteworthy that, 
for example, no hierarchical difference is done between different types of underlying 
offences or the degree to which these are committed. Especially the crime of war 
crimes can involve everything from isolated individual acts leading to limited harm to 
large-scale attacks against civilians resulting in mass victimization. In this regard, it is 
significant that in some domestic criminalizations of war crimes, a difference is made 
between different petty, standard and aggravated war crimes.1009 This model is from a 
phenomenological perspective functional in that it does not exclude minor violations of 
international humanitarian law from the scope of the law, but at the same time already at 
the conviction stage emphasizes differences between different types of war crimes. Also in 
connection to the other international crimes it would be possible to make differentiations 
depending on the type of harm caused.1010 In connection to crimes against humanity, the 
contextual element of the crime, however, already excludes internationally insignificant 
criminality from the scope of the crime. Also in connection to crimes against humanity 
and genocide, however, may the underlying offences range from individual harmful acts 
to large-scale patterns of violence. 
1007 Article 7(2)(g), ICC Statute (definition of persecution). 
1008 Ashworth 2006, at 35.
1009 The Criminal Code of Finland, Chapter 11, Sections 5-7. Factors that make a war crime aggravated in 
Finland include that the crime victimizes a great number of individuals, that the crime is committed in a 
particularly brutal and humiliating manner, and that the crime is committed in a systematic and organized 
manner. The Criminal Code of Finland, Chapter 11, Section 6.
1010 In Finland, a difference is also made between “standard” and aggravated crimes against humanity, 
and the criteria that make the crime aggravated are similar/the same as in connection to war crimes. The 
Criminal Code of Finland, Chapter 11, Sections 3-4. 
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7.  PARTICIPATION AND RESPONSIBILITY 
7.1.  Introduction
7.1.1.  Connecting Individuals to Crimes 
In the previous chapter, the definitions of the international crimes were considered. 
These definitions do, however, not by themselves determine the scope of the international 
criminal responsibility. Also the general part of criminal law is central in this regard.1011 
In most criminal justice systems, the general part of the criminal law entails that when a 
certain act is criminalized, some other “activities logically connected with that activity” 
simultaneously become criminal.1012 This is the case also in international criminal law. 
A person can, for example, besides for committing a crime, be held responsible for 
ordering or aiding and abetting it. The attribution alternatives (that is, the possible ways 
to connect individuals to crimes) are many and they significantly affect the scope of 
criminal responsibility. 
The extremely collective nature of international criminality gives rise to various 
legal difficulties. To begin with, the fact that international criminal tribunals only can 
prosecute a handful of offenders raises the question of which individuals should be 
prosecuted. This question is often defined as a procedural one involving prosecutorial 
discretion, and it lies as such beyond the scope of this study. It may, however, be 
noted that the international community has opted for a solution according to which 
international criminal tribunals shall focus on the more high-level criminals, whereas 
domestic courts are expected to deal with the more low-level actors. In domestic legal 
systems, participants in international crimes are, however, still often met with impunity. 
Other international prosecutorial strategies could, however, also be possible. Due to 
the frequent State involvement in international crimes, it is, for example, possible to 
ask whether international criminal law only should focus on perpetrators with a State 
connection. In this regard Schabas has questioned the strong focus of the ICC Prosecutor 
on the crimes committed by rebels in Uganda and Congo.1013 International criminal 
tribunals could also strive to function as an example to domestic criminal courts by 
prosecuting many different types of participants in the crimes. 
Secondly, the mass involvement in international criminality gives rise to the question 
of where the line should be drawn between criminal and non-criminal behaviour. This is 
clearly a substantive law question and it will as such be elaborated upon in this Chapter. It 
should be noted that mass violence usually only can take place in situations of large-scale 
bystander acquiescence and passive complicity, which can make it difficult to distinguish 
criminal participants from non-criminal bystanders. 
1011 It should be noted that in some early international criminal law instruments, the possible modes of 
participation were included in the provisions defining the crimes. E.g., Article 6, Nuremberg Charter.  
1012 J. Gardner, ‘On the General Part of the Criminal Law’, in A. Duff (ed.), Philosophy and the Criminal Law 
− Principle and Critique (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), at 207. Gardner furthermore 
notes that the main doctrines of the (English) “auxiliary general part of criminal law” are those dealing 
with inchoate forms of liability and those governing secondary participation in crimes.   
1013 Schabas 2008(c), at 751. 
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Thirdly, international criminality has features that can render attribution difficult. As 
an example of this is often mentioned the geographically far removed leader who directs 
his/her subordinates by very indirect means. It is, in fact, rather common in connection 
to international criminality that leaders do not publicly give orders, but influence their 
subordinates more indirectly and discreetly.1014 This makes it often difficult to establish 
a clear causal relationship between the behaviour of the leader and his/her followers. 
The international criminal tribunals focusing on the leadership stratum of perpetrators 
have therefore often been faced with cases where the guilt has been “obvious” from a 
non-legal perspective, but where it still has been problematic to establish the individual 
responsibility in a legally sound way. International criminal law’s problem to connect 
individuals to crimes is, however, not limited to high-level actors only. The individual 
criminal responsibility of mid- and low-level actors may also be difficult to establish. The 
relationships between individuals in collective mass criminality are namely often devious, 
complex and ambiguous.1015 Furthermore, the crimes often take place in chaotic, violent 
contexts, in which it may be difficult for witnesses to separate individual incidents from 
each other and in which much forensic evidence is destroyed. 
The unique features of international criminality raises the question to what extent 
attribution doctrines developed in domestic criminal justice systems primarily to deal 
with ordinary criminality fit international criminality. It has, for example, been observed 
that whereas remoteness to the physical perpetration in domestic legal systems generally 
is connected to presumptions of insignificance of participation, remoteness from the 
scenes of the crimes in relation to international criminality by no means corresponds 
with insignificance of participation. Due to this, Osiel argues that the traditional criminal 
law categories get the “moral valences entirely wrong.”1016 International criminal law 
has responded to this challenge by adopting attribution doctrines that are rare or non-
existent in domestic legal systems. The various attribution doctrines will be addressed in 
this Chapter, where it will be considered how individuals chosen for prosecution are and 
can be connected to the international crimes. 
7.1.2.  Different Approaches to Attribution in Relation to Collective Criminality 
Before attribution in international criminal law will be investigated, a more theoretical 
inquiry into how collective criminality can be approached is necessary. Domestic legal 
systems namely vary in how they distinguish between different types of participants in 
crime and in how criminal behaviour is distinguished from non-criminal behaviour. The 
focus here will be on how persons who have not themselves physically fulfilled any of the 
1014 E.g., R. Cryer, ‘Prosecuting the Leaders: Promises, Politics and Practicalities,’ 1 Göttingen Journal of 
International Law (2009), at 56-57. Exceptional in this regard were the Nazi atrocities. In the post-World 
War II trials, documents drafted, signed, and/or distributed by the defendants played a central role. T. 
Taylor, Final Report to the Secretary of the Army on the Nuernberg War Crime Trials under Control Council 
Law No. 10 (Washington D.C., 1949), 86.    
1015 Cohen 1995, at 27. This has been called the “qualitative problem” of international criminal law. 
Möller 2003, at 315. The quantitative problem, on the other hand, refers to typically usual high number of 
participants in mass atrocities. Ibid., at 298.
1016 Osiel 2005(b), at 807. 
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crime elements can be connected to the crimes (indirect responsibility).1017 When a single 
person commits a crime alone it is namely not generally challenging to attribute the 
crime to that person. The same applies when more than one person physically commit a 
criminal act together. Then the individuals are co-perpetrators and all clearly responsible 
for the crime in question or at least for their share in the crime. Physical actors or hands-
on criminals are generally prosecuted for crimes as perpetrators or principals (direct 
responsibility). 
In relation to the non-physical participants, it must be determined whether they 
at all should be held criminally responsible and, if yes, how the scope of their liability 
should be settled. In this regard, it is significant to note that the relationship between 
the person physically committing the crime (“person A”) and the non-physical actor 
(“person B”) can vary considerably. There may, for example, be: (1) situations where 
A and B engage in the criminal activity together and are more or less equally involved 
even though only A performs the physical acts constituting the elements of crimes; (2) 
situations where A clearly is the main actor and B merely has provided some influence or 
help; and (3) situations where B commits a crime through A, that is, situations where A is 
a person who cannot be held liable for the crime or where A is so to say “part of a system 
directed by B.” These three alternatives show that an evaluation of a person’s contribution 
to a crime cannot be assessed merely based on whether the person has been the physical 
actor or not.1018 
In relation to establishing individual responsibility for crimes, it has been put 
forward that there essentially are two main approaches. In the first approach, the focus 
is on causality or participation. The starting-point of this approach is the individual who 
has physically committed the crime and who can be characterized as the direct physical 
cause to the crime. An investigation is thereafter made into which other individuals are 
causally connected to the crime or can be said to have participated in it. This approach 
has been called the “bottom-up approach”, as the approach in connection to large-scale 
collective criminality entails that the starting-point is the physical perpetrator who often 
is a low-level actor.1019 
In criminal law, a causal relationship is generally required between the behaviour 
of an individual and the criminal outcome for criminal responsibility to arise. It may 
therefore be said that criminal law generally follows a bottom-up approach. The required 
causal relationship required may, however, vary. There may be a requirement that the 
participation of the person must be a condition sine qua non for the crime to occur 
or, for example, that the participation of a person has had a substantial effect on the 
crime in question. Causality is, however, not generally enough to give rise to criminal 
1017 The terms “direct responsibility” and “indirect responsibility” are often used to distinguish responsibility 
for physical participation from non-physical participation. In international criminal law, the concept of 
direct responsibility is, however, sometimes used to refer to all types of participation in the crimes and 
indirect responsibility to refer to so-called superior responsibility or omission responsibility. See e.g., 
Blaškić, Decision (indictment), TC, ICTY, 4 April 1997, para. 31.   
1018 In relation to collective crimes, it is also significant to note that it for outsiders may be challenging 
to evaluate the relationship between the actors, viz. e.g., in the examples given, whether the relationship 
should be characterized as one of type 1 or type 2.
1019 J. Vogel, ‘How to Determine Individual Criminal Responsibility in Systemic Contexts: Twelve Models’, 
Cahiers de défense sociale (2002), at 154. 
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responsibility, as causality considerations can lead to a situation where too many 
individuals can be connected to a crime from the point of view of criminal law. Hörnle 
has in this regard observed that: 
Causality is a necessary condition, but not a sufficient condition to attribute harm to 
accomplices and principals. [...] [C]riminal law should be ‘‘ultima ratio’’, restricted to 
the core of actions which are most closely related to the harm done. This requires a 
more discriminating assessment of attribution [...]. The question is whether we (the 
collective made up by all citizens) want to use criminal justice resources or ignore 
those acts on the periphery of events.1020
In criminal law, there is therefore a need for more precise criteria for how a certain 
criminal outcome (harm) may be ascribed to a certain individual.1021 More concretely, 
the criminal law must establish what behaviour is not permitted, and what the required 
relationship between this non-permitted behaviour and the result has to be.1022 
The legal systems in the world vary in to what extent they at the conviction stage 
recognize the existence of different types of participants and evaluate the degree of 
participation of individuals. A difference in this regard is often made between: (a) legal 
systems where everybody who contributes to the carrying out of a crime is regarded 
as a perpetrator (the unitary perpetrator or monistic model); (b) legal systems where 
various modes of participation are distinguished, but regarded as legally equivalent at 
the conviction stage (the equivalence theory); and (c) legal systems where the type of 
participation is reflected already in the conviction and where the different participation 
modes are evaluated differently (differential participation model). 
In legal systems adhering to the unitary perpetrator model, it is not at the 
conviction stage distinguished between different types of actors in the crimes.1023 “[E]ach 
participant in a crime is [hence] treated as a perpetrator irrespective of his or her degree 
of participation” in it.1024 This has to do with the fact that “a plurality of persons implies 
a plurality of offenses,”1025 which means that each individual’s actions are evaluated in 
1020 T. Hörnle, ‘Commentary to “Complicity and Causality”’, 1 Criminal Law and Philosophy (2007), at 145. 
1021 Hörnle also notes that causality cannot be used as a means to distinguish principals from accomplices, 
as causation is a necessary condition for both. Hörnle 2007, at 147.
1022 This is in Germany called Zurechnung Objektiven Tatbestand or objective imputation. See e.g., G. 
Jakobs, ‘Imputation in Criminal Law and the Conditions for Norm Validity’, 7 Buffalo Criminal Law 
Review (2004), at fn 17, and C. Roxin, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, Band I, 4th ed. (München: C. H. Beck, 
2006), 307 and 371-373.   
1023 See e.g., A. Eser, ‘Individual Criminal Responsibility’, in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta & J. R. W. D. Jones 
(eds.), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary, Volume I (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002), at 781, and V. Militello, ‘The Personal Nature of Individual Criminal 
Responsibility and the ICC Statute’, 5 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2007), at 948, and Olásolo 
& Pérez Cepeda 2004, at 482. Traditionally, e.g., Italy and Austria are mentioned as countries that follow 
this model. As the relative degrees of responsibility in these legal systems instead are considered at the 
sentencing stage, Vogel has called these legal systems sentencing-oriented (in contrast to responsibility-
oriented systems). Vogel 2002, at 158-159. 
1024 Gacumbitsi, Judgement (sep. op. of Judge Schomburg), AC, ICTR, 7 July 2006, para. 6.
1025 E. van Sliedregt, The Criminal Responsibility of Individuals for Violations of International Humanitarian 
Law (The Hague: T. M. C. Asser Press, 2003), 61.  
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isolation and that each participant due to this de facto becomes a principal to his/her 
own crime.1026 
In legal systems applying the equivalence theory, on the other hand, the underlying 
assumption is that numerous individuals can be connected to a single offence and a 
distinction is made between different types of participants in the crimes. For example, 
in the United States, a distinction is made between principals and accomplices. Which 
participants are regarded as principals varies, but it can, for example, be the physical 
actors.1027 In this model, the responsibility of the accomplice is connected to the principal’s 
actions, that is, the accomplice’s liability derives from that of the primary party.1028 For 
this reason, accomplice responsibility is derivative or accessorial.1029 At the conviction 
stage, this distinction between principals and accomplices is, however, immaterial as the 
two forms of participation are of “formal equivalence”.1030 The complicity doctrine namely 
makes the accomplice liable for the unlawfulness of the principal’s action,1031 that is, for the 
principal’s crime. The two forms of responsibility are thus just two alternative doctrinal 
routes to hold a person guilty of an offence.1032 From this perspective, international 
criminal tribunals, which mainly has dealt with the non-physical leadership stratum of 
actors, has therefore mainly tried to “catch the accomplices.”1033
In the differential participation model, the underlying assumption is also that several 
individuals can be responsible for a single offence. In legal systems applying this model, it 
is, however, significant that each individual only is punished for what she/he has actually 
done,1034 which entails that it already at the conviction stage is important to specify the 
role an individual has played in the commission of a crime. In these legal systems, aiders 
and abettors are, for example, not held liable “for the crime” but for their “contributions 
1026 A distinction is sometimes made between “pure unitary systems,” which do not make the distinction 
between perpetrators and other crime participants, and “functional unitary systems,” which do make the 
distinction but which do not recognize the derivate nature of participant/accomplice liability. H. Olásolo, 
‘Developments in the Distinction between Principal and Accessorial Liability in Light of the First Case Law 
of the International Criminal Court’, C. Stahn & G.. Sluiter (eds.), The Emerging Practice of the International 
Criminal Court (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009), at 340 (including further references). 
1027 Dubber notes that there are numerous differences between the various common law approaches to 
complicity and that, e.g., the American approach has changed due to the Model Penal Code of 1962. He 
furthermore observes that whereas in traditional common law principals were those were present when 
the physical act was committed, according to the model penal code the central question was whether a 
person had committed the physical act by his own conduct. M. D. Dubber, ‘Criminalizing Complicity – A 
Comparative Analysis’, 5 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2007), at 977 ff.
1028 Kadish 1985, at 339. 
1029 E.g., Eser 2002, at 783. 
1030 Fletcher 1998, at 189-190. See also, e.g., Ashworth 2006, at 412-413, and van Sliedregt 2003, at 62. Note, 
however, the opinion of Judge Schomburg, who argues that: “It is impossible to make a difference in terms 
of substantive law between planning, instigating, ordering, committing or aiding and abetting without 
acknowledging that, in principle, each of these modes warrants distinction on the sentencing level as well.” 
Gacumbitsi, Judgement (sep. op. of Judge Schomburg), AC, ICTR, 7 July 2006, para. 6. 
1031 Kadish 1985, at 327.
1032 Dubber 2007, at 989. 
1033 W. A. Schabas, ‘Enforcing International Humanitarian Law: Catching the Accomplices’, 83 International 
Revue of the Red Cross (2001), at 439-440.
1034 Cf. Fletcher 1998, at 200. 
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to the crime.”1035 To distinguish those actors who are responsible for the crime from those 
who only have contributed a difference is often made between perpetrators and other 
participants.1036 Different theories how perpetrators should be distinguished from mere 
participants have, however, been put forward. For example, the German scholar Roxin 
has made a difference between: (a) formal objective theories, which views the individuals 
who physically fulfil the crime elements as perpetrators; (b) material objective theories, 
which regard the individuals who are causally responsible for the crimes as perpetrators 
(as examples of material objective theories Roxin, for example, mentions the condition 
sine qua non theories and the theories that focus on those present when the crime is 
committed); (c) subjective theories, which regard as perpetrators those who have a 
certain mental state or those in whose interest the crime is; and (d) mixed theories.1037 He 
himself argues for a so-called theory of domination or control over the crime (German 
Tatherrschaft), which has become an influential theory in many legal systems adhering 
to the continental legal tradition.1038 According to this theory, the individuals who “stand 
in the centre of the committing of a crime or who steer it by means of predominant 
influence”1039 are regarded as perpetrators. For the purpose of labelling the individual 
contribution correctly, the perpetrators and participants can furthermore be categorized 
into subcategories such as “solitary perpetrators”, “co-perpetrators”, “intermediate 
perpetrators”, “instigators”, “aiders and abettors”, etc. In addition to making the labelling 
more precise, these distinctions make it possible to sanction the different modes of 
participation differently and limit the applicability of certain modes of participation to 
certain crimes.1040 In the same way as in the equivalence model, the distinction between 
different types of participants in the crimes makes it possible to “premise that the 
punishability of the secondary party is based on the principal offence.”1041
Of the three different models, the differential participation model is the one that 
describes the criminal event most precisely and which already at the conviction stage reflects 
that various individuals may contribute to the crime in ways that to a high degree vary “in 
weight and closeness to the accomplishment of a crime.”1042 At the same time, the model, 
however, makes the difference between perpetrators and other participants so significant 
that it becomes very important to adopt precise criteria for distinguishing between the 
different types of participants. Much time has therefore been devoted in the legal doctrine 
to finding the best test. Scholars not coming from legal systems adhering to this model have, 
however, not always been that impressed over the outcome of the extensive doctrinal debate. 
1035 E.g., van Sliedregt 2003, at 64, and E. M. Wise, ‘Commentary’, in L. S. Wexler & M. C. Bassiouni (eds.), 
Model Draft Statute for the International Criminal Court Based on the Preparatory Committee’s Text to the 
Diplomatic Conference, Rome, June 15-July 17 1998 (Paris: Érès, 1998), at 42.  
1036 Eser, however, observes that in the case of co-perpetrators, the persons are not held liable for the 
wrongdoing of others, as the “basis for criminal responsibility is the individual blame placed on each 
perpetrator for having participated in the planning of the crime and for having consented to the illegal 
contributions of the other co-perpetrators.” Eser 2002, at 780.  
1037 C. Roxin, Täterschaft und Tatherrschaft, 8th ed., (Berlin: De Gruyter Recht, 2006), 34-59.  
1038 See e.g., Roxin 2006(b), at 60 ff., and C. Roxin, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, Band II (München: C. H. 
Beck, 2003), 9-10.  
1039 Eser 2002, at 782. 
1040 E.g., Eser 2002, at 782, and Militello 2007, at 948.
1041 van Sliedregt 2003, at 64. 
1042 Cf. Eser 2002, at 782. 
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For example, Dubber has found the test of Tatherrschaft to be vague and underjustified.1043 
In legal systems where the distinction between principals and accomplices is of little legal 
significance, it is possible to apply less sophisticated tests to distinguish between the different 
types of participants. In all legal systems, the sentence should, however, reflect the culpability 
of the individual. The legal systems therefore only vary in relation to at what stage of the 
proceedings the evaluation of the scope of the contribution to the crime has to be done and 
how explicitly it has to be articulated in the form of legal labels. 
The causality or participation approach that criminal law generally follows may, 
however, lead to situations where individuals who from a criminal policy perspective 
should be connected to a crime cannot be because a relationship cannot be proven. This 
may happen especially in situations of mass criminality or network criminality, that is, in 
relation crimes such as genocide and terrorism where the high-level actors may be very 
remote from the physical actors. In this regard, it is noteworthy that some legal systems 
exceptionally accept “top-down approaches” to individual criminal responsibility. In such 
approaches, the pivotal concept is not causality or participation, but responsibility.1044 
It should be emphasized that criminal responsibility in situations where causality or 
participation cannot be proven is considered problematic by many criminal law scholars. 
7.2.  Modes of Responsibility in International Criminal Law
7.2.1.  Attribution in Early International Criminal Law 
In international criminal law, the attribution discussion has essentially centred around 
two main questions, namely what legal tradition international criminal law should 
follow and to what extent the law should take into consideration the special nature of 
the criminality. In the early days of international criminal law, the law was strongly 
characterized by two features: a significant Anglo-American influence, and a lacking 
codification and specificity. The lacking specificity especially plagued the general part 
of the criminal law.1045 The nature of the Nazi criminality, however, affected some 
legal choices made. For example, Pomorski has observed that when the Nuremberg 
Charter was negotiated consideration was given to how to address the massive 
and systematic nature of the criminality.1046 In the negotiations, the Americans put 
forward a plan according to which it would be established in a multinational trial 
that certain Nazi organizations conspired to crimes and certain individuals would 
be convicted as representatives of these criminal organizations. After this, members 
of the organizations declared criminal could be convicted for membership in the 
1043 Dubber 2007, at 1001. 
1044 Vogel 2002, at 155.
1045 Some scholars even today find international criminal law to be of limited “doctrinal maturity” as 
regards attribution. E.g., Werle 2009(b), at 136-137, and Eser 2002, at 774.  
1046 S. Pomorski, ‘Conspiracy and Criminal Organization’, in G. Gingsburgs & V. N. Kudriavtsev (eds.), The 
Nuremberg Trial and International Law (Dordrecht: Martinjus Nijhoff Publishers, 1990), at 213. 
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organizations before national courts.1047 The American proposal was controversial, but 
eventually endorsed.1048 The Nuremberg Charter therefore contained provisions on 
both conspiracy and criminal organizations.  
In the Nuremberg Charter, the provisions on attribution were primarily placed 
in Article 6, which contains the crime definitions. The article provided for criminal 
responsibility for the commission of the crimes and in relation to the crime against 
peace, for planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression or a war 
in violation of international treaties, agreements and assurances, or participation 
in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing. 
Furthermore, in the last paragraph of Article 6, it was stipulated that leaders, 
organizers, instigators, and accomplices participating in the formulation or execution of 
a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the crimes were responsible for all acts 
performed by any persons in execution of such plans. An article similar to Article 6 in 
the Nuremberg Charter was later included in the Tokyo Charter (Article 5). Articles 
9 and 10 of the Nuremberg Charter regulated the declaration of certain organizations 
as criminal.
The prosecutors before the Nuremberg Tribunal had divided their indictment into 
four counts, namely count one on the common plan or conspiracy, count two on crimes 
against peace, count three on war crimes and count four crimes against humanity.1049 
In relation to count one, the prosecutors argued that all the defendants participated 
as leaders, organizers, instigators or accomplices in the formulation or execution of a 
common plan or conspiracy to commit, or which involved the commission of, crimes 
against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity, and that the defendants were 
individually responsible for their own acts and for all acts committed by any other 
persons in the execution of such plan or conspiracy.1050 Also in relation to the counts 
on war crimes and crimes against humanity, it was argued that the defendants, acting in 
concert with others, formulated and executed a common plan or conspiracy to commit 
the crimes (count three and four).1051 The prosecutors also argued that certain groups or 
organizations should be declared criminal “by reason of their aims and the means used 
for the accomplishment thereof and in connection with the conviction of such of the 
named defendants as were members thereof [...].”1052 In an analysis of the Nuremberg 
indictment, Pomorski notes that the American Prosecutor Jackson wanted to “push” the 
conspiracy case to the fullest and that count one of the indictment was extremely broad 
in that all the defendants were accused of participation with “diverse other persons” in a 
conspiracy lasting over twenty years.1053 
1047 B. F. Smith, The American Road to Nuremberg – The Documentary Record 1944-1945 (Stanford: Hoover 
Institution Press, 1982), 36-37. See also e.g., T. Taylor, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials: A Personal 
Memoir (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1992), 36-41.
1048 Pomorski 1990, at 217-221.
1049 Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal (1947), Volume 1, 27 ff.
1050 Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal (1947), Volume 1, 29.
1051 Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal (1947), Volume 1, 43 and 65.
1052 Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal (1947), Volume 1, 28.
1053 Pomorski 1990, at 227 and 229.
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A conspiracy can be defined as “an agreement between two or more persons to 
pursue an illegal objective, or to pursue a legal objective by illegal means.”1054 In common 
law jurisdictions, conspiracy is generally an inchoate crime, that is, a conspiracy can be 
committed “even though the substantive offence is not successfully consummated.”1055 
If the substantive offence materializes, the participants in the conspiracy can be held 
responsible both for the substantive crime and the additional crime of conspiracy.1056 This 
common law understanding of conspiracy was behind both the conspiracy and criminal 
organization schemes in the American suggestion. In civil law jurisdictions, on the other 
hand, unexecuted criminal plans are rarely criminalized. In the rare cases where criminal 
plans are given a legal significance, there is therefore generally a requirement that the 
substantive offence must have been materialized or at least attempted.1057 Due to the 
different understandings of conspiracy, the conspiracy charges led to much controversy 
among the judges, but they were in the end able to reach a compromise.1058 The judges gave 
the conspiracy provisions a restrictive reading and limited the application of conspiracy 
to crimes against peace and declared that the conspiracy should not be “too far removed 
from the time of decision and of action.”1059 Those who gave Hitler their cooperation 
despite knowing of his aims (or plan) were treated as parties to the plan.1060 Conspiracy 
was thus not at Nuremberg treated as a separate crime in connection to war crimes and 
crimes against humanity, but rather as a “more inclusive” mode to commit the crime.1061 
Participation in a conspiracy thus became “the legal equivalent of complicity.”1062 
Even more controversial than the conspiracy provisions was, however, the 
Nuremberg Tribunal’s possibility to declare certain organizations as criminal and the 
connected idea of membership responsibility. The tribunal itself recognized this and 
pointed out that the application of the provision may produce great injustice unless 
properly safeguarded.1063 The judges therefore concluded that: 
A criminal organization is analogous to a criminal conspiracy in that the essence of 
both is cooperation for criminal purposes. There must be a group bound together 
and organized for a common purpose. The group must be formed or used in 
connection with the commission of crimes denounced by the Charter. Since the 
declaration with respect to the organizations and groups will [...] fix the criminality 
of its members, that definition should exclude persons who had no knowledge of 
1054 May 2006, at 317. 
1055 Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th ed. (2009) (‘inchoate’). Ohlin has, however, noted that the law of conspiracy 
at least in the United States is under pressure. J. D. Ohlin, ‘Group Think: The Law of Conspiracy and 
Collective Reason’, 98 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology (2007), at 148-149. 
1056 E.g., Fletcher 1998, at 191-192. 
1057 E.g., Pomorski 1990, at 218, and Schabas 2009, at 310. 
1058 Pomorski 1990, at 230.
1059 Göring et al., Judgment, IMT, 1 October 1946, at 225-226 and 253. See also Justice, Judgment, CCL, 4 
December 1947, at 956.
1060 Göring et al., Judgment, IMT, 1 October 1946, at 226. In this regard, the Nuremberg case law departed 
from the legal standards that May finds typical for conspiracy, viz. the intent to agree and the intent to plan 
to do a specific illegal act. May 2006, at 319.  
1061 W. R. Harris, Tyranny on Trial: The Evidence at Nuremberg (Dallas: Southern Methodist University 
Press, 1954), 555.
1062 Pomorski 1990, at 224.
1063 Göring et al., Judgment, IMT, 1 October 1946, at 256. 
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the criminal purposes or acts of the organization and those who were drafted by the 
State for membership, unless they were personally implicated in the commission of 
acts declared criminal [...] as members of the organization. Membership alone is not 
enough to come within the scope of these declarations.1064
The tribunal’s criminalization of membership in Gestapo therefore, for example, 
excluded persons employed by the Gestapo for purely clerical, stenographic, janitorial 
and similar unofficial routine tasks, and it required that the members who could be 
convicted became or remained members of the organization with knowledge that it was 
being used for the commission of acts declared criminal by the Nuremberg Charter or 
were personally implicated as members of the organizations in the commission of such 
crimes.1065 The Nuremberg Tribunal thus rejected a broad membership liability.1066 It 
should be noted that the Nuremberg doctrine on criminal organizations is really not a 
mode of participation as such, but a doctrine creating a separate crime of membership.1067 
In relation to the Tokyo Tribunal, Boister and Cryer argue that the tribunal 
interpreted its conspiracy provisions in a more common law way than the Nuremberg 
Tribunal, that is, as an inchoate crime. More specifically they observe that whereas the 
Nuremberg Tribunal “limited the grand conspiracy and merged it into the substantive 
counts,” this option was not open to the Tokyo Tribunal “because many of the accused 
would have escaped liability entirely as they were not party to the substantive offences.”1068 
They criticize the Tokyo Tribunal’s approach from the point of view that the inchoate 
conspiracy crime was not part of international customary law at the time being, and 
find that the Japanese leaders instead could have been prosecuted for, for example, the 
crimes of planning or preparing.1069 All in all, the Tokyo Tribunal in the same way as the 
Nuremberg Tribunal appears to have given attribution little consideration.1070 In contrast 
1064 Göring et al., Judgment, IMT, 1 October 1946, at 256. 
1065 Göring et al., Judgment, IMT, 1 October 1946, at 267-268. 
1066 Bonafè distinguishes between three possible relationships between collective and individual 
responsibility: (1) The establishment of collective criminal conduct entails that all members of the 
collective are individually criminally responsible; (2) the establishment of collective criminal conduct 
entails that some members (e.g., leaders) are individually criminally responsible; and (3) the establishment 
of collective criminal conduct does not automatically connect to individual criminal responsibility, but has 
other functions, such as to provide partial presumptions of the members’ criminal responsibility. Bonafè 
2009, at 168-169.  
1067 Bonafè 2009, at 172. Engelhart has, however, correctly noted that, in the end, the application of the 
provisions on criminal organizations did not become a precedent for punishing organizations, but a 
precedent for individual criminal responsibility based on the conspiracy and the joint criminal enterprise 
doctrines. Engelhart 2010, at 180.  
1068 N. Boister & R. Cryer, The Tokyo International Military Tribunal: A Reappraisal (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), 219. See also R. Cryer, ‘The Boundaries of Liability in International Criminal Law, 
or ‘Selectivity by Stealth,’ 6 Journal of Conflict and Security Law (2001), at 20. 
1069 Boister & Cryer 2008, at 220-221 and 244-245. 
1070 Regarding modes of responsibility and the Tokyo Tribunal, see e.g., Boister & Cryer 2008, at 205-236, 
and G. Boas, ‘Command Responsibility for the Failure to Stop Atrocities: The Legacy of the Tokyo Trial’, 
in Y. Tanaka, T. McCormack & G. Simpson (eds.), Beyond Victor’s Justice? The Tokyo War Crimes Trial 
Revisited (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2011), at 163-173. 
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to the Nuremberg Charter, the Tokyo Charter did not contain a provision on criminal 
organizations.1071
Finally, World War II was followed by numerous other trials against more low-level 
actors, of which the most famous ones are the trials held based on CCL adopted by the 
Allied Control Council. This law contained a more specific, but very broad, provision on 
attribution, viz. Article II(2), which stipulated that: “Any person [...] is deemed to have 
committed a crime [...], if he was (a) a principal or (b) was an accessory to the commission 
of any such crime or ordered or abetted the same or (c) took a consenting part therein or 
(d) was connected with plans or enterprises involving its commission or (e) was a member 
of any organization or group connected with the commission of any such crime or (f) with 
reference to [..., crimes against peace] if he held a high political, civil or military (including 
General Staff) position in Germany or in one of its Allies, co-belligerents or satellites or 
held high position in the financial, industrial or economic life of any such country.”
In the case law based on the CCL some discussion on attribution can be found. For 
example, in the High Command case, the tribunal argued that: “to be held criminally 
responsible, there must be a breach of some moral obligation fixed by international 
law, a personal act voluntarily done with knowledge of its inherent criminality under 
international law.”1072 In the Justice case, the tribunal, on the other hand, argued that in 
cases where it is argued that there has been a pattern or plan of criminality, this pattern 
or plan must be proved as well as the specific conduct of the individual defendant in 
furtherance of this plan.1073 The tribunal also noted that: “The person who persuades 
another to commit murder, the person who furnishes the lethal weapon for the purpose 
of its commission, and the person who pulls the trigger are all principals or accessories 
to the crime”.1074 In the Pohl case, the tribunal likewise emphasized that the international 
crimes may have many different types of participants and that “the [individual] acts [...] 
within the scope of the over-all plan, become the acts of all the others”.1075
From the point of view of this study, it is interesting to note that the legal 
discussions in relation to the Nuremberg Tribunal primarily concerned the crimes of 
conspiracy and membership in criminal organizations, and not modes of participation 
in the international crimes as such. This stresses that the question of how individuals are 
connected to criminal behaviour can be legally addressed both through criminalizations 
addressing the way in which the participation takes place and through separate modes 
of participation. In an analysis of the post-World War II case law from the point of view 
of attribution, Ambos notes that this case law “pragmatic rather than dogmatic” and that 
and “old-fashioned” cause-effect or causality approach was used.1076 He also observes 
1071 The only reference to membership responsibility can be found in Article 5 of the Tokyo Charter, 
which provides that the tribunal shall have jurisdiction over the criminals as individuals or as members of 
organizations. 
1072 High Command, Judgment, CCL, 28 October 1948, at 510.
1073 Justice, Judgment, CCL, 4 December 1947, at 1063.
1074 Justice, Judgment, CCL, 4 December 1947, at 1063.
1075 Pohl, Judgment, CCL, 3 November 1947, at 1173.
1076 K. Ambos, ‘Individual Criminal Responsibility in International Criminal Law: A Jurisprudential 
Analysis – From Nuremberg to The Hague,” in G. Kirk McDonald & O. Swaak-Goldman (eds.), Substantive 
and Procedural Aspects of International Criminal Law: The Experience of International and National Courts, 
Volume I (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000), at 8.
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that jurisprudence did not distinguish between principals and accessories on the level 
of attribution of criminal responsibility.1077 According to Ambos, it can therefore be 
argued that the “structure of the relationship between the crime(s) and the accused – 
the rules of attribution – were only of secondary interest”1078 in the post-World War II 
trials. Despite its shortcomings, the case law has, however, not been without influence. 
Conspiracy and membership responsibility have been found problematic due to wide 
nets of criminal responsibility these liability forms potentially cast and have for this more 
or less completely been abandoned in modern international criminal law.1079 The case law 
that has had greatest later significance in relation to attribution has therefore been the 
American and British war crimes trials that followed the trial of the major war criminals 
in Nuremberg.1080 The common plan responsibility envisaged in some of these cases is 
the legal basis for the presently influential JCE doctrine. 
7.2.2.  Attribution in Modern International Criminal Law 
The adoption of the ICTY Statute was characterized by rapidity and the lack of extensive 
participation by criminal law scholars.1081 Questions of attribution were not elaborated 
in detail during the adoption process. The report of the Secretary-General shortly 
notes that all persons who participate in the planning, preparation or execution of the 
crimes contribute to the commission of the violation and are, therefore, individually 
responsible.1082 In the ICTY Statute, this has been transformed to a provision that 
a person who plans, instigates, orders, commits or otherwise aids and abets in the 
planning, preparation or execution of a crime shall be individually responsible for the 
crime.1083 A similar provision can be found in the ICTR Statute.1084 Due to the brevity 
of the provisions and the fact that statutes of the ad hoc tribunals are expected to reflect 
customary international law, the modern ad hoc tribunals have often turned to the case 
law of the post-World War II tribunals when trying to identify the content of concepts, 
such as ordering. As noted above, the case law in relation to these questions has, however, 
not always been that elaborate. Furthermore, as the explicitly mentioned participation 
forms have been found to be unsuitable in many of the cases before the tribunals, the 
prosecutors and judges have also looked into customary international law to find more 
suitable attribution theories. The theory they have “found” there is most notably the 
theory of joint criminal enterprise responsibility. 
1077 Ambos 2000, at 8-11. Olásolo, on his part, argues that even though Control Council Law No. 10, Article 
II(2) introduced into international criminal law the distinction between principals and accessories, the 
military tribunals applying the law adhered to the unitary model. H. Olásolo, ‘Joint Criminal Enterprise 
and Its Extended Form: A Theory of Co-Perpetration Giving Rise to Principal Liability, a Notion of 
Accessorial Liability, or a Form of Partnership in Crime?’, 20 Criminal Law Forum (2009), at 272.  
1078 Ambos 2006, at 661.
1079 As regards conspiracy, the ICTY and ICTR Statutes provides for criminal responsibility for conspiracy 
to commit genocide. Article 4, ICTY Statute, and Article 2, ICTR Statute.  
1080 van Sliedregt 2003, at 64. 
1081 On the process, see e.g., Scharf 1997, at 51-63. 
1082 UN Doc. S/25704, 3 May 1993, para. 54. 
1083 Article 7(1), ICTY Statute. 
1084 Article 6(1), ICTR Statute. 
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Besides in the ICTY/ICTR statute articles on individual criminal responsibility, 
behaviour that gives rise to criminal responsibility is identified in the articles defining 
genocide. Both articles on genocide provide that it is not only genocide that is punishable, 
but conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, 
attempt to commit genocide and complicity in genocide.1085 These provisions that 
follow the model of the Genocide Convention separate between genocide proper, on 
the one hand, and other acts of genocide, on the other hand.1086 Of the four other acts 
of genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and public incitement to commit 
genocide, and attempt to commit genocide are often inchoate, that is, they do not require 
that a genocide de facto has taken place.1087 In the ad hoc tribunals’ jurisprudence, it 
is especially the relationship between the mode of participation of aiding and abetting 
and the act of complicity in genocide that has caused debate.1088 Also the relationship 
between genocide and conspiracy to commit genocide has caused uncertainty.1089 
In some case law, it has been suggested that they should not be regarded as separate 
crimes, but rather as different modes to commit genocide.1090 Other chambers, on the 
other hand, have treated them as distinct crimes and have foreseen the possibility of 
cumulative convictions.1091 The ad hoc tribunals hence deal with attribution both as a 
question of separate modes of participation and as a question of criminalized acts. This 
1085 Article 4, ICTY Statute, and Article 2, ICTR Statute. 
1086 See e.g., Schabas 2009, at 307. 
1087 E.g., Schabas 2009, at 307. In an ICTR judgement, the legal elements of conspiracy to commit genocide 
were articulated in the following way: “The actus reus of the crime is “an agreement between individuals 
to commit genocide”. The agreement need not be formal. An agreement may be proved by direct evidence 
of the conspiracy itself, such as evidence of planning meetings for the genocide, or may be inferred 
from circumstantial evidence. The concerted or coordinated action of a group of individuals may also 
constitute evidence of an agreement. The qualifiers “concerted or coordinated” are important: it is not 
sufficient to simply show similarity of conduct. In certain cases the existence of a conspiracy to commit 
genocide between individuals controlling institutions could be inferred from the interaction between 
these institutions. When based on circumstantial evidence, the finding of a conspiracy must be the only 
reasonable inference based on the totality of the evidence.” Ndindiliyimana et al., Judgement, TC, ICTR, 
17 May 2011, para. 2045. 
1088 See e.g., G. Dawson & R. Boynton, ‘Reconciling Complicity in Genocide and Aiding and Abetting 
Genocide in the Jurisprudence of the United Nations Ad Hoc Tribunals,’ 21 Harvard Human Rights Journal 
(2008), at 241. 
1089 Article 2(3), ICTR Statute distinguishes between different punishable acts and makes the distinction 
between “genocide” and “complicity in genocide.”
1090 Karemera et al., Decision (JCE), TC, ICTR, 18 May 2006, paras 3-10. See also e.g., Blagojević & Jokić, 
Judgement, TC, ICTY, 17 January 2005, paras 678-679, and Stakić, Decision (acquittal), TC, ICTY, 31 
October 2002, paras 45-68. Cf. however, Karemera et al., Decision (JCE, sep. op. of Judge Short), TC, 
ICTR, 18 May 2006, para. 8 (‘In my view, complicity in genocide has the indicia of a criminal offence, 
whilst encompassing a particular mode of liability. [...] In the case of Semanza, for example, the Accused 
[...] was found not guilty of genocide and convicted of complicity in genocide. It certainly cannot be said 
that the Accused in that case was convicted of a mode of liability. I am therefore of the view that the term 
“complicity in genocide” referred to under Article 2(3)(e) is a crime (genocide) to which a particular mode 
of criminal responsibility is attached (complicity, or accomplice liability).’)
1091 Due to fairness to the accused considerations, multiple convictions have, however, generally not been 
entered. See e.g. Karemera & Ngirumpatse, Judgement, TC, ICTR, 2 February 2012, paras 1709-1713, and 
Popović et al., Judgement, TC, ICTY, 10 June 2010, paras 2117-2127.  
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is problematic in that it entails that the same question is addressed in two different types 
of provisions, which relationship is not clearly settled. 
When the ICC Statute was negotiated, the continental legal tradition was for the 
first time influential in the formation of an international criminal law instrument. In 
practice, this is reflected in a categorization of the various modes of participation in a 
form that is more familiar to lawyers coming from the civil law tradition. Article 25(3) 
of the ICC Statute distinguishes between: (a) those committing a crime, whether as 
an individual, jointly with another or through another person, regardless of whether 
that other person is criminally responsible; (b) those ordering, soliciting or inducing 
the commission of a crime which in fact occurs or is attempted; (c) those that for the 
purpose of facilitating the commission of a crime, aids, abets or otherwise assists in its 
commission or attempted commission of a crime; and (d) those that in any other way 
contribute to the commission or attempted commission of a crime by a group of persons 
acting with a common purpose. In relation to genocide, it is also possible to directly and 
publicly incite others to commit the crime (e). It should be noted that the ICC Statute, 
in contrast to the Genocide Convention and the statutes of ICTY and ICTR, does not in 
the crime definition of genocide distinguish between genocide and other genocidal acts. 
In an analysis of ICC Article 25(3), Eser (who is German and hence a representative 
for the continental legal tradition) notes that the ICC Statute distinguishes between 
perpetration (subparagraph a) and participation (subparagraphs b and c) in a way 
that is “traditional for many jurisdictions”, but also includes “extensions of criminal 
co-responsibility” that are not so familiar in domestic systems (subparagraphs d and 
e).1092 He also argues that even though the ICC Statute does explicitly connect varying 
sentencing ranges to the different modes of participation, it seems to imply a hierarchy 
between the different forms beginning from committing and ending in inciting.1093 
The same conclusion is made by Werle (also German) who finds that Article 25(3) 
“establishes a value oriented hierarchy of participation in a crime under international 
law.”1094 Both German scholars thus stress a move towards a differential participation 
model of attribution in international criminal law. 
In the following discussion on attribution, the focus will be on the provisions and 
case law of the ad hoc tribunals, however, so that the provisions of the ICC and its initial 
case law also will be commented upon. As the attribution of criminal responsibility 
is legally unproblematic in cases where there is evidence that an individual physically 
has committed a crime, the attention will here be directed on how individuals can be 
committed to crimes where there is no evidence that they physically have caused the 
harm. The study focuses on situations where the social phenomenon of international 
criminality de facto has taken place. Inchoate responsibility and responsibility for 
attempts will hence not be considered. 
1092 Eser 2002, at 771. Likewise, K. Ambos ‘Article 25 – Individual Criminal Responsibility,’ in O. Triffterer 
(ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court – Observers’ Notes, Article by 
Article, 2nd ed. (München: C. H. Beck, 2008), at 746. 
1093 Eser 2002, at 787.
1094 G. Werle, ‘Individual Criminal Responsibility in Article 25 ICC Statute’, 5 Journal of International 
Criminal Justice (2007), at 957. 
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7.2.3.  Modes of Participation and Legally Significant Pre-Crime Behaviour
7.2.3.1.  Introductory Remark
International criminal law has, since World War II, reserved special treatment for 
persons in the highest echelons of military or political hierarchy who, by virtue of 
their position, are able to influence, formulate and subsequently order the execution 
of criminal schemes.1095
Certain of the possible participation modes in international crimes are such that they 
stress that the non-physical perpetrator has mainly played his/her part before the 
physical criminal act takes place.1096 Such participation modes are planning, instigating, 
soliciting, inducing and ordering. In all these participation forms, it is thus assumed 
that the non-physical actor has influenced the physical actor and that this influence has 
been such that it can be reproached. Kadish notes in this regard that: “Recognizing that a 
person is influenced by what other people say and do, just as a person is influenced by all 
his experiences, does not imply that volitional actions are caused, in the physical sense, 
the way natural events are determined by antecedent conditions.“1097 With an alternative 
definition of causation, it may, however, be argued that individuals planning, instigating, 
soliciting, inducing and ordering crimes are possible interpersonal causes to crimes to 
which the physical actors are the physical causes.1098 Even though these participation 
forms indicate that the participation has taken place before the physical criminal acts 
occur, it should be noted that, for example, inciting may have long-term effects on 
people’s minds.1099 
7.2.3.2.  Planning
Planning has in the statutes of the ad hoc tribunals explicitly been identified as a 
participation mode that can give rise to individual criminal responsibility.1100 An 
1095 Bantekas 2002, at 43. 
1096 Eser categorizes these participation modes as “accessory before the fact”. Eser 2002, at 795. Kadish, 
on his part, makes a difference between two alternative modes of involvement in another’s criminal act: 
influence and assistance. Influence largely overlaps with what here is referred to as legally significant 
pre-crime behaviour. Kadish points out that: “Various terms are used to capture the central notions 
of assistance and influence. [...] Influence is expressed in a greater variety of terms, sometimes with 
overlapping meanings, sometimes with different connotations. Advise, like counsel, imports offering one’s 
opinion in favor of some action. Persuade is stronger, suggesting a greater effort to prevail on a person, or 
counseling strongly. Command is even stronger, implying an order or direction, commonly by one with 
some authority over the other. Encourage suggests giving support to a course of action to which another is 
already inclined. Induce means to persuade, but may suggest influence beyond persuasion. Procure seems 
to go further, suggesting bringing something about in the sense of producing a result. Instigate as well 
as incite suggest stirring up and stimulating, spurring another to a course of action. Provoke is roughly 
equivalent to incite, with the added sense of producing a response by exploiting a person’s sensitivities. 
Solicit is generally equivalent to incite in legal usage, although in common usage it suggests simply asking 
or proposing.” Kadish 1985, at 343.
1097 Kadish 1985, at 343.
1098 Cf. Kelman & Hamilton 1989, at 208.
1099 This has made some call incitement to commit genocide a continuing crime W. K. Timmermann, 
‘Incitement in International Criminal Law,’ 88 International Review of the Red Cross (2006), at 842. 
1100 Article 7(1), ICTY Statute, and Article 6(1), ICTR Statute. 
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individual may be held liable for planning a crime: (a) where he/she designs the criminal 
conduct with intent that the crime is committed; or (b) where he/she designs the criminal 
conduct with awareness of the substantial likelihood that a crime will be committed.1101 
The planning can be proven with circumstantial evidence.1102 Usually, the planning takes 
place before the crimes are committed, but the planning may, however, also continue 
during the execution phase of the crime.1103 From the point of view of the fact that the 
international crimes can be very large-scale and of long duration this is of significance. If, 
however, a person has been found guilty of committing a crime, he/she should, however, 
not be convicted for having planned the same crime.1104 The planning may, however, then 
aggravate the crime and be reflected in the sentence.1105 It is not legally necessary for the 
planner to have a position of authority.1106 
Depending on whether there is a requirement that the planned crime, in fact, has 
taken place, planning is either an inchoate offence (no requirement of materialization) or 
a form of accomplice or participation responsibility (a requirement of materialization). 
In the case law of the ad hoc tribunals, planning has clearly been given the latter 
function.1107 For example, in the Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgement it is argued that: 
““planning” requires that one or more persons design the criminal conduct constituting 
one or more statutory crimes that are later perpetrated. It is sufficient to demonstrate 
that the planning was a factor substantially contributing to such criminal conduct.”1108 It 
is noteworthy that the ICC Statute does not explicitly provide for criminal responsibility 
for planning.1109
7.2.3.3.  Ordering
Due to the fact that many international crimes are committed by members of military 
groups and with State support, there seems to be a widespread belief that most of the 
physical acts constituting the underlying offences to the international crimes have been 
explicitly ordered by superiors and that low-level actors “just follow orders”. Even though 
this presumption has been challenged,1110 there are obviously situations were superiors 
explicitly order their subordinates to commit crimes or to engage in activity aware of the 
1101 E.g., Kordić & Čerkez, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 17 December 2004, paras 29 and 31, and Gatete, 
Judgement, TC, ICTR, 31 March 2011, para. 573.
1102 E.g., Blaškić, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 3 March 2000, para. 279.
1103 E.g., Akayesu, Judgement, TC, ICTR, 2 September 1998, para. 480, and Blaškić, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 
3 March 2000, para. 279.  
1104 E.g., Kordić & Čerkez, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 26 February 2001, para. 386. 
1105 E.g., Stakić, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 31 July 2003, para. 443, and Ndindabahizi, Judgement, AC, ICTR, 
16 January 2007, para. 122. 
1106 Kanyarukiga, Judgement, AC, ICTR, 8 May 2012, para. 258.
1107 E.g., Kordić & Čerkez, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 17 December 2004, para. 26, and Limaj et al., Judgement, 
TC, ICTY, 30 November 2005, para. 513. See, however, Cassese who argues that planning of international 
crimes as such should be criminal. Cassese 2008, at 226. See also Mettraux who notes that planning in a 
number of domestic legal systems in an inchoate crime. Mettraux 2005, at 280. 
1108 Kordić & Čerkez, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 17 December 2004, para. 26. See also e.g., Akayesu, Judgement, 
TC, ICTR, 2 September 1998, para. 473, and Gatete, Judgement, TC, ICTR, 31 March 2011, para. 573. 
1109 See also Ngudjolo, Judgment (conc. op. of Judge Van den Wyngaert), TC, ICC, 18 December 2012, 
para. 15.
1110 See further Chapter 3. 
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substantial likelihood that a crime will be committed in the realization of that activity. 
The statutes of all modern international criminal tribunals explicitly recognize ordering 
as a possible participation mode in the international crimes.1111
In situations of ordering, there has to be a person who has the ability to give orders, 
that is, ordering presupposes a hierarchical relationship between the superior and the 
subordinate. The ad hoc tribunals have in their case law defined ordering as using a 
position of authority to issue an order to engage in criminal conduct with the intent 
that a crime be committed or an order to engage in an act or omission aware of the 
substantial likelihood that a crime will be committed in the realization of that act or 
omission.1112 This position of authority needs not have been formalized and may only last 
for as long as it takes for the order to be given and obeyed.1113 The authority of the person 
ordering may be informal and temporary, but this requirement of authority or a “vertical 
relationship” still distinguishes ordering from most other participation forms, which can 
occur between equals.1114 The order may have been given in any form and it may be 
implicit or explicit. The existence of the order may be established circumstantially.1115 
This is important, as many others are given verbally and in the presence of only a limited 
group of persons. 
Also in relation to ordering it has been asked whether ordering an international 
crime is an inchoate crime, that is, whether the order must be acted upon or not.1116 The 
ICC Statute explicitly requires that the ordered crime must have occurred or at least has 
been attempted.1117 Also the case law of the ad hoc tribunals establishes that the liability for 
ordering is not inchoate. For example, in the Kamuhanda Appeal Judgement, the ICTR 
1111 Article 25(3)(b), ICC Statute, Article 7(1), ICTY Statute, and Article 6(1), ICTR Statute.
1112 E.g., Kordić & Čerkez, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 17 December 2004, paras 28-30, Galić, Judgement, AC, 
ICTY, 30 November 2006, paras 152 and 176, and Semanza, Judgement, AC, ICTR, 20 May 2005, para. 361. 
Boas, Bischoff and Reid note that “although some trial jurisprudence states that the accused must use his 
position of authority to ‘convince’, ‘persuade’, ‘impel’, or ‘compel’ the person ordered to engage in criminal 
conduct, several other judgements [....] hold simply that the accused must use his position of authority 
in issuing the order or instruction [...].” G. Boas, J. L. Bischoff & N. L. Reid, International Criminal Law 
Practitioner Library, Volume 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 365. In the case law, it has 
been stressed that ordering, in contrast to some other modes of responsibility, always requires a “positive 
action”. See e.g., Bagosora & Nsengiyumva, Judgement, AC, ICTR, 14 December 2011, para. 277, and Galić, 
Judgement, AC, ICTY, 30 November 2006, para. 176.
1113 See e.g., Kordić & Čerkez, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 17 December 2004, para. 28, and Gacumbitsi, 
Judgement, AC, ICTR, 7 July 2006, para. 181. The ad hoc tribunals’ case law on this has, however, not 
always been consistent. After the Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgement, it has, however, been established 
that a formal superior-subordinate relationship between the accused and the perpetrator is not required. 
See further e.g., Mettraux 2005, at 282, and Boas, Bischoff & Reid 2007, at 367-368. 
1114 Eser 2002, at 796. The Gacumbitsi Appeals Chamber expressed this by noting that ordering does not 
demand a superior-subordinate relationship, but “authority to order, a more subjective criterion that 
depends on the circumstances and the perceptions of the listener.” Gacumbitsi, Judgement, AC, ICTR, 7 
July 2006, para. 182. See also Setako, Judgement, AC, ICTR, 28 September 2011, para.  240 (“It is sufficient 
that there is proof of a position of authority on the part of the accused that would compel another person 
to commit a crime.”)  
1115 E.g., Blaškić, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 3 March 2000, para. 281, and Hategekimana, Judgement, AC, 
ICTR, 8 May 2012, para. 67. 
1116 Mettraux 2005, at 283.
1117 Article 25(3)(b), ICC Statute. 
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held that the “order [must] have a direct and substantial effect on the commission of the 
illegal act”.1118 In the Brđanin case before the ICTY, the Trial Chamber explicitly required 
that the crime in question had actually been committed by the principal offender(s).1119 
7.2.3.4.  Soliciting, Inducing and Instigating
According to the statutes of the ad hoc tribunals, instigating is a further mode of 
participation in international crimes.1120 The ICC Statute likewise stipulates that soliciting 
and inducing is criminal.1121 The three concepts of instigating, soliciting and inducing 
have in legal commentaries been given somewhat varying definitions.1122 All three 
concepts, however, refer to similar behaviour and it is therefore difficult to establish a clear 
difference between them. The common denominator in these modes of participation is 
that someone prompts another to engage in criminal conduct (or to some other conduct 
aware of the substantial likelihood that a crime will be committed in the realization of 
that conduct).1123 In the same way as, for example, those ordering a crime, the instigators, 
solicitors and inducers must set in motion a chain of events that eventually leads to the 
commission of a crime. In this regard, instigating differs from the inchoate crime of 
“direct and public incitement to commit genocide”.1124  
Soliciting, inducing and instigating are suitable “labels” in situations where a 
person has influenced another to commit a crime, but where it cannot be argued that the 
influencing person is able to give orders and/or that the person has been giving orders. 
These participation modes do thus not require any vertical relationship between the 
actors, but may take place between peers horizontally. It has, however, been noted that 
in reality “the exertion of influence would hardly function without a certain capability 
to impress others”.1125 The prompting must namely affect the physical perpetrator, even 
though it is not necessary to prove that the crime would have not been perpetrated 
without the prompting.1126 If it can be argued that the physical perpetrator had “definitely 
decided to commit the crime” already before the accused person tried to influence him/
her, the encouragement is more suitably labelled aiding and abetting.1127 
1118 Kamuhanda, Judgement, AC, ICTR, 19 September 2005, para. 75.
1119 Brđanin, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 1 September 2004, para. 267. Some legal scholars have, however, 
argued that in customary international law there does not seem to be a requirement that the order is 
executed. See e.g., Cassese 2008, at 230, and Mettraux 2005, at 283.
1120 Article 7(1), ICTY Statute, and Article 6(1), ICTR Statute.
1121 Article 25(3)(b), ICC Statute.
1122 E.g., soliciting has been defined as “urging, advising, commanding, or otherwise inciting another to 
commit a crime”, inducing as an “act or process of enticing or persuading another person to take a certain 
course of action” and instigation as goading or inciting (someone) to take some action or course. Black’s 
Law Dictionary, 9th ed. (2009) (‘inducement’ and ‘solicitation’).
1123 See e.g., Kordić & Čerkez, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 17 December 2004, paras 27 and 29. 
1124 On direct and public incitement to commit genocide, see further e.g., Muvunyi, Judgement, TC, ICTR, 11 
February 2010, paras 23-28, and Ruggiu, Judgement, TC, ICTR, 1 June 2000, para. 14. See also e.g., D. C. M. 
Byron, ‘Hate Speech and the Rwanda Genocide: ICTR Jurisprudence and Its Implications’, in C. Eboe-Osuji 
(ed.), Protecting Humanity − Essays in International Law and Policy in Honour of Navanethem Pillay (Leiden: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2010), at 53 ff. Inchoate crimes are not considered in detail in this study.  
1125 Orić, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 30 June 2006, para. 272. 
1126 Kordić & Čerkez, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 17 December 2004, para. 27. See also e.g., Gatete, Judgement, 
TC, ICTR, 31 March 2011, para. 574.
1127 Orić, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 30 June 2006, paras 271 and 281. 
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In the Mpambara case before the ICTR, it is held that instigation should take place 
“verbally or by other means of communication.”1128 The case law of the ICTY, however, 
suggests that instigation can take many different forms. For example, in the Orić case, it 
was put forward that: 
Instigation can be performed by any means, both by express or implied conduct, as 
well as by acts or omissions, provided that, in the latter case, the instigator is under 
a duty to prevent the crime from being brought about. As regards the way in which 
the perpetrator is influenced, different from ‘incitement’ to commit genocide [...] 
instigation to the crimes included in the Statute needs neither be direct and public 
nor require the instigator’s presence at the scene of the crime. Thus, instigating 
influence can be generated both face to face and by intermediaries as well as exerted 
over a smaller or larger audience, provided that the instigator has the corresponding 
intent.1129
In most real-life situations, the influence is of psychological nature, but Ambos notes that 
it may also include physical pressure in the sense of vis compulsiva.1130 
In the case law, it has been stressed that in contrast to direct and public incitement 
to commit genocide, instigation is a form of accomplice liability, that is, there must 
be a principal perpetrator who has committed (or at least attempted) the instigated 
crime.1131 An instigator must act intentionally, that is, intend to provoke or induce the 
commission of a crime or must at least be aware of the substantial likelihood that the 
commission of the crime would be a probable consequence of his/her acts.1132 Where 
the crime instigated is a specific intent crime, the instigator must also act with the 
specific intent.1133  
7.2.4.  Participation Forms Focusing on the Relationship between the Crime 
Participants 
7.2.4.1. Introduction
While planning, ordering, soliciting, inducing and instigating are participation modes 
that imply that the person in question has played his/her role primarily before the 
physical act constituting the crime takes place, there are other participation modes that 
1128 Mpambara, Judgement, TC, ICTR, 11 September 2006, para. 18.
1129 Orić, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 30 June 2006, para. 273. Timmermann has observed that public incitement 
is different from private incitement in that public incitement often contributes to the creation of an 
atmosphere of hatred and xenophobia, and such hatred is therefore especially dangerous. Timmermann 
2006, at 825.  
1130 Ambos 2008(a), at 756. In situations of vis absoluta a person is completely excluded from exercising his 
or her will, whereas in situations of vis compulsiva there is some freedom to decide.
1131 E.g., Kordić & Čerkez, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 17 December 2004, para. 27, and Article 25(3)(b), ICC 
Statute.
1132 E.g., Kvočka et al., Judgement, TC, ICTY, 2 November 2001, para. 252, Naletilić & Martinović, 
Judgement, TC, ICTY, 31 March 2003, para. 60, and Nchamihigo, Judgement, AC, ICTR, 18 March 2010, 
para. 61. 
1133 Nchamihigo, Judgement, AC, ICTR, 18 March 2010, para. 61. 
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do not in the same way emphasize the temporal aspect of the participation.1134 Such 
participation modes are aiding and abetting, participation in a joint criminal enterprise 
and other forms of commission responsibility. In these participation modes, the focus is 
instead placed on the type of relationship between the participants in crime.   
7.2.4.2.  Aiding, Abetting or Otherwise Assisting
The aiding and abetting in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime (ad 
hoc tribunals) or the aiding, abetting or otherwise assisting in the commission or 
attempted commission of a crime (ICC) has been declared criminal in the statutes of 
the international criminal tribunals.1135 It has been argued that the ad hoc tribunals have 
interpreted this responsibility mode “exceedingly broad” and that individuals therefore 
have been convicted based on this responsibility mode in relation to a “wide variety of 
participatory conduct in the perpetration of crimes by others.”1136 From a prosecutorial 
perspective, the attraction to claim this mode of participation is, however, reduced by the 
fact that aiding and abetting has been declared a “less grave mode of participation.”1137 
The label of aiding and abetting is hence not suitable if one wants to make the argument 
that an individual has played a central role in relation to the criminality. 
It should also be observed that the statutes of the ICTY and the ICTR also contain 
a provision on complicity in genocide.1138 Even though the Krstić Appeal Judgement 
suggests that complicity in genocide could encompass broader conduct than aiding and 
abetting genocide,1139 in practice, the ad hoc tribunals have not clearly distinguished 
complicity in genocide from aiding and abetting genocide.1140
In the ad hoc tribunal case law, the terms “aiding” and “abetting” have sometimes 
been given separate definitions, but today “aiding and abetting” is generally regarded as 
a singular legal concept.1141 For responsibility under this heading to arise, the following 
conditions must be met: (1) the aider and abettor must lend practical assistance, 
encouragement or moral support to the perpetrator of the crime; (2) the assistance or 
support has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime, but need not be causal 
to the act of the physical perpetrator; and (3) the aider and abettor acted intentionally 
with knowledge or awareness that his/her act would lend assistance, encouragement or 
moral support to the perpetrator.1142 Very significantly, the aider and abettor does thus 
1134 Jessberger and Geneuss, e.g., in line with this note that when a person orders or induces a crime, he/
she does not have to have control over the commission of the crime. F. Jessberger & J. Geneuss, ‘On the 
Application of a Theory of Indirect Perpetration in Al Bashir – German Doctrine at the Hague?,’ 6 Journal 
of International Criminal Justice (2008), at 865.  
1135 Article 7(1), ICTY Statute, Article 6(1), ICTR Statute, and Article 25(3)(c), ICC Statute. 
1136 Boas, Bischoff & Reid 2007, at 301.
1137 Orić, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 30 June 2006, para. 281. 
1138 Article 4(3)(e), ICTY Statute, and Article 2(3)(e), ICTR Statute. 
1139 Krštić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 19 April 2004, para. 139. 
1140 See further e.g., Dawson & Boynton 2008. 
1141 See e.g., Akayesu, Judgement, TC, ICTR, 2 September 1998, para. 484, Blagojević & Jokić, Judgement, 
AC, ICTY, 9 May 2007, paras 182-200, Kvočka et al., Judgement, TC, ICTY, 2 November 2001, para. 254, 
Ntakirutimana & Ntakirutimana, Judgement, TC, ICTR, 21 February 2003, para. 787, and Orić, Judgement, 
TC, ICTY, 30 June 2006, para. 280. See also Boas, Bischoff & Reid 2007, at 307, and Mettraux 2005, at 284.
1142 E.g., Furundžija, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 10 December 1998, paras 235 and 249, Gacumbitsi, Judgement, 
AC, ICTR, 7 July 2006, para. 140, and Vasiljević, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 25 February 2004, para. 102. 
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not have to share the intent of the physical perpetrator.1143 This is especially significant 
in relation to specific intent crimes, such as genocide and persecution.1144 The aider and 
abettor must, however, have knowledge of principal perpetrator’s specific intent.1145
Even though the acts of the aidor and abettor are connected to the acts of the physical 
perpetrator, the physical perpetrator does not have to be tried or even identified.1146 It is 
enough that the commission of the crime is proven. The case law of the ad hoc tribunals 
has, however, been unsettled in relation to whether it has to be proven that the aider 
and abettor acted with the knowledge that he/she aided and abetted a specific crime or 
whether it is enough to prove that he/she aided and abetted the commission of a crime.1147 
In the Perišić Appeal Judgement, the ICTY recently by majority held that the “specific 
direction remains an element of the actus reus of aiding and abetting liability.”1148 In the 
Stanišić and Simatović Trial Judgement, the Trial Chamber interpreted the Perišić finding 
to mean that even though specific direction generally may be considered both explicitly 
and implicitly, it “must be analyzed explicitly in cases where the person is remote from 
the crimes he or she is alleged to have aided and abetted.”1149 This new focus on the 
specific direction has been criticized by a number of scholars.1150 For example, Milanović 
has found that it entails that: “it will be practically impossible to convict under aiding 
and abetting any political or military leader external to a conflict who is assisting one 
of the parties even while knowing that they are engaging in mass atrocities, so long 
as that leader is remote from the actual operations and is not so thoroughly stupid to 
leave a smoking gun behind him.”1151 The ICC Statute also provides for aider and abettor 
responsibility in relation to attempted commissions of crimes.1152
The aiding and abetting may take place at the planning, preparation or execution 
stages of the crime.1153 In aiding and abetting, the focus is therefore not on the temporal 
aspect of the participation. Instead, aiding and abetting could be said to be characterized 
by its requirement of substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime. Cryer et al., 
1143 E.g., Aleksovski, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 24 March 2000, para. 162. 
1144 E.g., Krnjolelac, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 17 September 2003, para. 52, and Krštić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 
19 April 2004, para. 140.   
1145 See e.g., Kalimanzira, Judgement, AC, ICTR, 20 October 2010, para. 86, Krnojelac, Judgement, AC, 
ICTY, 17 September 2003, para. 52, and Ntakirutimana & Ntakirutimana, Judgement, AC, ICTR, 13 
December 2004, paras 500-501.
1146 E.g., Stakić, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 31 July 2003, para. 533. 
1147 Boas, Bischoff & Reid 2007, at 321-324. See also e.g., Brđanin, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 1 September 
2004, para. 273 (‘the aider and abettor must be aware of the essential elements of the crime committed by 
the principal offender’).
1148 Perišić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 28 February 2013, para. 36. 
1149 Stanišić & Simatović, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 30 May 2013, para. 1264. 
1150 See e.g., M. Milanović, ‘The Limits of Aiding and Abetting Liability: The ICTY Appeals Chamber 
Acquits Momcilo Perisic’, EJIL Talk! [blog], 11 March 2013, J. G. Stewart, ‘Guest Post: The ICTY Loses its 
Way on Complicity – Part 1’, Opinio Juris [blog], 3 April 2013, and J. G. Stewart, ‘“Specific Direction” is 
Unprecedented: Results from Two Empirical Studies’, EJIL Talk! [blog], 4 September 2013.
1151 Milanović 2013 [blog].
1152 Article 25(3)(c), ICC Statute. 
1153 Simić et al., Judgement, AC, ICTY, 28 November 2006, para. 85. The chambers of the ad hoc tribunals 
have generally been unwilling to recognize support after the physical act constituting the crime as aiding 
and abetting. E.g., Strugar, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 31 January 2005, para. 355, and Blagojević & Jokić, 
Judgement, TC, ICTY, 17 January 2005, para. 731. 
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however, observe that “this should not be taken as setting a high standard”.1154 They note 
that individuals have, for example, been convicted as aiders and abettors for preventing 
victims to escape and for providing the physical perpetrator with weapons.1155 The 
presence of a superior at the scene of the crime has furthermore been viewed as aiding 
and abetting the crime, when the presence has a significant legitimizing or encouraging 
effect on the physical perpetrators and the superior has the required mental state.1156 This 
emphasizes that in contrast to some other participation modes aiding and abetting can 
be “intangible,” that is, it can be in the form of moral support and encouragement.1157 
Taking into consideration the phenomenology of international crimes this is significant. 
Tacit support and encouragement by leaders is namely common in connection to 
international criminality. In relation to high-level actors aiding and abetting, the ICTR 
Appeals Chamber has stressed that for an individual to be convicted for abetting a crime, 
it is not necessary to prove that he had authority over the principal perpetrator.1158 The 
ICTY Appeals Chamber has also pointed out that “the fact that his or her participation 
amounted to no more than his or her “routine duties” will not exculpate the accused.”1159
It should be noted that ICC Article 25(3)(c) regulating aiding and abetting before 
the ICC introduces a mental element not required by customary international law, 
namely that the person acts for the purpose of facilitating the commission of a crime. It 
has been observed that this seems to introduce a motive element, which makes it more 
difficult to prosecute acts that “on their face, are neutral and professional acts”.1160  
7.2.4.3.  Participation in Joint Criminal Enterprises
Already at an early stage of the functioning of the ad hoc tribunals, it was recognized that the 
statutes of the tribunals do not explicitly contain a participation mode that would express 
that non-physical actors may play (or continue to play) a very central role at the crime 
execution stage of the crimes. To overcome this problem, ICTY made an investigation into 
customary international law and argued in its Tadić Appeal Judgement that participation in 
a joint criminal enterprise (JCE) was a participation form included in the statute implicitly 
1154 Cryer et al. 2010, at 375. Also Ambos has made the same evaluation in 1999. K. Ambos, ‘General 
Principles of Criminal Law in the Rome Statute’, 10 Criminal Law Forum (1999), at 11. 
1155 E.g., Cryer et al. 2010, at 375. See also Vasiljević, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 25 February 2004, para. 134, 
and Ntakirutimana & Ntakirutimana, Judgement, AC, ICTR, 13 December 2004, para. 530. 
1156 E.g., Furundžija, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 10 December 1998, para. 232, Aleksovski, Judgement, TC, 
ICTY, 25 June 1999, para. 64, and Kalimanzira, Judgement, TC, ICTR, 22 June 2009, para. 20. Boas, 
Bischoff and Reid argue that aiding and abetting by omission should not be accepted, but there should be a 
requirement that the superior has intentionally made himself available at the scene or intentionally stayed 
at the scene if already there for the express purpose of showing solidarity with the physical perpetrator or 
approval of their actions. In these situations, it may namely be argued that the aider and abettor has acted 
actively. If there only has been an omission, the individual should instead be convicted based on his/her 
possible superior responsibility. Boas, Bischoff & Reid 2007, at 313. It should be emphasized that whereas 
certain physical presence can constitute aiding and abetting, the physical presence of the aider and abettor 
at the scene of the crime is not as such a condition for aiding and abetting responsibility. Simić et al., 
Judgement, AC, ICTY, 28 November 2006, para. 85. 
1157 Cf. Ambos 2000, at 24, and Boas, Bischoff & Reid 2007, at 308. 
1158 Muhimana, Judgement, AC, ICTR, 21 May 2007, para. 189.  
1159 Blagojević & Jokić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 9 May 2007, para. 189 (see also para. 193).
1160 Cryer et al. 2010, at 377. See also Ambos 2008(a), at 760, and Eser 2002, at 801.  
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(as a form of committing).1161 This identification of customary international law has 
been challenged by numerous scholars,1162 but ICTY has reaffirmed the existence of JCE 
responsibility in several cases and it has, in fact, become the tribunal’s most important 
attribution doctrine. Subsequently, the ICTR has also applied the JCE theory. 
In the Tadić case, the ICTY besides arguing for the existence of JCE responsibility 
identified the central elements of this participation form. As regards the objective 
elements of the responsibility, the Appeals Chamber held that it must be established: 
(1) a plurality of persons; (2) the existence of a common plan, design or purpose which 
amounts to or involves the commission of a crime provided for in the statute; and (3) 
participation of the accused in the common design.1163 All three objective elements have 
been reaffirmed in numerous subsequent cases.1164
In interpreting the content of the requirement of a “plurality of persons,” the 
ICTY has established that this plurality need not be organized in a military, political or 
administrative structure.1165 In order to show that there is such a plurality of persons, 
it must simply be shown that there are two or more individuals who share a common 
purpose and who act together or in concert with each other to implement the purpose.1166 
A complicated question has been to what extent the individuals making up the plurality 
of persons should be identified. In some cases, it has been suggested that the identities of 
the other enterprise participants should if possible be clarified,1167 but such identification 
has not been aimed at in all cases.1168 The prevailing legal standard appears to be that: 
“While a Trial Chamber must identify the plurality of persons belonging to the JCE, it 
is not necessary to identify by name each of the persons involved. Depending on the 
circumstances of the case, it can be sufficient to refer to categories or groups of persons.”1169 
1161 Tadić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 15 July 1999, paras 188 and 226. 
1162 E.g., A. Marston Danner & J. S. Martinez, ‘Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command 
Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal Law’, 93 California Law Review (2005), 
at 110-112, J. D. Ohlin, ‘Three Conceptual Problems with the Doctrine of Joint Criminal Enterprise’, 5 
Journal of International Criminal Justice (2007), at 75-76, and S. Powles, ‘Joint Criminal Enterprise: 
Criminal Liability by Prosecutorial Ingenuity and Judicial Creativity?’, 2 Journal of International Criminal 
Justice (2004), at 615-617.
1163 Tadić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 15 July 1999, para. 227.
1164 E.g., Stakić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 22 March 2006, para. 64, and Vasiljević, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 25 
February 2004, para. 100.
1165 Tadić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 15 July 1999, para. 227. 
1166 Stakić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 22 March 2006, para. 69. In relation to the requirement of acting together, 
it was in the Krajišnik case noted that: “a common objective alone is not always sufficient to determine 
a group, as different and independent groups may happen to share identical objectives.” Krajišnik, 
Judgement, TC, ICTY, 27 September 2006, para. 884. The fact that also collective action is required is also 
stressed by the fact that for joint criminal enterprise responsibility convictions, a crime must in fact have 
been committed. Milutinović et al. Decision (JCE), AC, ICTY, 21 May 2003, para. 23.
1167 See e.g., Brđanin, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 1 September 2004, para. 346, Brđanin, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 
3 April 2007, para. 430, Brđanin & Talić, Decision (indictment), TC, ICTY, 20 February 2001, para. 21, 
Krajišnik, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 17 March 2009, paras 156-157, Krnojelac, Decision (indictment), TC, 
ICTY, 11 May 2000, para. 16, and Simić et al., Judgement, AC, ICTY, 28 November 2006, para. 22.
1168 V. Haan, ‘The Development of the Concept of Joint Criminal Enterprise at the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’, 5 International Criminal Law Review (2005), at 182. See also e.g., 
Krajišnik, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 27 September 2006, para. 1086. 
1169 Krajišnik, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 17 March 2009, para. 156.
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It is also important to note that the ICTY Brđanin Appeals Chamber has argued 
that “what matters [...] is not whether the person who carried out the actus reus of a 
particular crime is a member of the JCE, but whether the crime in question forms part 
of the common purpose.”1170 The physical actor does thus not have to be a member of the 
enterprise and may hence be used as a “tool” by the JCE members. In these cases, it has 
to be shown that the crime can be imputed to one member of the enterprise, and that this 
member – when using a principal perpetrator – acted in accordance with the common 
plan.1171 Wirth has argued that this “enables international criminal law to address 
situations where the members of a (relatively small) “leadership” JCE use non-members 
to carry out the actual crimes.”1172 The Brđanin Appeal Judgement has, however, by others 
been criticized for not answering exactly how the relevant physical perpetrator in these 
situations should be linked to the defendant (or the enterprise).1173 In the Krajišnik case, 
it was, however, with reference to the Brđanin Appeal Judgement clarified that:
The establishment of a link between the crime in question and a member of the 
JCE is a matter to be assessed on a case-by-case basis. Factors indicative of such 
a link include evidence that the JCE member explicitly or implicitly requested the 
non-JCE member to commit such a crime or instigated, ordered, encouraged, or 
otherwise availed himself of the non-JCE member to commit the crime. However, 
it is not determinative whether the non-JCE member shared the mens rea of the JCE 
member or that he knew of the existence of the JCE; what matters in JCE Category 1 
is whether the JCE member used the non-JCE member to commit the actus reus of 
the crime forming part of the common purpose.1174
In JCE responsibility, the most central objective element is the common plan, design 
or purpose (hereinafter “common plan”), which knits together the different actors in 
the crime. In the case law, it has been established that this common plan does not have 
to be previously arranged or formulated.1175 It may materialize extemporaneously and 
be inferred from the fact that a plurality of persons acts in unison to put into effect 
a JCE.1176 In some cases, the question has been raised whether the arrangement or 
understanding has to amount to an agreement, or more specifically, an express agreement 
to commit a specific crime. Some ICTY trial judgements suggest the existence of such a 
1170 Brđanin, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 3 April 2007, para. 410. Earlier ICTY case law, however, seems to 
establish that, in the basic form of enterprises, the accused person and the physical perpetrator must share 
the same criminal intent. E.g., Krnjolelac, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 17 September 2003, paras 83-84, Tadić, 
Judgement, AC, ICTY, 15 July 1999, para. 220, and Vasiljević, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 29 November 2002, 
paras 64 and 68.
1171 Brđanin, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 3 April 2007, para. 413. See also Krajišnik, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 17 
March 2009, paras 225-226. 
1172 S. Wirth, ‘Committing Liability in International Criminal Law’, C. Stahn & G. Sluiter (eds.), The 
Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009), at 334. 
1173 J. D. Ohlin, ‘Second-Order Linking Principles: Combining Vertical and Horizontal Modes of Liability’, 
25 Leiden Journal of International Law (2012), at 774. Ohlin elaborates on the possibility of arguing that 
there are subsidiary or interlinked JCEs. Ibid., at 775-776. See also C. Farhang, ‘Point of No Return: Joint 
Criminal Enterprise in Brdanin’, 23 Leiden Journal of International Law (2010), at 152 ff.  
1174 Krajišnik, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 17 March 2009, para. 226.
1175 Tadić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 15 July 1999, para. 227.
1176 Tadić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 15 July 1999, para. 227.
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requirement,1177 but the Appeals Chamber has explicitly rejected it.1178 The ICTY Appeals 
Chamber has emphasized that the common plan may evolve and change over time.1179 
If the common purpose alters, a Chamber must, however, make a finding “when the 
expanded crimes became incorporated into the common objective”.1180
When enterprise responsibility is argued, a central question is therefore how the 
common plan is defined, that is, which crimes form part of the enterprise and which 
do not. In the case law, not many requirements on the common plan have been settled. 
In fact, only two requirements have so far been identified, namely that the common 
plan must amount to or involve the commission of a crime1181 and that the definition of 
common plan should be strict.1182 In many cases before the ICTY, the common plan has 
been defined in terms of persecution and/or forcible transfer of certain segments of the 
population in/from a certain region1183 or the running of camps in which atrocities have 
been committed,1184 that is, the common plan has been wider than a single international 
crime.1185 In the legal doctrine, it has been dreaded that enterprises would be defined even 
broader, for example, in terms of nation-wide genocidal campaigns.1186 Such definitions 
of common plan namely entail that numerous individuals and numerous crimes become 
part of the enterprise, which has been seen to increase the risk of guilt by association. 
In situations of large-scale enterprises, it is also often possible to identify numerous sub-
enterprises (for example, concentration camps), which raises the complicated question 
about the relationship between various enterprises.1187 Despite the concerns raised, 
1177 Most notably, Brđanin, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 1 September 2004, paras 344 and 347. See also e.g., 
Krnjolelac, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 15 March 2002, para. 80, and Vasiljević, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 29 
November 2002, paras 66 and 208.
1178 Brđanin, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 3 April 2007, para. 418, Krnjolelac, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 17 September 
2003, paras 96-97 (regarding the systematic form of enterprises), and Kvočka et al., Judgement, AC, ICTY, 
28 February 2005, para. 118. The express agreement requirement has also been criticized by legal scholars. 
E.g., K. Gustafson, ‘The Requirement of an ‘Express Agreement’ for Joint Criminal Enterprise Liability − A 
Critique of Brđanin’, 5 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2007), at 134 and 145.
1179 Krajišnik, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 17 March 2009, para. 163. 
1180 Krajišnik, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 17 March 2009, para. 171.
1181 Tadić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 15 July 1999, para. 227. In the Martić case, the Trial Chamber noted that: 
“[...] The Trial Chamber considers that [..., the] objective [...] to unite with other ethnically similar areas, in 
and of itself does not amount to a common purpose within the meaning of the law on JCE [...]. However, 
where the creation of such territories is intended to be implemented through the commission of crimes 
within the Statute this may be sufficient to amount to a common criminal purpose.” Martić, Judgement, 
TC, ICTY, 12 June 2007, para. 442.
1182 Krnjolelac, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 17 September 2003, para. 116. More concretely, the chambers should 
specify the common criminal purpose in terms of both the criminal goal intended and its scope, that is, 
e.g., the temporal and geographic limits of this goal, and the general identities of the intended victims. 
E.g., Brđanin, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 3 April 2007, para. 430, and Simić et al., Judgement, AC, ICTY, 28 
November 2006, para. 22.
1183 E.g., Martić, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 12 June 2007, para. 442, Simić et al., Judgement, TC, ICTY, 17 
October 2003, paras 984 and 987, Stakić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 22 March 2006, paras 73 and 78, and Tadić, 
Judgement, AC, ICTY, 15 July 1999, para. 230. 
1184 E.g., Kvočka et al., Judgement, TC, ICTY, 2 November 2001, para. 319. 
1185 Cf. Haan 2005, at 181. 
1186 E.g., Marston Danner & Martinez 2005, at 134-135, and E. van Sliedregt, ‘Joint Criminal Enterprise as a 
Pathway to Convicting Individuals for Genocide’, 5 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2007), at 200. 
1187 Cf. Kvočka et al., Judgement, TC, ICTY, 2 November 2001, para. 307.
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the ad hoc tribunals have not wanted to limit enterprises responsibility to small-scale 
enterprises only.1188 This approach has been justified with the additional requirement of 
participation, which has been seen to take away the risk of guilt by association.1189 
Thirdly, JCE responsibility demands participation of the accused in the common 
purpose.1190 According to the case law, this participation need not involve commission of 
a specific crime, but may take the form of assistance in, or contribution to, the execution 
of the common plan.1191 The required degree of participation is somewhat unsettled in 
the case law of the tribunals. The ICTY Appeals Chamber has noted that not every type 
of conduct would amount to a significant enough contribution,1192 but it has not wanted 
to uphold the suggested requirement of substantial contribution.1193 It is, however, clear 
that there are no requirements that participant in the enterprise physically commits any 
of the crime elements,1194 that the participation amounts to a conditio sine qua non for 
the crime commission,1195 nor that the accused is present in the JCE at the time the crime 
is committed by the physical actor.1196 In relation to the requirement of participation, it 
should furthermore be noted that ICTY has been criticized for sometimes conflating 
personal conduct with organizational role, function or position. In this connection, 
Ambos has argued that: “Culpability implies personal conduct, which finds expression 
in individual contributions to the enterprise, contributions that do not necessarily 
correspond to the function assigned to the accused in the enterprise.”1197 That the ICTY, 
especially in the systemic cases of enterprise responsibility, sometimes has given much 
attention to the accused person’s position of employment is exemplified by the Kvočka 
1188 E.g., Brđanin, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 3 April 2007, para. 424, and Krajišnik, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 27 
September 2006, para. 876. The Brđanin Trial Chamber, however, wanted to limit enterprise responsibility 
only to smaller enterprises. Brđanin, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 1 September 2004, para. 355.
1189 Brđanin, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 3 April 2007, para. 424.
1190 Tadić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 15 July 1999, para. 227.
1191 Tadić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 15 July 1999, para. 227. In the Kanyarukiga case before the ICTR, it was 
questioned whether a JCE participant must take part in the execution of the common plan or purpose, 
or whether also planning can constitute significant participation. Most AC Judges did not consider this 
question at all, but Judge Pocar held that also “planning a crime may amount to a significant contribution 
to the execution of the common purpose”. Kanyarukiga, Judgement (sep. op. of Judge Pocar), AC, ICTR, 
8 May 2012, para. 4.
1192 Brđanin, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 3 April 2007, para. 427. E.g., mere membership is not “participation” 
enough. E.g., Brđanin, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 1 September 2004, para. 263. The ICTR has suggested 
that also omissions can constitute participation: “Involvement in a joint criminal enterprise may also be 
proven by evidence characterized as an omission. The objective element of participation is satisfied as 
long as the accused has “committed an act or an omission which contributes to the common criminal 
purpose”. Although it is hard to imagine that total passivity could demonstrate the requisite intent for co-
perpetratorship, an omission in combination with positive acts might have great significance.” Mpambara, 
Judgement, TC, ICTR, 11 September 2006, para. 24.
1193 E.g., Brđanin, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 3 April 2007, para. 430, Krajišnik, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 17 
March 2009, para. 215, and Kvočka et al. Judgement, AC ICTY, 28 February 2005, paras 97, 104 and 187.
1194 E.g., Brđanin, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 3 April 2007, para. 427, Krnojelac, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 17 
September 2003, para. 81, and Kvočka et al. Judgement, AC, ICTY, 28 February 2005, para. 99.
1195 Kvočka et al., Judgement, AC, ICTY, 28 February 2005, para. 98.
1196 Krnjolelac, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 17 September 2003, para. 81.
1197 K. Ambos, ‘Joint Criminal Enterprise and Command Responsibility’, 5 Journal of International Criminal 
Justice (2007), at 173-174. 
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case, where the Appeals Chamber held that: “A position of authority [...] may be relevant 
evidence for establishing the accused’s awareness of the system, his participation in 
enforcing or perpetuating the common criminal purpose of the system, and, eventually, 
for evaluating his level of participation for sentencing purposes.”1198
Besides the objective elements, JCE responsibility demands that certain mental 
elements are present. In this regard, the international case law has differentiated between 
three different JCE forms with different mens rea requirements.1199 Of these three, the 
basic form of JCE (JCE I) is characterized by the shared intent of the participants to 
advance the goal of the enterprise, that is, to commit the commonly intended crimes.1200 
There may be a division of labour between the different participants, but they all intend 
the same result. In civil law legal systems, this type of participation is often characterized 
as co-perpetration.1201 The shared intent is often inferred from knowledge of the 
common plan and participation in its advancement.1202 This inference must be “the 
only reasonable inference on the evidence.”1203 The shared intent does not require the 
participant’s personal satisfaction or enthusiasm or his personal initiative in contributing 
to the enterprise.1204
The second form of enterprise responsibility is often called the systemic form (JCE 
II) and in this JCE form it must be established the personal knowledge of the nature of 
the system of ill-treatment and intent to further the system (common plan).1205 In cases 
concerning the systemic form of enterprise responsibility, the existence of a system of ill-
treatment, such as, a detention or prison camp in which atrocities are committed, must 
first be proven.1206 Only after this, can the accused person’s knowledge of the system and 
intent to further it be established. The knowledge may be proven by direct evidence or 
1198 Kvočka et al., Judgement, AC, ICTY, 28 February 2005, para. 101.
1199 Tadić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 15 July 1999, para. 228. See also e.g., Stakić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 22 
March 2006, para. 65. 
1200 Tadić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 15 July 1999, paras 220 and 228. In the Brđanin case, the Appeals 
Chamber noted that the criminal purpose should not merely be the same, but common to all of the 
persons acting together within the enterprise. Brđanin, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 3 April 2007, para. 430. In 
some cases, the ICTY has not made a clear distinction between crimes that are intended (shared intent) 
and part of the enterprise, and crimes that are not intended by all enterprise participants and which 
thus are not part of the enterprise. E.g., in the Babić case, the Appeals Chamber makes the following 
point: “Under these circumstances, the Trial Chamber was right to imply that the Appellant’s guilt is not 
“lessened by the fact that he did not intend the commission of the murders as such but was merely aware 
that murders were being committed as part of the [joint criminal enterprise, ...].” Babić, Judgement 
(sentencing), AC, ICTY, 18 July 2005, para. 28. In the Krajišnik case, it was suggested that JCE I requires 
“a consensus or shared understanding amounting to a psychological causal nexus.” The existence of 
such a requirement was, however, rejected by the Appeals Chamber. Krajišnik, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 
17 March 2009, para. 185. 
1201 Ambos 2007(a), at 170-171. Eser notes in this regard, that ICTY has adopted a wide notion of co-
perpetration. Eser 2002, at 791.
1202 Kvočka et al., Judgement, TC, ICTY 2 November 2001, para. 271.
1203 Brđanin, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 3 April 2007, para. 429.
1204 E.g., Krnjolelac, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 17 September 2003, para. 100, and Kvočka et al., Judgement, 
AC, ICTY, 28 February 2005, para. 106.
1205 Tadić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 15 July 1999, para. 220.
1206 Stakić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 22 March 2006, para. 65.
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be inferred from the accused person’s position of authority or duties in the system.1207 
Especially when the duties have been performed during a longer period of time, may the 
knowledge be inferred from the participation.1208 Also the intent may be inferred from 
such indicia.1209 
Finally, in the extended form of JCE responsibility (JCE III) a person is held 
responsible for crimes that go beyond the common plan, but which are its natural and 
foreseeable consequences. More specifically, this enterprise responsibility form requires: 
(a) the intention to take part in a JCE and to further the criminal plan of that enterprise; 
and (b) the foreseeability of the possible commission by other members of the group of 
offences that do not constitute the object of the common criminal plan.1210 Furthermore, 
the Appeals Chamber in the Tadić case argued that what is required is a state of mind in 
which a person, although he did not intend to bring about a certain result, was aware that 
the actions of the group were most likely to lead to that result but nevertheless willingly 
took that risk.1211 This mental state is in many legal systems called either dolus eventualis 
or advertent recklessness.1212 In the Kvočka et al. case, the Appeals Chamber emphasized 
that it is the accused person’s knowledge that is central, that is, what was natural and 
foreseeable to this person. More specifically, the Appeals Chamber held that: 
[...] participation in a systemic joint criminal enterprise does not necessarily entail 
criminal responsibility for all crimes which, though not within the common purpose 
of the enterprise, were a natural or foreseeable consequence of the enterprise. A 
participant may be responsible for such crimes only if the Prosecution proves that 
the accused had sufficient knowledge such that the additional crimes were a natural 
and foreseeable consequence to him. 1213
This mixture of knowledge/awareness and foreseeability required for extended enterprise 
responsibility has been criticized by Ambos who points out that: 
Either an accused knows that a certain result will occur or this result is foreseeable 
to him; both at once are logically impossible. In fact, knowledge is a standard for 
intent crimes [...], while foreseeability belongs to the theories of recklessness or 
negligence. The only way out of this impasse is to construe foreseeability as an 
objective requirement (in the sense of a reasonable man standard), leaving the 
knowledge standard as the (only) subjective or mental requirement of liability. [...] As 
a consequence, JCE III responsibility presupposes, first, the objective foreseeability of 
1207 Tadić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 15 July 1999, para. 228. See also e.g., Stakić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 22 
March 2006, para. 65.
1208 Krnjolelac, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 17 September 2003, para. 111.
1209 Tadić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 15 July 1999, para. 203.
1210 Tadić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 15 July 1999, paras 206, 220 and 228.
1211 Tadić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 15 July 1999, paras 220 and 228.
1212 Tadić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 15 July 1999, para. 220. Here, it should be noted that Fletcher and Ohlin 
argue that there is a difference between dolus eventualis and recklessness. They argue that recklessness 
focuses on the risk that the perpetrator is willing to take, whereas dolus eventualis is about the attitude 
of the actor. The punishable attitude is one of approval and identification with the evil result. Fletcher & 
Ohlin 2005, at 554.
1213 Kvočka et al., Judgement, AC, ICTY, 28 February 2005, para. 86. Likewise e.g., Limaj et al., Judgement, 
TC, ICTY, 30 November 2005, para. 512.
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crimes that went beyond the object of the enterprise [...] and, second, the knowledge 
of the concrete participant with regard to this (objective) foreseeability. 1214
This lower mental state requirement for the secondary crimes has been justified with 
the fact that in this form of responsibility, the actor already possesses the intent to 
participate and further the common criminal plan of a group.1215 In relation to specific 
intent crimes, the ICTY has held that JCE III responsibility does not demand that the 
prosecuted person shares the specific intent of the crime in question.1216 This finding 
has been strongly criticized in academia. It has, inter alia, been submitted that JCE III 
responsibility reflects a general legal hostility towards criminal enterprises due to the 
increased risk of injury they give rise to.1217 
7.2.4.4.  Shortly on the Criticism Directed towards the JCE Doctrine 
It has been noted that it is ironic that “the most complex and conceptually challenging 
liability theory in international criminal law is the only one not mentioned explicitly 
in the statutes”.1218 Enterprise responsibility is indeed a complicated attribution theory 
that has raised a vivid discussion among legal scholars. As this discussion is central to 
the topic of this study, the debate surrounding enterprise responsibility will be briefly 
summarized here and the points raised will be analyzed in greater detail in the analysis 
section following the discussion on the lex lata. 
Enterprise responsibility has first and foremost been criticized for casting a too wide 
net of criminal responsibility and hence for conflicting with the principle of individual 
responsibility.1219 This criticism can generally be categorized into two sub-groups. First, 
some think that the enterprises can be defined too broadly, which results in numerous 
individuals and crimes being part of the enterprises. Second, some think that the level of 
participation required is too low, which also results in too many enterprise participants. 
As noted, the enterprise size affects both which individuals and which crimes come 
within the ambit of the enterprise. For most scholars, the use of the enterprise doctrine to 
1214 Ambos 2007(a), at 175. See also Krajišnik, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 27 September 2006, para. 882. Also 
Cassese notes that the foreseeability standard is an objective one (what a person ought to have foreseen/
reasonable man standard), and not a subjective one (what the person actually foresaw). A. Cassese, ‘The 
Proper Limits of Individual Responsibility under the Doctrine of Joint Criminal Enterprise,’ 5 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice (2007), at 122-123. See also W. A. Schabas, ‘Mens Rea and the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,’ 37 New England Law Review (2003), at 1033. In an appeal 
decision, the ICTR, however, seems to suggest a subjective test. Karemera et al., Decision (JCE), AC, ICTR, 
12 April 2006, para. 17 (‘In certain circumstances, crimes committed by other participants in a large-scale 
enterprise will not be foreseeable to an accused’.)
1215 Blaškić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 29 July 2004, para. 33. See also Babić, Judgement (sentencing), AC, 
ICTY, 18 July 2005, para. 27. 
1216 E.g., Stakić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 22 March 2006, para. 38, and Popović et al., Judgement, TC, ICTY, 
10 June 2010, paras 1195 and 1332. See, however, the opposite view in Ayyash et al., Decision (applicable 
law), AC, STL, 16 February 2011, para. 249, and Taylor, Judgement, TC, SCSL, 18 May 2012, para. 468.  
1217 D. L. Nersessian, ‘Whoops, I Committed Genocide! The Anomaly of Constructive Liability for Serious 
International Crimes,’ Fletcher Forum of World Affairs (2006), at 86-87. 
1218 Marston Danner & Martinez 2005, at 103. 
1219 E.g., Darcy, who characterizes enterprise responsibility as a “nuanced form of guilt by association”. S. 
Darcy, ‘Imputed Criminal Liability and the Goals of International Justice’, 20 Leiden Journal of International 
Law (2007), at 386.
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mob-type of criminality (as for example in the Tadić case before the ICTY) is unproblematic. 
In these situations, the non-physical and physical perpetrators know each other and the 
enterprise participants are usually aware of the various crimes that are committed within 
the enterprise. Most scholars also think that it is justified to use the enterprise doctrine to 
slightly larger enterprises, such as prison and concentration camps, in which it often can 
be assumed that the individuals involved have knowledge about how the prison, camp, 
etc. is run.1220 When, however, enterprise responsibility is used to prosecute loosely knit 
network (such as, al-Qaeda terrorists)1221 or nation-wide genocides, it becomes much 
more problematic to assume that enterprise participants have the needed comprehension 
of the functioning of the enterprise. This is problematic, as a central element of the JCE 
responsibility doctrine is that every member of the enterprise is criminally liable for all 
crimes committed within the enterprise (hereinafter, the principle of equal culpability or 
equal guilt). For individual members of large-scale enterprises this can signify that they 
are held responsible for crimes they did not know about and which have been physically 
committed by individuals who they are unfamiliar with. Furthermore, as the natural and 
foreseeable consequences of large-scale enterprises generally are more or less unlimited 
there is a potential for very far-reaching extended criminal responsibility. This kind of 
extensive criminal responsibility has been found somewhat more acceptable in situations 
where it can be argued that a high-level actor can be said to be able to influence the 
functioning of the large-scale enterprise. As the enterprise doctrine, however, does not 
distinguish between participants based on their ability to influence the functioning of the 
enterprise, the doctrine has been found to entail a risk of an unacceptable extension of 
criminal liability for low-level and mid-level actors.1222
In the Brđanin case, ICTY responded to this kind of criticism by limiting the applicability 
of the JCE doctrine to small-scale enterprises and by requiring a specific agreement to commit 
a crime between the non-physical and physical actors.1223 The Trial Chamber judgement was, 
however, not well received it either, as it was pointed out that these kinds of limitations made 
it impossible to convict structurally remote leaders and that it was precisely these leaders that 
the doctrine was “developed for.”1224 High-level political leaders do not, for example, usually 
make explicit agreements with low-level perpetrators.1225 The limitations of the enterprise 
1220 E.g., Marston Danner & Martinez 2005, at 134-135. 
1221 Osiel 2005(b), at 799-800. 
1222 H. Olásolo, ‘Reflections on the Treatment of the Notions of Control of the Crime and Joint Criminal 
Enterprise in the Stakić Appeal Judgement,’ 7 International Criminal Law Review (2007), at 158. 
1223 Brđanin, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 1 September 2004, paras 347 and 355.
1224 E.g., Gustafson 2007, at 149, A. O’Rourke, ‘Joint Criminal Enterprise and Brđanin: Misguided 
Overcorrection,’ 47 Harvard International Law Journal (2006), at 307 and 323, and H. van der Wilt, ‘Joint 
Criminal Enterprise: Possibilities and Limitations’, 5 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2007), at 99. 
1225 E.g., Gustafson 2007, at 153-154, and O’Rourke 2006, at 323. On the difference between “agreements” 
and “common purposes” it has been noted that: “[A common purpose] presumably requires less of 
prosecutors, since individuals may independently choose to subscribe to a single purpose without entering 
into even a tacit agreement. To form an agreement, participants must be aware, at least, that others exist 
who share its terms. One may share a purpose with others, by contrast, while completely ignorant of 
their existence.” Osiel 2005(a), at 1794. Ohlin has, however, criticized the dismissal of the agreement 
requirement by stressing that an agreement can be implicit. According to Ohlin, the requirement of an 
agreement is necessary to distinguish joint behaviour from crowd behaviour. J. D. Ohlin, ‘Joint Intentions 
to Commit International Crimes’, 11 Chicago Journal of International Law (2011), at 699 and 701.  
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doctrine suggested by the Brđanin Trial Chamber were later rejected by the Appeals Chamber 
in the same case.1226 It should also be stressed that the enterprise doctrine in reality has been 
used to indict and/or convict very high-level actors for large-scale enterprises, for example, in 
the Krajišnik case. In that case, the Trial Chamber, in fact, argued that the JCE doctrine is well 
suited to cases in which “numerous persons are all said to be concerned with the commission 
of a large number of crimes.”1227 
Secondly, it has been argued that it is not enough that the enterprise doctrine 
requires participation, but that it should require substantial participation.1228 ICTY has, 
in fact, in one case suggested such a requirement,1229 but the present legal standard seems 
to be that “there is no specific legal requirement that the accused make a substantial 
contribution to the joint criminal enterprise”, but that “there may be specific cases 
which require, as an exception to the general rule, a substantial contribution of the 
accused to determine whether he participated in the joint criminal enterprise.”1230 In the 
Krajišnik Trial Judgement, an alternative legal requirement was suggested, namely that 
of concerted action. The Trial Chamber namely argued that what must be proven is that 
the person in a criminal enterprise must be shown to act together or in concert with 
each other members of the enterprise in the implementation of a common objective.1231 
In the Appeal Judgement of that case, many aspects of the JCE doctrine were considered, 
but not whether the requirement of concerted action entails an additional participation 
requirement.1232 
While the challenges regarding the way in which the requirements of a common 
plan and participation have been defined are applicable to all forms of enterprise 
responsibility, a lot of additional criticism has been raised against the extended form 
of enterprise responsibility.1233 In this form of enterprise responsibility, an individual 
may namely be held responsible for crimes he/she did not intend to be committed. The 
extended form of responsibility is instead based on foresight and voluntary assumption 
of risk.1234 This lowering of the mens rea requirements has been found to be the most 
problematic aspect of the extended enterprise responsibility,1235 as it has been questioned 
whether it is appropriate to convict individuals acting “without intent” for international 
crimes. Especially in relation to specific intent crimes, it has been put in question whether 
1226 Brđanin, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 3 April 2007, paras 418 and 425. Also the Appeals Chamber of the 
ICTR has expressed the view that the joint criminal enterprises may very well be of a vast scope.  Karemera 
et al., Decision (JCE), AC, ICTR, 12 April 2006, para. 16, and Rwamakuba, Decision (JCE), AC, ICTR, 
22 October 2004, para. 25. Also e.g., the Krnojelac Appeals Chamber has rejected the express agreement 
requirement. Krnjolelac, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 17 September 2003, para. 97.
1227 Krajišnik, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 27 September 2006, para.  876.
1228 E.g., Cassese 2007, at 109 and 127-128, Marston Danner & Martinez 2005, at 150, and J. A. Ramer, ‘Hate 
by Association: Joint Criminal Enterprise Liability for Persecution’, 7 Chicago-Kent Journal of International 
and Comparative Law (2007), at 110. 
1229 Kvočka et al., Judgement, TC, ICTY, 2 November 2001, paras 310 and 312. 
1230 Kvočka et al., Judgement, AC, ICTY, 28 February 2005, para. 97. See also Brđanin, Judgement, AC, 
ICTY, 3 April 2007, para. 427. 
1231 Krajišnik, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 27 September 2006, para.  884.
1232 Krajišnik, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 17 March 2009.
1233 E.g., Ambos 2006, at 672-673, and Ohlin 2007(b), at 76.
1234 Cassese 2007, at 113. 
1235 E.g., Ambos 2007(a), at 174. 
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it is appropriate to attribute not just the acts of other individuals, but also thoughts.1236 It 
has also been argued that any good lawyer knows that “virtually any consequence can be 
characterized as foreseeable”,1237 that is, that the criterion is vague and unreliable. 
7.2.4.5.  Other Types of Commission Responsibility in the Case Law of the Ad Hoc 
Tribunals 
The JCE doctrine is an attribution theory that is not familiar in many domestic legal 
systems and it has also been found to have many problematic aspects. Not surprisingly, 
therefore, alternatives to the doctrine have been put forward both by academic scholars 
and by individuals practicing international criminal law. Often the authors behind these 
alternatives have come from civil law countries, such as Germany and Spain. It appears 
that it especially two theories that have found support among individuals who are 
sceptical towards the enterprise doctrine. 
The first popular alternative theory is the theory of control of the act by virtue 
of a hierarchical organization (German Organisationsherrschaft) or the “perpetrator 
behind the perpetrator theory” which is often connected with the German scholar 
Claus Roxin.1238 Roxin notes that in contrast to normal situations where a distance to the 
victims and the execution of the criminal act generally entails that an individual does not 
have control of the criminal act and hence is a marginal actor, in situations of organized 
structures of power such an assumption cannot be made.1239 An organized structure of 
powers refers to an apparatus exercising powers comprised of individuals organized into 
a hierarchy so that there are leaders and replaceable physical actors.1240 Such structures are 
common, for example, in relation to war and State criminality.1241 In organized structures 
of power, it is the leaders who are the most blameworthy actors and the theory therefore 
focuses on the leader’s ability to control his/her organization committing the crimes.  
The other popular theory is that of functional perpetration.1242 In functional 
perpetration the underlying rationale is that individuals have divided the “essential 
functions for the commission of the crime”, which means that they together share the 
control of the crime.1243 In the same way as in the JCE model, there is thus a requirement 
of a common agreement or common plan.1244 In functional perpetration, however, 
only those individuals who make an essential contribution to the crime are regarded 
as perpetrators,1245 that is, there is a stronger requirement of participation than in the 
enterprise model. In contrast to the theory of control of the act by virtue of a hierarchical 
organization, functional control emphasizes that also the physical perpetrators are 
1236 Ramer 2007, at 114.
1237 Fletcher & Ohlin 2005, at 550.
1238 Roxin 2006(b), at 242 ff. 
1239 Roxin 2006(b), at 243 and 247. 
1240 Roxin 2006(b), at 245 (referring to “der Fungibilität des Ausführenden”). Furthermore, the organized 
structure of power must, according to Roxin, not only exceptionally act outside the law. Ibid., at 249. See 
also Olásolo & Pérez Cepeda 2004, at 492.
1241 Roxin 2006(b), at 243 and 247. 
1242 Olásolo & Pérez Cepeda 2004, at 498 and 506 (referring to Jakobs and Jescheck/Weigend).
1243 Olásolo & Pérez Cepeda 2004, at 499. 
1244 Olásolo & Pérez Cepeda 2004, at 500. 
1245 Olásolo & Pérez Cepeda 2004, at 499-500. Scholars, however, disagree on whether the essential 
contribution must take place at the execution stage or not. Ibid., at 504.  
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“fully responsible and free.”1246 The theory does not have a vertical starting-point and at 
such it is capable to take into consideration that not all relevant relationships between 
individuals are vertical.
The ad hoc tribunals have addressed these alternatives theories mainly in one case, 
namely the Stakić case before the ICTY, where the Trial Chamber applied a participation 
mode it called coperpetratorship, which has been found to be a combination of the two 
above mentioned theories.1247 According to the Stakić Trial Chamber, where the Presiding 
Judge was Wolfgang Schomburg from Germany, coperpetration is characterized by “an 
explicit agreement or silent consent to reach a common goal by coordinated co-operation 
and joint control over the criminal conduct.”1248 In the same case, the Appeals Chamber, 
however, found that the “introduction of new modes of liability into the jurisprudence of 
the Tribunal may generate uncertainty, if not confusion”1249 and that coperpetratorship as 
a mode of liability “does not have support in customary international law or in the settled 
jurisprudence of [the ICTY].”1250 
The ICTR has, however, in some more recent cases found non-physical crime 
participants as perpetrators without applying the JCE doctrine.1251 In these cases, a 
central criterion has been whether the role played by the accused has been “an integral 
part of the crimes.”1252 The ICTR decisions have been criticized for not clearly spelling 
out the elements of the non-physical commission liability as well as for lacking references 
to sources that would establish the customary basis of the responsibility mode.1253 The 
1246 Olásolo & Pérez Cepeda 2004, at 506. 
1247 Olásolo & Pérez Cepeda 2004, at 508. Also Haan has found that this participation mode is a 
combination of two forms of commission, viz. co-perpetration (Mittäterschaft) and perpetrator behind 
the direct perpetrator responsibility (mittelbare Täterschaft). Haan 2005, at 197.
1248 Stakić, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 31 July 2003, paras 438 and 440. 
1249 Stakić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 22 March 2006, para. 59.
1250 Stakić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 22 March 2006, para. 62. See also Milutinović et al., Decision (indirect co-
perpetration), TC, ICTY, 22 March 2006, paras 32-41. A contrary view is expressed by Judge Schomburg 
in the Simić Appeal Judgement. It should be noted that Judge Schomburg was the presiding judge in the 
Stakić trial judgement. Simić et al., Judgement (diss. op. of Judge Schomburg), AC, ICTY, 28 November 
2006, para. 23.
1251 Gacumbitsi, Judgement, AC, ICTR, 7 July 2006, para. 61, Ndindabahizi, Judgement, AC, ICTR, 16 
January 2007, para. 123, Seromba, Judgement, AC, ICTR, 12 March 2008, para. 161. (It should be noted 
that Judge Schomburg was a Judge in the ICTR Appeals Chamber in these three cases.) See also Munyakazi, 
Judgement, AC, ICTR, 28 September 2011, paras 135-136. In some other ICTR cases, it has, however, been 
held that commission responsibility “covers the direct and physical perpetration of a crime (with criminal 
intent) or a culpable omission of an act that is mandated by a rule of criminal law, and participation 
in a joint criminal enterprise”, that is, the new type of commission responsibility is not mentioned. 
Ndindiliyimana et al., Judgement, TC, ICTR, 17 May 2011, para. 1912. See also Gatete, Judgement, TC, 
ICTR, 31 March 2011, para.  576.
1252 E.g., Kalimanzira, Judgement, AC, ICTR, 20 October 2010, para. 219, and Munyakazi, Judgement, AC, 
ICTR, 28 September 2011, para. 135.
1253 F. Z. Giustiniani, ‘Stretching the Boundaries of Commission Liability – The ICTR Appeal Judgment in 
Seromba,’ 6 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2008), at 795-796. See also Cryer et al. 2010, at 362-
363. In relation to commission liability in connection to multi-person criminality, Wirth distinguishes 
between: (1) co-perpetration, which includes joint commission and JCE responsibility; (2) indirect 
perpetration; and (3) “uncategorized multi-person commission.” In the third category, he includes 
the Gacumbitsi, Ndindabahizi and Seromba ICTR appeal judgements as well as the ICTY Limaj Trial 
Judgement. Wirth 2009, at 330 and 336-337. 
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decisions have also had separate opinions, in which certain Appeals Chamber Judges 
have been critical to the new approach. For example, Judge Liu has noted that the new 
interpretation of commission conflates the difference between commission and other 
forms of participation in the crimes (as the evidence used to prove commission often 
has been that the accused has ordered, instigated etc. the crimes). More specifically, 
he argues that the new “notion of commission not only embraces acts that technically 
amount to secondary forms of participation, but also extends to conduct that contributes 
to the commission of crimes of others. In this regard, this novel form of commission 
uncannily resembles joint criminal enterprise, without requiring the satisfaction of its 
more stringent pleading criteria.”1254 Despite the criticism, also the ICTY has applied the 
integral-part-of-the-crime doctrine in a few cases.1255    
7.2.4.6.  The ICC and Commission Responsibility
In the ICC Statute, the possible modes of participation in the international crimes are 
settled in Article 25(3) which is partly similar and partly different from the corresponding 
provisions in the statutes of the ad hoc tribunals.1256 The greatest difference lies in that 
the ICC Statute distinguishes between different ways of committing a crime, namely 
committing individually, committing jointly with another and committing through 
another person. Furthermore, the ICC Statute explicitly criminalizes the contribution to 
commission of a crime by a group of persons acting with a common purpose. In relation 
to these provisions, the question has arisen to what these differences are just differences 
in formulation and to what extent they reflect real differences in regulation. The most 
disputed question has in this regard been what role the ad hoc tribunals’ JCE doctrine 
should be given.1257 It should be noted that the ICC Statute (1998) predates the ICTY 
Appeal Judgement in the Tadić case (1999). 
Especially scholars coming from civil law jurisdictions have found that the ICC 
Statute finally “frees” international attribution from its common law history. According 
to these scholars, the ICC Statute has clearly opened the door for some alternative 
attribution theories and closed the door for the most dubious attribution theories in 
customary international criminal law, viz. primarily the enterprise doctrine and especially 
its extended form.1258 For example, committing jointly with another has been seen as an 
explicit recognition of co-perpetration as a “separate head of responsibility [...] no longer 
subsumed under complicity”,1259 and it has been noted that committing through another 
1254 Munyakazi, Judgement (sep. op. of Judge Liu), AC, ICTR, 28 September 2011, paras 2-4. 
1255 Lukić & Lukić, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 20 July 2009, paras 898-899 and 908, and Haraquija & Morina, 
Judgement (contempt), TC, ICTY, 17 December 2008, paras 101-102. 
1256 It should be noted that based on Regulation 52 of the Court, the document containing the charges 
shall contain a legal characterization of the facts to accord the precise form of participation under Article 
25.The same applies to Article 28 on superior responsibility. ICC Doc. ICC-BD/01-01-04, Regulations of 
the Court. 
1257 In the scholarly literature, the ad hoc tribunals’ enterprise doctrine is sometimes discussed in relation 
to Article 25(3)(a) of the ICC Statute (committing jointly with another) and sometimes in relation to 
Article 25(3)(d) (contribution to commission of a crime by a group of persons acting with a common 
purpose).  See e.g., Boas, Bischoff & Reid 2007, at 126-128, and Eser 2002, at 791 ff.
1258 E.g., Ambos 2007(a), at 172-173, and Werle 2007, at 963. Note, however, Cassese 2007, at 132.
1259 van Sliedregt 2003, at 76. 
208
person could include so-called perpetrators behind perpetrators.1260 In all respects, the 
ICC statute does not, however, adhere to the civil law tradition, but contains expansions 
of attribution not known in these systems. Most notably, contribution to the commission 
of a crime by a group acting with a common purpose is not a familiar concept for 
continental law lawyers.1261 To what extent the deviations from the civil law systematic 
should be seen as signs of the continued relevance of the common law influenced 
customary international law in the field is, however, open to debate. It appears that the 
exact content of Article 25(3) cannot be known before it has been extensively interpreted 
by the ICC. 
The prosecutorial strategy in relation to Article 25(3) has been interesting. The 
prosecutor has in some cases argued that the individuals have committed the crime 
individual, jointly with another or through another person (subparagraph a),1262 in 
other cases that the individuals have ordered or induced the crimes (subparagraph b), 
1263 and finally in some cases that the individuals have contributed to crimes as part of a 
group of persons acting with a common purpose (subparagraph d).1264 In some cases, the 
charges were presented in the alternative.1265 It is doubtful whether these differences in 
the charging merely can be explained with differences in the factual circumstances of the 
cases. In contrast, it appears that the prosecutor through this strategy wanted to get first 
interpretations of the various subparagraphs even though the prosecutor, for example, in 
the Lubanga case argued that he had chosen the form of responsibility he thought best 
represented the criminal responsibility of Lubanga.1266 This multi-paragraph strategy, 
however, suggests that the prosecutor does not share the view expressed by some legal 
scholars that the participation modes in Article 25(3) have been hierarchically enumerated 
and that subparagraph (d) responsibility in general would be less blameworthy than, 
for example, aiding and abetting (subparagraph c).1267 It should namely be noted that 
in Situation in Darfur, Sudan, the prosecutor in one case based his charges primarily 
on subparagraph (d) even though both persons charged were high-level, influential 
actors. Mr. Harun served as a Minister of State for the Interior of the Government of 
Sudan1268 and Mr. Kushayb was characterized as “one of the most senior leaders in the 
1260 E.g., Ambos 2008(a), at 753, and Werle 2007, at 964. 
1261 E.g., R. Lahti, ‘Towards Harmonization of the General Principles of International Criminal Law’, in 
International Criminal Law: Quo Vadis? (Ramonville Saint-Agne: Éditions érès, 2004), at 349.
1262 E.g., Ntaganda, Warrant of Arrest, PTC, ICC, 22 August 2006.
1263 E.g., Kony, Warrant of Arrest, PTC, ICC, 27 September 2005, Odhiambo, Warrant of Arrest, PTC, ICC, 
8 July 2005, Ongwen, Warrant of Arrest, PTC, ICC, 8 July 2005, and Otti, Warrant of Arrest, PTC, ICC, 8 
July 2005. In the warrant of arrest of Kony, it is, however, also argued that Kony individually or together 
with other persons “committed” the crimes. Kony, Warrant of Arrest, PTC, ICC, 27 September 2005, 
paras 10 and 42. In the Odhiambo arrest warrant, it is also suggested that Odhiambo himself physically 
committed crimes, but he is despite this only charged for having ordered crimes. Odhiambo, Warrant of 
Arrest, PTC, ICC, 8 July 2005, para. 9.
1264 Harun, Warrant of Arrest, PTC, ICC, 27 April 2007 (regarding most counts).
1265 Katanga & Ngudjolo, Prosecutor’s Submission (charges), PTC, ICC, 24 April 2008, Annex 1.
1266 Lubanga, Decision (confirmation of charges), PTC, ICC, 29 January 2007, para. 319.
1267 E.g., Eser 2002, at 787. 
1268 Harun, Warrant of Arrest, PTC, ICC, 27 April 2007.
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tribal hierarchy in the Wadi Salih Locality” and as a commander of thousands of Militia/
Janjaweed.1269 
The first ICC decision in which Article 25(3) was interpreted was the Lubanga 
confirmation of charges decision. In that decision, the Pre-Trial Chamber followed 
the interpretation suggested by many civil law legal scholars by accepting the ideas of 
a hierarchy between the various subparagraphs1270 and of control over the crime as the 
distinguishing factor between perpetrators and other participants.1271 In later case law, 
the ICC has upheld the idea of a hierarchy, 1272 which is likely to affect prosecutorial 
strategies towards prosecutions based on subparagraph (a). The hierarchy case law has 
been criticized by some ICC judges.1273
In relation to co-perpetration, the Lubanga Pre-Trial Chamber put forward that: 
The concept of co-perpetration based on joint control over the crime is rooted in 
the principle of the division of essential tasks for the purpose of committing a crime 
between two or more persons acting in a concerted manner. Hence, although none 
of the participants has overall control of the offence because they all depend on one 
another for its commission, they all share control because each of them could frustrate 
the commission of the crime by not carrying out his or her task.1274 
Interestingly, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber made explicit references to the Stakić Trial 
Judgement, which was not upheld by the ICTY Appeals Chamber, when interpreting the 
legal meaning of co-perpetration.1275 The argumentation was further developed in the 
Lubanga Trial Judgement, where the Trial Chamber identified as the elements of direct 
co-perpetratorship: 
(i) there was an agreement or common plan between the accused and at least one 
other co-perpetrator that, once implemented, will result in the commission of the 
relevant crime in the ordinary course of events;
(ii) the accused provided an essential contribution to the common plan that resulted 
in the commission of the relevant crime; [...]
1269 Ali Kushayb, Warrant of Arrest, PTC, ICC, 27 April 2007, at 5-6.
1270 Lubanga, Decision (confirmation of charges), PTC, ICC, 29 January 2007, paras 321 and 337.  
1271 Lubanga, Decision (confirmation of charges), PTC, ICC, 29 January 2007, paras 330-332 and 338. 
1272 E.g., in the Trial Chamber judgement, the majority supported the hierarchy approach whereas the 
dissenting judge, Judge Fulford, did not. Lubanga, Judgement, TC, ICC, 14 March 2012, paras 996-999, 
and Lubanga, Judgement (sep. op. of Judge Fulford), TC, ICC, 14 March 2012, para. 8.
1273 Lubanga, Judgement (sep. op. of Judge Fulford), TC, ICC, 14 March 2012, para. 8, and Ngudjolo, 
Judgment (conc. op. of Judge Van den Wyngaert), TC, ICC, 18 December 2012, paras 22-27.
1274 Lubanga, Decision (confirmation of charges), PTC, ICC, 29 January 2007, para. 342 (emphasis 
added). The Pre-Trial Chamber specifies its finding by identifying two objective and three subjective 
requirements: (1) the existence of an agreement or common plan between two or more persons; (2) 
co-ordinated essential contribution by each co-perpetrator resulting in the realisation of the objective 
elements of the crime; (3) the suspect must fulfil the subjective elements of the crime; (4) the suspect 
and the other co-perpetrators must all be mutually aware and mutually accept that implementing their 
common plan may result in the realization of the objective elements of the crime; and (5) the suspect 
must be aware of the factual circumstances enabling him or her to jointly control the crime. Ibid., paras 
342-367.    
1275 Lubanga, Decision (confirmation of charges), PTC, ICC, 29 January 2007, fn 422-423. See also Bemba, 
Decision (confirmation of charges), PTC, ICC, 15 June 2009, paras 347-348. 
210
(iv) the accused was aware that he provided an essential contribution to the 
implementation of the common plan; [...]1276
The agreement or common plan must include a “critical element of criminality”, that is, 
“its implementation [... must embody] a sufficient risk that, if events follow the ordinary 
course, a crime will be committed.”1277 The commission of the crime does, however, not 
have to be “the overreaching goal of the co-perpetrators.”1278 Regarding the required 
contribution, the majority of the Trial Chamber held that co-perpetrator responsibility 
demands a more significant contribution than subparagraphs c and d of Article 25(3), 
namely an essential contribution.1279
The Katanga and Ngudjolo Pre-Trial Chamber made an even more explicit approval 
of the ICTY Stakić case law by recognizing the existence of the participation mode of 
indirect co-perpetration, in which the accused person has control over a hierarchical 
apparatus of power.1280 The elements of this responsibility mode were enumerated in the 
Ruto et al. confirmation of charges decision: 
(i) the suspect must be part of a common plan or an agreement with one or more 
persons; 
(ii) the suspect and the other co-perpetrator(s) must carry out essential contributions 
in a coordinated manner which result in the fulfillment of the material elements of 
the crime; 
(iii) the suspect must have control over the organisation;
(iv) the organisation must consist of an organised and hierarchal apparatus of power;
(v) the execution of the crimes must be secured by almost automatic compliance with 
the orders issued by the suspect; 
1276 Lubanga, Judgement, TC, ICC, 14 March 2012, para. 1018 (see also para. 1006). In some cases an 
additional element has been suggested, namely awareness of the factual circumstances enabling joint 
control. E.g., Bemba, Decision (confirmation of charges), PTC, ICC, 15 June 2009, para. 351.   
1277 Lubanga, Judgement, TC, ICC, 14 March 2012, para. 984. See also K. Ambos, ‘The First Judgment of 
the International Criminal Court (Prosecutor v. Lubanga): A Comprehensive Analysis of the Legal Issues’, 
12 International Criminal Law Review (2012), at 139-140. The inclusion of a new objective requirement 
(viz., that the plan must in the ordinary course of events result in the commission of the crime) has been 
criticized by Wirth, who finds that the previous subjective test was enough (viz., awareness of risk). S. 
Wirth, ‘Co-Perpetration in the Lubanga Trial Judgment’, 10 Journal of International Criminal Justice 
(2012), at 974 and 986. Judge van den Wyngaert has been critical towards the idea that a common plan is 
an objective element of joint perpetration. Ngudjolo, Judgment (conc. op. of Judge Van den Wyngaert), TC, 
ICC, 18 December 2012, paras 31-35.
1278 Lubanga, Judgement, TC, ICC, 14 March 2012, para. 985. 
1279 Lubanga, Judgement, TC, ICC, 14 March 2012, paras 996-999. See further on the essential contribution 
requirement e.g., Ngudjolo, Judgment (conc. op. of Judge Van den Wyngaert), TC, ICC, 18 December 2012, 
paras 40-48, and J. D. Ohlin, E. van Sliedregt, & T. Weigend, ‘Assessing the Control-Theory’, 26 Leiden 
Journal of International Law, at 731-734. 
1280 Katanga & Ngudjolo, Decision (confirmation of charges), PTC, ICC, 30 September 2008, paras 480-
538. On the decision, see further e.g., J. L. Černić, ‘Shaping the Spiderweb: Towards the Concept of Joint 
Commission through another Person under the Rome Statute and Jurisprudence of the International 
Criminal Court’, 22 Criminal Law Forum (2011), at 539-565. 
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(vi) the suspect must satisfy the subjective elements of the crimes; 
(vii) the suspect and the other co-perpetrators must be mutually aware and accept 
that implementing the common plan will result in the fulfillment of the material 
elements of the crimes; and 
(viii) the suspect must be aware of the factual circumstances enabling him to exercise 
joint control over the commission of the crime through another person(s).1281
In the Katanga and Ngudjolo case, the Pre-Trial Chamber discussed the concept of an 
organised and hierarchal apparatus of power and noted that: 
The Chamber finds that the organisation must be based on hierarchical relations 
between superiors and subordinates. The organisation must also be composed of 
sufficient subordinates to guarantee that superiors’ orders will be carried out, if not 
by one subordinate, then by another. These criteria ensure that orders given by the 
recogised leadership will generally be complied with by their subordinates.1282 
All in all, the early ICC case law on committing through another person (including 
Organisationsherrschaftslehre) and indirect co-perpetration follows closely Roxin’s 
thinking. 
In connection to responsibility based on Article 25(3)(d)1283 the ICC has held that 
the common plan must be defined in the same way as in connection to Article 25(3)(a) 
and that the contribution to the crime must be significant.1284 The ICC has stressed that 
Article 25(3)(d) responsibility differs from JCE responsibility in that it is a residual form 
of responsibility of an accessorial type.1285 When a person is convicted based on Article 
25(3)(d), he/she is hence not convicted as a perpetrator. 
In relation to attribution, the ICC has hence “emancipated itself from the ad hoc 
tribunals”1286 and there exists “two diverging bodies of international criminal law,”1287 that 
is, one applied by the ad hoc tribunals and one applied by the ICC. Whether this is a good 
1281 Ruto et al., Decision (confirmation of charges), PTC, ICC, 23 January 2012, para. 292. Also in the arrest 
warrant against President Al Bashir, the charges have been brought under Article 25(3)(a) claiming that 
Al Bashir is responsible as an indirect perpetrator or as an indirect co-perpetrator. Al Bashir, Warrant of 
Arrest, PTC, ICC, 4 March 2009, at 7. See also Jessberger & Geneuss 2008, at 853 ff. In the arrest warrant, 
the Pre-Trial Chamber concludes that there are reasonable grounds to believe that Al Bashir was “in full 
control of all branches of the “apparatus” of the State of Sudan” and that he used that control to secure the 
implementation of the counter-insurgency plan of the Government of Sudan. Al Bashir, Warrant of Arrest, 
PTC, ICC, 4 March 2009, at 7.
1282 Katanga & Ngudjolo, Decision (confirmation of charges), PTC, ICC, 30 September 2008, para. 512. 
1283 Article 25(3)(d), ICC Statute: ‘In any other way contributes to the commission or attempted commission 
of such a crime by a group of persons acting with a common purpose. Such contribution shall be intentional 
and shall either: (i) Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal purpose of the 
group, where such activity or purpose involves the commission of a crime within the jurisdiction of the 
Court; or (ii) Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the crime’.
1284 Mbarushimana, Decision (confirmation of charges), PTC, ICC, 16 December 2011, paras 271 and 283. 
1285 Mbarushimana, Decision (confirmation of charges), PTC, ICC, 16 December 2011, para. 282. 
1286 K. Ambos, ‘Commentary’ [on the Lubanga confirmation of charges decision], in A. Klip & G. Sluiter 
(eds.), Annotated Leading Cases of International Criminal Tribunals, Volume XXIII (Antwerp: Intersentia, 
2010), at 748. 
1287 Cf. van Sliedregt 2003, at 115. 
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or bad thing is open to debate. So far, ICC has only had one case in which there has been 
a conviction and there are no appeals chamber convictions yet. As such, it is most likely 
that the interpretation of Article 25(3) will still evolve. 
7.2.5.  Non-Participatory Responsibility: The Doctrine of Superior Responsibility
7.2.5.1.  Introduction 
So far in this chapter, it has been investigated what kind of participation in or contribution 
to international crimes is enough to give rise to individual criminal responsibility. 
International individual criminal responsibility is, however, not restricted to contributory 
responsibility. Non-contributory responsibility can arise in situations where no criminal 
harm has occurred or where the harm is insignificant for the responsibility, for example, 
in relation to attempts or inchoate offences.1288 Responsibility in these situations is, 
however, not considered in this study, where the focus is on the criminal law that is 
used to deal with the “social reality of international criminality.” Furthermore, non-
participatory responsibility can arise in situations where a person is convicted for the 
acts of another person as though they were his/her own acts due to a special relationship 
between the persons.1289 This type of responsibility is often called vicarious responsibility. 
In international criminal law, superiors have a special criminal responsibility called 
superior or command responsibility. The doctrine has its origin in military thinking 
according to which a rigid superior-subordinate is essential for successfully carrying out 
military operations.1290 Furthermore, for the law of war to be effective, it is regarded as 
crucial that the combatants are under the control of a superior. In this context, superior 
responsibility is seen as an incentive for superiors to ensure that their troops abide the 
law.1291 As the doctrine of superior responsibility sometimes is characterized as a form 
of vicarious responsibility,1292 it has been a matter of considerable “discussion and 
reflection.”1293 
In the statutes of the ad hoc tribunals, it is established that the fact that an 
international crime was committed by a subordinate does not relieve his superior of 
criminal responsibility if he knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about 
1288 See further e.g., Cassese 2008, at 219-220. Vogel distinguishes between four types of criminal 
responsibility without proof of criminal harm, viz. (1) (common law) conspiracy; (2) climate offences 
(German Klimadelikte), which refers to inchoate offences, such as, attempted instigation, private or public 
incitement and certain forms of hate crime; (3) criminalization of membership in a criminal or terrorist 
organization; and (4) criminalization of collective violent actions regardless of results (e.g., rioting in 
football stadiums). Vogel 2002, at 163-164.
1289 Fletcher 1998, at 190.
1290 E.g., Bantekas 2002, at 70, and N. Tsagourias, ‘Command Responsibility and the Principle of Individual 
Criminal Responsibility: A Critical Analysis of International Jurisprudence’, in C. Eboe-Osuji (ed.), 
Protecting Humanity − Essays in International Law and Policy in Honour of Navanethem Pillay (Leiden: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2010), at 817.  
1291 M. Lippman, ‘The Evolution and Scope of Command Responsibility’, 13 Leiden Journal of International 
Law (2000), at 139.
1292 E.g., Feinberg 1970, at 227. The exact nature of the superior responsibility is, however, disputed. See 
further Section 7.2.5.6.  
1293 B. B. Jia, ‘The Doctrine of Command Responsibility Revisited’, 3 Chinese Journal of International Law 
(2004), at 1. 
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to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the necessary and 
reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.1294 In the 
case law of the tribunals, this rule has been seen to include three essential requirements, 
namely (1) the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship; (2) that the superior knew 
or had reason to know that the criminal act was about to be or had been committed; and 
(3) that the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the 
criminal act or punish the perpetrator thereof.1295 Article 28 of the ICC Statute makes a 
difference between military commanders and other superiors, and the exact requirements 
for superior responsibility are dependent on the type of superior in question. In relation 
to superior responsibility, the customary and the ICC norms thus differ. 
7.2.5.2.  The Requirement of a Superior-Subordinate Relationship
The first requirement for superior responsibility identified in the case law of the ad hoc 
tribunals is thus a superior-subordinate relationship. This requirement has been found 
to lie at the very heart of the doctrine, as it is the special relationship that establishes 
the duty to act.1296 According to the case law, there exists a superior-subordinate 
relationship when there is a superior who has effective control over his/her subordinate. 
Effective control has been understood to mean material ability to prevent or punish the 
commission of offences by subordinates.1297 This effective control standard signifies that 
substantial influence and other lower forms of influence are not enough for superior 
responsibility.1298 Despite being a demanding standard, effective control should, 
however, not be equated with the superior having powers to control every aspect of the 
subordinate’s behaviour. This was stressed by the Bagosora and Nsengiyumva Appeals 
Chamber when it observed that “the fact that subordinates might perpetrate crimes 
independently of orders does not show that a superior lacks the ability to prevent or 
punish those crimes.”1299
As regards the source of the effective control, a difference has in the case law been 
done between de jure powers and de facto powers. Whereas de jure powers refer to 
positions of power resulting from official/formal appointments, de facto powers refer 
to equal positions not resulting from such appointments. The case law of the ad hoc 
1294 Article 7(3), ICTY Statute, and Article 6(3), ICTR Statute. 
1295 Delalić et al., Judgement, TC, ICTY, 16 November 1998, para. 346. Marston Danner and Martinez 
identify the appeal judgement in the Delalić et al. case before the ICTY as the “definitive statement of ICTY 
and ICTR doctrine.” Another standard was put forward in the Blaškić Trial Judgement. Marston Danner 
& Martinez 2005, at 128. 
1296 Strugar, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 31 January 2005, para. 359. Likewise, in the Aleksovski case it was 
observed that the superior must have such powers prior to his failure to exercise them. Aleksovski, 
Judgement, AC, ICTY, 24 March 2000, para. 76.
1297 E.g., Delalić et al., Judgement, TC, ICTY, 16 November 1998, para. 378. Article 28, ICC Statute requires 
“effective command and control” or “effective authority and control”.
1298 E.g., Delalić et al., Judgement, AC, ICTY, 20 February 2001, paras 263-264 and 266. See also Musema, 
Judgement, TC, ICTR, 27 January 2000, paras 140-141. Cf. also Bagosora & Nsengiyumva, Judgement, 
AC, ICTR, 14 December 2011, para. 295 (‘The only demonstrable link the Trial Chamber found between 
Nsengiyumva and the civilian attackers was the “coordination between soldiers and civilians” [...] However, 
the Appeals Chamber is not convinced that coordination between soldiers and civilians is sufficient to 
establish that a superior-subordinate relationship existed between Nsengiyumva and the civilian attackers.’) 
1299 Bagosora & Nsengiyumva, Judgement, AC, ICTR, 14 December 2011, para. 472.
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tribunals clearly establish that the effective control can result from either de jure or de facto 
powers.1300 This is especially important taking into consideration the phenomenology 
of international criminality, that is, the fact that armed groups which do not appoint 
officials formally are involved in many contemporary armed conflicts.1301 In addition, 
it is important to recognize that a person who on the paper is the superior does not 
necessarily have effective control.1302 
The case law of the ad hoc tribunals have furthermore clearly settled that superior 
responsibility is not limited to military superiors functioning in clear chains of command, 
but extends to civilians.1303 There is, however, a requirement of a hierarchical relationship 
between the actors also in relation to civilian superiors.1304 The relationship does not, 
however, have to be permanent or fixed, but may be temporary.1305 Effective control must 
thus also be proven in relation to civilian superiors, but the concept may have a different 
meaning in non-military hierarchies.1306
Finally, it should be noted that there may exist numerous superiors at various 
hierarchical levels that may become responsible for the same criminal act. Superior 
responsibility is namely not limited to the most senior superiors, but applies to all 
superiors who have effective control over some subordinates.1307 The doctrine can 
hence be applicable to, inter alia, policy commanders (that is, “high-level” superiors 
who determine the overall missions or objectives and who decide whether the projects 
should be continued or not), strategic commanders (that is, “high-level” superiors who 
make the overall mission into a strategic plan), operational commanders (that is, “mid-
level” superiors who exercise operational control over, for example, military corps and 
1300 E.g., Delalić et al., Judgement, AC, ICTY, 20 February 2001, paras 192-193, Bagilishema, Judgement, 
AC, ICTR, 3 July 2002, para. 50, Gacumbitsi, Judgement, AC, ICTR, 7 July 2006, para. 143, and Kajelijeli, 
Judgement, AC, ICTR, 23 May 2005, para. 85. See also e.g., J. A. Williamson, ‘Command Responsibility 
in the Case Law of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’, 13 Criminal Law Forum (2002), at 
369-373.
1301 Delalić et al., Judgement, AC, ICTY, 20 February 2001, para. 193.
1302 E.g., Blagojević & Jokić, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 17 January 2005, para. 791. It should also be noted that 
while the legal standard of effective control in theory is clear, de facto as well as de jure powers often are 
difficult to establish in practice. E.g., B. I. Bonafè, ‘Finding a Proper Role for Command Responsibility’, 
5 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2007), at 608, and Marston Danner & Martinez 2005, at 130.
1303 E.g., Aleksovski, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 24 March 2000, para. 76. The ICTR was initially cautious 
in applying command responsibility to civilians. Williamson 2002, at 366. The concept of command 
responsibility is sometimes used as a synonym to superior responsibility. Sometimes, however, command 
responsibility is given a more limited meaning, that is, it is used to refer to the responsibility of military 
superiors. See e.g. Boas, Bischoff & Reid 2007, at 144.
1304 See e.g., Delalić et al., Judgement, AC, ICTY, 20 February 2001, paras 251-252 and 303.
1305 E.g., Kunarac et al. Judgement, TC, ICTY, 22 February 2001, para. 399. 
1306 See e.g., Kajelijeli, Judgement, AC, ICTR, 23 May 2005, para. 87. See also Boas, Bischoff & Reid 2007, 
at 192-193 and 199-200. 
1307 In the Orić case, it was questioned whether superior responsibility can become topical in relation 
to remote superiors. The Appeals Chamber found that both proximate and remote superiors may be 
held responsible based on the doctrine. Orić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 3 July 2008, para. 20. The Appeals 
Chamber also elaborated on the degree to which the individual subordinates had to be individualized. In 
that context, the Appeals Chamber stipulated that: “notwithstanding the degree of specificity with which 
the culpable subordinates must be identified, in any event, their existence as such must be established.” 
Ibid., para. 35. 
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divisions) and tactical commanders (mid- and low-level superiors who in concrete 
situations issue orders and exercise command).1308 In practice, also this means that the 
concept of effective control does not always bear the same meaning. In this regard, Osiel 
has noted that in relation to heads of states effective control cannot mean control over 
specific individuals, that is, so-called micro-management of behaviour at the lowest 
echelons.1309 This is stressed by case law emphasizing that the superiors do not need 
to know the exact identity of their subordinates in order to incur liability.1310 In the 
Hategekimana case before the ICTR, the Appeals Chamber, for example, held that “the 
Trial Chamber’s finding that a soldier from the Ngoma Military Camp perpetrated the 
rape provided a reasonable identification of the subordinate.”1311 In relation to low-level 
actors, it is, however, more natural to require micro-management and identification of 
subordinates. 
7.2.5.3.  Requirements of Knowledge and Intent 
The second requirement of superior responsibility before the ad hoc tribunals has been 
that the superior knew or had reason to know that his/her subordinate was about to 
commit a crime or had done so.1312 Superiors can thus be held responsible if they actually 
knew about their subordinates’ behaviour (actual or positive knowledge) or if they had a 
reason to know (constructive knowledge). It should be noted that it is not enough that it is 
proven that the accused knew or had reason to know that crimes had been committed or 
were about to be committed. Rather, the superior must know or have reason to know that 
his/her subordinates were involved in the crimes or were about to become involved.1313 In 
relation to specific intent crimes, the superior does not have to share the specific intent 
of his/her subordinate.1314   
As regards actual knowledge, it can according to the case law of the tribunals be 
proven with direct or circumstantial evidence.1315 As direct evidence often is difficult 
1308 Cf. D. Kaye, ‘Are There Limits to Military Alliance? Presidential Power to Place American Troops 
under Non-American Commanders’, 5 Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems (1995), at 407-409. 
1309 Osiel 2005(b), at 796.  
1310 E.g., Bagosora & Nsengiyumva, Judgement, AC, ICTR, 14 December 2011, para. 196, and Blagojević & 
Jokić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 9 May 2007, para. 287. See also E. van Sliedregt, ‘System Criminality at the 
ICTY’, in A. Nollkaemper & H. van der Wilt (eds.), System Criminality in International Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009), at 186-187.
1311 Hategekimana, Judgement, AC, ICTR, 8 May 2012, para.166.
1312 Article 7(3), ICTY Statute, and Article 6(3), ICTR Statute. Boas et al. note that the Orić Trial Chamber 
tried (without citing any authority) to introduce a further mental element, viz. that the superior was aware 
of his/her superior position. Boas, Bischoff & Reid 2007, at 200 (fn 351), and Orić, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 
30 June 2006, para. 316.   
1313 E.g., Orić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 3 July 2008, paras 55-60, and Bagilishema, Judgement, AC, 
ICTR, 3 July 2002, para. 42 (‘With regard to the arguments advanced by the Prosecution, the Appeals 
Chamber, however, deems it necessary to make a distinction between the fact that the Accused had 
information about the general situation that prevailed in Rwanda at the time, and the fact that he had 
in his possession general information which put him on notice that his subordinates might commit 
crimes.’).  
1314 E.g., Bagosora & Nsengiyumva, Judgement, AC, ICTR, 14 December 2011, para. 384.
1315 E.g., Delalić et al., Judgement, TC, ICTY, 16 November 1998, para. 386. 
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to find,1316 factors such as type and scope of illegal acts, the number and types of troops 
involved and the officers and staff involved are used to prove actual knowledge.1317 
It should be stressed that the superior’s superior position as such does not allow a 
presumption of actual knowledge.1318 
While superior responsibility in situations of actual knowledge is relatively accepted, 
the acceptability of superior responsibility in cases of constructive liability is more 
controversial. This is partly due to uncertainties regarding the legal standard. In the 
Blaškić case, the Trial Chamber suggested that a superior should be held responsible where 
the absence of knowledge is the result of negligence in the discharge of duties.1319 This 
interpretation of the constructive knowledge standard has, however, been overruled and 
today a superior can only be held responsible if information was available to him/her that 
puts him/her on notice that his/her subordinates were about to engage, were engaging or 
had engaged in criminal conduct and he/her after this admonitory information failed to 
carry out reasonable investigation to become informed.1320 While this requirement of wilful 
blindness or gross negligence is more restrictive than the negligence standard suggested by 
the Blaškić Trial Chamber, it is, however, plagued by the difficulty to qualify the information 
that is required to alert the superior.1321 It should be noted that as there is always in 
armed conflicts a more or less heightened risk of subordinates committing crimes,1322 the 
question of what sort of behaviour should attract the attention of the superior is especially 
complicated. If not much is required in respect to the prior notice, the difference between 
the negligence standard and the wilful blindness standard is not that significant. 
1316 Mundis mentions as examples of direct evidence oral or written reports that the accused commander 
acknowledged receiving or such reports written by the commander himself. D. A. Mundis, ‘Crimes of the 
Commander: Superior Responsibility under Article 7(3) of the ICTY Statute’, in G. Boas & W. A. Schabas 
(eds.), International Criminal Law Developments in the Case Law of the ICTY (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2003), at 256-257. 
1317 E.g., Blaškić, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 3 March 2000, para. 307, and Blaškić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 29 
July 2004, para. 57.
1318 E.g., Blaškić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 29 July 2004, para. 57. Jia has noted that if the superior based on 
his/her position is expected to know about the behaviour of his/her subordinates, the superior would 
become liable based on his/her status alone, which would mean that superior responsibility would be a 
form of strict liability. B. B. Jia, ‘The Doctrine of Command Responsibility: Current Problems’, 3 Yearbook 
of International Humanitarian Law (2000), at 159.
1319 Blaškić, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 3 March 2000, para. 332. This standard is a negligence standard, as it 
implies that the superior has not exercised the standard of care that a reasonably prudent superior would 
have exercised in a similar situation. Cf. Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th ed. (2009) (‘negligence’). Cf. also 
the Report of the UN Secretary General preceding the ICTY Statute, in which superior responsibility is 
characterized as a form of “criminal negligence.” UN Doc. S/25704, 3 May 1993, para. 56.  
1320 E.g., Delalić et al., Judgement, AC, ICTY, 20 February 2001, para. 241, Bagilishema, Judgement, AC, 
ICTR, 3 July 2002, paras 33-35, and Blaškić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 29 July 2004, para. 62. Bantekas makes 
a distinction between the must have known standard, which according to him is a rebuttable presumption 
test, and the had reason to know standard, which he calls an objective negligence test which takes into 
account the circumstances at the time. Bantekas 2002, at 113-114.  
1321 See further Boas, Bischoff & Reid 2007, at 210-220. See also I. Bantekas, ‘The Contemporary Law of 
Superior Responsibility’, 93 American Journal of International Law (1999), at 590. 
1322 Triffterer makes a difference between an abstract/a latent threat of crimes that always exists and a 
concrete threat. O. Triffterer, ‘Causality, a Separate Element of the Doctrine of Superior Responsibility as 
Expressed in Article 28 Rome Statute?,’ 15 Leiden Journal of International Law (2002), at 193. 
217
7.2.5.4.  A Failure to Prevent or Punish 
The third requirement for superior responsibility is that the superior has failed to take the 
necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the criminal acts of his/her subordinate 
or to punish the perpetrators thereof.1323 In relation to this requirement, the central 
question is how to qualify necessary and reasonable measures, which the ad hoc tribunals, 
however, have refused to do in abstract. For example, the Delalić et al. Trial Chamber put 
forward that “any evaluation of the action taken by a superior to determine whether this 
duty has been met is so inextricably linked to the facts of each particular situation that 
any attempt to formulate a general standard in abstracto would not be meaningful.”1324 
The superior’s material ability in a concrete case and his/her exercise of this ability is thus 
what matters. In the Strugar case, the Trial Chamber, however, identified certain indicia 
that in most cases are relevant, namely what measures to secure the implementation of 
these orders were taken, what other measures were taken to secure that the unlawful acts 
were interrupted and whether these measures were reasonably sufficient in the specific 
circumstances, and, after the commission of the crime, what steps were taken to secure 
an adequate investigation and to bring the perpetrators to justice.1325 
The obligation to prevent or punish contains two separate types of legal 
obligations,1326 namely the obligation to prevent, which concerns future or ongoing crimes 
of subordinates and the obligation to punish which concerns past crimes committed by 
subordinates.1327 If a superior has knowledge of future or ongoing crimes, he/she thus has 
an obligation to prevent them and is not entitled to wait and punish them afterwards.1328
As regards the failure to prevent, a contentious question has been whether there 
has to be a causal relationship between the superior’s failure and the subordinate’s 
crime. In relation to causation, a difference between causation in situations of an act 
and causation in a situation of an omission should be made. With regard to omission 
responsibility requiring harm, the causality cannot directly be assessed in relation to 
the harm, but must be evaluated with an assessment of the probability with which a 
“correct act” would have changed the outcome.1329 Furthermore, a difference has to be 
made between: (a) situations where the omission of a person directly causes harm; and 
1323 Article 7(3), ICTY Statute, and Article 6(3), ICTR Statute. See also e.g., Delalić et al., Judgement, TC, 
ICTY, 16 November 1998, para. 346. 
1324 Delalić et al., Judgement, TC, ICTY, 16 November 1998, para. 394. See Bantekas who has made a 
difference between different types of command (e.g., operational commanders and executive commanders) 
and analyzed what is reasonable to expect from the different types of commanders. Bantekas 1999, at 584-
587.
1325 Strugar, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 31 January 2005, para. 378. 
1326 Article 7(3) does thus not provide a superior with two alternative options. Strugar, Judgement, TC, 
ICTY, 31 January 2005, para. 373.
1327 Blaškić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 29 July 2004, para. 83. See also e.g., Halilović, Decision (indictment), 
TC, ICTY, 17 December 2004, para. 31, and Hadžihasanović & Kubura, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 15 March 
2006, para. 127 (regarding ongoing crimes). 
1328 Strugar, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 31 January 2005, para. 373. See also e.g., Halilović, Judgement, TC, 
ICTY, 16 November 2005, para. 72. 
1329 See e.g., Nuotio 1998(a), at 288. Nerlich, on his part, argues that it should be enough to prove that the 
superior’s failure increased the risk for the subordinate’s crime. V. Nerlich, ‘Superior Responsibility under 
Article 28 ICC Statute: For What Exactly Is the Superior Held Responsible?’, 5 Journal of International 
Criminal Justice (2007), at 673.  
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(b) situations where the omission of a person influences another person who physically 
causes the harm.1330  In the latter case, which the superior responsibility cases represent, 
the outcome is dependent on the “free decision” of the other person, which makes it 
impossible to speak of causation in the natural science sense.1331 To establish causation 
in “human chains” generally requires that the person influenced acknowledges that 
she/he has been influenced.1332 As superior responsibility in most cases involve “human 
behavior [...] [where] no precise law of natural science exists to predict, in what cases 
and by which means human beings can definitively be influenced”, Triffterer argues 
that emphasis should be put on what “experience over the years, generations, and even 
centuries” have taught us of how (military) hierarchies function.1333 In criminal law, 
it is thus possible to use, for example, criminological and psychological knowledge to 
assess whether it is reasonable to conclude that the superior has influenced, inspired, 
supported, etc. his/her subordinates. The ad hoc tribunals have not opted for this 
possibility, as they have in relation to superior responsibility not demanded any proof 
of causation.1334 
The ad hoc tribunals’ approach to causality in connection to preventive superior 
responsibility has been criticized by a number of scholars.1335 The question of whether 
causality should be demanded is partly connected to the question for what a superior 
is punished for in cases of superior responsibility.1336 Meloni has, for example, noted 
that if the superior is merely punished for his failure to act there is no need to require 
causality, whereas a punishment for the crime of the subordinate (“contribution”) 
makes a causality requirement more called for.1337 It should be noted that if causality 
is demanded, the question of the relationship between superior responsibility and 
responsibility for participation/contribution through an omission becomes topical, 
1330 Nuotio has observed that psychological influencing is especially problematic to assess from the point 
of view of traditional theories of causality and that causality in situations of complicity and omissions are 
very different from “traditional cases” of physical perpetration of a crime. Nuotio 1998(a), at 279-280. 
1331 Triffterer 2002, at 194-196. 
1332 Triffterer 2002, at 195-196. 
1333 Triffterer 2002, at 197. 
1334 E.g., Delalić et al., Judgement, TC, ICTY, 16 November 1998, para. 398 (see, however, also para. 399), 
Blaškić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 29 July 2004, para. 77, and Hadžihasanović & Kubura, Judgement, AC, 
ICTY, 22 April 2008, para. 40. See also Orić, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 30 June 2006, para. 338 (‘Although the 
superior’s measures must be directed at preventing imminent crimes of subordinates or at deterring future 
crimes through punishment, and thereby at least pursue a causal aim, this represents mere finality on the 
level of the superior’s intention. As concerns objective causality, however, it is well established case law of 
the Tribunal that it is not an element of superior criminal responsibility to prove that without the superior’s 
failure to prevent, the crimes of his subordinates would not have been committed.’) 
1335 E.g., K. Ambos, ‘Superior Responsibility’, in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta & J.R.W.D. Jones (eds.), The Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary, Volume I (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002), at 851, K. Ambos, ‘Command Responsibility and Organisationsherrschaft: Ways of Attributing 
International Crimes to the “Most Responsible”’, in A. Nollkaemper & H. van der Wilt (eds.), System 
Criminality in International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), at 134, Mettraux 2005, at 
309, and D. Robinson, ‘How Command Responsibility Got So Complicated: A Culpability Contradiction, 
Its Obfuscation, and a Simple Solution’, 13 Melbourne Journal of International Law (2012), at 3.
1336 See further Section 7.2.5.6. 
1337 C. Meloni, ‘Command Responsibility – Mode of Liability for the Crimes of Subordinates or Separate 
Offence of the Superior?,’ 5 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2007), at 629.
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and it may be questioned what the function of superior responsibility then would 
have.1338 
In relation to the failure to punish, it has, however clearly been settled that “it would 
make no sense to require a causal link between an offence committed by a subordinate 
and the subsequent failure of a superior to punish the perpetrator of that same offence.”1339 
In the Ndindiliyimana et al. case, the ICTR therefore suggested that there does not have 
to be a temporal concurrence between a superior’s effective control and the time when 
the crimes were committed in relation to the obligation to punish. When a new superior 
assumes command he/she “should be required to punish the perpetrators provided 
that he has the material ability to do so”.1340 The ICTY Appeals Chamber has, however, 
in a majority decision held that: “an accused cannot be charged under Article 7(3) of 
the Statute for crimes committed by a subordinate before the said accused assumed 
command over that subordinate. The Appeals Chamber is aware that views on this issue 
may differ.”1341 In failure to punish situations, the focus is on whether the superior has 
initiated any for him/her possible punitive measures, such as investigations regarding the 
subordinate’s misconduct or reporting them to competent authorities.1342
7.2.5.5.  The ICC and Superior Responsibility 
In the ICC Statute, the regulation of superior responsibility is more detailed than in the 
statutes of the ad hoc tribunals. The ICC Statute, inter alia, makes a difference between 
military commanders and other superiors. More specifically, Article 28 stipulates that 
military commanders or persons effectively acting as a military commander shall be 
criminally responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the court committed by 
forces under their effective command and control (or effective authority and control as 
the case may be) as a result of their failure to exercise control properly over such forces, 
where  that commander either knew or owing to the circumstances at the time should 
have known that the forces were committing or about to commit such crimes and the 
commander failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within his/her power to 
prevent or repress their commission or to submit the matter to the competent authorities 
for investigation and prosecution. Other superiors shall be held criminally responsible 
for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court committed by subordinates under their 
effective authority and control, as a result of their failure to exercise control properly 
over such subordinates, where the superior either knew or consciously disregarded 
information which clearly indicated that the subordinates were committing or about 
to commit such crimes, the crimes concerned activities that were within the effective 
responsibility and control of the superior and the superior failed to take all necessary 
and reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent or repress their commission 
or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution. 
1338 Orić, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 30 June 2006, para. 338. See also Jia 2004, at 32, and Meloni 2007, at 629. 
1339 Orić, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 30 June 2006, para. 338. See also Delalić et al., Judgement, TC, ICTY, 16 
November 1998, para. 400, and Hadžihasanović & Kubura, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 15 March 2006, para. 
188. 
1340 Ndindiliyimana et al., Judgement, TC, ICTR, 17 May 2011, paras 1961-1962. 
1341 Hadžihasanović et al., Decision (command responsibility), AC, ICTY, 16 July 2003, para. 51 (see also 
para. 37). See also Cryer et al. 2010, at 391.
1342 See e.g., Hadžihasanović & Kubura, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 15 March 2006, paras 173-178. 
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The most significant difference between the ICC Statute and the case law of the ad 
hoc tribunals is the distinction between military and non-military superiors in relation 
to requirements of constructive knowledge. While the legal standard before the ad hoc 
tribunals is “had reason to know,” the ICC standard is “owing to the circumstances 
at the time should have known” in respect of military commanders and “consciously 
disregarded information which clearly indicated that the subordinates were committing 
or about to commit such crimes” in respect to non-military commanders. This raises the 
question exactly how does the ICC standard differs from the standard applied by the ad 
hoc tribunals.1343 
In respect of military commanders, the ICC standard of “owing to the circumstances 
at the time should have known” can be seen to reintroduce the negligence standard 
explicitly rejected by the ad hoc tribunals.1344 On the other hand, it has also been 
suggested that the ICC provision could be construed so that it does not that much depart 
from the ad hoc tribunals’ doctrine.1345 In the Bemba case, a Pre-Trial Chamber seems to 
have followed the first approach, as the chamber interpreted the “should have known” 
standard to introduce negligence responsibility.1346 It should be noted that due to the fact 
that the ad hoc tribunals have rejected negligence responsibility, the difference between 
the ad hoc tribunals gross negligence/wilful blindness standard and the ICC standard of 
“consciously disregarded information which clearly indicated that the subordinates were 
committing or about to commit such crimes” in respect to non-military commanders 
is, in fact, not that considerable.1347 The “disjointed” or “bifurcated” system of superior 
responsibility established by the ICC Statute has been criticized for making it necessary 
for the ICC to separate the two different types of superiors, as this may sometimes be 
difficult as there are superiors who have both civilian and military responsibilities.1348   
1343 It should be noted that the ICC Statute predates much of the case law of the ad hoc tribunals, including 
the significant judgements in the Delalić et al. case. Regarding the negotiations of Article 28 in the 
ICC Statute, see e.g., UN Doc. A/CONF.183/2/Add.1, at 51, M. H. Arsanjani, ‘The Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court’, 93 American Journal of International Law (1999), at 37, and Boas, Bischoff 
& Reid 2007, at 254-257. 
1344 E.g., N. Pisani, ‘The Mental Element in International Crime,’ in F. Lattanzi & W. A. Schabas (eds.), 
Essays on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Volume II (Ripa di Fagnano Alto: il Sirente, 
2004), at 135-136, and Triffterer 2002, at 192. 
1345 E.g., Boas, Bischoff & Reid 2007, at 258-259. See, however, Mundis who prefers the Blaškić/ICC 
approach over the current ICTY standard. Mundis 2003, at 261-262 and 275.
1346 Bemba, Decision (confirmation of charges), PTC, ICC, 15 June 2009, paras 429 and 434. See also R. 
Cryer, ‘Command Responsibility at the ICC and ICTY: In Two Minds on the Mental Element’, EJIL Talk! 
[blog], 20 July 2009 (‘This cuts quite directly against what the ICTY and ICTR have consistently held, at 
least since the decision of the Appeals Chamber in Bagilishema [...] that negligence is not the standard. The 
mental element in the ICTY is summed up by the Appeals Chamber in Čelebići, as not covering negligence 
in failure to find out about offences, instead requiring either actual knowledge or that the superior ‘had 
in his possession information of a nature, which, at the least, would put him on notice of the risk of such 
offences by indicating the need for additional investigation’ [...].’)
1347 Boas, Bischoff & Reid 2007, at 259-260. Cf., however, Vetter who argues that the consciously disregarded 
standard “may go much further” in lessening a civilian superior’s duty to remain informed. G. R. Vetter, 
‘Command Responsibility of Non-Military Superiors in the International Criminal Court (ICC)’, 25 Yale 
Journal of International Law (2000), at 124.
1348 G. Mettraux, The Law of Command Responsibility (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) 26-27. See 
also e.g., Bemba, Decision (confirmation of charges), PTC, ICC, 15 June 2009, paras 408-410. 
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A second difference between the statutes of the ad hoc tribunals and the ICC is 
the requirement in the ICC Statute that the crimes of the subordinate occur as a result 
of the superior’s failure to exercise control. The ICC Statute thus seems to introduce a 
requirement of causation not supported by the case law of the ad hoc tribunals.1349 Such 
a requirement of causation has been found to be in line with the fact that according to 
the ICC Statute, the superior is held responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
court committed by their subordinates. On the other hand, however, it has also been 
noted that a requirement of causation blurs the line between participation liability and 
superior liability,1350 and strongly limits the superior’s obligation to punish crimes by 
subordinates. In the Bemba case, the Pre-Trial Chamber noted that the requirement of 
causality was fulfilled when it was established that the commander’s omission “increased 
the risk of the commission of the crimes charged”.1351 Here, it should be noted that 
Mettraux has argued that the requirement of causation is different in relation to aiding 
and abetting responsibility and superior responsibility, and that whereas it in relation to 
aiding and abetting is required substantial effect on the commission of the crime by the 
principal offender, the requirement in relation to superior responsibility should be that 
“the failure to act was a significant – though not necessarily the sole – contributing factor 
in the commission of the crime [...] [and that this causation] goes [...] to the general 
ability of the perpetrator to carry out his deeds [...].”1352 Also Mettraux seems to suggest 
a “causation” corresponding to creating an increased risk for harm. 
7.2.5.6.  Superior Responsibility and the Type of Responsibility
In some domestic criminal justice systems, criminal responsibility for omissions is 
divided into responsibility for genuine and non-genuine omission offences. Genuine 
omission offences then refer to offences that only can be committed through an omission 
and where the relevant consideration is that a person has omitted to do something he/
she should have done. The omission in these situations does not have to result in a special 
criminal harm. Non-genuine omission offences, on the other hand, refer to offences 
causing harm that can be committed both through acts and omissions (“commission 
through omission”). Omission responsibility for these crimes generally requires a special 
obligation to act, as it is felt that criminal responsibility otherwise becomes too broad. 
The sentences for genuine omission offences are, as a rule, less severe than for offences 
connected to the causing of harm.1353 
Another similar distinction is that between direct responsibility for a dereliction 
of duty and indirect responsibility for the criminal acts of another person. While 
responsibility for a genuine omission offence generally equals responsibility for a 
dereliction of a duty, indirect responsibility and responsibility for non-genuine omission 
offences are by no means equivalent. Non-genuine omission responsibility generally 
arises in situations where a harmful outcome has been caused by an omission. The 
central question is then whether individuals causing harm through omissive behaviour 
1349 Bemba, Decision (confirmation of charges), PTC, ICC, 15 June 2009, paras 423-424. See also e.g., 
Ambos 2002(b), at 860, Boas, Bischoff & Reid 2007, at 260-262, and Jia 2004, at 14-15.
1350 Cf. Jia 2004, at 15. 
1351 Bemba, Decision (confirmation of charges), PTC, ICC, 15 June 2009, para. 425. 
1352 Mettraux 2009, at 42-43 (see also 87-89). 
1353 See e.g., Jareborg 1995(a), at 118-121. 
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can be blamed for the harm. In indirect responsibility, on the other hand, the focus is not 
on what kind of behaviour has caused the harm (that is, act or omission), but on whether 
a person not personally causing any harm any way can be blamed for it. As noted before, 
the responsibility is often called vicarious when it is based on the special relationship 
between the individuals. 
In the legal literature, superior responsibility has, inter alia, been called 
responsibility for a genuine omission offence,1354 vicarious liability,1355 imputed 
liability,1356 co-perpetrator/accomplice responsibility,1357 and functional responsibility.1358 
These differences in categorization can partly be explained with uncertainties regarding 
the content of the doctrine, especially regarding the required relationship between the 
superior’s omission and the subordinate’s crime. The differences are, however, also due 
to variations in terminology and difficulties connected with trying to use domestic 
concepts to describe international phenomena. If the superior is held responsible for 
the crime of his/her subordinate without a causal connection between the omission and 
the subordinate’s crime, it, in fact, appears that superior responsibility is a sui generis 
form of criminal responsibility with very few domestic equivalents. A special feature is 
that the responsibility form entails dual liability. The superior is blamed both for his/
her omission and the crime of his/her subordinate.1359 The sentence imposed on the 
1354 E.g., Ambos 2002(b), at 824, and Ambos 2009(a), at 131 (regarding the ICC version). It should, however, 
be noted that in relation to superior responsibility mere failure to act is not sufficient for responsibility. The 
superior’s subordinates must de facto commit underlying offences, that is, produce harm. On the concept of 
subordinates’ “committing” crimes, see further Blagojević & Jokić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 9 May 2007, para. 280. 
1355 E.g., Darcy 2007(b), at 391. The opposite view is expressed by e.g., Bantekas 2002, at 98, and Mettraux 
2005, at 297.  
1356 E.g., Bantekas 1999, at 577. 
1357 E.g., Schabas 2009, at 361 and 363 (speaking of command responsibility as a form of criminal 
participation). The contrary view is expressed by e.g., Meloni 2007, at 632. Ambos has found that one of 
the problems with the doctrine of superior responsibility, is that the doctrine seems to establish direct or 
principal responsibility, and not accomplice responsibility. Ambos 2009(a), at 132. 
1358 E.g., H. van der Wilt, ‘Joint Criminal Enterprise and Functional Perpetration’, in A. Nollkaemper & 
H. van der Wilt (eds.), System Criminality in International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2009), at 180, and M. Wladimiroff, ‘Former Heads of State on Trial’, 38 Cornell International Law Journal 
(2005), at 954. On the nature of command responsibility, see also e.g., R. Cryer & O. Bekou, ‘International 
Crimes and ICC Cooperation in England and Wales’, 5 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2007), 
at 446, and W. A. Schabas, ‘Canadian Implementing Legislation for the Rome Statute’, 3 Yearbook of 
International Humanitarian Law (2000), at 342. 
1359 In some trial chamber judgements it has, however, been suggested that the superior is only punished 
for his omission. E.g., Hadžihasanović & Kubura, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 15 March 2006, para. 2075, and 
Orić, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 30 June 2006, para. 293. The Orić Appeals Chamber did not consider the 
nature of super responsibility, as it reversed the conviction of Orić based on Article 7(3). See, however, 
Orić, Judgement (decl. of Judge Shahabuddeen), AC, ICTY, 3 July 2008, paras 18-26. The Hadžihasanović 
& Kubura Appeal Judgement, however, clearly stressed that “the gravity of a subordinate’s crime remains 
[...] an ‘essential consideration’ in assessing the gravity of the superior’s own conduct”. Hadžihasanović & 
Kubura, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 22 April 2008, para. 313. It is therefore questionable whether one can argue 
that the doctrine of command responsibility has changed from a doctrine emphasizing responsibility 
for the acts of the subordinates to a doctrine emphasizing the omission of the superior. Cf. T. Weigend, 
‘Superior Responsibility: Complicity, Omission or Over-Extension of the Criminal Law’, in C. Burchard, 
O. Triffterer, & J. Vogel (eds.), The Review Conference and the Future of the International Criminal Court 
(Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2010), at 70.  
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superior may, however, be more lenient than the one imposed on the subordinate.1360 It 
thus appears that the much debated question whether superior responsibility is a form of 
indirect liability or an offence of dereliction of duty is a false one. 
Another special feature of superior responsibility is that it is the special relationship 
between the superior and the subordinate (link to physical perpetrator) that compensates 
for the lack of a causal relationship between the superior and the underlying offence 
(link to crime).1361 In superior responsibility, the superior is thus not found to have 
committed the underlying offence through his/her omission (which would be the case in 
non-genuine omission offences) or to have participated in/contributed to the crime.1362 
Instead, it is the combination of a personal omission and the special relationship with 
the subordinate that is the ground for the superior’s responsibility for the underlying 
offence. It should be noted that this very indirect relationship between the superior 
and the underlying offence raises the question to what extent the seriousness of the 
underlying offence should affect the sentence of the superior. The prevailing answer 
appears to be that it is not the seriousness of the underlying offence alone that should 
influence the outcome, but the seriousness of the superior’s omission taking into 
consideration the gravity of the subordinate’s criminality.1363 Superior responsibility is in 
this regard especially problematic in situations of constructive knowledge. Taking into 
consideration the seriousness of the crimes, it has namely been found problematic that 
a superior can punished harshly for getting drunk at the wrong time, for taking an ill-
advised holiday or for being incompetent or distracted.1364 On the other hand, it could be 
argued the other way around that taking into consideration the seriousness of the crimes, 
there is a greater need for society to also criminalize non-prudent behaviour. It should 
further be emphasized that in superior responsibility, it is not only a causal connection 
to the harm or participation that is lacking, but also the traditional requirement of intent, 
which makes superior responsibility a responsibility form that significantly differs from 
traditional criminal responsibility.1365 
From the point of view of this study, it is furthermore interesting that Ambos besides 
calling superior responsibility a form of genuine offence of omission has characterized it as 
an offence which creates danger,1366 that is, an endangerment offence. This characterization 
is interesting as Duff has observed that attacks (“normal crimes”) and endangerments 
constitute two completely different types of criminal wrongs as endangerments are 
characterized by failures of proper concern whereas attacks are characterized by hostility 
1360 van Sliedregt 2009, at 188.
1361 Jia 2004, at 33. 
1362 This is, inter alia, reflected in the fact that the mens rea of the superior does not need to be established 
with reference to all the objective and subjective elements of the subordinate’s crime. Meloni 2007, at 
630-631. See, however, the Blagojević & Jokić and Brđanin judgements, in which it was required that the 
superior had knowledge of the subordinate’s genocidal intent. Blagojević & Jokić, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 17 
January 2005, para. 686, and Brđanin, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 1 September 2004, para. 721.
1363 See e.g., Hadžihasanović & Kubura, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 22 April 2008, para. 313, which emphasizes 
that two matters must be taken into account, viz. (1) the gravity of the underlying crime committed by 
the convicted person’s subordinate; and (2) the gravity of the convicted person’s own conduct in failing to 
prevent or punish the underlying crimes. See further Section 9.2.3.
1364 Nersessian 2006, at 93.
1365 Hadžihasanović & Kubura, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 15 March 2006, para. 2076.
1366 Ambos 2002(b), at 824, 828 and 845.   
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towards the interests or people that are attacked and hence intent to cause harm.1367 
By calling superior responsibility an endangerment offence, it is thus possible to stress 
that completely different criminalization rationales underlie superior responsibility and 
participation responsibility. The main goal of superior responsibility is often understood 
to be to ensure a responsible command,1368 that is, to function as an incentive for 
superiors to perform their duties properly and carefully. This is a very utilitarian or goal-
oriented rationale, which makes more retributive or backwards-looking concerns of exact 
blameworthiness of the behaviour difficult to apply to the doctrine.1369 It should be noted 
that the number of endangerment offences has grown in many domestic criminal justice 
systems during the last decades.1370 Endangerment criminalizations are thus possible, 
even though they raise the difficult question of which risks are acceptable and which 
unacceptable.1371
From the point of view of the phenomenology of the international crimes, this idea 
that superior responsibility is an endangerment offence and not merely an offence of 
dereliction of duty is intriguing. It should namely be remembered that most international 
crimes are committed in armed conflicts and in totalitarian societies, that is, in contexts 
where there is often much violence and many crimes. Furthermore, the possible harms 
resulting from derelictions of duties are often significantly more serious than in normal 
contexts of peace.1372 These two factors clearly can influence what is regarded as risk-
behaviour. It would be possible to require from superiors functioning in armed conflicts 
and in totalitarian regimes constant monitoring of their subordinates and to punish 
negligence in this regard.1373 
On the other hand, and especially in relation to more low-level superiors, it is often 
pointed out that armed conflicts and totalitarian regimes are chaotic environments, in 
which it can be difficult to supervise subordinates effectively. The context characteristics, 
1367 R. A. Duff, ‘Criminalizing Endangerment’, 65 Lousiana Law Review (2005), at 945. It should namely 
be noted that the present doctrine of superior responsibility is not concerned with the “potential danger 
inherent in the failure to control”, but with inactivity in a situation where a legally protected interest de 
facto is concretely endangered. Triffterer 2002, at 199.
1368 Cf. e.g., the discussion on the relationship between the concepts of “responsible command” and 
“superior responsibility”. Hadžihasanović et al., Decision (command responsibility), AC, ICTY, 16 July 
2003, para. 22 (‘The Appeals Chamber recognizes that there is a difference between the concepts of 
responsible command and command responsibility. The difference is due to the fact that the concept of 
responsible command looks to the duties comprised in the idea of command, whereas that of command 
responsibility looks at liability flowing from breach of those duties. But, [...] the elements of command 
responsibility are derived from the elements of responsible command.’)
1369 See Womack on utilitarian and retributive perspectives on superior responsibility, even though Womack 
discusses these perspectives regarding the mens rea requirement only. B. Womack, ‘The Development and 
Recent Applications of the Doctrine of Command Responsibility: With Particular Reference to the Mens 
Rea Requirement’, in S. Yee (ed.), International Crime and Punishment, Volume 1 (Lanham: University 
Press of America, 2003), at 105-111 and 138-142.
1370 Takala 1995, at 52.  
1371 Takala 1995, at 56 ff. 
1372 Bantekas 2002, at 95. 
1373 Regarding the relationship between endangerment and negligence criminalizations, Takala has noted 
that some criminal law scholars have suggested that negligence criminalizations should be replaced with 
endangerment criminalizations, as offences of negligence are considered to be “relics of an uncivilized 
sense of justice”. Takala 1995, at 54.  
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as well as the seriousness of the consequences of mere negligence, can thus be used to 
argument in the other way, that is, to speak against extensive superior responsibility. The 
question of what legitimately can be expected from superiors and what are “excessive 
obligations”1374 is thus not straightforward. 
7.2.5.7. The Relationship between Superior Responsibility and Other Forms of 
Responsibility
Besides the question of the nature of superior responsibility, the question of the 
relationship between superior responsibility and participatory responsibility has been 
debated. In the indictments before the ad hoc tribunals, the prosecutors have often 
charged the accused persons in the alternative based on both forms of responsibility. 
Some scholars have noted that this is odd, at least if the charges in relation to the 
participatory responsibility is framed in terms of active participation and the charges 
on superior responsibility claim that the accused person remained passive in the same 
situation.1375 The prosecutorial practice can often be explained with the desire to ensure 
a conviction in situations where the prosecutor is not sure that he/she can prove active 
participation. It has, however, also sometimes been suggested that two alternative heads 
of responsibility concern different aspects of the accused’s criminal actions.1376 It should 
also be noted that in the case law of the ad hoc tribunals, it has been established that 
participatory responsibility also can arise from omissions.1377 This emphasizes that the 
difference between participatory and superior responsibility is not merely the act or 
omission distinction. Whether the ICC will accept participatory responsibility based 
on omissions is unclear. A draft article, which explicitly provided that the conduct for 
which a person may be criminally responsible and liable can constitute either an act or 
an omission, was deleted at the Rome Conference.1378 
In the case law of the ad hoc tribunals, the alternative charging has primarily 
been discussed from the point of view of the following two questions: (1) Can an 
individual be convicted for both responsibility forms for the same behaviour; and (2) 
What responsibility form should be chosen if a conviction for both is possible but not 
permissible. As regards the first question, some early convictions allowed convictions 
based on both heads of responsibility for the same crime,1379 but today the prevailing case 
law is that it is inappropriate to convict an accused for both forms of responsibility.1380 
1374 Ambos 2002(b), at 847. 
1375 See e.g., Ambos 2007(a), at 179-180, and Mettraux 2005, at 311. 
1376 Cf. Mettraux 2005, at 311. 
1377 See e.g., the discussion on aiding and abetting by omission. Boas, Bischoff & Reid 2007, at 310-315. 
1378 UN Doc. A/CONF.183/2/Add.1, at 54, and UN Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/WGGP/L.4/Add.1, at 4 (draft 
Article 28). See also B. Goy, ‘Individual Criminal Responsibility before the International Criminal Court: 
A Comparison with the Ad Hoc Tribunals’, 12 International Criminal Law Review (2012), at 5, and R. 
Cryer, ‘General Principles of Liability in International Criminal Law’, in D. McGoldrick et al. (eds.), The 
Permanent International Criminal Court: Legal and Policy Issues (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004), at 236-
240.  
1379 E.g., Aleksovski, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 25 June 1999, para. 228. 
1380 See e.g., Blaškić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 29 July 2004, para. 91, Gacumbitsi, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 7 
July 2006, para. 142, Kajelijeli, Judgement, AC, ICTR, 23 May 2005, para. 81, and Naletilić & Martinović, 
Judgement, AC, ICTY, 3 May 2006, para. 368. 
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The tribunals have, however, not clearly reasoned why concurrent convictions should not 
be tolerated.1381
As regards the second question, it is also possible to find case law pointing at different 
directions and not that much reasoning and discussion. In some cases, the tribunals 
have suggested that the responsibility mode that better characterizes the criminality of 
the accused should be chosen.1382 In other cases, the tribunals have, however, expressed 
a preference for participatory responsibility, and have argued than when both forms of 
responsibility are possible a conviction should only be entered based on participatory 
responsibility.1383 This preference for participatory responsibility has now been endorsed 
by the appeals chambers of the ad hoc tribunals.1384 The ICC appears to follow the 
approach taken by the ad hoc tribunals.1385
While the preference for participatory responsibility reflects the fact that the wrongfulness 
of active participation generally is greater than the wrongfulness of passive tolerance,1386 the 
rule can, however, be criticized for being too categorical1387 and for unnecessary limiting 
the trial chambers’ powers especially as participatory responsibility also can arise from 
omissions.1388 While most scholars clearly appreciate perpetrator responsibility as the most 
serious type of responsibility, the question of whether superior responsibility or aiding and 
1381 See further Boas, Bischoff & Reid 2007, at 396 ff. According to Ambos, the Trial Chamber in the Krštić 
case apparently resolved the conflict between enterprise and superior responsibility by drawing an analogy 
to the rules on concurrence of offences, that is, looking to the rules of false or apparent concurrence 
whereby the larger crime (subparagraph 1) prevails over and absorbs the smaller crime (subparagraph 
3). Ambos 2007(a), at 163. It has also been suggested that it is illogical to at the same time claim that 
both active and passive behaviour has occurred. Kamuhanda, Judgement (sep. and part. diss. op. of Judge 
Shahabuddeen), AC, ICTR, 19 September 2005, para. 410 (‘The Blaškic rule is based on the illogicality 
of holding, under article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute, that the crime committed by a subordinate was in the 
first instance ordered by the accused himself, and of at the same time holding, under article 7(3), that 
the accused, as the superior, failed to prevent the commission of the crime by the subordinate or failed 
to punish the subordinate for committing it. The assumption of the ordering situation under the article 
7(1) is that the accused actively advanced the commission of the crime; the assumption of the command 
responsibility situation under article 7(3) is that he did not.’)
1382 E.g., Gacumbitsi, Judgement, TC, ICTR, 17 June 2004, para. 266, Galić, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 5 
December 2003, para. 177, Krnjolelac, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 15 March 2002, para. 173, and Ntagerura et 
al., Judgement, TC, ICTR, 25 February 2004, para. 623.
1383 See e.g., Krštić, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 2 August 2001, para. 605, Stakić, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 31 
July 2003, paras 465-466, and Orić, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 30 June 2006, para. 342 (‘the Trial Chamber 
finds that active involvement by way of participating in the principal crime carries greater weight than 
failure by omission. Further, the Trial Chamber finds that participation in the crime means to have made 
a causal contribution to the impairment of the protected interest, whereas the failure as a superior need 
not necessarily contribute to the injury as such, but may merely involve the omission of his duty, as is 
particularly evident in the case of failure to punish.’) 
1384 E.g., Blaškić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 29 July 2004, para. 91, Kajelijeli, Judgement, AC, ICTR, 23 May 
2005, para. 81, and Kvočka et al., Judgement, AC, ICTY, 28 February 2005, para. 104.
1385 E.g., Bemba, Decision (confirmation of charges), PTC, ICC, 15 June 2009, paras 342 and 402 (Bemba 
was primarily charged based on Article 25(3) and only alternatively based on Article 28).
1386 Orić, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 30 June 2006, paras 342-343. 
1387 The idea that results caused by acts always are more wrongful than those caused by omissions has, e.g., 
been questioned. See e.g., F. Muñoz-Conde & L. E. Chiesa, ‘The Act Requirement as a Basic Concept of 
Criminal Law’, 28 Cardozo Law Review (2007), at 2473. 
1388 Cf. Boas, Bischoff & Reid 2007, at 401.
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abetting is more blameworthy is by no means easy to answer. For example, Bonafè appears to 
think that superior responsibility is more stigmatizing than “mere” accomplice liability.1389 It 
is likely that many others think the same way. It may therefore be argued that the hierarchy 
created by the ad hoc tribunals between the different responsibility forms can be criticized 
for not reflecting the fact that the active participation form of aiding and abetting in many 
domestic legal systems is reserved for insignificant participants in crimes and that superior 
responsibility from a labelling perspective is more neutral. 
7.2.6.  The De Facto Popularity of the Different Attribution Alternatives
As this Chapter has demonstrated, the international prosecutors have many alternative 
attribution doctrines they can use when making claims about individual criminal 
responsibility. At least in the beginning of the functioning of the ad hoc tribunals, 
the tribunals also made use of many different participation modes and it was difficult 
to identify a clear favourite among the alternatives. Increasingly, however, the non-
statutory JCE doctrine has found its way to the indictments and has already for some 
time now been the most popular participation mode at least before the ICTY.1390 The 
popularity of the enterprise theory is often explained with the fact that it is felt that the 
theory allows “convictions not possible with more traditional theories of liability”1391 
and that it makes it possible for the prosecutor to overcome special evidentiary 
problems.1392 For example, Schabas has called the JCE theory the “magic bullet of 
the Office of the Prosecutor.”1393 Some other scholars, however, have argued that the 
enterprise doctrine better than the other attribution theories describes the reality 
of joint action common in relation to many international crimes.1394 It has also been 
noted that there is a “clear symbolic dimension to convicting a defendant for having 
participated in a JCE [... as] ‘joint criminal enterprise’ sounds more serious than 
simply alleging that someone [...] has been found liable on a complicity theory.”1395 
1389 See e.g., Bonafè 2007, at 615.
1390 The first public indictment to explicitly rely on the enterprise doctrine was confirmed in June 2001. 
Marston Danner and Martinez have calculated that 64 % of the ICTY indictments confirmed between 25 
June 2001 and 1 January 2004 contained enterprise responsibility claims. Marston Danner & Martinez 
2005, at 107. The popularity of the enterprise doctrine has continued after this. Marston Danner and 
Martinez also think that some of the early ICTY cases (e.g., the Delalić et al. case) probably today would be 
prosecuted with the enterprise doctrine. Ibid., at 131. 
1391 Cf. D. S. Donnelly-Cole, ‘Not Just a Few Bad Apples: The Prosecution of Collective Violence’, 5 
Washington University Global Studies Law Review (2006), at 159. 
1392 Marston Danner & Martinez 2005, at 133. 
1393 Schabas 2003(b), at 1032. 
1394 E.g., Mettraux 2005, at 292. 
1395 Marston Danner & Martinez 2005, at 145. Some responsibility forms that take into consideration the 
collective nature of international criminality have been more or less completely abandoned in modern 
international criminal law, namely conspiracy and criminal organization responsibility. Chouliaras has, 
however, characterized JCE as the “evolution and refinement” of these doctrines applied by the post-
World War II tribunals. It may thus be argued that the doctrines have in this regard not completely been 
abandoned. A. Chouliaras, ‘From ‘Conspiracy’ to ‘Joint Criminal Enterprise’: In Search of the Organizational 
Parameter’, in C. Stahn & L. van den Herik (eds.), Future Perspectives on International Criminal Justice 
(The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2010), at 572-573. Furthermore, in connection to genocide, conspiracy 
responsibility is still sometimes asserted. 
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Despite the merits of the enterprise theory, its advancement has not been applauded by 
everybody. On the contrary, many academics have found it problematic primarily due 
to questions relating to its compatibility with established criminal law thinking. It is 
therefore possible that the popularity of JCE doctrine in the future will decrease. Such 
a development is, in fact, likely due to the alternative participation modes suggested by 
the ICC Statute and the refusal of the ICC to accept the JCE in its early case law.1396 The 
early ICC case law indicates that direct and indirect co-perpetratorship responsibility 
will be popular before that court. 
It should be observed that superior responsibility, in the same way as enterprise 
responsibility, often has been charged before the international criminal tribunals. Not 
that many individuals have, however, been convicted for superior responsibility. Schabas, 
in this regard, notes that: 
In the early years of the tribunals, superior responsibility was presented as the silver 
bullet of the prosecution. It was an endless source of fascination for commentators 
and postgraduate students. Its practical results have been almost insignificant. [...] 
The handful of convictions by the ad hoc tribunals that have depended upon superior 
responsibility alone have resulted in short sentences, reflecting the fact that these are 
most definitely not in the category of the most serious crimes committed by the most 
serious perpetrators.1397 
Bonafè explains the decrease of the doctrine’s popularity with the ad hoc tribunals’ explicit 
preference for participatory liability.1398 Osiel, on his part, has found that it has been 
made too hard to find people liable under the doctrine of command responsibility.1399 
The popularity of various responsibility forms is hence besides the prosecutorial choices 
dependent on judicial decision-making. In the Kalimanzira Appeal Judgement, the ICTR 
Appeals Chamber stressed that it is enough that the chambers implicitly consider all 
forms of liability pleaded in the indictment, that is, that it is up to the chambers to decide 
which indicted responsibility forms they discuss explicitly and convict upon.1400 It is 
hence up to the chambers to decide which indicted and established responsibility form 
they find “most appropriate”1401 or the one that “best describes” the criminal behaviour 
of the accused.1402 
Before the ICC, “the Chamber is only bound by the factual basis and the evidence 
and information provided by the Prosecutor in his application”, that is, a chamber 
1396 See e.g., Lubanga, Decision (confirmation of charges), PTC, ICC, 29 January 2007, paras 325-338. See 
also T. Weigend, ‘Intent, Mistake of Law, and Co-Perpetration in the Lubanga Decision on Confirmation 
of Charges’, 6 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2008), at 478.  
1397 Schabas 2007, at 222-223. 
1398 Bonafè 2007, at 599 and 602. 
1399 Osiel 2005(b), at 794. 
1400 Kalimanzira, Judgement, AC, ICTR, 20 October 2010, para. 207. The Appeals Chamber of the 
ICTY has also reaffirmed that it considers that it has a right to enter convictions based on alternate 
modes of responsibility. Gotovina & Markač, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 16 November 2012, paras 106 
and 155.
1401 Kalimanzira, Judgement, AC, ICTR, 20 October 2010, para. 207.
1402 Rukundo, Judgement, AC, ICTR, 20 October 2010, para. 39.
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may legally characterize the conduct as it best sees.1403 After a chamber has decided 
upon what modes of responsibility the trial shall be held, it may, however, be difficult 
to modify them afterwards. In the Lubanga case, Judge Fulford emphasized this in a 
separate opinion: 
Abandoning the control of the crime theory for the purposes of the Article 74 
Decision [= judgement] would significantly modify the law governing the charges, 
at a stage when the evidence is closed and the parties have made their submissions. 
The alternative approach which I have described above arguably involves applying 
a “lesser” test. If at this stage in the proceedings (and without prior notice) the 
Chamber ruled that the prosecution only has to establish a contribution – as opposed 
to an “essential” contribution – the trial would be rendered unfair [...]. The accused 
is likely to have made a number of tactical decisions that, at least in part, have been 
informed by the legal requirements for a conviction. [...]1404
Also a recent decision in the Katanga and Ngudjolo case emphasizes the significance of 
the legal characterization of facts before the ICC. In that case, the majority of the trial 
chamber decided to recharacterize the charges after all evidence in the case had been 
heard, which made Judge van den Wyngaert put forward a strong dissent: 
With this decision, the Majority gives notice under Regulation 55(2) that it is 
considering a recharacterisation of the facts of the case to accord with a different 
form of criminal responsibility. Instead of pronouncing itself on whether or not 
the evidence establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that Germain Katanga is 
guilty as charged, i.e. under Article 25(3)(a) of the Statute, the Majority now 
proposes to consider whether he is guilty under Article 25(3)(d)(ii) of the Statute. 
This mode of liability differs noticeably from the one under which the charges 
in this trial have been brought and on the basis of which the entire trial has 
proceeded. As a result, Germain Katanga can now be potentially convicted under 
Article 25(3)(d)(ii), even if he were to be acquitted under Article 25(3)(a) on all 
charges.1405
1403 Gaddafi et al., Decision (arrest warrant), PTC, ICC, 27 June 2011, para. 70. See also Regulation 55 
of the ICC Regulations of the Court: “1. In its decision under article 74, the Chamber may change the 
legal characterisation of facts to accord with the crimes [...] or to accord with the form of participation 
of the accused under articles 25 and 28, without exceeding the facts and circumstances described in the 
charges and any amendments to the charges. 2. If, at any time during the trial, it appears to the Chamber 
that the legal characterisation of facts may be subject to change, the Chamber shall give notice to the 
participants of such a possibility and having heard the evidence, shall, at an appropriate stage of the 
proceedings, give the participants the opportunity to make oral or written submissions. The Chamber 
may suspend the hearing to ensure that the participants have adequate time and facilities for effective 
preparation or, if necessary, it may order a hearing to consider all matters relevant to the proposed 
change. [...]” ICC Doc. ICC-BD/01-01-04. Before the ad hoc tribunals there is no provision similar to 
Regulation 55.   
1404 Lubanga, Judgment (sep. op. of Judge Fulford), TC, ICC, 14 March 2012, paras 20-21 (‘In my view, 
this requirement for notice means that the accused should not only be informed of the factual allegations 
against him, but he needs to be aware of the basic outline of the legal framework against which those facts 
will be determined.’)
1405 Katanga & Ngudjolo, Decision (Regulation 55, diss. op. of Judge van der Wyngaert), TC, ICC, 21 
November 2012, para. 2. 
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The decision has been found to give rise to “serious fair trial issues”.1406
7.3.  Analysis
7.3.1.  Introduction: Fair Labelling as the Starting Point for the Analysis 
The discussion of the various attribution possibilities has shown that there exist multiple 
different possibilities to connect individuals to international crimes. From a prosecutor’s 
or judges’ perspective, this multitude is, however, sometimes a chimera, as lack of 
evidence may make certain prosecutorial strategies or convictions impossible to make. 
From the point of view of this study, more interesting is, however, the question of what 
responsibility form is chosen when the evidence would allow for alternative convictions. 
Also the modes of responsibility may hence be analyzed from a fair labelling perspective. 
The label chosen should both send an accurate picture of what the offender has done and 
signal his/her blameworthiness correctly. The label chosen is important both for fairness 
to the accused and for public communication.1407 
The responsibility form chosen may hence send different signals about the offender’s 
individual behaviour. At the same time, however, the choice of a certain participation 
mode may also portray the collective criminal happening in different ways. Piacente has, 
for example, observed that while the ICTY indictments issued before 2001 often alleged 
that the accused had committed the crimes charged in isolation or in cooperation with 
co-perpetrators, the more recent ICTY indictments portray the events differently, as 
collective enterprises.1408 The chosen participation mode does thus emphasize certain 
characteristics of the prosecuted criminality and the prosecutorial and judicial choices 
affect the way in which the historical events are pictured. These different emphases will 
be analyzed next. Before that, the relationship between international criminal law and 
the leading attribution traditions will, however, be shortly commented upon. 
7.3.2.  What Attribution Tradition Does International Criminal Law Follow? 
International criminal law contains elements of all three leading attribution models (that 
is, the unitary perpetrator model, the equivalence theory and the differential participation 
model), which is interesting as the theories in comparative law accounts sometimes are 
portrayed as alternative approaches. For example, in line with the unitary perpetrator 
model, international criminal law does not make the criminal responsibility of the physical 
1406 W. A. Schabas, ‘Serious Fairness Issues Raised by New Ruling in Katanga Case’, PhD Studies in Human 
Rights [blog], 2 December 2012 (‘For the two majority judges, who come from a culture of inquisitorial 
proceedings, the idea of reframing a mode of liability in this way is perhaps not as unusual as it might 
be for a judge from a background in adversarial proceedings. [...] Regulation 55 allows the judges to 
intervene and propose changes to the charges, but this is not really that different from a situation where 
the prosecutor proposes an amendment to the charges. It is acceptable – within reasonable bounds – while 
the trial is underway, and especially before the defence has played its hand, but it becomes increasingly 
intolerable from the standpoint of fairness as the trial advances.’)
1407 Ashworth 2006, at 88-89. 
1408 N. Piacente, ‘Importance of the Joint Criminal Enterprise Doctrine for the ICTY Prosecutorial 
Strategy’, 2 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2004), at 448.
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actor a prerequisite for the criminal responsibility of the non-physical actor,1409 although 
it usually requires that a crime has taken place or at least been attempted. On the other 
hand, international criminal law clearly departs from the unitary perpetrator model in 
that it recognizes that numerous individuals can be connected to a single crime and 
distinguishes between different types of actors in the crime. As the various participation 
modes, however, mainly only serve a “descriptive and classificatory purpose,”1410 that 
is, the participation modes are not connected to alternative sentencing ranges, it can 
be argued that international criminal law, at least as applied by the ad hoc tribunals, 
primarily follows the equivalence model favoured by common law jurisdictions. The 
equivalence thinking is especially evident in the ad hoc tribunals’ JCE doctrine which 
is based on the idea of the equal guilt of all enterprise participants.1411 The fact that the 
ad hoc tribunals have recognized that aiding and abetting is a participation mode that 
generally warrants a lower sentence than perpetration1412 and that aiders and abettors 
are not held responsible “of the crime itself ” but for their individual participation in 
it,1413  and that the ICC Statute allegedly has established a hierarchy between the various 
participation modes, have, however, been seen as signs that international criminal law 
now is moving towards the differential participation model.1414    
In the scholarly analysis of this perplexing international practice, it is usually only 
scholars coming from civil law jurisdictions who at all discuss alternative approaches 
in relation to attribution. Usually, these scholars also find the differential participation 
model, which generally is applied in their own legal system, to be more sophisticated 
and hence more suitable for any type of criminality. In line with this, they therefore 
find international criminal law’s more recent orientation towards this model as a sign 
of the growing maturity of the branch of law. Not everybody, however, agrees that the 
differential participation model is superior in all respects, and, for example, Dubber 
who belongs to the minority of common law scholars who have discussed attribution 
from a comparative perspective, has noted that differential participation model is prone 
1409 E.g., O. Triffterer, ‘Bestandsaufnahme zum Völkerstrafrecht’, in G. Hankel & G. Stuby (eds.), Strafgerichte 
gegen Menschheitsverbrechen: Zum Völkerstrafrecht 50 Jahre nach den Nürnberger Prozessen (Hamburg: 
Hamburger Edition, 1995), at 230, Eser 2002, at 788, and Militello 2007, at 948. 
1410 Cassese 2008, at 188. See also B. Burghardt, ‘Modes of Participation and Their Role in a General Concept 
of Crimes under International Law’, in C. Burchard, O. Triffterer & J. Vogel (eds.), The Review Conference 
and the Future of the International Criminal Court (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2010), 
at 88 (‘[they] are merely phenomenological descriptions of conduct’). 
1411 E.g., Tadić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 15 July 1999, para. 191, Brđanin, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 3 April 2007, 
paras 431-432, and  Vasiljević, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 25 February 2004, para. 111.
1412 E.g., Vasiljević, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 25 February 2004, para. 182. Van Sliedregt has suggested a 
further graduation of culpability. More concretely, she has put forward that the extended form of enterprise 
responsibility should attract a lower sentence than perpetration, but higher than aiding and abetting the 
crime. van Sliedregt 2007, at 205. This suggestion is so far not approved in international case law. Even 
though the legal distinction between perpetrators and aiders and abettors today is established, Judge Hunt 
has questioned the usefulness of it. Milutinović et al., Decision (JCE, sep. op. of Judge Hunt), AC, ICTY, 
21 May 2003, para. 31. 
1413 Blagojević & Jokić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 9 May 2007, para. 192. 
1414 E.g., Burghardt 2010, at 91, and Eser 2002, at 787-788. Cf. however Goy, who argues that also the ICC 
follows a dualistic system, where the essential distinction lies between committing and other modes of 
liability. Goy 2012, at 6. 
232
to cause problems of line-drawing and that, for example, the theory of control of the 
crime theory to be vague and underjustified.1415 Recently, strong criticism towards the 
differential participation model was also put forward by Judge Fulford in his dissenting 
opinion in the Lubanga trial judgement. He argued that it was not meaningful to interpret 
ICC Article 25(3) so as to avoid creating an overlap between the various modes of 
responsibility, as the underlying idea behind the various forms of participation was not 
to create a hierarchy, but to cover all eventualities.1416 An even stronger opposition to the 
recent development of international criminal law has been put forward by Stewart who 
suggests that international criminal law should completely abandon the idea of modes 
of responsibility and instead follow the unitary approach to attribution.1417 According to 
Stewart, this would return international criminal law to the preferable approach of the 
Nuremberg Tribunal “where most defendants were simply convicted because they were 
‘concerned in’, ‘connected with’, ‘inculpated in’ or ‘implicated in’ international crimes.”1418
While all attribution models have their pros and cons, the central question for this 
study is how the different models take into account the special features of international 
criminality. In relation to the unitary perpetrator model, it has been suggested that this 
model has the advantage of not making the responsibility of one person dependant on 
the responsibility of another, which can be practical in relation to international crimes 
where the connection between the physical actor and the prosecuted non-physical 
actor can be remote.1419 At the same time this, however, is the weakness of the unitary 
perpetrator model, as it is in relation to collective crimes relevant to recognize that 
individual actions, in reality, are connected, even though these relationships may be 
complex and difficult to specify. In this vein, it has been argued that it is positive that 
international criminal law is moving towards the differential participation model as 
this model has the advantage of already at the conviction stage recognizing various 
contributions to a crime and that this “is particularly relevant with regard to system 
criminality where contributions to the crime cover a wide scale: from mere facilitation 
to instigation as an auctor intellectualis.”1420 In the differential participation model it 
is often a central goal to find the responsibility form that best describes the criminal 
behaviour of the accused. 
Whereas the various participation modes in some legal systems clearly establish 
the “level of personal involvement in the criminal events, and therefore the degree of 
individual responsibility for the crime,”1421 it is questionable whether it in relation to 
international criminality is possible to clearly rank the various participation modes in 
1415 Dubber 2007, at 978 and 1001. See also e.g., Fletcher 1998, at 190, and Ohlin 2011(a), at 721.  
1416 Lubanga, Judgement (sep. op. of Judge Fulford), TC, ICC, 14 March 2012, paras 6-7.
1417 J. G. Stewart, ‘The End of ‘Modes of Liability’ for International Crimes’, 25 Leiden Journal of International 
Law (2012), at 165-219. The suggestion by Stewart has prompted a vivid scholarly debate on the topic. 
See e.g., D. Robinson, ‘LJIL Symposium: Darryl Robinson Comments on James Stewart’s “End of ‘Modes 
of Liability”’, Opinio Juris [blog], 21 March 2012, and T. Weigend, ‘LJIL Symposium: Thomas Weigend 
Comments on James Stewart’s “The End of ‘Modes of Liability’ for International Crimes”’, Opinio Juris 
[blog], 22 March 2012. 
1418 J. Stewart, ‘LJIL Symposium: James Stewart Responds to Jens Ohlin’, Opinio Juris [blog], 23 March 2012. 
1419 See e.g., Triffterer 1995, at 230, and Eser 2002, at 788. 
1420 van Sliedregt 2003, at 115. 
1421 Werle 2007, at 970. 
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the same way as in some domestic legal systems.1422 While the nature of international 
crimes most often requires different types of participants in the crimes, most domestic 
crimes only demand a single physical perpetrator. This means, on the one hand, that 
the common law distinction between primary and secondary participants becomes 
problematic. Schabas has, for example, in relation to complicity and genocide noted 
that: 
Complicity is sometimes described as secondary participation, but [...] there is 
nothing ‘secondary’ about it. The ‘accomplice’ is often the real villain, and the 
‘principal offender’ a small cog in the machine. Hitler did not, apparently, physically 
murder or brutalize anybody; technically, some might describe him as ‘only’ an 
accomplice to the crime of genocide.1423 
Likewise, the civil law viewpoint that perpetration is the most blameworthy 
participation mode faces problems when faced with the reality of international 
criminality. Civil law scholars (for example, Roxin) have tried to deal with this 
problem by expanding the concept of perpetration. In this vein, Judge Liu in the 
Munyakazi case before the ICTR questioned the “new” interpretation of committing 
by noting that it conflates the difference between the various modes of responsibility, 
which according to him might raise fair trial concerns.1424 Cryer et al. have, however, 
questioned the advisability of this approach taken into consideration that the various 
participation modes in international criminal law are not connected to particular 
sentencing ranges.1425 Also, for example, Boas has been critical towards the “obsessive 
preoccupation with the apportionment of responsibility to political leaders for 
committing crimes [...].”1426 
1422 Likewise Judge Fulford has noted that: “Some have suggested that Article 25(3) establishes a hierarchy 
of seriousness as regards the various forms of participation in a crime, with Article 25(3)(a) constituting 
the gravest example and Article 25(3)(d) the least serious. I am unable to adopt this approach. In my 
judgment, there is no proper basis for concluding that ordering, soliciting or inducing a crime (Article 
25(3)(b)) is a less serious form of commission than committing it “through another person” (Article 25(3)
(a)), and these two concepts self-evidently overlap. Similarly, I am unable to accept that the criminality 
of accessories (Article 25(3)(c)) is greater than those who participate within a group (Article 25(3)(d)), 
particularly since many of history’s most serious crimes occurred as the result of the coordinated action 
of groups of individuals, who jointly pursued a common goal.” Lubanga, Judgement (sep. op. of Judge 
Fulford), TC, ICC, 14 March 2012, para. 8.
1423 Schabas 2009, at 340.
1424 Munyakazi, Judgement (sep. op. of Judge Liu), AC, ICTR, 28 September 2011, para. 3 (‘Whether 
instances of ordering, instigating, and aiding and abetting may be classified as “committing” is 
ostensibly a question of nature and degree, requiring judicial scrutiny to determine whether the 
overall conduct of the accused should be “elevated” to commission. Inevitably, the conflation of 
these various forms of liability creates considerable ambiguity as to the scope of a convicted person’s 
criminal responsibility.’)
1425 Cryer et al. 2010, at 364. See also Krnjolelac, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 15 March 2002, paras 74-75.
1426 G. Boas, ‘The Difficulty with Individual Criminal Responsibility in International Criminal Law’, in C. 
Stahn & van der Herik (eds.), Future Perspectives on International Criminal Justice (The Hague: T. M. C. 
Asser Press, 2010), at 502. See also Giustiniani 2008, at 799.
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7.3.3.  Vertical or Horizontal Emphasis? 
7.3.3.1.  Introduction
In most human collectives, there are both vertical features (that is, leader-subordinate 
relationships) and horizontal features (that is, peer relationships). This being said, 
there are, however, collectives, where the vertical dimension defines the essence of the 
collective. In such hierarchical collectives, there are persons in positions of authority 
who have the ability and right to give orders to subordinates and to expect their orders 
to be followed.1427 Such relationships of domination and subordination traditionally exist 
in armies and, for example, police forces. 
In international criminal law, the frequent verticality of collectives engaged in 
international criminality is reflected in responsibility forms assuming or requiring a 
vertical relationship. An explicit requirement of a superior-subordinate relationship 
can be found in relation to ordering and superior responsibility. In the Delalić et al. 
case, the Appeals Chamber in this regard noted that it “does not consider the doctrine 
of command responsibility [...] as having been intended to impose criminal liability 
on persons for the acts of other persons of completely equal status.”1428 In superior 
responsibility, the hierarchical relationship is especially decisive for the criminal 
responsibility, as the responsibility is not as in ordering based on the individual 
participation in the criminality.1429 In relation to the ICC, the doctrine of control 
over the crime has furthermore been seen as a doctrine that emphasizes vertical 
features in relation to international criminality. For example, Ambos has observed 
that: “It is clear that such a model of attribution targets primarily the leadership level 
of the given organization since only the leaders are able to control and dominate 
the collective action with full responsibility.”1430 The idea of a perpetrator behind 
a perpetrator, in fact, presupposes the existence of a vertical power structure, 
where the physical perpetrator is controlled by the non-physical actor.1431 However, 
also participation modes where a superior-subordinate relationship is not a legal 
requirement, such as planning, can reflect a hierarchical reality. It is namely often 
high-level actors who plan international crimes and more low-level actors who put 
the plans into action.
As regards the vertical attribution alternatives, an additional distinction may 
be made between doctrines where the focus is put on the leaders’ causation or strong 
influence on their subordinates’ action, and doctrines where the focus is on the 
leaders’ responsibility and role.1432 In international criminal law, it is especially superior 
1427 See e.g., Osiel 2005(a), at 1769-1770.
1428 Delalić et al., Judgement, AC, ICTY, 20 February 2001, para. 303.
1429 That is, in ordering more attention is instead paid to the behaviour of the accused. Bonafè 2007, at 612.
1430 Ambos 2006, at 664 (referring to Schlösser). 
1431 Olásolo and Pérez Cepeda have noted that in the Stakić case, the direct perpetrators did not belong 
to the structure of power controlled by Stakić, but to two other structures of powers. Therefore, the trial 
chamber could not base his criminal responsibility only on the notion of indirect perpetration. Olásolo & 
Pérez Cepeda 2004, at 509. 
1432 Cf. the distinction made by Vogel regarding naturalistic and normative models. Vogel 2002, at 154-
155. 
235
responsibility1433 and responsibility based on control of the act by virtue of a hierarchical 
organization that have features of role-based responsibility.1434 The responsibility forms 
can also be categorized based on whether they assume that the superior at some point 
has ordered the commission of crimes. In this regard, Osiel finds that the doctrine of 
Organisationsherrschaft “assumes that superiors – at some point in the chain of command 
– have expressly ordered atrocities, even if there exists no direct evidence at trial to this 
effect”, whereas superior responsibility and JCE responsibility do not contain such a 
presumption.1435  
Participation modes, such as JCE and aiding and abetting, on the other hand, 
are often defined as horizontal.1436 For example, JCE emphasizes coordination, not 
hierarchies.1437
In relation to vertical respectively horizontal participation modes, it may be noted 
that whereas vertical models often stress who are behind the collective action, more 
horizontal responsibility models often rather emphasize the outcome of the decision-
making or the collective action itself. This being said, soliciting, inducing or instigating, are 
examples of more horizontal models of responsibility that proceed from the assumption 
that certain individuals lie behind the criminality of others. 
7.3.3.2.  Where Should the Emphasis Be Put? 
In academic texts, it is sometimes possible to find suggestions of suitable situations of 
use for the various modes of participation. Van Sliedregt has, for example, contemplated 
the situations in which planning could be charged and argues that: “‘Planning’ will 
normally occur in the initial stages of the commission of a crime and to those that find 
themselves at the top of a hierarchy. The link between the actual perpetrator and the 
auctor intellectualis can be quite distant. It is likely to pass through mid-level positions 
in the governmental hierarchy or a military command structure, where the plans are 
elaborated and implemented.”1438 Boister and Cryer largely agree with van Sliedregt 
and argue that it could have been suitable to convict the leading Japanese World War II 
criminals for planning.1439 In relation to ordering, Werle has suggested that the mode of 
participation is particularly relevant in relation to mid-level superiors who both receive 
and issue orders.1440 The most high-level actors do namely generally not give specific 
1433 Kelman and Hamilton have noted that: “The greater the range of outcomes for which a superior can 
be held responsible on grounds of what was expected, the weaker the evidence becomes that the superior 
is causally responsible for any given outcome. [...] Superiors tend to be judged on their degree of role 
responsibility − perhaps in part because the greater the superior’s role responsibility, the less clear any 
specific causal responsibility is likely to be.”  Kelman & Hamilton 1989, at 207.
1434 Ambos 2006, at 664 (referring to a normativist or supervisionist model of attribution). 
1435 Osiel 2010, at 125. 
1436 Ohlin, however, calls both JCE and indirect co-perpetration combined vertical-horizontal liability modes, 
as both attribution theories can be used to connect low-level and high-level actors respectively peers. Ohlin 
2012, at 771-772. As the present author sees it, the modes of liability, however, have different emphases.
1437 E.g., Ambos 2009(a), at 139, and Osiel 2005(a), at 1786-1787. 
1438 van Sliedregt 2003, at 80. 
1439 Boister & Cryer 2008, at 245. 
1440 Werle 2007, at 968. Bantekas has noted that it is clearly established that liability attaches not only to 
the person who first issue the order, but also to those that further transmit it through a chain of command. 
Bantekas 2002, at 50-51. 
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orders. Rather, they envisage abstract political goals that more low-level actors then must 
implement by measures that may involve ordering. 
These suggestions that try to find a match between different actor types and modes 
of responsibility are interesting in that they stress the fact that certain types of actors 
usually play certain types of roles in connection to international criminality. Certain 
actors hence usually have more vertical roles than others. It is, however, important 
to note that the chosen mode of responsibility does not merely portray the criminal 
behaviour of the individual offender. It also mirrors the context of action in which the 
individual offender behaves criminally. To from a phenomenological perspective choose 
a vertical respectively horizontal perspective in this regard is not simple as international 
criminality is often not one-dimensional: Vertical and horizontal structures often coexist. 
Or to put it another way, whereas one participation mode makes us see one thing, it 
may at the same time conceal another aspect of the social reality. Vertical participation 
modes direct our attention to power structures and to the leaders. These responsibility 
modes therefore often convey the picture that international criminality is the result of 
the criminal behaviour of a smaller group of leaders. A vertical approach also mirrors 
the fact that many international crimes are committed by members of strong vertical 
organizations, where there undoubtedly exists an “organizational culture” that superior 
orders and wishes shall not be questioned. A strong top-down vertical approach may, 
however, be criticized for making it possible that a handful of individuals serve as an alibi 
for the population at large to relieve itself from responsibility.1441 
Of the vertical attribution alternatives, it is probably the theory of control of the 
act by virtue of a hierarchical organization which is the “most vertical”. It starts out 
from the assumption that in connection to international criminality high-level leaders 
often control organizations, and not individuals as individuals. From a criminological 
perspective, the extremely strong stressing of the fungibility of the hands-on criminals 
can, however, be questioned. The theory namely portrays the hands-on criminals as 
individuals with no will and no powers of their own. It has therefore been held that the 
theory is not “a theory of complicity at all but a denial of complicity and an allocation 
of total responsibility to the calculating perpetrator behind the scenes.”1442 Furthermore, 
if certain low-level actors in an organization are non-interchangeable, the foundation of 
the theory is fundamentally challenged.1443 This has prompted Ambos to argue that the 
doctrine of Organisationsherrschaft needs a normative foundation to complement the 
problematic empirical one.1444 By reference to Murmann, he argues that only individuals 
with a certain special position of duty should be convicted based on the doctrine, namely 
individuals who have a particular position of responsibility in combination with a specific 
power of violation.1445 He therefore finds that the theory only can be applied in relation 
to “the leadership level of the formally established government” and in exceptional cases 
1441 Koskenniemi 2002, at 14.
1442 Fletcher 1998, at 197 (Fletcher is not commenting Roxin’s theory in the quotation, but perpetration by 
means in general). 
1443 Ambos 2009(a), at 145-147. 
1444 Ambos 2009(a), at 148-151. Also e.g., Osiel has questioned the idea and relevance of the fungibility of 
subordinates thesis. Osiel 2010, at 114.  
1445 Ambos 2009(a), at 148 ff. 
237
to “the top hierarchy of the military and police forces.”1446 It is indeed less problematic to 
apply the doctrine to the most high-level actors who have exceptional abilities to ensure 
that their wishes are adhered to, but the theory is still problematic in that it only focuses 
on the powers of the leaders and completely disregards the image that it conveys of the 
participation of mid- and low-level actors (which essentially are portrayed as mindless 
members of apparatuses of power). 
Horizontal attribution alternatives, on their part, stress that not all international 
crimes are explicitly ordered, but that malevolent influences may travel through informal 
and widely dispersed networks,1447 and that international crimes may have numerous 
participants representing various hierarchical levels and societal strata. The roles played 
by individual participants in a collective may be multiple. A high-level actor may at 
the same time be a leader and a peer. Horizontal forms of criminal responsibility can, 
however, be very broad, and it has, for example, been noted that the JCE doctrine has 
been (mis)used to reach very “small fry” on the outermost fringes of collectives.1448 It 
may, furthermore, be difficult to convict high-level leaders based on horizontal models. 
Van der Wilt has, for example, argued that the JCE doctrine must be stretched to its outer 
limits if one wants to convict “Bauman’s functionaries and Arendt’s Schreibtischmörder” 
based on the doctrine.1449 Finally, horizontal approaches may be criticized for making 
us blind to the power structures and expectations of obedience that often are present in 
international criminality.1450 The JCE may also be difficult to define in a way that portrays 
reality well. In this regard, Osiel has noted that: 
On first introduction to the two doctrines, superior responsibility clearly seems the 
more formalistic, whereas enterprise responsibility appears the more sociologically 
realistic. [...] The opposite may be closer to the truth, however. De facto power – in 
all its sociological messiness – quickly asserts itself as central to the contemporary 
application of superior responsibility in international courts, whereas prosecutors 
there are free to define the criminal enterprise in ways tied only very loosely to any 
observable patterns of influence and interaction between putative participants.1451
It is noteworthy that criminology in relation to international crimes has devoted much 
attention to phenomena such as obedience to authority, and the result of this criminology 
has been found to support the use of vertical doctrines, such as control of the act by 
virtue of a hierarchical organization. Much less attention has been given to phenomena 
such as peer pressure and the striving towards conformity, which could be seen as 
supporting more horizontal approaches to attribution. Furthermore, the criminality can 
have elements (or causes) that cannot be described as either vertical or horizontal. In this 
regard, Fletcher has pointed out that Eichmann and the German State can be compared 
with a five-person improvisational jazz group and its drummer: 
1446 Ambos 2009(a), at 154. 
1447 Osiel 2005(a), at 1771.
1448 Osiel 2005(b), at 802 (regarding terrorism). 
1449 van der Wilt 2009(b), at 168. 
1450 Osiel 2005(a), at 1804. Due to this, it has been suggested that horizontal theories, such as the joint 
criminal enterprise doctrine is not a suitable attribution theory when trying to convict the masterminds 
behind the crimes. van Sliedregt 2007, at 206.
1451 Osiel 2009(b), at 77. 
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The group expresses itself through the drummer as well as through other individual 
musicians, but the collective entity of jazz musicians does not cause the drummer to 
play. Nor would it be correct to say the group, improvising as it does, dominates its 
members or is complicitous in their playing.1452 
International criminality is hence not only obedience behaviour, only behaviour caused 
by peer pressure, etc. 
In summary, it may therefore be concluded that the phenomenology and criminology 
of international crimes do thus not as such provide us with general answer regarding the 
suitability of different participation modes as both vertical and horizontal approaches 
have their weakness from a phenomenological and criminological perspective. 
7.3.3.3.  The Difficulty to Establish Vertical Relationships 
So far, there have not been that many convictions for vertical forms of individual criminal 
responsibility in international criminal law.1453 This is interesting as many individuals 
who have been prosecuted for international crimes have been individuals who have 
worked in armies or prisons, that is, in organizations that often par excellence are 
hierarchical. The more popular modes of participation have instead been horizontal in 
nature (most notably, JCE responsibility and aiding and abetting). While the popularity 
ratio may change when the ICC starts to produce more judgements, it should be noted 
that vertical relationships of power often are difficult to establish evidentiary. In relation 
to this, Triffterer has noted that: 
the belligerent events after World War II demonstrated clearly that hierarchical 
structures of command played an increasing role in modern warfare. Commanders 
were no longer permanently present at the battle fields and the possibility to 
communicate by electronic technical means was more and more perfected. This 
raised their possibilities to influence their forces but at the same time made it more 
difficult to locate the exact chain of command, especially since paper trails, as the 
Nazis left behind them, were less frequently used.1454
In a similar vein, Koskenniemi has argued that: 
To create that chain will, in the absence of written orders, have to involve broad 
interpretations and assumptions about the political and administrative culture 
in the territory, including personal links and expectations between the various 
protagonists.1455
Power relations can partly be established through documentary evidence, such as 
appointment decisions and organization charts, but at least in relation to de facto superiors 
in paramilitary and irregular militia forces it is often essential that individuals who have 
made part of the hierarchy testify about the power structures.1456 While it sometimes 
1452 Fletcher 2002(b), at 1539-1540.
1453 National prosecutors in transitional democracies, on the other hand, have more often had a vertical 
focus and the prosecutors have made use of the doctrine of superior responsibility. Osiel 2005(a), at 1751.
1454 Triffterer 2002, at 183. 
1455 Koskenniemi 2002, at 16.
1456 Minow has stressed that it is very difficult to establish chains of command in adversarial trials, if 
individuals who have made part of the hierarchy do not give evidence. Minow 1998, at 59.
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is easy to find willing insider witnesses, it may in other cases be utmost difficult. The 
functioning rationale of certain groups is namely that they work “in the dark” and that 
their internal structure shall remain unclear for outsiders. The use of insider evidence 
may also be problematic from the point of view that the members may be tempted to tell 
lies about their own role as well as of the role of their friends. 
Another factor that makes the establishment of hierarchies difficult is that these 
assessments have to be made in court post facto. In this regard, Williamson argues in 
relation to superior responsibility that: “[P]ost facto assessments of events within a 
judicial context rarely allows for a full understanding of past chaotic realities. Likewise 
it remains difficult to truly comprehend the extent to which a superior could have acted 
in the given circumstances.”1457 For him, these post facto assessments often therefore are 
nothing else than speculations about the superior’s possibilities to act, instead of being 
precise statements of facts. It should, however, be noted that it always lies in the nature 
of criminal court proceedings that the facts are established ex post facto.1458 As such, 
this problem is not unique for vertical responsibility forms. What, however, can make 
the establishment of hierarchical power structures especially complicated is that the 
distribution of powers and control in organizations often is more complicated than what 
appears at first sight. Osiel has, in connection to this, noted that: 
Chains of command often prove more complex than the organization chart depicts 
them because a subordinate may answer to one superior on certain matters and 
to another on different issues. The jurisdiction of two agencies may also overlap − 
perhaps deliberately, to encourage their competition for approval and resources from 
above. This means, however, that each superior will be able to point to another in a 
different agency who exercised similar responsibility over the criminal subordinate 
[...].1459 
Thirdly, it should be noted that even “when a written record is available, the chain of 
command on paper may differ significantly from the real one.”1460
Finally, it should be remembered that the evidentiary standard required for 
establishing such a relationship is crucial both for the number of convictions and as 
regards to what extent the vertical doctrine reflects “the reality” of the criminality. Osiel 
has, in this regard, regarding the requirement of effective control noted that: (a) if the 
effective control is made very difficult to prove there is a risk of acquitting individuals who 
for good reason should be blamed for not acting; and (b) if effective control is made easy 
to establish there is the chance that too many individuals are classified as superiors.1461 
From a phenomenological perspective, the fact that more and more collectives with non-
traditional structures take part in armed conflicts has raises the question of whether 
1457 Williamson 2002, at 383.
1458 E.g., Nuotio 1998(a), at 2 and 291.  
1459 Osiel 2005(a), at 1778. 
1460 L. Moranchek, ‘Protecting National Security Evidence While Prosecuting War Crimes: Problems and 
Lessons for International Justice from the ICTY’, 31 Yale Journal of International Law (2006), at 478 (also 
noting e.g., that ‘A lead investigator on the Milošević team suggested that one of the key commanders 
transmitting orders from Milošević to the Serbian police forces, deputy prime minister Nikola Sainović, 
did not even have a title in the police [...].’)
1461 Osiel 2005(b), at 795. 
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effective control should be broadened so as to include what could be characterized as 
significant influence. There is, however, a point at which one is not anymore dealing with 
“real” vertical structures and superiors anymore. It is not advisable to stretch vertical 
attribution models so much that they start to cover de facto non-vertical realities.  
Even if the hierarchy as such could be established and individuals could be placed 
in the hierarchy, there furthermore remains the difficulty of identifying the roles played 
by the individual members of vertical structures of power in relation to individual 
crimes. In rare cases, are there, for example, written orders that certain crimes should 
be committed. Orders “rarely survive with any clarity the transition from one authority 
down a chain of subordinates to the ultimate actors.”1462 They are furthermore often oral 
and vague. Minow has, in this regard, noted that: 
Officers breaching the borders of legality in their orders will most likely not give 
a directive that explicitly states, “Deprive this person of treatment required under 
international law,” or “Use torture on this detainee.” The commander may well instead 
say, “Keep this detainee quiet,” or “Make this detainee aware we mean business,” or 
“Make sure there is no local person aware of our approach toward the village.” [..., 
or] The officer may simply say, “Get the detainees ready for interrogation,” but mean, 
“Abuse and humiliate them.” Or he may say, “Clear the area” but convey, instead, “Kill 
the people who are there.1463
The vagueness of orders makes it both more difficult to hold the order-givers responsible 
for them and to excuse subordinates for following them.  
7.3.4.  Large v. Small Collectives and Tight v. Loose Collectives
The types of collectives engaged in the commission of international crimes can not only be 
categorized based on whether they are primarily vertical or horizontal. Other meaningful 
categorizations appear to be at least the size of the collective and the tightness of the organization. 
In sociology and social psychology, it is namely generally acknowledged that the size of the 
group affects the interaction between members of the group. In small collectives, all members 
of the collective often interact actively with each other. In large collectives, person-to-person 
links may be numerous, but not all members generally interact directly with each others. In 
large collectives, bureaucratic organization forms are more common.   
In domestic judicial systems, it is generally collective activity that takes place in 
small groups that is to be attributed to individuals. In international criminal law settings, 
small-group and mob criminality occurs as well, but it is also often possible to connect 
individuals to large-scale collectives. This has been well articulated by Fletcher who puts 
forward that: 
Imagine a large circle with several small circles within it. [...] The small circles stand 
for subgroups within the society [...]. The large circle stands for the nation defined 
historically by its language, sometimes by its religion, often by its historical struggle 
for survival and independence. Some [individuals, ....] within one of the smaller 
1462 Kelman & Hamilton 1989, at 2
1463 M. Minow, ‘Living up to Rules: Holding Soldiers Responsible for Abusive Conduct and the Dilemma 
of the Superior Orders Defence’, 52 McGill Law Journal (2007), at 48-49.
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circles, call it the army, commit some great wrong but with the knowledge and 
spiritual support, to varying degrees, of everyone in the nation, defined by the outer 
circle. The problem is attributing the guilt for this action. Should the target of the 
attribution be the smaller circle, namely the army, or the larger circle, the nation?1464
In relation to international criminality, two important attribution questions therefore 
arise, namely (1) how should the relationship between smaller and larger collectives be 
legally addressed; and (2) how should criminal law approach large collectives. 
In international criminal law, the question of the size of the collective has 
primarily been discussed in connection to JCE responsibility. As has been noted, the 
applicability of the theory to large-scale enterprises, such as nation-wide genocides, has 
been questioned.1465 Such applications of the theory have namely been seen as making 
it possible to hold individuals responsible for crimes they did not know of committed 
by individuals they were not personally acquainted with.1466 It has also been observed 
that in relation to very large-scale enterprises, the enterprise becomes more or less 
equal to the general societal or historical context in which the individual acts,1467 and 
that the enterprises in these cases are “legal fictions” in the sense that individuals do 
not generally perceive as participating in common enterprises in such contexts.1468 It 
has in a similar vein been suggested that individuals do not necessarily understand that 
they are engaging in criminal activity due to the fact that so many other individuals in 
their surrounding likewise are involved. This is especially the case in situations when the 
criminal enterprise is equal to a State or regional policies, as such policies are generally 
a priori viewed as legitimate. In contrast to specific agreements to commit ordinary 
crimes, it may be more difficult to specify exactly when a large-scale enterprise has come 
into being and exact what the purpose of the enterprise is.1469 If criminal responsibility 
is attributed to all members of very large collectives, the risk of wrongly convicting 
innocents also increases. In the scholarly literature, it has for these reasons been suggested 
that international prosecutors could “concentrate on the collective nature of the crime 
at a more local level: the conspiracy of the military leadership, the militia, the gang and 
the mob.”1470 According to Ohlin, this is “the closest we can come to the collective nature 
of these crimes and still remain faithful to the basic foundation of criminal law and its 
commitment to holding individuals responsible for their actions.”1471
While it undoubtedly is more difficult for criminal law to deal with large-scale 
collectives than small groups, it has, however, been noted that “[a]lthough the criminal 
planning [...] may occur at the level of active military operations, through a joint 
criminal enterprise by military officers and militia leaders, the ethnic hatred at the 
heart of genocide stems from the intent of nations.”1472 Attribution alternatives that 
1464 Fletcher 2002(b), at 1529-1530.
1465 See further Section 7.2.4.4.
1466 Cf. Olásolo 2007, at 157-158. See also Brđanin, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 1 September 2004, para. 355, and 
Brđanin, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 3 April 2007, paras 423-428. 
1467 Cf. Mettraux 2005, at 292. 
1468 E.g., Olásolo 2007, at 158, Osiel 2005(a), at 1802, and Osiel 2005(b), at 800. 
1469 E.g., Osiel 2005(a), at 1798. 
1470 Ohlin 2007(b), at 74.
1471 Ohlin 2007(b), at 74.
1472 Fletcher & Ohlin 2005, at 548.
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telescopically focus on the acts of small groups (or individuals) may thus conceal the 
fact that international criminality often is State-level or at least large-scale phenomena. 
Furthermore, approaches in which the focus is on individuals and subgroups may lead to 
situations where the same historical incidents and facts in the different cases are described 
inconsistently or even contradictory.1473 International criminal law is therefore also in 
relation to collective size facing the problem of having to choose perspective. A focus on 
large-scale collectives easily leads to conflicts with basic criminal law principles. A focus 
on small-scale collectives, on the other hand, often conceals the systematic aspect of the 
criminality and can result in incoherent case law. 
It is, however, not only the size of the collective that affects what can be attributed 
to the members of the collective, but also its organization. In addition to usually dealing 
with small collectives, domestic criminal law generally deals with tightly knit groups. 
This obviously goes hand in hand as members of small groups generally interact actively 
with each other and, for example, share information with each other. In relationship to 
the question of the tightness of the collective, the distinction made by Ohlin regarding: 
(1) tightly knit horizontal conspiracies (characterized by shared decision-making and 
pooled information, for example, a group of individuals committing a bank robbery 
together), (2) tightly knit vertical conspiracies (characterized by hierarchical decision-
making and pooled information, for example, a Mafia family); and (3) loosely net vertical 
conspiracies (characterized by hierarchical decision-making and low-level members 
who simply execute the decisions without being in active contact with the leaders, for 
example, system criminality) seems to be especially interesting.1474 In relation to these 
different types of conspiracies, Ohlin argues that it is justified to hold all conspiracy 
participants responsible for the acts of others in tightly net horizontal conspiracies, as it 
is only in these conspiracies that there is shared decision-making.1475 
In relation to international criminality, it is increasingly common to find that loose 
vertical collectives lie behind the criminality. While the verticality primarily negates 
shared decision-making, the looseness makes it more difficult to assume knowledge and 
control over others. In a loose organization, it is quite foreseeable that a leader is unaware 
of the criminal behaviour of a low-level actor and that a low-level actor acts with limited 
knowledge of the overall criminal plan of the collective and the identity of the high-
level leaders. This is especially the case in network type of organizations. In relation to 
the terrorist network al-Qaeda, it can, for example, been argued that “traditional” strict 
control and explicit orders have been replaced by semi-autonomous cells and leadership 
through mechanisms such as indoctrination.1476 For criminal law, loose relationships 
between individuals are especially challenging. The theory of control of the act by virtue of 
1473 E.g., Mettraux 2005, at 292-293 (‘Although the indictments against Ms Plavšić, Mr Martić, and Mr 
Stanisić, for instance, relate to events and crimes alleged in the Milošević indictment, the joint criminal 
enterprises described therein – and of which Slobodan Milošević is said to be a member – are described 
differently to the alleged joint criminal enterprise in the Milošević indictment, including a different alleged 
membership’.), and Piacente 2004, at 451.
1474 Ohlin 2007(a), at 190-195. 
1475 Ohlin 2007(a), at 201. 
1476 See e.g., N. Lubell, ‘The War (?) against Al-Qaeda’, in E. Wilmshurst (ed.), International Law and the 
Classification of Conflicts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), at 425, and Lippens 2001, at 320-321 
(referring to Heckscher). 
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a hierarchical organization and the JCE doctrine both explicitly recognize the possibility 
anonymous hands-on criminals, but the theories still demand some sort of individual or 
collective control over the hands-on criminals. It is hence very difficult in criminal law 
to give legal recognition to strong influence not amounting to control. The looseness of 
many modern organizations may also affect the “functioning” of other responsibility 
modes. May has, in this regard, argued that the looseness of many collectives entail that 
the leaders should be prosecuted based on their own acts and intentions, for example, in 
relation to planning a war, as it is only rarely that a group of leaders act truly in concert 
with one another and where it makes make sense to treat them as a unit.1477 
7.3.5.  Legitimate and Illegitimate Collectives, and State Involvement in the 
Criminality 
In criminology, a difference is sometimes made between: (a) crimes committed as part of 
legitimate organizations by respectable citizens (≈ white-collar criminality); and (b) crimes 
committed as part of non-legitimate or criminal organizations by individuals perceived 
by the society – and often by themselves too – as “criminals”. It is namely often different 
types of individuals who get involved in the two types of criminality and the mechanisms 
that lie behind them differ. Regarding the latter type of criminality, the idea of criminal 
organizations has been topical. This has been the case especially in relation to motorcycle 
gangs and terrorism organizations. In the law, there are at least two different possibilities to 
give legal relevance to criminal organizations. Firstly, it is possible to consider membership 
in a criminal organization a crime. The goal of this type of criminalizations is to discourage 
individuals to join the criminal organizations ab initio. Secondly, it is possible to view 
membership in the organization as relevant when attributing a crime to an individual. 
What is interesting from a criminological perspective is that in international 
criminality both collectives that can be characterized as non-legitimate or criminal (such 
as paramilitary groups with bad reputation)1478 and collectives that are “utmost legitimate” 
(most notably the State apparatus) participate.1479 If brutal paramilitary groups can be 
characterized as criminal and participation in their activity can be considered a crime, 
should it also be possible to declare whole States criminal and to connect individual 
criminal responsibility to the State criminality? For most such State criminality would 
1477 May 2006, at 321-322. 
1478 E.g., in relation to the Balkan conflict a number of paramilitary groups with a questionable reputation 
participated in the commission of crimes (such as, the Tigers and the White Eagles) and in the Rwanda 
genocide the Hutu paramilitary organization Interahamwe played a central role. See e.g., Morris & Scharf 
1995, at 95 (fn 298), and N. H. B. Jørgensen, ‘A Reappraisal of the Abandoned Nuremberg Concept of 
Criminal Organisations in the Context of Justice in Rwanda’, 12 Criminal Law Forum (2001), at 375.
1479 Here, it is interesting to make a comparison with terrorism, where a difference often is made between 
terrorist criminality by (illegitimate) terrorist organizations and State-sponsored terrorism. Schmid has 
investigated how the term “terrorism” historically has been used, and notes that while it historically often 
has referred to State-connected criminality (e.g., the regime de la terreur of the French revolution and 
the Nazi terror), it has since the 1960s primarily been used to refer to criminality by non-State actors 
(such as liberation groups and fundamentalists). Schmid 2004, at 399. The historical trajectory of the 
“terrorism” term is one explanation to the difficulty to define terrorism. What is interesting here is that 
both in connection to terrorism and international core criminality, it has been considered to what extent 
the criminalizations should cover both State actor and non-State actor criminality.  
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be extremely problematic. As was noted in Chapter 2, there is a “legality bonus” in 
State action, which discharges individuals morally,1480 and to declare a State post facto 
criminal raises serious human rights concerns.1481 Secondly, States are collectives where 
membership is automatic and which do not have a so-to-say limited purpose.1482 Certain 
State entities may, however, have chosen membership and a limited purpose.
In international criminal law, the question of criminal organizations has in 
particular been debated in connection to the Nuremberg proceedings, as the IMT had 
the powers to declare certain organizations as criminal with the underlying idea that 
individual members thereafter could be convicted for membership alone.1483 This idea 
that membership alone would be criminal was, however, rejected by the Nuremberg 
Tribunal, which held that only members who personally were implicated in the 
commission of acts declared criminal should be the object of criminal sanctions.1484 This 
case law can most notably be explained with the desire to avoid guilt by association. From 
a phenomenological perspective, it is, however, interesting that the organizations that the 
Nuremberg Tribunal declared as criminal were all public entities applying traditional 
State functions.1485 To some of these organizations, individuals were drafted.1486 This may 
also partly explain the judges’ discomfort with the idea of criminal responsibility being 
directly connected with the membership in the organization. The negative approach to 
membership responsibility has later on been maintained in international criminal law in 
relation to the international core crimes. In connection to organized criminality, drug 
criminality and terrorism international law has, however, foreseen that participation in 
an organized criminal group can be defined as a criminal offence.1487
1480 Jäger 1992, at 76.
1481 Furthermore, it lies in the nature of totalitarian regimes to affect societal evaluations of what is legitimate or 
illegitimate, or who is guilty (“the enemy”) or who is innocent (“the friend”), that is, in totalitarian regimes these 
evaluations may differ drastically from evaluations made in “normal” societies. Smeulers & Werner 2010, at 26. 
1482 Cf. According to Rikhof, in Canada, it is possible to attribute responsibility to individuals who are 
members of so-called brutal, limited-purpose organizations. In relation to these organizations membership 
combined with knowledge is usually sufficient to establish complicity. In non-brutal organizations, on 
the other hand, personal and knowing participation in the commission of crimes is generally required 
for responsibility. J. Rikhof, ‘Complicity in International Criminal Law and Canadian Refugee Law – A 
Comparison’, 4 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2006), at 712-713 and 716-717. 
1483 See further Section 7.2.1. 
1484 Göring et al., Judgment, IMT, 1 October 1946, at 256.
1485 In the indictment it was claimed that that the Reich Cabinet, the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party, the 
SS (Schutzstaffeln), the SD (Sicherheitsdienst), Gestapo, the SA (Sturmabteilungen), and the General Staff 
and the High Command of the German Armed Forces were criminal. Trial of the Major War Criminals 
before the International Military Tribunal, Volume I (1947), at 28. 
1486 Einsatzgruppen, Judgment, CCL, April 1948, at 578 (‘much evidence was introduced on behalf of the 
defendant to show that he did not enter the SS or SD organizations voluntarily, but was drafted. It is not 
sufficient however, in order to absolve oneself from the charge of membership in a criminal organization to 
show that one entered its ranks involuntarily. Attention is directed to that part of the International Military 
Tribunal decision which says that it charges with criminal membership in the SS those persons who become 
or remained members of the organization with knowledge that it was being used for criminal purposes, or 
“who were personally implicated as members of the organization in the commission of such crimes.”’) 
1487 E.g., UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (2000), Articles 2 and 5, EU Council 
Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on Combating Terrorism (EU Doc. OJ L 164, 22 June 2002), Article 2, 
and UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988), Article 3.
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Bonafè has argued that “one of the major problems with international crimes is that 
these are prohibited under international rules directed at either states or individuals, when 
in practice international crimes are most often committed by groups of perpetrators.”1488 
Also Jørgensen has observed that international criminal law’s focus on individual 
responsibility makes it difficult for the law to recognize the institutionalized structures of 
violence.1489 The problem of declaring organizations as criminals, however, involves the 
risk that human rights, such as the freedom of association, are wrongly restricted. It can 
also be difficult to formulate the criminalization so that the requirement of specificity 
of criminalizations is fulfilled. Jørgensen has in this regard stressed that “groups and 
organizations are difficult to define.”1490 In relation to international criminality, in 
which commission many different types of collectives are involved, it also becomes a 
difficult question where the line should be drawn between criminal and non-criminal 
organizations. From this perspective, the negative approach of modern international 
criminal law to criminal organizations is understandable. 
While modern international criminal law has been hostile towards the idea of 
criminal organizations, it has, however, not rejected the idea that a criminal collective 
may be relevant in connection to attribution. In the JCE doctrine, the prosecutor 
must prove the existence of a collective that has a common purpose that amounts to 
or involves the commission of a crime.1491 Indirectly, the enterprise doctrine therefore 
portrays certain collectives as criminal groups.1492 This is evident especially in relation 
to the so-called systemic form of JCE where, for example, prison camps may be labelled 
as organized systems of ill-treatment or as brutal organizations.1493 Also the extended 
form of enterprise responsibility (JCE III) rests on the idea that it is justified to impose 
an additional responsibility burden on individuals who have embarked upon a forbidden 
course of endangering human life,1494 that is, individuals who have so-to-say joined a 
1488 Bonafè 2009, at 187. Likewise Osiel has held that: “Responsibility for mass atrocity, although not equally 
shared among all citizens, is nonetheless very widely shared, in ways that make it difficult to identify, with 
satisfactory precision, the nature and extent of any individual defendant’s culpability and contribution [...]. 
[T]his study, which contends that collective sanctions directed against responsible groups – intermediate 
between the state and the individual – offer a workable middle way.” Osiel 2009(b), at xv.
1489 Jørgensen 2001, at 375-376.
1490 N. H. B. Jørgensen, ‘Criminality of Organizations under International Law’, in A. Nollkaemper & H. 
van der Wilt, System Criminality in International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), at 
216. 
1491 Tadić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 15 July 1999, para. 227.
1492 See e.g., Mettraux who argues that enterprise responsibility sometimes has been dangerously close to 
assigning guilt for mere membership in a group. Mettraux 2005, at 293. 
1493 E.g., Vasiljević, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 25 February 2004, para. 98 (referring to extermination or 
concentration camps) and Krnjolelac, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 17 September 2003, para. 89 (‘The Appeals 
Chamber holds that, although [... JCE II] clearly draws on the Second World War extermination and 
concentration camp cases, it may be applied to other cases [...]. Although the perpetrators of the acts tried 
in the concentration camp cases were mostly members of criminal organisations, the Tadić case did not 
require an individual to belong to such an organisation in order to be considered a participant in the joint 
criminal enterprise. According to the Tadić Appeals Judgement, this category of cases [...] is characterised 
by the existence of an organised system set in place to achieve a common criminal purpose.’). 
1494 Cf. Fletcher 1998, at 193. It should be noted that it is increasingly common that punishment is imposed 
for an act that only includes the risk of harm (so-called endangerment offences). Takala 1995, at 52. Also 
in relation to attribution may causing danger be criminalized.
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criminal group or organization. The JCE doctrine does not, however, per se or explicitly 
define the enterprises (or the collectives) as criminal. The ICTY Appeals Chamber 
has also held that in connection to aiding and abetting responsibility, the fact that a 
person has cooperated with “an organisation whose sole and exclusive purpose was the 
commission of crimes” can support a finding of responsibility.1495 Before the ICC, the 
doctrine of indirect co-perpetration by virtue of control over an organization engaged 
in international crimes raises the “question [...] whether it is appropriate [...] to give a 
special position to ‘organizations’ as a legally significant mediator that stands between 
the defendant and the relevant physical perpetrators who commit the actual crimes.”1496
In connection to attribution, the frequent State involvement in the criminality is not 
a relevant consideration. All responsibility forms can be applied to both State-affiliated 
offenders and to offenders with no State-affiliation. 
7.3.6.  Alternative Time Perspectives and Shifting Roles
While many ordinary domestic crimes can consist of “simple, atomic actions that can 
be completed in a single moment”,1497 the nature of the international crimes is such that 
they generally are part of a broader pattern or chain of events. The underlying offences 
in relation to the international crimes can be specific incidents that do not take long to 
perpetrate, but they may as well consist of numerous individual acts (for example, in 
connection to persecution).1498 In situations where the crime (or its pre-phase) has a 
longer duration, the role played by the individual offender may vary over time, which is 
a factor that has to be considered in relation to attribution.   
As noted in relation to the survey of the different modes of participation, some 
participation forms suggest that the offender has played his role primarily before the 
physical act that entails the realization of the crime. For example, in planning, ordering 
and instigation, the criminal conduct has to take place before the physical act if the 
underlying offence consists of a single act.1499 In reality, the persons planning, ordering 
1495 Perišić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 28 February 2013, para. 52. See also Ohlin who notes that: “How does 
complicity work in the organizational context? If an organization engages in a mix of illegal and “legal” 
activities, when does assistance to that organization trigger liability? Such questions do not often arise in 
domestic criminal law, since criminal organizations (like the Mafia) are usually understood to be criminal 
through and through. Since they do not have a legitimate purpose, the Perisic issue does not arise. I have 
been searching for a good comparison in another area of domestic law where the mixed nature of an 
organization is relevant in this way. I haven’t found one yet.” J. D. Ohlin, ‘Why Did the ICTY Acquit 
Stanisic and Simatovic?’, Lieber Code [blog], 1 June 2013.
1496 Ohlin, van Sliedregt & Weigend 2013, at 737. Cf. “Article 25(3)(a) only speaks of commission “through 
another person”. It is hard to see how this could be read to mean that this form of criminal responsibility 
also attaches when an accused commits crimes through an organisation.” Ngudjolo, Judgment (conc. op. of 
Judge Van den Wyngaert), TC, ICC, 18 December 2012, para. 52. 
1497 Ohlin 2007(a), at 176.
1498 Nissel makes a difference between completed crimes (such as, a murder), continuing crimes (such as 
enforced disappearances) and composite crimes (such as discrimination that require a plurality of acts or 
omissions). A. Nissel, ‘Continuing Crimes in the Rome Statute’, 25 Michigan Journal of International Law 
(2004), at 661-663.   
1499 Jessberger and Geneuss, e.g., in line with this note that when a person orders or induces a crime, he/
she does not have to have control over the commission of the crime. Jessberger & Geneuss 2008, at 865.  
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and instigation, however, often continue to support the criminal activity when it 
happens and even afterwards, and it may be argued that at least in situations when this 
continued support is strong, labelling the criminal behaviour “merely” as planning, 
ordering or instigation depicts the criminal behaviour deficiently. More general modes 
of participation, such as participation in a JCE or co-perpetration may therefore be more 
suitable in situations where the offender has played varying significant roles during the 
criminal incident. This appears to be the case in many cases of international criminality. 
It should furthermore from a phenomelogical perspective be noted that there may also 
be situations where superiors create “criminal enterprises” that after a certain time period 
start to function by themselves, that is, without superior involvement. In these situations, 
it may be impossible to convict the high-level actors for responsibility forms that at the 
point of time when the harm occurs require effect control over the subordinates (viz. 
superior responsibility).1500 
In the case law of the international criminal tribunals, the leading principle has 
been that a conviction for a pre-crime participation is not suitable when commission 
also can be established. For example, in the Stakić case, the ICTY found that “an 
additional conviction for ordering a particular crime is not appropriate where the 
accused is found to have committed the same crime.”1501 While this approach can 
be justified in relation to ordinary domestic crimes where the individuals who plan 
the crimes often also are those who execute it, it is questionable, whether it also in 
connection to international criminality is justified to always exclude the possibility of 
two different types of attribution for the same crime. This is due to the nature of the 
criminality where a division of work generally is necessary and where a person may 
play multiple roles simultaneously. Due to the fact that different attribution principles 
highlight different aspects of a person’s criminal behaviour, fair labelling may speak 
for applying multiple attribution grounds, especially as the various attribution 
alternatives are not connected to specific sentencing ranges. The fact that a person has 
been convicted based on two heads of responsibility for the same crime should then 
naturally be considered at the sentencing stage.   
In relation to international criminality, the time factor is not only significant 
in the sense that wrongdoing can alter over time, but in that there may be legally 
relevant connections between previous non-criminal behaviour and following 
criminal behaviour. In this regard, Nuotio has (in a domestic criminal law context) 
noted that the difference made between acts and omissions may be simplistic. As an 
example he mentions a teacher who actively takes his class to an indoor swimming 
pool and omits to supervise his class as a result of which one of his pupils drowns. 
The blameworthy behaviour of the teacher does not begin before the teacher omits 
to supervise his swimming pupils, but Nuotio notes the way in which the teacher’s 
active lawful behaviour creates a specific situation in which passive behaviour 
can become blameworthy.1502 In connection to international criminality, Ambos 
has observed that a superior may actively further a criminal enterprise and fail to 
supervise his/her subordinates, and that “the antagonism between a positive act 
1500 Osiel 2010, at 117-118. 
1501 Stakić, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 31 July 2003, para. 445. 
1502 Nuotio 1998(a), at 287 (see also 289).  
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and an omission [..., therefore] only applies, strictly speaking, to single crimes, not 
to collective commissions.”1503 The criminal law’s focus on certain moments of time 
may thus obscure relevant connections between different types of behaviours. In 
relation to international criminality, much behaviour that from a criminological or 
phenomenological perspective is relevant (that is, the creating conditions conducive 
for international crimes) and which consist of active acts by leaders is left outside the 
scope of criminal law. The focus of the various attribution alternatives is largely on the 
execution stage of the crime or the stages temporally close to that. While this focus 
can be explained with the difficulty to establish causal connections between remote 
acts/omissions and crimes, it can be questioned whether, for example, the scope of a 
superior’s responsibility to prevent and punish, should be connected to the extent he/
she personally has been involved in creating an environment in which crimes are likely 
to occur.1504 
7.3.7.  The Modes of Responsibility and the Abnormal Contexts of Action 
More generally, it may be asked to what extent the various attribution theories used 
in international criminal law take into consideration the fact that most international 
crimes are committed in armed conflicts and in other similar abnormal societal 
contexts. The abnormal crime contexts can both be regarded as factors that speak for 
lighting the requirements for attribution (the individuals act in a high-risk context and 
they should therefore behave especially prudently) and as factors that speak for being 
especially strict as regards attribution (in collective crime commission contexts there 
is an increased risk that individuals are blamed for the acts and omissions of others). 
In this regard, it is noteworthy that whereas most crime definitions take into account 
the special context of action, most attribution theories are also applied in connection 
to ordinary domestic criminality.1505 The attribution theories do therefore not generally 
take into account the fact that most international crimes are committed in armed 
conflicts. The doctrine of superior responsibility is an exception in this regard as it has 
its origin in military settings, but the broadening of the doctrine to also cover civilian 
superiors entails that the doctrine is not anymore only based on a “military logic.” In 
relation to most attribution theories “civilians are treated no differently from military 
officers in that identical criteria are employed in defining each as participants.”1506 All 
responsibility modes in international criminal law can be applied in connection to all 
1503 Ambos 2007(a), at 181. 
1504 It has been noted that problems relating to lack of evidence could be “solved” by switching the 
evidentiary burden, e.g., so that the superiors would be presumed to have ordered the commission of 
crimes, if they do not establish that the contrary is true. Even though such switched evidentiary burdens 
are used in relation to certain crimes in domestic legal systems (e.g., environmental damage and driving 
while intoxicated), they are clearly problematic from the point of view of the presumption of innocence. 
Schabas 2007, at 220.
1505 Milanović calls JCE and superior responsibility “international forms of responsibility” and notes that 
these do generally not exist in domestic legal systems. M. Milanović, ‘An Odd Couple: Domestic Crimes 
and International Responsibility in the Special Tribunal for Lebanon’, 5 Journal of International Criminal 
Justice (2007), at 1142.
1506 Osiel 2009(b), at 57 (regarding JCE responsibility).  
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three international core crimes, which entails that they all can raise both in wartime 
and in peacetime. 
In both societies engaged in armed conflicts and in totalitarian regimes propaganda 
is often in frequent use, which often leads to strongly criminogenic atmosphere. The 
criminalization of direct and public incitement to commit genocide, in this regard, 
recognizes the dangers of genocidal propaganda. In connection to other international 
crimes, such incitement is not criminalized.1507 In practice, incitement can, however, 
often be punished through other forms of responsibility, and most notably instigation. 
These forms of responsibility do, however, not in the same way as direct and public 
incitement emphasize the special danger of “speeches made to large, fully public 
assemblies, messages disseminated by the media, and communications made through a 
public address system over a broad public area.”1508 
7.3.8.  Bystander Responsibility and the “Waves of Punishable Responsibility” 
One function of attribution doctrines is to distinguish non-criminal behaviour from 
criminal behaviour. This function is important in relation to all criminality, but it is 
of special significance in connection to international criminality. The law to begin 
with distinguishes between non-criminal creation of societal conditions conducive 
for international criminality and, for example, criminal aiding and abetting. A similar 
relationship between non-criminal and criminal behaviour can be found in relation 
to bystanders. The non-criminal bystanders to mass atrocities play a significant role in 
that their passivity allows the perpetrators to see their behaviour as acceptable or even 
right.1509 In relation to criminality in which public officials are involved, it has been 
argued that these crimes can be seen as being made in the name of the citizens, which 
entails a form of “political complicity” for everybody who does not protest.1510 Fletcher 
likewise notes that those “who participate in creating the banality of evil bear a portion 
of the guilt for the accidental offender whose actions bespeak the mentality of the 
crowd”.1511 The question of how far the “waves of punishable responsibility”1512 should 
be allowed to spread is therefore of special importance in relation to international 
criminality. 
The responsibility of bystanders is generally regarded as so diffuse and distant 
that it cannot give rise to a meaningful criminal responsibility.1513 In some domestic 
1507 Cf. G. S. Gordon, ‘Formulating a New Atrocity Speech Offense: Incitement to Commit War Crimes’, 43 
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal (2012), at 281-361. 
1508 Kalimanzira, Judgement, AC, ICTR, 20 October 2010, para. 156. 
1509 Staub 2002, at 12 and 27. Likewise Drumbl notes: “As atrocity becomes more wide scale in nature [...] it 
becomes more difficult to construct participation therein as deviant. [...] Even less deviant is the complicity 
and acquiescence of the bystander. This complicity and acquiescence fall outside of the criminal law 
paradigm but constitute an essential prerequisite for violence to become truly massive in scale.” Drumbl 
2011, at 29. 
1510 Cf. L. Farmer, ‘Complicity beyond Causality: A Comment’, 1 Criminal Law and Philosophy (2007), at 
154-155. 
1511 Fletcher 2002(b), at 1544.
1512 Zahar & Sluiter 2008, at 220. 
1513 Cf. Farmer 2007, at 154. 
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jurisdictions, it is criminal not to try to hinder a serious crime1514 or not to help people 
in danger,1515  but in international criminal law such a requirement to intervene could 
have significant effects on the number of individuals who could be held criminally 
responsible. International criminal law therefore requires a special relationship between 
the offender and the person watching the crime being committed (superior position, 
colleague to the physical perpetrator, etc.) before individual criminal responsibility at all 
can be considered.  
More specifically, the question has arisen in some cases before the international 
criminal tribunals to what extent individuals are allowed to stand by and do nothing 
when they are at or near the scenes of the crimes. The question of mere or knowing 
presence at the scene of the crime can give rise to criminal responsibility was for the 
first time raised before the ICTY in the Furundžija case, where Anto Furundžija, a local 
commander of a unit of the Croatian Defence Council (HVO), raised the argument that 
the Trial Chamber had erred in finding that presence alone would implicate him as an 
aider and abettor.1516 In the judgement, the Trial Chamber had namely laid down that 
the actus reus of aiding and abetting is “practical assistance, encouragement, or moral 
support which has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime” and noted that 
in the so-called German post-World War II cases “the spectator in these cases was only 
found to be complicit if his status was such that his presence had a significant legitimising 
or encouraging effect on the principals”.1517 In the topical case, the Trial and Appeals 
Chambers, however, found that the accused had not just been present, but found that 
he had continued to interrogate a witness when the other actors had committed the 
physical acts.1518 The requirement of substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime for 
aiding and abetting responsibility, excludes bystander aiding and abetting responsibility 
in cases where the link between the person watching the crime being committed and the 
criminal outcome is more indirect.   
1514 E.g., in Finland it is an offence against the administration of justice not to report a serious offence. Section 
10(1) of Chapter 15 of the Criminal Code of Finland provides that: “A person who knows of imminent 
genocide, preparation of genocide, crime against humanity, aggravated crime against humanity, war crime, 
aggravated war crime, breach of the prohibition of chemical weapons, breach of the prohibition of biological 
weapons, compromising of the sovereignty of Finland, treason, aggravated treason, espionage, aggravated 
espionage, high treason, aggravated high treason, rape, aggravated rape, aggravated sexual abuse of a child, 
murder, manslaughter, killing, aggravated assault, robbery, aggravated robbery, trafficking in persons, 
aggravated trafficking in persons, hostage taking, aggravated criminal mischief, aggravated endangerment 
of health, nuclear device offence, hijacking, an offence committed with terrorist intent [...], aggravated 
impairment of the environment or aggravated narcotics offence, and fails to report it to the authorities or the 
endangered person when there is still in time to prevent the offence, shall be sentenced, if the offence or a 
punishable attempt thereof is committed, for a failure to report a serious offence to a fine or to imprisonment 
for at most six months. [...]”
1515 E.g., in Finland, Section 15 of Chapter 21 of the Criminal Code, establishes that: “A person who 
knows that another is in mortal danger or serious danger to his or her health, and does not give 
or procure such assistance that in view of his or her options and the nature of the situation can 
reasonably be expected, shall be sentenced for neglect of rescue to a fine or to imprisonment for at 
most six months.”
1516 Furundžija, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 21 July 2000, para. 124.
1517 Furundžija, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 10 December 1998, paras 232 and 235.
1518 Furundžija, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 21 July 2000, para. 126.
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Taking into consideration the limited number of convictions that there still has been 
for international crimes, it may furthermore be argued that the waves of punishability 
have not spread very far in international criminal law, at least yet. The international 
criminal tribunals are expected to focus on the high-level actors, even though the 
prosecution of some low-level hands-on criminals has occurred. Domestic prosecutions 
for international crimes have increased in numbers, but are still rare. In relation to 
international criminal law, it has thus not only been the law, but also prosecutorial 
practice and jurisdictions of courts that have affected the scope of the punishability. 
From the point of view of this study, it may finally be noted that the law to some extent 
has been moulded to focus on the leaders. In attribution, many of the attribution theories 
are namely designed to make it possible to prosecute the “top of the pyramid.” It is, for 
example, generally recognized that the goal of doctrines, such as the JCE doctrine, is to 
make it possible to prosecute leaders, even though it has been noted that the doctrine as 
a side effect may make extensive prosecutions possible. The goal of international criminal 
law today is thus not to prosecute everyone who causally has affected the criminality, but 
rather to direct the attention towards the leaders. 
7.3.9.  Objective and Subjective Focuses, and the Connection between Modes of 
Responsibility and Crime Definitions 
It has been argued that: “A reason for the difficulty of defining what “to perpetrate 
an offense” should entail is the [...] disparity that exists between the offenses.”1519 The 
relationship between the crime definitions and participation modes is indeed a complex 
one. In the same way as the definitions of the crimes establish certain elements that 
must be proven, the modes of participation in international criminal law also have 
actus reus and mens rea elements that the prosecutor must establish in order to secure a 
conviction.1520 This strict distinction between proof of the crime itself and proof of the 
forms of responsibility has been questioned by Zahar and Sluiter who argue that the 
approach chosen has hindered the international criminal tribunals from systematically 
considering “how far [...] the waves of punishable responsibility [should] be allowed to 
spread” from the physical perpetrator.1521 
Whereas some participation modes can be said to emphasize objective or 
behavioural elements, other participation modes have their focus on the mental side. 
The possible objective elements include requirements of causality in relation to the 
1519 C. E. Herlitz, Parties to a Crime and the Notion of a Complicity Object (Uppsala: Iustus förlag, 1992), 
43 (italics omitted). 
1520 The question of whether it is the crime’s mens rea requirement or the mode of responsibility’s mens rea 
requirement may affect who should have the mens rea. See e.g., Milutinović et al., Judgement, TC, ICTY, 26 
February 2009, vol. 1, para. 181 (‘With regard to the question of who must have the requisite discriminatory 
intent, namely the physical perpetrator or the accused who planned, ordered, or instigated the conduct of the 
physical perpetrator, the Trial Chamber considers that, so long as it is proved that one of these individuals 
possessed discriminatory intent, this element is satisfied. The Chamber reiterates here that this analysis should 
not be confused with the question of whether the accused bears criminal responsibility for persecution. 
Instead, the above is simply a determination as to whether such persecution was committed at all.’) See also 
Boskoški & Tarčulovski, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 19 May 2010, paras 67-68. 
1521 Zahar & Sluiter 2008, at 220.
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harm, requirements of effect on the behaviour of the physical perpetrator and various 
requirements regarding the type and degree of participation. The most extreme focus 
on the objective side is in strict or absolute liability, where there are no mental elements 
that need to be proven. The subjective requirements are often expressed in terms of 
intent and knowledge, but may also include, for example, requirements of special motives. 
Conspiracy could be called the opposite of strict liability, at least in its common law form, 
where there is no requirement that the conspired crime in fact has been committed or 
attempted. In international criminal law, all presently accepted attribution alternatives 
contain both objective and subjective elements, and the relevant question is therefore 
rather which elements the different attribution alternatives emphasize and hence where 
the essence of the wrongdoing so to say lies. 
As regards the objective elements and the required types and degrees of participation, 
the various responsibility modes clearly differ in how demanding they are in relation to 
the objective side. In relation to some participation modes, the required participation is 
− at least in theory − straight forward. For example, ordering requires ordering, planning 
requires planning, etc. The responsibility forms thus differ to the extent they capture “the 
true situation,”1522 that is, the extent to which they describe exactly what the individual 
has done or not done. Responsibility forms where the exact type of participation is not 
emphasized (for example, JCE and aiding and abetting) have been popular in international 
criminal law. In relation to these more open participation modes, the required participation 
has also been more controversial. The fact that JCE responsibility as a form of perpetration 
requires some participation whereas aiding and abetting responsibility as a lesser form of 
responsibility demands behaviour that has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the 
crime has been found odd in that the requirements are more demanding on the objective 
side in relation to aiding and abetting. The ICC requirement of essential contribution for 
perpetrator responsibility is more logical in this regard. 
The crime definitions contain further objective elements that must be attributed to 
individuals. In this regard, Roxin has argued that concepts such as perpetrator, instigator 
and aidor and abettor become problematic, because these participation modes merely 
are aimed at connecting individuals to the underlying offences.1523 Roxin’s solution to the 
problem is his own theory of control of the act by virtue of a hierarchical organization.1524 
In international criminal law, however, both underlying offences and chapeau elements 
must always be attributed to a person before a conviction can be entered. Roxin’s collective 
attribution theory, in the same way as the JCE doctrine, however, makes it easier to 
attribute underlying offences to non-physical participants in mass atrocities.1525 As has 
1522 Brđanin, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 3 April 2007, para. 367 (referring to a Prosecution Appeal Brief). 
1523 Roxin 2006(b), at 243. 
1524 Roxin 2006(b), at 242 ff.
1525 High-level actors rarely personally cause the harm and as such fulfil the objective elements of the 
underlying offence. E.g., H. Olásolo Alonso, ‘Current Trends on Modes of Liability for Genocide, 
Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes’, in C. Stahn & L. van den Herik (eds.), Future Perspectives on 
International Criminal Justice (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2010), at 521. It should further be noted 
that the collective context of action that these two collective attribution theories take into account does not 
have to match the contextual crime element of the crimes. The common purpose of a JCE may, e.g., be to 
kill civilians in a certain area, whereas the crime charge may be war crimes and the context element is the 
existence of an armed conflict to which the killings are connected.
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been noted before in this study, in connection to high-level actors the problem often lies 
at connecting them to the underlying offences, whereas the problem in connection to 
low-level actors more often is to establish their link to the chapeaus. 
Of the international responsibility modes, it is especially the JCE doctrine that 
is found to focus on the subjective side.1526 A strong emphasis on subjective elements 
is, however, inherently connected with the risks of finding individuals criminally 
responsible for not much more than thoughts or intentions.1527 The JCE doctrine has, in 
fact, been criticized for not requiring much as regards the link between the person and 
the crime.1528 Mettraux has, for example, has noted that the descriptions of the JCE in the 
indictments are generally no more than general descriptions of the sets of factual events 
that form the background of the charges.1529 In international criminal law, the emphasis 
on the subjective side is furthermore connected with two additional difficulties. 
The first is related to the fact the fulfilment of mental elements often is inferred 
from objective participation. For example, when an individual actively participates 
in a system of ill-treatment, and does so with a certain position of authority, he/she 
is regarded as having the required knowledge and intent for JCE II responsibility.1530 
Haan has called this “an objectification of the subjective requirements” and has argued 
that ICTY in practice has shifted the burden of proof with regard to knowledge and 
intent in the systemic JCE cases.1531 While there is some merit in Haan’s criticism, it 
must be emphasized that it in criminal law is common to establish mental elements from 
factual circumstances. This “objectification of the subjective requirements” can, however, 
be regarded as especially problematic in situations where difficulties to secure specific 
evidence about the participation are usual and where differences in the mental elements 
significantly affect how the criminal behaviour is characterized. In international criminal 
law, an omission by a superior may, for example, dependant on the superior’s mental 
state lead to superior responsibility, aiding and abetting responsibility1532 or perpetration 
1526 E.g., Olásolo 2007, at 147. See also Krnojelac, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 15 March 2002, para. 75 (‘The 
seriousness of what is done by a participant in a joint criminal enterprise who was not the principal 
offender is significantly greater than what is done by one who merely aids and abets the principal offender. 
That is because a person who merely aids and abets the principal offender need only be aware of the intent 
with which the crime was committed by the principal offender, whereas the participant in a joint criminal 
enterprise with the principal offender must share that intent.’) 
1527 Due to the focus on the subjective side, some scholars find that JCE responsibility resembles 
responsibility for conspiracy. Ambos 2007(a), at 167-168.
1528 E.g., Haan 2005, at 196, and van Sliedregt 2007, at 201.
1529 Mettraux 2005, at 292. 
1530 Cf. Kvočka et al., Judgement, TC, ICTY, 2 November 2001, para. 278. Also so-called specific intent 
(e.g., discriminatory intent for persecution) has been inferred from participation in an enterprise. See e.g., 
Kvočka et al., Judgement, TC, ICTY, 2 November 2001, para. 201, and Simić et al., Judgement, TC, ICTY, 
17 October 2003, para. 51. 
1531 Haan 2005, at 190 (see also at 199). For this reason, the replacement of the systemic form of enterprise 
responsibility with the basic form has been suggested, as the shared intent in the basic form is not simply 
a rebuttable presumption. Ibid., at 190. ICTY has itself numerous times called the systemic form of 
responsibility a variant of the basic form. Tadić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 15 July 1999, paras 203 and 228.
1532 In the Orić case, it was, in this regard, found that if the superior has knowledge of his/her subordinate’s 
criminal behaviour and he/she acts intentionally with knowledge or awareness that his/her omission will 
lend assistance, encouragement or moral support to his/her subordinate, the superior should be convicted 
as an aidor and abettor. E.g., Orić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 3 July 2008, para. 43. 
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responsibility.1533 From blameworthiness and labelling perspectives, the difference 
between the various responsibility forms is significant, but the factual differences in the 
cases may be rather subtle. It is therefore not surprising that the appeals chambers of 
the international criminal tribunals in a number of cases have overturned the mens rea 
evaluations of the trial chambers.1534 
Secondly, it has been put forward that certain responsibility forms can be used to 
overcome the difficulty to prove challenging crime elements. The two sets of actus reus 
and mens rea requirements are namely especially problematic in situations where the 
crime definitions have demanding mens rea elements and the participation modes do not 
require much in this regard. Individual responsibility for a specific intent crime based on 
the extended form of enterprise responsibility has, for example, been found irreconcilable 
by many legal scholars.1535 In this regard, Nersessian has ironically given his article on 
genocide and JCE responsibility the title “Whoops, I Committed Genocide!”.1536 Likewise 
the relationship between superior responsibility and specific intent crimes has been found 
to be problematic. For example, Schabas has put forward that “command responsibility 
is an offence that resembles negligence, and exactly how a specific intent offence can be 
committed by negligence remains somewhat of a paradox.”1537 Ambos, on his part, argues 
that negligence liability for intentional acts is “not only logically impossible but, more 
importantly, hardly compatible with the principle of guilt”.1538 
At last, it may be emphasized that the phenomenology of international crimes has 
put pressure on relaxing both objective and subjective elements for responsibility, which 
has caused criminal law scholars to criticize many attribution doctrines in international 
criminal law. The problem is especially acute in situations where both the objective and 
subjective elements have been relaxed. May has, in this regard, held that: 
Regardless of which types of international crime we are considering [...] my view 
is that we should not weaken the intent element. It may be justifiable to weaken 
the act element when looking at high-ranking officials, and perhaps joint criminal 
enterprise theory is one of the acceptable ways to do that. For it is not these leaders 
who do the torturing or murdering on their own. [...] But having already weakened 
the act element of criminal liability, it seems an especially bad idea also to weaken 
the intent element. If we weaken both act and intent elements, then we run the risk 
of moving toward mere guilt by association for these leaders. 1539
The present author shares May’s concern. 
1533 If the superior intentionally omits to act and shares the criminal intent of his/her subordinate, 
perpetrator responsibility appears more suitable.
1534 E.g., the Krstić case, where the ICTY Appeals Chamber did not agree with the Trial Chamber’s 
identification of genocidal intent and instead convicted Krstić as an aider and abettor to the genocide. 
Krstić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 19 April 2004, paras 134 and 143. 
1535 E.g., M. E. Badar, ‘‘Just Convict Everyone!’ – Joint Perpetration: From Tadić to Stakić and Back Again’, 
6 International Criminal Law Review (2006), at 302, Cassese 2007, at 121-122, Haan 2005, at 200, Marston 
Danner & Martinez 2005, at 151, and Ramer 2007, at 114.
1536 Nersessian 2006, at 81 (the article also addresses command responsibility).  
1537 Schabas 2009, at 363. See also Nersessian 2006, at 92-93.
1538 Ambos 2002(b), at 871. 
1539 May 2006, at 323. 
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7.4.  Concluding Evaluative Remarks 
7.4.1.  The Modes of Responsibility and the Ideal of “Good Criminal Law” 
The phenomenology of international crimes entails that the attribution of crimes to 
individuals often is demanding. In relation to high-level actors, the challenge often lies 
in connecting the actors to the physical acts causing the harm, whereas it in relation to 
low-level actors can be difficult to individualize the harm caused by them and to connect 
them to the contexts in which their acts take place. Due to this, attribution doctrines 
often used in domestic criminal law have a tendency to function badly in connection to 
international criminality. This has made international criminal law look for alternative 
attribution doctrines, such as the doctrines on superior responsibility, JCE responsibility 
and responsibility based on control of the act by virtue of a hierarchical organization. 
From a criminal law perspective, these doctrines are, however, not completely new. The 
JCE doctrine, for example, can be said to combine complicity law (essential element 
“participation”) with conspiracy (essential element “mutual agreement”).1540 In superior 
responsibility, one can identify a combination of responsibility for own omissions with 
responsibility for the acts of others due to a special relationship. In this sense, international 
criminal law follows established criminal law thinking in what kinds of factors are relevant 
at attribution. International criminal law also largely adheres to domestic criminal law 
thinking as regards what is not relevant in attribution. The motives of the actor are, for 
example, often disregarded at the conviction stage both in domestic and international 
criminal law. In this regard, the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Kvočka et al. case, for 
example, noted that participants in JCE do not need to act with enthusiasm.1541 
It has been put forward that the purpose of international criminal law is “to determine 
the individual criminal responsibility of individual offenders” instead “of focusing on 
collective guilt”, that is, to reject “the tendency in times of conflict to blame an entire people 
for the crimes committed by certain individuals”.1542 The most common criticism directed 
towards attribution in international criminal law, however, is that it does not adhere to 
the criminal law principle of personal responsibility. Especially, the JCE doctrine has often 
been accused of representing a collective form of responsibility. When addressing the 
claim that a certain responsibility form represents collective responsibility, the concept of 
“collective responsibility” must first be defined. This is, however, not an easy task as the 
term is used in many different meanings. The concept of “collective responsibility” can, 
to begin with, be used to denote the responsibility of States, companies and other legal 
persons. In these situations, collective responsibility equals holding the collective entity 
1540 van der Wilt 2009(b), at 164. 
1541 Kvočka et al., Judgement, AC, ICTY, 28 February 2005, paras 105-106. In the Boškoski & Tarčulovski 
case, it likewise held that: “the Appeals Chamber notes that the legitimate character of an operation does 
not exclude an accused’s criminal responsibility for planning, instigating and ordering crimes committed 
in the course of this operation. In other words, even if the goal of an operation is to root out “terrorists”, 
this must not be achieved by an act that constitutes a crime. In addition, the Appeals Chamber recalls “that 
motive is generally not an element of criminal liability”.” Boškoski & Tarčulovski, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 19 
May 2010, para. 172.
1542 A. Cassese, ‘On the Current Trends towards Criminal Prosecution and Punishment of Breaches of 
International Humanitarian Law’, 9 European Journal of International Law (1998), at 9. 
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or unit per se responsible.1543 This use of the concept is, however, prone to cause confusion 
and it is often more suitable to use other concepts, such as organizational responsibility 
or State responsibility, to denote responsibility forms where individuals are not held 
criminally responsible.1544 Secondly, the concept of collective responsibility can refer to 
situations where individuals are punished as members of a collective entity. Collective 
responsibility can then be used to describe situations where a “penalty [is] inflicted on a 
group of persons without regard to individual responsibility for the conduct giving rise to 
the penalty.”1545 If whole groups, nations, generations, etc. in this way are held criminally 
responsible there is usually much undeserved punishment or “too much guilt”.1546 A similar 
phenomenon may occur when criminal responsibility is based on organizational role, 
function or position rather than personal conduct.1547 In this form, collective responsibility 
denotes responsibility without culpability or fault, which conflicts with both criminal 
law and human rights thinking. Thirdly, the concept of collective responsibility can refer 
to situations in which members of a group are held responsible for acts committed by 
other members or by the group as a whole.1548 This is a broad use of the concept and if 
the concept is used in this sense collective responsibility does not necessarily mean that 
an individual has been punished completely without fault. Feinberg has, for example, 
noted that there may be: (a) collective responsibility with non-contributory fault, which is 
the case when every member of the group shares the same fault, but only one member’s 
or some members’ fault leads to harm;1549 and (b) collective responsibility due to collective 
and distributive fault, which is the case when a group engages in criminal activity and 
all members are held responsible for the whole crime even though they play different 
roles in the commission of the crime.1550 In these cases of collective responsibility, there 
is no perfect correspondence between the individual conduct and the criminal outcome. 
Instead, the responsibility is first and foremost based on the fact that the individual has 
changed his/her normative position with an initial attack against protected interests, that 
is, for example, by intentionally engaging in criminal activity.1551 JCE responsibility is 
collective responsibility in this third sense. 
1543 E.g., Vogel 2002, at 165. The relationship between society and its constituent parts may be approached 
in different ways. With reference to Rousseau, Fletcher distinguishes between the popular will in the 
aggregative or liberal sense (i.e., the sum total of the individual wills in the society) and the popular will 
in the associative or romanticist sense (i.e., the society as an entity abstracted from the individuals who 
constitute it). Fletcher 2002(b), at 1509.
1544 S. Darcy, Collective Responsibility and Accountability under International Law (Leiden: Transnational 
Publishers, 2007), xviii. 
1545 Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th ed. (2009) (‘collective punishment’). Feinberg calls this type of collective 
responsibility a form of liability without fault. J. Feinberg, ‘Collective Responsibility’, 65 The Journal of 
Philosophy (1968), at 681, and Feinberg 1970, at 241. 
1546 Cf. Fletcher 2002(b), at 1544.
1547 Jareborg notes that a crime “consists in a separate event of wrongdoing” and that criminal law therefore 
directly only should be concerned with the act or omission and only indirectly with the offender. Jareborg 
1995(b), at 22. 
1548 E.g., Darcy 2007(a), xiii and xvi.
1549 The absence of a causal linkage to the harm is only a lucky incident and reflects no credit of the person 
who is at fault. Feinberg 1968, at 681, and Feinberg 1970, at 241. 
1550 Feinberg 1968, at 684-685, and Feinberg 1970, at 233.  
1551 Ashworth 2008, at 412. 
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In comparative criminal law or, for example, human rights law there is no equivocal 
answer to the question of what the link between individual behaviour and the crime has 
to be to legitimately attributed to an individual. Fletcher has, for example, noted that 
in the American system the focus can be on “groups of people interacting in order to 
produce a crime”, which makes it “impossible under American law to hold individuals 
liable simply for what they do”, that is, simply for their own contribution to the crime.1552 
Through the JCE doctrine also international criminal law accepts that the relationship 
between the individual behaviour and the criminal harm may be indirect1553 and that 
the responsibility (at the conviction stage) can extend beyond individual contribution. 
Criminal responsibility that is based on responsibility (a normative model) rather than 
participation and causality (a naturalistic model) is thus sometimes accepted.1554 When 
accepting this type of criminal responsibility, the scope of the individual responsibility 
must, however, at some point be measured or evaluated. Usually this is then done at the 
sentencing stage, where factors such as scope of participation influence the outcome. 
The present author thinks that the current doctrines of responsibility in 
international criminal law are reconcilable with the basic tenets of criminal law. The 
doctrines do namely not create collective responsibility in the second sense. This is, 
however, not to say that the law always would represent ideal criminal law. Doctrines, 
such as the JCE and superior responsibility, stretch the boundaries of acceptable criminal 
law. The approach chosen is, however, understandable from the point of view of the 
phenomenology of international crimes.1555 In Jareborgian terms, the phenomenology 
of international criminality has therefore pushed international criminal law towards 
an offensive criminal law approach, which is, inter alia, characterized by an increased 
criminalization of negligence and different forms of complicity.1556 The opposite of an 
offensive approach is a defensive one, where the main goal is to protect individuals 
against abuse of power,1557 and where expansive criminal law is not accepted even 
1552 Fletcher 1998, at 189 and 192. 
1553 While enterprise responsibility generally is seen as “more common law”, some civil law lawyers have 
put forward similar schemes. E.g., Klaus Marxen has suggested that in relation to system criminality, three 
“elements” can be identified, viz. (1) the behaviour of an individual; (2) the supra-individual context of the 
crime (e.g., a criminal system); and (3) the harm. These three elements are connected to each other in that 
the individual behaviour is part of the context or system (connection I) and the harm is produced by the 
context or system (connection II). There does not have to be a direct connection between the individual 
behaviour and the criminal harm. Marxen 1998, at 231-233.  
1554 Vogel 2002, at 154-155. 
1555 Cf., however, Ohlin who finds that: “[T]here is no warrant for extending liability [...] simply because 
the very nature of these crimes is collective. The question is not whether it is collective or not but what kind 
of collective action is criminal [...].” Ohlin 2007(b), at 74.
1556 Jareborg 1995(b), at 26-27. The gravity of the atrocities that international criminal law addresses 
probably explains why those eminent criminal law professionals working at international criminal 
tribunals often accept and justify the use of from a criminal law perspective dubious attribution doctrines. 
Drumbl has argued that the case law of international criminal tribunals is “schizofrenic” in the sense that 
the judges often claim to adhere to central criminal law tenets even though they in fact approve the use 
of doctrines that can be regarded as problematic from the point of view of exactly those tenets. E.g., in 
relation to the Blaškić case (ICTY) he notes that “these systems incorporate vicarious legal elements in 
order to secure convictions, but then express concern that criminalization ought not be based on vicarious 
liability.” Drumbl 2005(b), at 1310. 
1557 Jareborg 1995(b), at 21-22. 
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though this would entail that the social or societal problem that the criminality 
represents would be more effectively addressed.1558 While the discussion on defensive/
offensive criminal law primarily has started as a reaction to the modern trend to use 
of criminal law to address societal problems not clearly causing harm to others, it is 
interesting that the problems of modern criminal law that these discussions highlight 
also can be found in relation to international criminality, which often is characterized 
by extensive causing of harm to others. In international criminal law, the law clearly 
protects values and interests that generally are protected through criminal law, but the 
problem lies in protecting these values in a way that respects the fundamental tenets 
of criminal law. 
In the same way as Osiel, the present author therefore feels that the phenomenology 
of international crimes is something that must be recognized at attribution. More 
specifically, Osiel argues that as “a normative matter, it is perfectly reasonable to hold to 
higher standards those who choose to assume control over large groups of armed young 
men – without seriously training them to avoid causing pointless suffering [...].”1559 He, 
however, also correctly points out that: “This is not to say that the law need go so far as 
to hold the military leader “strictly liable,” that is, despite his diligent efforts to avoid 
criminal harm by his minions.”1560 Also in connection to more low-level actors is it 
reasonable to accept attribution models such as the JCE doctrine. International crimes 
namely generally occur in especially dangerous contexts of action where all individuals 
should be prudent not to engage in or support serious violations of human rights.1561 
The attribution principles should contain incentives for individuals not to engage in 
international criminality.1562 
As the present author sees it, what is more troublesome with international 
attribution from a legality perspective is the uncertainty and fragmentation that 
surrounds the lex lata. For example, in connection to commission responsibility the 
approaches of the ad hoc tribunals and the ICC depart considerably and it may be asked 
whether the coexistence of several different commission theories is justified. Also the 
superior responsibility doctrine is plagued by unjustified fragmentation between the ad 
hoc tribunals and the ICC. 
1558 The offensive approach hence regards criminal law as a solution of social or societal problems and 
allows expansive criminal law to achieve this goal. Jareborg 1995(b), at 24-25.
1559 Osiel 2009(b), at 127-128. 
1560 Osiel 2009(b), at 128. 
1561 As such, the present author does not think that the armed conflict context of action should be regarded 
as something that decreases individual responsibility.
1562 This being said, the present author recognizes that the question of incentives is a difficult one. In 
this regard Osiel has argued that: “Moreover, the problem of perverse incentives to remain ignorant and 
hence inculpable does not suggest that the law ought to impose shared responsibility among all people 
involved, even in episodes of administrative massacre. When the law imposes shared responsibility, there 
may be perverse incentives of a very different kind. Intellectual architects might ensure that so many 
people are involved that few are clean enough to assist any effort at prosecution. When the law imposes 
collective responsibility on all who are party to a common enterprise, it ensures that each individual will 
feel implicated in the acts of his peers. At a certain point, he will conclude that they have implicated him 
so deeply in their acts that he no longer has any stake in distancing himself from them. The law has linked 
their fate too closely to his own.” Osiel 1999, at 155. 
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7.4.2.  A Fair Labelling Evaluation of the Modes of Responsibility 
In attribution, a central consideration is not only to find a way to connect an individual 
to a crime so that a conviction can be secured. It is also important to find a label that 
describes the blameworthy behaviour of the individual in a representative manner.1563 
What attribution doctrines available in international criminal law do therefore best 
characterize the criminality of the accused persons1564 or best capture their “true 
situation and the true culpability”?1565 Obviously, there is no single answer to these 
questions. International criminality generally has many different dimensions and the 
various attribution alternatives highlight alternative aspects of the criminality. The same 
is often true in individual cases of international criminality. Some attribution doctrines 
emphasize vertical power relationships and others horizontal relationships. Others stress 
the individual criminal acts, whereas others put the emphasis on the fact that people 
have acted together. There are, however, aspects of international criminality that rarely, if 
at all, are recognized by the currently used attribution doctrines in international criminal 
law. Such characteristics are, for example, the participation of criminal organizations 
in the criminality, the significance of peer pressure, the fact that the criminality often 
is State affiliated and the fact that it often is committed in abnormal societal contexts. 
From this perspective, the international modes of responsibility differ from the crime 
definitions in which numerous dimensions of international criminality are given legal 
attention. It is, however, typical for criminal law that it is the special part of the law that 
the special characteristics of different types of criminality primarily are considered. The 
attribution belongs to the general part of criminal law, which in most domestic criminal 
justice systems is common for all types of crimes. 
Ambos has found that the fact that certain conceptually or structurally 
different attribution doctrines in the case law have been applied simultaneously has 
entailed that the differences between the various responsibility modes have lost in 
importance.1566 It is indeed awkward if the prosecutor simultaneously claims that a 
person has actively participated in a JCE to commit particular crimes and that he/she 
has passively failed to supervise his/her subordinates in relation to the same crimes. 
The reality obviously should be either or, but the conviction will often depend on 
what the prosecutor has been able to prove. This shows that fair labelling in relation 
to international criminality is a goal that is not always achieved due to evidentiary 
problems, which can be caused by both: (a) lack of available evidence; and (b) the 
degree to which the elements to be proven are demanding. It should, however, also 
be acknowledged that dichotomies, such as active-passive, can be difficult to apply 
in relation to criminal behaviour that spans over a long time period and where the 
individual behaviour at times may be characterized by passivity and at times by 
activity. The fact that alternative attribution doctrines often can be used in relation 
1563 Scholars, however, disagree on the importance of fair labelling. Van der Wilt, e.g., makes a distinction 
between the JCE doctrines “criminal law functions” and its “hermeneutic or narrative aspirations”, 
indicating that the narrative aspirations of a doctrine have to come second in relation to the criminal law 
function. van der Wilt 2009(b), at 160. 
1564 Krnojelac, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 15 March 2002, para. 173. 
1565 Brđanin, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 3 April 2007, para. 367 (referring to a Prosecution Appeal Brief).
1566 Ambos 2009(a), at 139. 
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to individual cases, however, entails that very different stories about what has 
happened can be told through the criminal law. 
Finally in international criminal law, where many cases often are related, the risk of 
incoherence between the stories told in different cases should be noted. If the high-level 
actors are prosecuted by using attribution doctrines that paint an image of complete 
dominance by the elites, it is awkward if the low-level actors in relation to the same crimes 
are prosecuted based on attribution doctrines that emphasize the individual decision-
making by the low-level actors. The risk of fragmentation often increases if special 
attribution doctrines are used to high-level respectively low-level actors (for example, the 
control of the act by virtue of a hierarchical organization doctrine). Doctrines which can 
be applied to all different types of participants (such as the JCE doctrine), in theory, seems 
to make it possible to avoid fragmentation. In practice, the enterprises have, however, in 
connection to JCE often been defined differently from case to case, and as such also the 
stories told by two cases in which the JCE has been used may conflict. 
All in all, attribution in international criminal law therefore emphasizes a central 
thesis of this study: that the nature of international criminality and the flexibility of 
international criminal law often allow very different stories to be told about various 
historical events forming the basis of the criminal proceedings.1567 It is often some aspect 
of the criminality that becomes emphasized, as all dimensions of the criminality cannot 
be captured by the law. 
1567 This risk of different cases telling different stories can also arise regarding the crimes. Milanovic has, 
e.g., noted that the question of whether there in former Yugoslavia occurred genocide outside Srebrenica 
has been answered differently by different trial chambers in no case to answer proceedings. See further M. 
Milanovic, ‘Karadzic Trial Chamber Finds No Genocide in Bosnia but for Srebrenica’, EJIL Talk! [blog], 
28 June 2012. 
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8.  AVERTING CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 
8.1.  Introduction
8.1.1.  Introductory Remarks 
In both criminal law and everyday moral judgments the concept of excuse plays a 
crucial role. This is because the practice of blaming is intrinsically selective. It cannot 
survive if all harm-doers are to be blamed, any more than it can if none are. Excuse 
is one of those central concepts that serve to draw the line between the blameworthy 
and the blameless and so make a blaming system possible.1568
So far, it has been investigated how individual criminal responsibility in international 
criminal law may arise and how this law takes into consideration the special characteristics 
of international criminality. The elements of the international crimes and the attribution 
doctrines do not, however, alone settle which individuals can be held criminally liable. 
There are namely also grounds for excluding criminal responsibility, which limit the 
scope of responsibility. The study of inculpating factors must hence be complemented 
with an investigation into exculpating factors.1569 
In a concrete court case, the defence team may besides arguing that the prosecutor 
has not met his/her burden of proof in relation to the elements of crimes or modes 
of responsibility (failure of proof arguments)1570 claim that there exists a justification 
(which is a challenge of the unlawfulness of the act) or an excuse (which is a challenge 
of the blameworthiness of the actor) for the behaviour.1571 The defence team may 
also make procedural objections, that is, for example argue that court cannot convict 
the accused person due to his/her immunity or due to the fact that the person in 
question already has been convicted for the same crime earlier.1572 While immunities 
traditionally have been of great significance in relation to international crimes, the 
statutes of all modern international criminal tribunals unequivocally deny immunities 
based on official capacity. For example, Article 27 of the ICC Statute stipulates that 
1568 S. H. Kadish, ‘Excusing Crime’, 75 California Law Review (1987), at 257. 
1569 Fletcher 1998, at 93. 
1570 A difference is sometimes made between: (a) true or affirmative defences (that is, justifications and 
excuses); and (b) defences that negate crime elements or failure of proof arguments. A true defence is 
an argument that leads to the conclusion that a person who fulfils all the crime and participation mode 
elements should not be convicted “all things considered”. What in some legal systems is a true defence 
can in other merely be a failure of proof defence. E.g., van Sliedregt has noted that in relation to mistake 
of law this is dependent on whether the domestic legal system presumes knowledge of the law (“neutral 
intention”) or requires dolus malus in which awareness of unlawfulness is required. In the latter case (e.g., 
Belgium and France) a mistake of law is a failure of proof defence. van Sliedregt 2003, at 233-234.  
1571 E.g., Duff 1990, at 100.
1572 Note, however, Zahar and Sluiter who argue that the traditional discussion on defences has been too 
theoretical and who instead treat all submissions the defence teams in reality regularly make in seeking 
acquittals as defences. This interesting alternative approach has meant that they in connection to defences, 
e.g., discuss the claim that invalid inferences have been drawn from circumstantial evidence and the 
argument of politically motivated prosecutions. Zahar & Sluiter 2008, at 396 ff. 
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the Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction based on official 
capacity and that official capacity as a Head of State or Government, a member of a 
Government or parliament, an elected representative or a government official shall in 
no case exempt a person from criminal responsibility. Immunities will therefore not 
be considered further here.1573 It should, however, be noted that whereas justifications 
and excuses exculpate a person, immunities merely procedurally hinder prosecutions 
and convictions.1574 
The question of excuses is especially interesting in relation to international 
criminality due to the phenomenology and criminology of the crimes. Particularly in 
relation to low-level actors, it is namely often suggested that it is the abnormal societal 
situations that push “ordinary people” into criminality. Individuals may be forced to 
commit crimes due to superior orders or prescription of law. While the phenomenology 
of international crimes challenges the idea that situations of complete lack of freedom 
of choice would be common, the frequent State involvement in the criminality and 
its collective nature entail that there are especially strong pushes towards criminality. 
In this regard, it has been noted that: “Situations in which international crimes are 
committed tend to be ones in which there is group activity, and therefore some level 
of coercion of an offender by colleagues is often to be expected.”1575 In these situations, 
the question arises to what extent individuals can be expected to follow international 
norms. Or to pose the question another way: Are there situations where the pushes 
towards criminality are so strong that individuals should be excused for committing 
crimes? The relationship between defences and the social reality of the criminality is, 
however, not straightforward. The acceptance of particular defences is often highly 
dependent on societal moral evaluations. Even if criminology would tell us that 
high-level actors generally participate in international crimes due to significant peer 
pressure, society is not necessarily willing to give legal relevance to this push towards 
criminality. 
Also the question of justifications is interesting in relation to international 
criminality. As noted in relation to the phenomenology of international crimes, armed 
conflicts have been characterized as alternative legal orders, in which much behaviour 
1573 Schabas argues that the defence of official capacity has to be distinguished from the procedural 
question of immunities. Schabas 2009, at 370 and 375. Also David finds that ICC Article 27 on 
irrelevance of official capacity makes a distinction between a substantive defence and a procedural 
one, and rejects both. E. David, ‘Official Capacity and Immunity of an Accused before the International 
Criminal Court’, in J. Doria, H. –P. Gasser & M. C. Bassiouni (eds.), The Legal Regime of the International 
Criminal Court – Essays in Honour of Professor Igor Blishchenko (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
2009), at 743. 
1574 M. Baron, ‘Excuses, Excuses’, 1 Criminal Law and Philosophy (2007), at 21. The following difference 
may be made between criminal responsibility and criminal liability: Criminal responsibility arises when 
an offence is committed by an agent and there are no non-exculpatory defences, such as immunity, lack 
of jurisdiction, double jeopardy and statute of limitations. Criminal liability, in turn, arises when a person 
who is responsible for an offence is not exculpated by a justification or an excuse. P. Westen, ‘Offences and 
Defences Again’, 28 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (2008), at 565-566, and R. A. Duff, ‘Excuses, Moral and 
Legal: A Comment on Marcia Baron’s ‘Excuses, Excuses’’, 1 Criminal Law and Philosophy (2007), at 53. This 
terminological differentiation is not adhered to in this study, as many scholars use the concept of criminal 
responsibility to cover both situations.   
1575 Cryer et al. 2010, at 410-411. 
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that usually is regarded as unlawful suddenly becomes lawful.1576 In such contexts, the 
question of what is right and wrong, and hence what can function as a justification is 
not as evident as in normal societal situations. In relation to this, David has, in fact, 
held that because the laws of armed conflict already by themselves allow violence that in 
normal societal situations generally is not accepted, the logic of justifications in ordinary 
domestic criminal law should not be automatically upheld in international criminal law. 
Or to use his words, “it is logical to think that defences admissible in peace time are 
no longer admissible in war time.”1577 In the same way as criminalizations are societal 
expressions of what is considered right and wrong, justifications reflect such evaluations. 
Even though the criminology and phenomenology of international criminality 
makes the question of defences especially topical, defences have, however, attracted 
little attention among international criminal law scholars. This has often been explained 
with the gravity of the criminality and the connected uneasiness with the idea that the 
atrocities could be justified or excused.1578 The fact that the international law-makers 
and appliers are reluctant to consider justifications and excuses is interesting taking into 
consideration the traditional impunity that has characterized international criminality. 
The widespread acceptance of impunity may namely be seen as a sign of the fact that the 
man on the street does not regard certain acts of war as criminal or that he/she finds them 
excusable. In fact, it appears that whereas the international legal community increasingly 
has started to reject many explanations given to international crimes as legally irrelevant, 
these explanations continue to be morally relevant for many people on the ground. 
1576 Haque makes the interesting argument that one cannot claim that killing in war presumably would be 
lawful. Rather, he argues “the laws of war bar the domestic prosecutions of lawful combatants for murder 
unless they kill in violation of both domestic criminal law and the laws of war.” A. A. Haque, ‘Law and 
Morality at War’, Criminal Law and Philosophy (on-line 30 July 2012). For Haque, the laws of war are hence a 
sort of “procedural defence” that sometimes affects (“bars”) the applicability of ordinary domestic criminal 
law. A similar point is made by Doria, when he discusses the relationship between war crimes and crimes 
against humanity: “It is only when the act is expressly excused or justified by the positive laws of war, rather 
than when it is not prohibited, that the laws of war can take precedence, because this is in essence what 
the Martens clause says: namely the absence of prohibition does not make an act against civilians which is 
otherwise contrary to the principles of humanity and dictates of public conscience permissible.” J. Doria, 
‘Whether Crimes against Humanity Are Backdoor War Crimes’, in J. Doria, H.-P. Gasser & M. C. Bassiouni 
(eds.), The Legal Regime of the International Criminal Court: Essays in Honour of Professor Igor Blishchenko 
(Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009), at 658. Both authors hence regard the law of war as a branch 
of law that creates exceptions or “defences”. Haque has, however, correctly stressed that the law of war has a 
double function: it “can serve either as a basis for or as a bar to prosecution.” Haque 2011(a), at 111. 
1577 E. David, ‘Self-Defence and State of Necessity in the Statute of the ICC’, in J. Doria, H. – P. Gasser & M. 
C. Bassiouni (eds.), The Legal Regime of the International Criminal Court – Essays in Honour of Professor 
Igor Blishchenko (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009), at 769. David also at another point notes that: 
“IHL [= international humanitarian law] is at the centre of two conflicting demands [...] where military 
necessities oppose humanitarian necessities. To admit [...] necessities other than the ones on which IHL is 
built, challenges the very essence of IHL in spite of its nearly absolute character [...].” Ibid., at 775. 
1578 E.g., Cryer et al. 2010, at 402, A. Eser, ‘“Defences” in War Crime Trials’, in Y. Dinstein & M. Tabory 
(eds.), War Crimes in International Law (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1996), at 252-253, van 
Sliedregt 2003, at 5 and 227, and R. J. Wilson, ‘[Book review]’, 96 American Journal of International Law 
(2002), at 517. Regarding some excuses, it has, however, been suggested that they have been accepted 
because of the seriousness of the crime. E.g., it has been argued that the partial defence of provocation in 
common law jurisdictions is due to the mandatory life sentence for murder. S. Silber, ‘Excusing Crime – 
Jeremy Horder’ [book review], Law Quarterly Review (2005), at 695. 
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The meagre attention defences has received in international criminal law scholarship 
can, however, also be explained with the fact that only a small fraction of possible cases 
are prosecuted at the international level. Due to the selection of cases, cases where valid 
defences could be put forward are rarely chosen for prosecution.1579 International case 
law on defences is therefore scarce. 
8.1.2.  Different Approaches to Exculpation
Before the analysis of defences in international criminal law will be embarked upon, a 
few words should be said about defences in general. Also in relation to defences have 
namely the leading legal systems of the world chosen different approaches. While most 
legal systems theoretically recognize the difference between justifications and excuses, 
they clearly differ in the legal weight they give to the distinction. In many civil law 
jurisdictions, criminal responsibility requires the fulfilment of the elements of the crime, 
wrongdoing and guilt, and a clear difference is made between justifications that deny 
wrongdoing and excuses that deny guilt. In common law jurisdictions, on the other 
hand, the central distinction is often between inculpating and exculpating factors, and 
both justifications and excuses are possible defences that exculpate an individual.1580 
Regarding justifications, it has been noted that while some justifications are nearly 
universally recognized, the question of their rationale is more controversial. A difference 
in this regard is often made between the deeds or objective theory focusing on avoiding 
a greater harm, and the reasons or subjective theory emphasizing a person acting for the 
right reason.1581 The social function of justifications can correspondingly be either to 
permit people to act in a particular way or to encourage people to act in a certain way.1582 
It is also possible to make a distinction between justifications based on whether they are 
examples of (a) waiver of protection of interest (most notably, victim consent), (b) action 
against invasion (most notably, self-defence), and (c) action in a state of conflict between 
interests (most notably, necessity).1583 
Also regarding excuses, it has been asked what the rationale for excusing individuals 
is or should be. While some argue that the main rationale of excuses is to ensure that 
those individuals who due to personal (for example, insanity) or situational factors (for 
example, duress) are unable to adhere to the behavioural expectation are not punished,1584 
1579 In certain legal systems, a prosecutor may, e.g., chose not to indict in situations where a concentration 
camp prisoner has been forced to kill another inmate. The degree to which a prosecutor can choose 
whether to prosecute or not, however, varies strongly between different legal systems. It may be said that 
defences are of special importance in legal systems where the prosecutor has few possibilities to refrain 
from prosecuting. P. Akhavan, ‘The Dilemmas of Jurisprudence’, 13 American University International Law 
Review (1998), at 1522. 
1580 E.g., Fletcher 1998, at 101-102. 
1581 P. H. Robinson & J. M. Darley, ‘Testing Competing Theories of Justification’, 76 North Carolina Law 
Review (1998), at 1095. 
1582 Cf. Gardner 2012, at 114-115. 
1583 A. Eser, ‘Justification and Excuse: A Key Issue in the Concept of Crime’, in A. Eser & G. P. Fletcher 
(eds.), Rechtfertigung und Entschuldigung – Rechtsvergleichende Perspektiven, Band I (Freiburg: Eigenverlag 
Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches und internationales Strafrecht, 1987), at 49-50. 
1584 Baron 2007, at 23. People should hence have a fair possibility to adjust their behaviour to the 
requirements of the law. E.g. Hart 1968, at 181.
265
others have suggested that the main rationale rather is that there are contexts which 
prompt individuals to act out of character and the excuses reflect the fact that criminal 
law wants to punish those with “vicious character” rather than those with “unruly fate”.1585 
It has also been suggested that a person can be excused based on diminished objective 
wrongdoing (for example, in relation to excessive self-defence).1586 A difference can 
hence be made between: (1) excuses where the mental state of the accused person has 
been such that it is felt that he/she cannot be blamed; and (2) excuses in situations where 
the accused person has acted intentionally and knowingly. In relation to the latter, it is 
not argued that an individual lacked the capacity to exercise choice.1587 The question in 
regard to such excuses is rather whether it would be unfair to require that the individual 
would have behaved otherwise.
The distinction between justifications and excuses has in many legal systems 
practical consequences in that it affects the right of resistance and the right of assistance. 
Greenawalt has, in this regard, pointed out that: 
Justified action is warranted action; similar actions could properly be performed by 
others; such actions should not be interfered with by those capable of stopping them; 
and such actions may be assisted by those in a position to render aid. If action is 
excused, the actor is relieved of blame but others may not properly perform similar 
actions; interference with such actions is appropriate; and assistance of such actions 
is wrongful.1588 
The characterization of something as justified action thus means accepting it as legitimate, 
or at least permissible, whereas excusing it does not in the same sense entail an approval. 
Fletcher has stressed this by noting that: “Claims of justification direct our attention to 
the property of the act in the abstract; claims of an excuse, to the blameworthiness of the 
actor in the concrete situation.”1589 In collective crimes, the fact that the acts of an individual 
are merely excused also entails that other individuals may be held accountable for the 
crime in question.1590 Due to these different third party consequences of justifications 
and excuses, Knoops has argued that in international criminal law all defences − with 
1585 See hereby e.g., W. Wilson, ‘The Structure of Criminal Defences’, Criminal Law Review (2005), at 
109, and Lacey 1988, at 66-68. Finkelstein notes that this approach is based on Aristotelian virtue ethics 
according to which bad acts generally allow conclusions of bad character. In situations of excuses, it is, 
however, not possible to draw that inference. C. Finkelstein, ‘Excuses and Dispositions in Criminal Law’, 6 
Buffalo Criminal Law Review (2002), at 318-319 and 324-325.   
1586 Eser has made a distinction between excusing due to: (a) lacking cognitive and/or voluntative elements 
of culpability; (b) extraordinary psychological pressure on the perpetrator; and (c) diminished objective 
wrongdoing. Eser 1987, at 58. 
1587 Cf. S. J. Morse, ‘Excusing and the New Excuse Defenses: A Legal and Conceptual Review’, 23 Crime and 
Justice (1998), at 358, and Norrie 1991, at 154-156. 
1588 K. Greenawalt, ‘The Perplexing Borders of Justification and Excuse’, 84 Columbia Law Review (1984), 
at 1900. Likewise e.g., A. Cassese, ‘Justifications and Excuses in International Criminal Law,’ in A. Cassese, 
P. Gaeta & J. R. W. D. Jones (eds.), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary, 
Volume I (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), at 952. 
1589 G. P. Fletcher, ‘The Right and the Reasonable’, in A. Eser & G. P. Fletcher (eds.), Rechtfertigung und 
Entschuldigung – Rechtsvergleichende Perspektiven, Band I  (Freiburg: Eigenverlag Max-Planck-Institut für 
ausländisches und internationales Strafrecht, 1987), at 77 (emphasis added).  
1590 E.g., Cassese 2002(c), at 952-953. 
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the exception of self-defence − should be regarded as excuses.1591 Lawful belligerent 
reprisals are, however, another defence in international criminal law that some view as 
a justification.1592  
Even if the distinction between justifications and excuses in theory is clear, it 
has, however, been observed that in practice there exists troubling borderline cases. 
According to Greenawalt permissible acts that are less than morally ideal is one such 
type of borderline cases, and he notes that a person may act in a manner that what many 
people would do although a different response would be morally preferable.1593 In these 
situations, we may feel uncomfortable to justify the acts as this would imply that we 
recognize that the conduct was acceptable in the circumstances, but at the same time 
it may seem impossible to claim that something really hindered the individual from 
choosing the right action (that is, to excuse the actor).1594 It appears that these kinds of 
borderline cases are especially typical for international criminality. 
In relation to excuses, it should furthermore be noted that there is “a scale of 
exculpation” running from situations where it may be argued that it is morally completely 
impossible to blame the actor (for example, severe mental disorder) to situations where 
the factors identified as exculpatory are nothing more than extra pressure that hardly 
affect the culpability of the actor.1595 Most of the excuse defences exist in strong and 
weak forms, for example, severe and insignificant mental disorder, and strong and 
weak duress.1596 These gradations are reflected in the law in that whereas some excuses 
are complete defences others are merely partial defences or factors that mitigate the 
sentence.1597 The excusing factors can hence both exclude and diminish responsibility. 
Sometimes different evaluations are made about a factors exculpating effect in the 
various legal systems of the world, that is, whether a factor is: (a) a complete excuse; (b) 
a mitigating factor; or (c) a legally completely irrelevant factor.1598 The legal systems may 
also differ in whether something is regarded as an excuse or as a justification.1599 In this 
study, mitigating factors are considered in the next Chapter on sentencing. 
Finally, it should be noted that even though the difference between offence/
responsibility elements and defences in theory is clear (viz., the main function of 
1591 G.-J. Knoops, Defenses in Contemporary International Criminal Law (Ardsley, New York: Transnational 
Publishers, 2001), 30. 
1592 Cassese et al. also include in the list of justifications lawful punishments. A. Cassese et al., International 
Criminal Law: Cases and Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) 460. 
1593 Greenawalt 1984, at 1904. 
1594 Greenawalt 1984, at 1904.
1595 Ashworth 2006, at 239. 
1596 Ashworth 2006, at 239.
1597 Ashworth 2006, at 239. In a partial or qualified defence, the reduced culpability may, e.g., be reflected 
in that a less serious crime category is chosen. 
1598 Different approaches can e.g., be found in connection to the legal relevance of intoxication. 
1599 Eser has, in this regard, observed (in 1987) that: “Contrary to common law tradition, which seems 
to limit excuse to insanity, duress, mistake of fact and to some extent mistake of law, German law has 
recognized for quite some time that excessive self-defense by reason of confusion, fear or fright [...], 
excusing necessity [...] and conflict of duties [...].” Eser 1987, at 57. Cf., however, Horder who discusses 
the excusing of acts committed in response to provocation or acts of excessive defence in a common law 
context. J. Horder, Excusing Crime (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), at 11, but 25 (mitigation of 
sentence) and 30.
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defences is thus to function as a ground to avert criminal responsibility in situations 
where the offence and responsibility elements a priori are fulfilled), in practice, it can be 
complicated.1600 This is partly due to the fact that certain things that in common or moral 
parlance are called excuses are not really excuses in criminal law.1601 For example, in 
criminal law, a mistake of fact generally negates intent and knowledge, which are essential 
responsibility elements, and the need to excuse in situations where responsibility has not 
been established does not arise.1602 Schabas has, in this regard, observed that, in fact, 
most “if not all” defences in fact entail a challenging of the fact that the mens rea has been 
established.1603 
8.2.  International Criminal Law and Grounds for Excluding Criminal 
Responsibility
8.2.1.  Introductory Remarks 
The suggested defences in international criminal law include mental incapacity, 
intoxication, self-defence, duress, necessity, superior orders, victim consent, military 
necessity and mistake of fact and law, and they can be categorized based on whether 
their origin primarily is in public international law or in domestic criminal law.1604 They 
can also be distinguished based on whether they exclude the fulfilment of a crime or 
responsibility element, or whether they rather justify the act or excuse the person. It 
should, however, be noted that the legal instruments of international criminal law (and 
most notably, the ICC Statute) do not clearly divide the defences into justifications and 
excuses.1605 As such, their justificatory or excusing character can sometimes be debated. 
This can be criticized from a fair labelling perspective. Bergelson has in connection 
to provocation noted that: “The proper labeling of a defense […] matters both to the 
defendant and society at large. Knowing whether, all things considered, the defendant 
was right or wrong in what he did and whether society can fairly expect others in his 
1600 J. Blomsma, Mens Rea and Defences in European Criminal Law (Cambridge: Intersentia, 2012), 285-
286.
1601 Furthermore, it should be noted that the concept of defences sometimes is used to refer to any argument 
the defendant can use to avoid a conviction. In criminal law theory, the concept is, however, generally used 
only to arguments that do not deny the fact that a prohibited act has been committed by the defendant. 
E.g., alibi arguments and denials of mens rea are thus not defences in the strict sense. 
1602 See further e.g., M. Scaliotti, ‘Defences before the International Criminal Court: Substantive Grounds 
for Excluding Criminal Responsibility – Part 2’, 2 International Criminal Law Review (2002), at 1-4. 
1603 Schabas 2010(a), at 501. Dinstein calls duress, mistake of fact or of law and mental disease all “defences 
based on lack of mens rea.” Y. Dinstein, ‘International Criminal Courts and Tribunals, Defences’, Max 
Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, available at www.mpepil.com (last update May 2009, last 
visited 17 August 2010).
1604 E.g., Knoops 2001, at 37 and 73, and van Sliedregt 2003, at 228. See also the Report of the Ad Hoc 
Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, which distinguishes between: (1) 
Negation of liability (such as error of fact and diminished mental capacity); (2) Excuses and justification; 
and (3) Defenses under public international law. UN Doc. A/50/22, Annex II, at 59-60. 
1605 E.g., K. Ambos, ‘Defences in International Criminal Law’, in B. S. Brown (ed.), Research Handbook on 
International Criminal Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2011), at 301.  
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situation to behave differently is essential for society’s collective sense of justice and for 
people’s ability to make personal decisions.” 1606
Interestingly, most of the defences that have their origin in public international 
law and which generally are considered as justificatory defences have lost in legal 
relevance. Military necessity and tu quoque are, for example, generally not anymore 
accepted as valid defences.1607 This reflects the trend in international human rights 
law and international humanitarian law to regard certain types of acts as prohibited 
whenever committed. Self-defence (which is globally recognized as a justification 
in domestic legal systems) has likewise lost in importance, but has, however, not 
completely been ruled out in international criminal law.1608 The same can be said about 
reprisals.1609  
As regards excuses, international criminal law adheres to the principle universally 
found in domestic legal systems that when the mental state of the person is such that he/
she does not appreciate the wrongfulness of his/her action, he/she cannot be blamed. 
Mental incapacity is therefore a valid excuse in international criminal law. While the 
questions who is insane or who has diminished mental capacity are not easily answerable 
questions, most studies indicate that persons committing international crimes are not 
generally insane or have diminished mental capacity from a psychiatric perspective.1610 
As such that ground for excluding criminal responsibility is not studied in greater detail 
here.1611 The relevance of intoxication, which is addressed differently in various domestic 
legal systems, will be considered shortly due to claims often made that many atrocities 
are committed by intoxicated hands-on criminals.1612 The focus will, however, be put 
on suggested excuses in which it may be argued that the accused person has acted 
1606 V. Bergelson, ‘Justification or Excuse? Exploring the Meaning of Provocation,’ 42 Texas Tech Law 
Review (2009), at 308. 
1607 See e.g., van Sliedregt 2003, at 291-298, and David 2009(b), at 774 (regarding military necessity). 
1608 On self-defence, see e.g., T. L. H. McCormack, ‘Self-Defence in International Criminal Law, in H. 
Abtahi & G. Boas (eds.), The Dynamics of International Criminal Justice – Essays in Honour of Sir Richard 
May (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006) 231-255, and W. A. Schabas, ‘General Principles of 
Criminal Law in the International Criminal Court Statute (Part III)’, 6 European Journal of Crime, Criminal 
Law and Criminal Justice (1998), at 108-109. 
1609 See further Section 8.2.5.3.
1610 It should, however, be noted that in (at least) the United States, some defendants have claimed that 
exposure to certain social environmental factors or “social toxins” (such as a violent childhood or TV 
violence) has made them legally insane or that the environment has diminished their mental capacity. 
Important to note is thus that it not claimed that the environment itself should excuse the offender. P. 
J. Falk, ‘Novel Theories of Criminal Defense Based upon the Toxicity of the Social Environment: Urban 
Psychosis, Television Intoxication, and Black Rage’, 74 North Carolina Law Review (1996), at 731 ff. These 
types of arguments are interesting in connection to international criminality in that the context in which 
international crimes are committed often seen as a significant explanatory factor for the criminality. To 
what extent the environment affects an individual is both dependent on the character of the “social toxin” 
and the responsiveness of the individual for the toxin. Ibid., at 802-803. Falk, however, observes that social 
toxins cannot obviate criminal liability for large segments of offenders as “only some individuals have a 
degree of mental impairment cognizable under the criminal law.” Ibid., at 805.    
1611 See further e.g., Ambos 2011(b), at 301-304, Cryer et al. 2010, at 405-406, Scaliotti 2002, at 16-28, and 
Schabas 2010(a), at 484-486. It should, however, be noted that some defendants have (often unsuccessfully) 
claimed diminished mental responsibility. Ambos 2011(b), at 302.   
1612 E.g., Cryer et al. 2010, at 406. 
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intentionally and knowingly, that is, on superior orders, prescription of law, necessity 
and duress. 
8.2.2.  Mistakes of Fact and Law 
Many international crimes are committed in chaotic, abnormal societal contexts, in 
which it is not unlikely that some individuals make wrongful evaluations of facts or are 
uncertain about the level of violence that is legal.1613 In armed conflicts and totalitarian 
regimes, propaganda and the spreading of false information is common.1614 Kamber has 
in this regard held that: “Ethicists generally agree that factual ignorance or error can 
excuse or at least mitigate one’s responsibility for a wrongful act [... and that the] excuse 
is even stronger if my erroneous belief resulted from the lies of others.”1615 At the same 
time, international criminality is characterized by a severity, which should make most 
individuals suspicious that their behaviour is not lawful. Schabas observes this tension 
by noting that: 
In national legal systems, claims to ignorance of law are hardly credible when serious 
crimes against the person are involved, and in real life the disputes tend to arise with 
respect to obscure regulatory offences of a highly technical nature. War crimes law is 
somewhat anomalous, however, for on the one hand it focuses on the most serious 
crimes [...] and thus should be evident to all, yet at the same time acknowledges 
that on occasion the individual may not be aware that a specific act is ‘manifestly 
unlawful’ [...].1616 
Van Sliedregt has furthermore found that mistake of law is an especially appropriate and 
necessary defence in the context of international criminal law due to the “vagueness of 
the laws of war.”1617 
1613 Osiel notes the argument of Arendt that under certain circumstances it is impossible for people to 
know or to feel that they are doing wrong and argues that in such circumstances the person “is likely to 
make mistakes of law.” Osiel 1999, at 146. 
1614 Cf. R. v. Finta, Judgement (containing dissents), Supreme Court of Canada, 24 March 1994 (‘Wars are 
concerned with death and destruction. Sweet reason is often among the first victims. The manipulation of 
emotions, often by the dissemination of false information and propaganda, is part and parcel of the terrible 
tapestry of war. False information and slanted reporting is so predominant that it cannot be automatically 
assumed that persons in units such as the Gendarmerie would really know that they were part of a plot to 
exterminate an entire race of people.’)
1615 Kamber 1999, at 254. 
1616 Schabas 2010(a), at 503. See also e.g. K. J. Heller, ‘Mistake of Legal Element, the Common Law, and 
Article 32 of the Rome Statute – A Critical Analysis’, 6 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2008), at 
439.  
1617 van Sliedregt 2003, at 315. 
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Before the ICTY and ICTR, the defences of mistake of fact or law have, however, not 
really been considered.1618 This may be explained with the fact that judges are unlikely to 
accept such claims, if there is no “air of reality” to them and evidence to support them.1619 
Furthermore, to make a claim of mistake of fact, the defendant must first admit that he/
she has fulfilled the actus reus. Some contempt proceedings, however, indicate that the ad 
hoc tribunals do not completely rule of mistakes of fact, whereas arguments of mistake of 
law are not accepted.1620 In the Rome Statute of the ICC, the question of mistakes of fact 
and law has, however, been regulated in detail.1621 
Article 32 of the ICC Statute stipulates that a mistake of fact shall be a ground 
for excluding criminal responsibility only if it negates the mental element required by 
the crime. A relevant mistake of fact may, for example, be that a person falsely believes 
that a particular vehicle is a military vehicle and hence a legitimate military target. 
Most crimes demand knowledge as a mental element, but in certain cases it is enough 
that the perpetrator should have known about a fact, for example, that a person was 
under the age of 18 years. In such cases, it is evident that the defence of mistake of fact 
cannot be raised successfully if the defendant has acted negligently.1622 It is noteworthy 
that Article 32 does not require that the mistake is a reasonable one or that the person 
cannot himself/herself be blamed for making the mistake (for example, due to voluntary 
drunkenness).1623 Mistakes of fact can be made in relation to facts: (1) that relate to the 
elements of the crimes; (2) that would establish a ground for justification, and (3) that 
would establish a ground for excusing the offender.1624 Article 32 only explicitly deals 
with mistakes of facts relating to crime elements.
1618 Regarding mistakes of fact, Schabas has observed that “the defence appears to be rarely if ever 
invoked by modern-day defendants.” Schabas 2010(a), at 501. See, however, the Boškovski and 
Tarčulovski case, where the defence team claimed that the principles of mistake of law and fact were 
relevant in the evaluation of whether the accused should have known about the existence of an armed 
conflict. Boškoski & Tarčulovski, Transcripts, TC, ICTY, 8 May 2008, at 11179-11181. See also Brima 
et al., Judgement, AC, SCSL, 22 February 2008, paras 293 and 296 (‘[...] Due to various factors, 
detailed in his Appeal Brief, Kanu submits that “he believed that his conduct [of conscripting or 
enlisting children under the age of 15 years] was legitimate.” [...] Kanu’s submission that conscripting 
or enlisting children under the age of 15 was not a war crime at the time alleged in the Indictment 
is without merit. Furthermore it is frivolous and vexatious for Kanu to contend that the absence of 
criminal knowledge on his part vitiated the requisite mens rea in respect of the crimes relating to child 
soldiers.’). On the use of these defences in the post-World War II trials, see e.g., O. Triffterer, ‘Article 
32 – Mistake of Fact or Mistake of Law’, in O. Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court – Observers’ Notes, Article by Article, 2nd ed. (München: C. H. Beck, Hart, 
Nomos, 2008), at 897. 
1619 Schabas 2010(a), at 501. 
1620 See e.g., Hartmann, Judgement (contempt), SAC, ICTY, 14 September 2009, paras 64-65, and Jokić, 
Judgement (contempt), AC, ICTY, 15 March 2007, para. 27.
1621 For a discussion on the difference between mistakes of fact and mistakes of law, see e.g., van Sliedregt 
2003, at 301-303. She notes, inter alia, that a difference can be made between descriptive elements (perceivable 
through the human senses) and normative elements, which require interpretation and application of a rule. 
Mistakes regarding descriptive elements can entail a relevant mistake of fact. Mistakes regarding normative 
elements, on the other hand, can constitute both relevant mistakes of fact and mistakes of law. Ibid.
1622 Schabas 2010(a), at 502. 
1623 Cryer et al. 2010, at 414. 
1624 Triffterer 2008(a), at 901. 
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Regarding mistakes of law, the ICC Article 32(2) stipulates that: “A mistake of law as 
to whether a particular type of conduct is a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court shall 
not be a ground for excluding criminal responsibility. A mistake of law may, however, be 
a ground for excluding criminal responsibility if it negates the mental element required 
by such a crime, or as provided for in article 33 [on superior orders and prescription of 
law].” In relation to superior orders, Lappi-Seppälä has found that: “it is one thing to 
require that people in general find out the content of criminal law, and another thing to 
demand that a subordinate should make sure that his superior is acting according to the law 
when giving the orders. Those who are working in a hierarchical system have a certain 
right to rely on the fact that their superior’s act is in accordance with the law.”1625 The ICC 
Statute reflects this type of thinking.
When interpreting Article 32(2), it is significant to note that the first sentence uses 
the verb “shall” and the second “may”. According to Triffterer, this entails that the ICC 
first has to decide whether the mistake concerns “the law or the rule to be applied” and 
if the answer is in the affirmative, the mistake cannot be regarded as legally relevant.1626 
Secondly, if the first question is answered in the negative, the Court has to consider 
whether “the mistake is based on a wrongful legal evaluation” in case of which the 
Court has to use its discretion and decide whether there is criminal responsibility or 
not.1627 Heller similarly makes a distinction between “mistakes of law” (for example, not 
knowing that attacks against civilians are unlawful), which do not exempt from criminal 
responsibility, and “mistakes of legal element” (for example, not being aware of how a 
civilian population is legally defined), which can exempt from criminal responsibility.1628 
In relation to mistakes of law and legal elements, it has been asked to what extent 
individuals have an obligation to inform themselves of the content of the law. Bantekas 
has observed that the “ignorance of law defence does not presuppose that the ordinary 
citizen is fluent in all aspects of the criminal law or that one should keep pace with 
legal developments”, but that “we are asked to be social animals” and hence to possess 
knowledge of basic requirements of social behaviour.1629 In relation to mistakes of law, 
the relevant question is, in fact, not generally what an individual accused person de facto 
knew, but rather what he or she should have known (an objective test). Dinstein observes 
this by noting that: “The question that usually arises in the concrete case is whether 
a reasonable person is objectively expected to be aware of the illegality of a particular 
conduct under international law.”1630 This may be regarded as problematic from a mens rea 
perspective (if a truly guilty mind is required), and it has been observed that “extremely 
high demands on the individual actor’s knowledge of the law mean that a mistake of 
law will in the individual case virtually never be considered relevant, which may lead to 
1625 T. Lappi-Seppälä, ‘Defences Applicable to Third Party Involvement from a Scandinavian Point of View’, 
in A. Eser, B. Huber & K. Cornils (eds.), Einzelverantwortung und Mitverantwortung im Strafrecht (Freiburg 
im Breisgau: Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches und internationales Strafrecht, 1998), at 296-297. 
1626 Triffterer 2008(a), at 908. 
1627 Triffterer 2008(a), at 908. 
1628 Heller 2008, at 420-423. 
1629 I. Bantekas, International Criminal Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010), 117. See also I. Bantekas, 
‘Individual Responsibility and the Application of Ignoratio Juris Non Excusat in International Law’, 19 
European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice (2011), at 88.
1630 Dinstein 2009, para. 13. 
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a dangerous qualification of the fundamental guilt principle.”1631 It should, however, be 
noted that a serious investigation into individual person’s knowledge of the law (a purely 
subjective test) would entail that the applicability of the law would vary from one person 
to another based on their knowledge, and that it often would become possible to evade 
responsibility by claiming ignorance.1632 Most domestic legal systems are very reluctant to 
legal relevance to claims of mistake of law.1633 This is the case especially in connection to 
mala in se criminality.1634 If mistakes of law are given legal relevance, there must generally 
be a special reason to do so (for example, that the legislation criminalizing the behaviour 
has been unusually vague).1635
Scholars differ in relation to how much mistake defences they believe can be 
successful based on Article 32 of the Rome Statute. Most scholars do not think that the 
Statute allows for many mistakes of law or legal element, and the ICC has itself in the 
Lubanga case noted that “the scope of a mistake of law within the meaning of article 
32(2) is relatively limited.”1636 Heller has, however, argued that Article 32 “properly 
understood” allows for a wide variety of exculpatory mistakes of legal elements and that 
the Rome Statute therefore should be amended to explicitly apply a negligence standard 
to the legal elements.1637 It should be noted that has also been suggested that what a 
person should know about the content of the law is dependent on the position of the 
person, that is, for example, so that people in a guarantee position should have more 
detailed knowledge of the content of international humanitarian law.1638 This suggestion 
1631 Schabas 2010(a), at 504 (referring to Ambos). See also Ambos 2011(b), at 321. An opposite view is 
expressed by Ohlin, who argues that ignorance of law does not affect culpability as “it is the act itself – not 
knowledge of its unlawfulness − that generates culpability.” J. Ohlin, ‘Mistake of Law’, in A. Cassese (ed.), 
The Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), at 422.
1632 Cf. Cassese 2008, at 295. 
1633 Schabas has summarized the comparative law on mistake of law in the following manner: “Continental 
penal codes do not, as a general rule, allow a defence of mistake of law. German law appears as an exception, 
allowing a limited defence under what is called the ‘layman’s parallel evaluation test.’ The common law 
excludes mistake of law, but allows the related defence of mistake of legal element.” Schabas 2010(a), at 502.
1634 As was noted in Chapter 6, it may be debated to what extent international crimes constitute mala in 
se or mala prohibita criminality. In this regard, Ambos notes that the presumption of knowledge of the 
law is a fiction especially in connection to mala prohibita crimes. He notes that: “the growing amount of 
special criminal law produces more and more ‘mala prohibita’. The same holds true for ICL [=international 
criminal law], at least as far as war crimes are concerned. Things are more complicated even if one includes 
grounds excluding criminal responsibility (‘defences’) in the analysis, since the scope and the existence of 
defences are often unknown to the average citizen.” Ambos 2006, at 668.    
1635 E.g., in Finland, the Criminal Code provides (in Chapter 4, Section 2) regarding that: “If the perpetrator 
errs in regarding his or her act as lawful, he or she is exempt from criminal liability if the mistake is to be 
deemed manifestly excusable due to the following factors: (1) the defective or erroneous publication of the 
law, (2) the particular obtuseness of the contents of the law, (3) erroneous advice by an authority, or (4) 
another reason comparable to these.” 
1636 Lubanga, Decision (confirmation of charges), PTC, ICC, 29 January 2007, para. 305. 
1637 Heller 2008, at 419-420. 
1638 E.g., van Sliedregt 2003, at 314-315 (referring to post-World War II case law), and G.- J. A. Knoops, ‘The 
Diverging Position of Criminal Law Defences before the ICTY and the ICC: Contemporary Developments’, 
in J. Doria, H. - P. Gasser & M. C. Bassiouni (eds.), The Legal Regime of the International Criminal Court 
– Essays in Honour of Professor Igor Blishchenko (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009), at 793. Also 
Cassese et al. suggest that mistakes of law could be especially relevant in relation to low-ranking members 
of an army. Cassese et al. 2011, at 507.  
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is supported by the ICC Statute, which makes the connection between mistakes of law 
and superior orders.1639 
8.2.3.  Victim Consent 
In international criminal law, the victims are often in the terms of Nils Christie “ideal 
victims”. They are namely often “weak”, they cannot be blamed for being where they were 
when the crime was committed, and the offender is “big and bad” and unknown to the 
victim.1640 Due to this, victim consent is generally not considered a topical question in 
international criminal law. 
More generally, it may be noted that whereas victim consent can annul wrongdoing 
in relation to crimes causing trivial harm or when it changes the nature of the conduct 
(for example, in relation to rape), individuals cannot generally consent to serious 
harm to them if such harm also violates human dignity (respecting human beings 
in themselves).1641 In most legal systems, individuals cannot, for example, consent to 
being murdered or tortured.1642 Furthermore, it is generally thought that international 
crimes primarily violate common interests, even though they also victimize individuals. 
In relation to international crimes, it can therefore be questioned whether individuals 
as individuals can consent to them.1643 Ambos points out that it “is a general norm in 
criminal law that consent can only exclude criminal responsibility if the consenting 
victim is entitled to dispose exclusively of the (individual) legal interest protected by the 
offence” and that if “the offences also protect collective interests the individual’s consent 
cannot have an exonerating effect.”1644 According to Ambos, this entails that international 
criminal law does not admit the consent defence.1645 
The ICC Elements of Crimes interestingly contain one footnote in relation to the 
war crime of mutilation, which states that consent is not a defence to that crime. Schabas 
has found that this exclusion might breach the presumption of innocence.1646 As the 
present author sees it, a difference has to be made between: (a) crimes where the non-
1639 Articles 32(2) and 33, ICC Statute. 
1640 Christie 1986, at 19.
1641 D. J. Baker, ‘The Moral Limits of Consent as a Defense in the Criminal Law,’ 12 New Criminal Law 
Review (2009), at 97-98. In relation to behaviour causing harm, Baker has importantly emphasized that: “It 
is important to recognize that it is wrongful harmdoing that is criminalizable, not mere harmdoing. The 
focus has to be on nullifying the wrongfulness of inflicting [... harm to another] as the harmfulness of such 
conduct cannot be nullified by consent.” Ibid., at 101-102.
1642 Cf. V. Hahto, Uhrin myötävaikutus ja rikoksentekijän vastuu (Helsinki: Edita, 2004), at 241. 
1643 Cf. In domestic legal systems, where it is usual to regard crimes as violations against the public, victim 
consent can, however, function as a justification that takes away the unlawfulness of an act (justification) 
or as a factor that entails that the crime elements have not been fulfilled. Hahto 2004, at 243.
1644 Ambos 2011(b), at 328. Cassese argues that individuals cannot consent to unlawful attacks on life, 
body or dignity of human beings, as these interests are protected by jus cogens norms to which are non-
derogable both to States and individuals. Cassese 2002(c), at 953.
1645 Ambos 2011(b), at 328. On victim consent and international criminal law, see also Cryer et al. 2010, at 
420-422, and Werle 2009(b), at 226.
1646 Schabas 2010(a) at 494. Interestingly, regarding genocide Schabas has, however, found that the “special 
nature of the crime” entails that the defence of victim consent is of little interest in relation to that crime. 
Schabas 2009, at 367. 
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consent of the victims is a crime element and hence affects the nature of the act (such 
as rape, forcible displacement and pillage); and (b) crimes in relation to which it may 
be asked whether victim consent is relevant or not. In relation to the first category, the 
question of victim consent clearly is of importance for the criminal responsibility.1647 
In relation to the latter group, however, the present author agrees with Ambos (and a 
number of other scholars) who find that victim consent cannot generally justify the 
underlying offences to international crimes. Hence, the present author does not find that 
it breaches the presumption of innocence to exclude victim consent as a valid defence in 
relation to most international crimes, including mutilation. The rationale for this is that 
while individuals due to their personal autonomy can consent to certain harms, there are 
in relation other harms societal interests to punish despite victim consent that override 
personal autonomy considerations.1648 The general principle of law that can be derived 
from domestic legal hence does not support the claim that victim consent is relevant for 
all types of criminality.1649 
In relation to the phenomenology of international criminality it should furthermore 
be noted that international crimes often are committed in circumstances in which it can 
become a survival strategy for victims to pretend to consent or agree.1650 In international 
criminal law, it is therefore especially essential to consider the difference between genuine 
and non-genuine consent. The international norms and case law on rape are especially 
illuminating in this regard. In the Gacumbitsi Appeal Judgement, the ICTR found that 
the prosecutor can prove non-consent beyond reasonable doubt by proving the existence 
of coercive circumstances under which meaningful consent is not possible.1651 If a rape 
victim has been detained by the accused person during an ongoing campaign against 
a civilian population, it is reasonable to assume that the victim consent has not been 
genuine. The ICC RPE and Elements of Crimes imply that a similar practice will also 
1647 In international criminal law, rape can be the underlying offence both to crimes against humanity and war 
crimes. The statutes of the ad hoc tribunals do not define the concept of rape, which has forced the tribunals to 
do this in their case law. This case law is not discussed in detail here, but the question of whether non-consent 
is a crime element of rape or whether consent is a defence to rape should be noted. In the rules of procedure 
and evidence of the ad hoc tribunals, it is namely put forward that consent shall not be allowed as a defence if 
the victim (a) has been subjected to or threatened with or has had reason to fear violence, duress, detention 
or psychological oppression, or (b) reasonably believed that if the victim did not submit, another might be 
so subjected, threatened or put in fear. Rule 96(ii), ICTY RPE. See also Rule 96(ii), ICTR RPE. In their case 
law, the ad hoc tribunals have clearly settled that non-consent is a crime element and not “merely” a possible 
defence. Kunarac et al., Judgement, TC, ICTY, 22 February 2001, paras 463-464, and Gacumbitsi, Judgement, 
AC, ICTR, 7 July 2006, paras 153-154. This question has also been raised in domestic legal systems. See e.g., 
Westen 2008(b), at 571-572.
1648 On this topic, see further e.g., Baker 2009, at 93. 
1649 The present author hence disagrees with Schabas who finds that: “Consent may be a defence to many 
crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court, just as it is for ordinary crimes. A theft is not a theft if the 
owner consents, and a similar norm is set out with respect to the property-related war crime of pillage.” 
Schabas 2010(a), at 493.  
1650 In the Milch case following World War II, it was suggested that individuals would have consented to 
medical experiments to (if they survived) transform a death sentence to life imprisonment. The tribunal, 
however, found that the “claim scarcely [..., merited] serious consideration.” Milch, Judgment, CCL, 17 
April 1947, at 776. In that case, the type of victims, the types of medical experiments and the circumstances 
surrounding the experiments made the victim consent claims completely incredible.
1651 Gacumbitsi, Judgement, AC, ICTR, 7 July 2006, para. 155.
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be followed by the ICC.1652 Also regarding forcible displacement (including deportation 
across a border and forcible transfer within a country),1653 it has been noted that an 
individual may consent to or even request removal, but that the genuineness of the 
consent or request must be investigated and assessed in the light of the surrounding 
circumstances.1654   
In the ICC RPE and Elements of Crimes in relation to rape, it is furthermore 
expressly stressed that there are certain individuals who due to personal characteristics 
cannot give a genuine consent.1655 Such incapacity may be due to “natural, induced or 
age-related incapacity.”1656 This entails that, for example, victim consent clearly is legally 
irrelevant before the ICC in sexual violence cases involving minors. 
8.2.4.  Intoxication
It is not unusual that hands-on criminals participate in international crimes as 
intoxicated. That toxicants play a central role in the crime commission is, however, not 
unique for international criminality. In this regard it has been observed that criminology 
always has “dealt with alcoholism and the consumption of drugs because of their 
capacity to lead consumers to offend or commit crimes.”1657 Often the intoxication in 
connection to international criminality is voluntary, that is, alcohol and drugs are used 
to alleviate the stress caused by the participation in the fighting. Sometimes military 
leaders, however, support the drug use of their subordinates or even demand it to 
ensure that their soldiers are not inhibited from killing and committing other crimes. 
Furthermore, when individuals have been made into addicts, there is no easy answer 
to the question of whether the drug use has been voluntary or not.1658 The answer can 
then depend on whether one focuses on individual events of intoxication or whether 
one instead sees at the circumstances leading to the drug abuse. In many legal systems, 
voluntary intoxication is not accepted as a defence, and the legal systems simply presume 
culpability in situations of intoxication.1659 In some legal systems, alcoholism can, 
1652 Rule 70(a), ICC RPE (‘Consent cannot be inferred by reason of any words or conduct of a victim where 
force, threat of force, coercion or taking advantage of a coercive environment undermined the victim’s 
ability to give voluntary and genuine consent.’), and ICC Doc. ICC-ASP/1/3 (Part II-B) (Crime against 
humanity of rape: ‘[...] 2. The invasion was committed by force, or by threat of force or coercion, such 
as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power, against 
such person or another person, or by taking advantage of a coercive environment, or the invasion was 
committed against a person incapable of giving genuine consent. [...]’)
1653 E.g., Naletilić & Martinović, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 3 May 2006, para. 154, and Stakić, Judgement, AC, 
ICTY, 22 March 2006, para. 277-278.
1654 See e.g., Stakić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 22 March 2006, paras 279-282, Krnojelac, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 
15 March 2002, para. 475, Krnojelac, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 17 September 2003, para. 229, and Krstić, 
Judgement, TC, ICTY, 2 Augusti 2001, paras 529-530.
1655 Rule 70(b), ICC RPE (regarding sexual violence): “Consent cannot be inferred by reason of any words 
or conduct of a victim where the victim is incapable of giving genuine consent”. 
1656 ICC Doc. ICC-ASP/1/3 (Part II-B), fn 16.
1657 Scaliotti 2002, at 28 (referring to Mantovani).  
1658 Cf. the discussion in Chapter 7, regarding the sometimes complex relationship between non-criminal 
and criminal behaviour. 
1659 Lappi-Seppälä in this regard speaks of “fictive culpability”. Lappi-Seppälä 1998, at 299-300. 
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however, be equated with depression and other mental conditions, and the questions of 
mental incapacity or diminished mental responsibility may arise.1660 
The Rome Statute of the ICC is the first international legal instrument to address 
defences relating to intoxication. Relating to the Statute negotiations, Saland observes 
that: 
There was no great substantive disagreement on permitting involuntary intoxication 
as a ground for excluding criminal responsibility. But voluntary intoxication 
presented big problems. For some delegations voluntary intoxication was a ground 
for excluding criminal responsibility except when the perpetrator had a specific 
intent to commit the crime which actually ensued. Others [...] would not accept 
voluntary intoxication as a ground under any circumstances. Still others would be 
prepared to accept it as a ground for excluding criminal responsibility except when 
the person realized that becoming intoxicated entailed a risk for the commission 
of crimes.1661
Article 31(1)(b) of the ICC Statute now provides that a person shall not be criminally 
responsible if, at the time of that person’s conduct, the  
person is in a state of intoxication that destroys that person’s capacity to appreciate the 
unlawfulness or nature of his or her conduct, or capacity to control his or her conduct 
to conform to the requirements of law, unless the person has become voluntarily 
intoxicated under such circumstances that the person knew, or disregarded the 
risk, that, as a result of the intoxication, he or she was likely to engage in conduct 
constituting a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court.
Saland characterizes this as a compromise “which had the benefit of not satisfying 
anyone”.1662 
Eser has emphasized that it is not based on Article 31(1)(b) sufficient that the 
intoxication diminishes the ability to appreciate the unlawfulness or nature of his/her 
conduct or capacity to control his/her conduct to conform to the requirements of law, but 
that this ability/capacity must be destroyed.1663 He also notes that in relation to voluntary 
intoxication increasing the risk for a crime being committed, the question of how 
“disregarded the risk” should be interpreted is controversial. Eser sees this as introducing 
a recklessness standard (between negligence and dolus eventualis),1664 whereas, for 
example, Werle argues that an “aggravated form of negligence” rules out the intoxication 
1660 Cf. Vasiljević, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 29 November 2002, para. 290. 
1661 P. Saland, ‘International Criminal Law Principles’, in R. S. Lee (ed.), The International Criminal Court 
– The Making of the Rome Statute (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999), at 207. See also Ambos, 
who emphasizes that intoxication as oppose to mental disease is not universally accepted as a ground for 
excluding criminal responsibility. Ambos 2011(b), at 305. 
1662 Saland 1999, at 207. 
1663 A. Eser, ‘Article 31 – Grounds for Excluding Criminal Responsibility’, in O. Triffterer (ed.), Commentary 
on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court – Observers’ Notes, Article by Article, 2nd ed. 
(München: C. H. Beck, 2008), at 877. Tadros has found that those involuntarily intoxicated should only be 
excused when it can be proven that the intoxication de facto has shifted their character, that is, that those 
who are violent also when sober should not be excused for their violent behaviour when drunk. V. Tadros, 
Criminal Responsibility (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 299.
1664 Eser 2008, at 877. 
277
defence.1665 It remains to be seen how the Court will interpret that part of the provision. 
Article 31(1)(b) is, however, clearly held to rule out the possibility to use intoxication as a 
defence in situations where hands-on criminals voluntary use intoxicants to get courage 
to participate in crimes. 
It should be noted that while Article 31(1)(b) is applicable to all crimes in the 
ICC Statute, some delegations at the negotiations expressed the view that this ground 
“would generally not apply in cases of genocide or crimes against humanity, but 
might apply to isolated acts constituting war crimes.”1666 In relation to this, Eser has, 
however, found that: “[a]lthough it seems practically inconceivable that masterminds 
of a prolonged genocidal engagement or of widespread or systematic attacks against 
a civilian population raise intoxication, it is not unlikely that an individual genocidal 
act or a particular crime against humanity is committed by an ordinary low-level 
person who is actually intoxicated throughout the whole crime and should thus not be 
precluded from raising [..., the argument of intoxication].”1667 In a similar vein, Scaliotti 
has found that: “It goes without saying that genocide cannot be planned and ordered 
by someone when intoxicated. As regards war crimes or crimes against humanity, in 
theory a commander in a state of intoxication may order the commission of isolated 
acts constituting such crimes.”1668 In this regard, it is noteworthy that in certain 
domestic jurisdictions intoxication is admissible in relation to specific intent crime 
prosecutions, but not in relation to general intent crimes.1669 From a phenomenological 
and criminological perspective, it is interesting that many appear to be legally more 
prone to accept intoxication as a legally relevant fact in relation to low-level actors. 
Political leaders and other high-level actors may, however, also have problems with 
alcoholism and drug abuse and the use of intoxicants does not necessarily entail that 
one becomes unable to plan or act long-term. It is not completely inconceivable that 
intoxicants affect a leader’s perceptions of reality and make him/her more prone to 
draw up genocidal plans. 
The approach taken by the Rome Statute is interesting in that ad hoc tribunals have 
been reluctant to accept intoxication even as a mitigating factor. For example, in the 
Kvočka et al. case, the Trial Chamber found that:
The [...] Defense submits that committing a crime under the influence of drugs 
or alcohol serves as a mitigating factor because the defendant’s mental capacity is 
diminished. In this regard, the Trial Chamber acknowledges that mental impairment 
is considered relevant in mitigation of sentences in many countries. However, when 
mental capacity is diminished due to use of alcohol or drugs, account must be 
taken of whether the person subjected himself voluntarily or consciously to such a 
diminished mental state. While a state of intoxication could constitute a mitigating 
circumstance if it is forced or coerced, the Trial Chamber cannot accept [..., the 
Defence’s] contention that an intentionally procured diminished mental state could 
1665 Werle 2009(b), at 223-224. 
1666 UN Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/WGGP/L.4/Add.1/Rev.1, fn 8. 
1667 Eser 2008, at 876. See also Ambos 2011(b), at 305. 
1668 Scaliotti 2002, at 37. 
1669 M. Keiter, ‘Just Say No Excuse: The Rise and Fall of the Intoxication Defense’, 87 Journal of Criminal 
Law and Criminology (1997), at 492-493. Schabas has in relation to genocide found that intoxicants may 
entail that individuals do not have the specific intent required for that crime. Schabas 2009, at 398. 
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result in a mitigated sentence. Indeed, the Trial Chamber considers that, particularly 
in contexts where violence is the norm and weapons are carried, intentionally 
consuming drugs or alcohol constitutes an aggravating rather than a mitigating 
factor.1670
8.2.5.  Compulsion Defences 
8.2.5.1.  Introduction 
In domestic criminal justice systems, it is usual to find defences such as duress, compulsion, 
coercion, necessity, self-defence and force majeure. In common these defences have that 
they recognize that sometimes individuals are coerced into doing things they do not 
desire to do.1671 The criminal behaviour can hence be a reaction to something. A difference 
may, however, be made between the various compulsion defences depending on the type 
of phenomenon that causes the situation of compulsion, the extent to which the person 
in the compulsion situation is able to make choices, etc.1672 
In common law jurisdictions, a difference is often made between situations of choice 
between two evils, that is, necessity which often is regarded as a possible justification, and 
situations of overwhelming pressure, that is, duress, which generally is perceived as a 
possible excuse.1673 Duress is often caused by another person, whereas necessity generally 
is brought about by a situation (for example, an accident or an emergency).1674 In 
continental legal systems, on the other hand, the relevant difference is generally between 
justifying necessity and excusing necessity, and both forms of necessity require that there 
has been a threat against a legally protected interest, or to put it another way, that there 
has been a conflict between two interests (for example, between a life interest and a 
property interest).1675 Whereas justifying necessity generally has to do with situations 
where a choice has to be made between two evils and the chosen evil is less serious, 
excusing necessity is rarer and refers to situations where there has been a threat against 
1670 Kvočka et al., Judgement, TC, ICTY, 2 November 2001, para. 706. See also e.g., Todorović, Judgement, 
TC, ICTY, 31 July 2001, paras 94-95.
1671 Ashworth has noted that the behaviour is not involuntary, but non-voluntary, as the person acts with 
intent. Ashworth 2006, at 224. Sistare has likewise observes that in duress situations, an individual makes 
choices, but the individual is not able to choose “in the normal way.” Sistare 1989, at 315. See also Kadish 
1987, at 273-274, and S. J. Morse, ‘Culpability and Control’, 142 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 
(1994), at 1596.
1672 E.g., a difference is in some legal systems made between coercion and force majeure, which leave to the 
actor no other choice, and necessity, where the actor is pressured but able to make a choice. UN Doc. A/
CN.4/SER.A/1986/Add.1 (Part 2) (Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1986, Volume II, Part 
Two), at 51 (paras 152-153). 
1673 E.g., Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th ed. (2009) (‘duress’ and ‘necessity’). 
1674 S. Janssen, ‘Mental Condition Defences in Supranational Criminal Law’, 4 International Criminal Law 
Review (2004), at 88. Ashworth makes the distinction between behaviour caused by threats from another 
person (duress per minas) and behaviour to avert dire consequences (necessity or duress of circumstances). 
Ashworth 2006, at 219. 
1675 E.g., regarding Germany Hörnle 2008, at 14, and regarding Finland A.-M. Nuutila, Rikoslain yleinen 
osa (Helsinki: Lakimiesliiton kustannus, 1997), 305-311. 
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a legally protected interest and “the offender could not reasonably have been expected to 
have acted otherwise”.1676
Compulsion defences give rise to evaluations of: (1) how serious the threat against 
an interest has to be; (2) how serious the crime committed in response has been; and 
(3) what the relationship between these two should be. Simplifying, it may be said that 
in cases of justifying necessity, the main question is often the proportionality between 
the threat and the caused criminal act. Justifying necessity is rarely allowed in cases that 
involve the loss of human lives.1677 For example, Ashworth has argued that: “Where it is 
a question of liability for taking one innocent life to save another, the rationale must be 
one of excuse, not justification.”1678  
In duress or “excusing necessity”, the proportionality between the threat and the 
response is not the main question.1679 Instead, the focus is put on what can be expected 
from the person in duress. The duress defence may therefore be said to be a “concession 
to human frailty”1680 or an expression of “understanding for the actor”.1681 The normative 
assessment of what can be expected can have as its basis what kinds of threats “ordinary 
people” generally endure or what kind of pressure the person in question can be expected 
to tolerate taking into consideration his/her age, education, etc.1682 In both cases, the law 
reflects social expectations, even though national legal systems differ in how explicitly 
they recognize this.1683 The duress excuse is thus generally justified with: (a) the existence 
of a hard choice situation not caused by the perpetrator; and (b) with the fact that the 
criminal behaviour has been understandable in that situation. Often it is, however, also 
stressed that in situations of duress, (c) the perpetrator has not wanted or desired to 
behave criminally.1684 Norrie has in this regard argued that the legal evaluation of duress 
1676 The Criminal Code of Finland, Chapter 4, Section 5. According to Hörnle, the legal standard in Germany 
is that that there is an imminent danger for his life, health, or freedom of movement, or if someone from his 
family or a person otherwise close to him was thus endangered, and if this danger could not have been averted 
otherwise and the offender could not have been “reasonably expected” (German zugemutet) to endure the 
dangerous situation. Hörnle 2008, at 14. 
1677 Self-defence is, however, a justificatory defence that in some domestic legal systems is accepted also 
in connection to cases involving loss of life. In relation to self-defence, it is interesting that the ECHR 
provides that “[d]eprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of [the right to life...] 
when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary [...] in defence of any 
person from unlawful violence.” Article 2(2), ECHR.
1678 Ashworth 2006, at 227. 
1679 In this regard, it is, however, noteworthy that duress in many common law jurisdictions is not 
accepted in connection to murder. In civil law jurisdictions, on the other hand, the defence generally 
applies to all crimes. P. Akhavan, ‘Should Duress Apply to All Crimes? A Comparative Appraisal of Moral 
Involuntariness and the Twenty Crimes Exception under Section 17 of the Criminal Code’, 13 Canadian 
Criminal Law Review (2009), at 271 ff.  
1680 Hörnle 2008, at 30-31. 
1681 L. E. Chiesa, ‘Duress, Demanding Heroism, and Proportionality’, 41 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational 
Law (2008), at 752. 
1682 Cf. Kadish 1987, at 274. Barton has emphasized that the applicability of the excuses is not static, but 
something that has to be evaluated in casu. Baron 2007, at 23.
1683 Hörnle 2008, at 31. 
1684 Horder has argued that the key issue in necessity is the moral imperative to act, whereas it in duress is 
the personal sacrifice the coerced person is asked to make. J. Horder, ‘Self-Defence, Necessity and Duress: 
Understanding the Relationship’, 11 Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence (1998), at 143.
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also often involves an investigation into motives of the accused person and an evaluation 
of the acceptability of these motives.1685 Sadism and hatred are, for example, motives that 
are perceived to be irreconcilable with claims of duress or necessity.1686 Likewise Hahto 
has observed that both the motives of the actor and the context in which an act occurs 
may affect the evaluation of whether the act should be considered justified, the actor 
should be considered excused or the punishment should be reduced.1687 From a criminal 
law perspective (where motives largely are legally irrelevant at the conviction stage) the 
central role given to the motives in connection to certain defences is interesting.
8.2.5.2.  Self-Defence and Necessity1688
In international criminal law, the question of self-defence may be approached both from 
a “normal” criminal law perspective and from a public international law perspective. 
From a criminal law perspective, it may be asked whether a person has the right to 
avert an attack directed against him/her in a way that involves the commission of an 
international crime. This type of (individual) self-defence is an accepted ground for 
excluding criminal responsibility in most legal systems of the world. Individuals are 
hence perceived to have a right to “hold one’s own against assault.”1689 In international 
criminal law, the acceptability and scope of self-defence is, however, not as evident. As 
noted by van der Wilt:
As assets of the state, soldiers are expected to perform their military defensive duties 
on behalf of the collective. As lawful combatants they have the right to kill and to 
be killed, a privilege which they share on a perfectly reciprocal basis [...]. This legal 
symmetry on the battlefield implies that any repulsion of an attack by another (fellow) 
soldier does not count as individual self-defence in a legal sense, because the latter 
would require the unlawfulness of the prior attack in the first place.1690 
From a public international law perspective, on the other hand, it may be questioned 
whether certain attacks against a State gives rise to a collective right to self-defence, which 
for individual persons entail that they have a right to participate in that self-defence and 
to commit an act that otherwise would constitute an international crime.1691 In common 
these two types of self-defence have the general requirements for acceptable self-defence, 
1685 Norrie 1991, at 156 (referring to Lord Simon).  
1686 Cf. J. D. Ohlin, ‘The Bounds of Necessity’, 6 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2008), at 298. 
1687 Hahto 2004, at 51. 
1688 Most scholars discuss the defence of necessity in connection to duress. The present author, however, 
finds that whereas necessity primarily has a justificatory character (and proportionality considerations 
are central), duress is an excusatory defence where the question of what can be expected of individuals is 
the central question. As such, the present author feels that necessity is closer to self-defence than duress.  
1689 Eser 1987, at 51 (referring to Jescheck). Eser notes that self-defence is also held to have a social 
function, viz. to self-defence is regarded as “the actualization of the legal interest in promotion of general 
peace.” Ibid. 
1690 H. G. van der Wilt, ‘Can Romantics and Liberals Be Reconciled? Some Further Reflections on 
Defending Humanity’, 7 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2009), at 532. 
1691 Cf. M. Scaliotti, ‘Defences before the International Criminal Court: Substantive Grounds for Excluding 
Criminal Responsibility – Part 1’, 1 International Criminal Law Review, at 158. See also van Sliedregt 2003, 
at 254-255.  
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viz. that the self-defence is immediately connected to the initial illegal attack and that the 
self-defence reaction is proportional to the initial attack. 
In international criminal law, the first codification of self-defence can be found in 
the Rome Statute. ICC Article 31(1)(c) stipulates that a person shall not be criminally 
responsible if, at the time of that person’s conduct: 
the person acts reasonably to defend himself or herself or another person or, in the 
case of war crimes, property which is essential for the survival of the person or another 
person or property which is essential for accomplishing a military mission, against 
an imminent and unlawful use of force in a manner proportionate to the degree of 
danger to the person or the other person or property protected. The fact that the 
person was involved in a defensive operation conducted by forces shall not in itself 
constitute a ground for excluding criminal responsibility under this subparagraph. 
This definition of self-defence − which by ICTY has been found to reflect customary 
international law1692 − has, however, attracted considerable criticism by some scholars. Most 
notably, it has been asked if international crimes ever can be characterized as reasonable 
action or as proportionate.1693 For example, David has found that “to say that a genocide 
or a crime against humanity could find some justification through self-defence is at least 
strange, if not absurd, unless we give the States credit for a dark sense of humour.”1694 It 
should also be noted that self-defence measures by States that violate jus cogens norms, 
such as genocide, are not accepted. The idea that individuals in corresponding situations 
would have a right to claim self-defence has found to be a legal anomaly.1695 It, however, 
appears that numerous scholars find self-defence (at least in connection to war crimes)1696 
as conceivable. For example, Schabas asks if not a soldier who is attacked by an escaping 
prisoner of war has the right to harm the prisoner of war in self-defence.1697 Many academic 
scholars therefore in relation to self-defence focus on elaborating how the concepts of 
reasonable, proportional, imminent etc. should be understood.1698 The present author is 
inclined to agree with David that it is difficult to envisage that genocide and crimes against 
1692 Kordić & Čerkez, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 26 February 2001, para. 451. It has, however, been argued that 
the right to protect property through self-defence is not part of customary international law. E.g., Cassese 
et al. 2011, at 463.  
1693 E.g., David 2009(b), at 762 (regarding genocide and crime against humanity) and 765. 
1694 David 2009(b), at 758-759. 
1695 It has, in this regard, been suggested that Article 21(3) of the ICC Statute (that the interpretation of the 
Statute must be consistent with human rights) can be interpreted to exclude justificatory defences to jus 
cogens norms. See further Grover 2010, at 558-559 (see also at 560).  
1696 Van Sliedregt (and some others), however, want to maintain the defence also in relation to genocide 
and crimes against humanity, as “reality can confront us with unpredictable situations.” Van Sliedregt 2003, 
at 258 (and 261). 
1697 Schabas 2010(a), at 489. That some force can be used in this situation is, however, already foreseen by 
Article 42, GC III, which stipulates that: “The use of weapons against prisoners of war, especially against 
those who are escaping or attempting to escape, shall constitute an extreme measure, which shall always be 
preceded by warnings appropriate to the circumstances.” It is hence questionable whether this at all would 
be characterized as a war crime. See also Cassese 2002(c), at 953.
1698 E.g., K. Ambos, ‘Other Grounds for Excluding Criminal Responsibility’, in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta & 
J.R.W.D. Jones (eds.), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary, Volume I 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), at 1032-1035, Ambos 2011(b), at 307-310, Eser 2008, at 880-883, 
van Sliedregt 2003, at 260-267, and Werle 2009(b), at 201-202.
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humanity ever could be regarded as the right way to act and as a proportional response to 
an attack. The same applies also to most war crimes.  
The ICC definition of self-defence emphasizes that a distinction has to be made 
between a State’s right to self-defence and the individual right to take self-defence measures 
by stressing that the “fact that the person was involved in a defensive operation conducted 
by forces shall not in itself constitute a ground for excluding criminal responsibility 
under” the ICC Statute. ICTY has, in this regard, held that the legally relevant question is 
generally not whether an act has been committed pre-emptively, defensively or offensively, 
but whether it is criminal in itself,1699 and that “military operations in self-defence do not 
provide a justification for serious violations of international humanitarian law.”1700 In 
connection to genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, the central question 
is therefore whether the individual has an individual right to defend himself/herself.1701 
It has been noted that the fact that the ICC Statute allows self-defence to protect 
other things as “self ”, namely other person and property, has made self-defence in ICC 
international criminal law more into a general necessity defence.1702 The defence of 
necessity has in the international case law, inter alia, been discussed in the Orić case 
(ICTY), where the Trial Chamber suggested that a defence of necessity exists in customary 
international law and that its requirements are: (1) a present and imminent threat of 
severe and irreparable harm to life; (2) that the measure taken was the only means to 
avoid the aforesaid harm; (3) that the measure taken was not disproportionate to the 
expected harm; and (4) that the perpetrator did not voluntary bring about the necessity 
situation.1703 These criteria for necessity stress the close relationship between self-defence 
and necessity situations.1704 Interestingly, in some post-World War II cases, the situations 
characterized as necessity situations were defined in very broad terms. For example, in 
the Einsatzgruppen trial, some defendants claimed that the Jews were dangerous bearers 
of bolshevism, which caused an emergency situation (necessity) justifying the mass 
killing of Jews. The court did obviously not accept this line of argumentation.1705 The 
1699 E.g., Kordić & Čerkez, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 17 December 2004, para. 812.  
1700 Kordić & Čerkez, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 26 February 2001, para. 452. See also Boškoski & Tarčulovski, 
Judgement, AC, ICTY, 19 May 2010, paras 44-51. 
1701 Cf. “Individuals within states, however, are only subject to moral rules about how they fight in war, not 
whether they fight. The determination to go to war is ascribed to the state, and the state, not its combatants, 
is responsible for the justness of that determination. On this perspective, while state may lose its right of 
self-defense by becoming an aggressor, combatants on both sides always retain their individual right of 
self-defense [...].” S. Viner, ‘Self-Defense, Punishing Unjust Combatants and Justice in War’, 4 Criminal Law 
and Philosophy (2010), at 315. According to international criminal law, those who fight on the just and 
unjust side of the war are hence morally and legally equal. Viner’s argument does not take into account the 
fact that individuals may be held responsible for the crime of aggression.   
1702 Cf. David 2009(b), at 757. More generally, David finds that self-defence can be regarded as an under-
category of necessity. Ibid., at 757 (with reference to Hennau and Verhaegen). It should be noted that in 
some domestic legal systems, a difference is made between self-defence, defence of others and defence of 
property. J. Ohlin, ‘Excuses and Justifications’, in A. Cassese (ed.), The Oxford Companion to International 
Criminal Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), at 320. 
1703 Orić, Transcripts, TC, ICTY, 8 June 2005, at 9027. 
1704 Gaeta differentiates necessity and self-defence by arguing that in necessity the victim has to be innocent. 
E.g., P. Gaeta, ‘May Necessity Be Available as a Defence for Torture in the Interrogation of Suspected 
Terrorists?’, 2 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2004), at 791.
1705 Einsatzgruppen, Judgment, CCL, April 1948, at 464-465. 
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claims made in the Einsatzgruppen case, however, stress that different opinions exist on 
what constitutes situations of necessity. Morse has, in this regard, noted that the concept 
of “coercion” is not well established and that no consensus about its meaning exists 
among experts or laypeople.1706 Most lawyers and laymen would, however, not regard 
situations where the objective existence of an imminent threat is as questionable as in the 
Einsatzgruppen case as situations of coercion. 
8.2.5.3.  But What about Military Necessity, Reprisals and Tu Quoque?
Self-defence can hence by its underlying rationale (that is, that harm is caused due to 
an unlawful attack by another) be connected to military necessity, but also to the related 
arguments of legitimate reprisals and tu quoque. In common self-defence, military 
necessity, reprisals and tu quoque namely have that they raise the question of how macro 
(often State) level reasons for action affect the question of individual responsibility (viz. 
the “micro level”). Military necessity, reprisals and tu quoque, however, depart from self-
defence (and, for example, force majeure) in that the external compulsion to commit the 
crimes is not that strong. 
Military necessity may be defined as “an exception that exempts a measure from 
certain specific rules of international humanitarian law prescribing contrary action to 
the extent that the measure is required for the attainment of a military purpose.”1707 
Hayashi argues that military necessity should be distinguished from the general defence 
of necessity in that military necessity does not require that the measure taken is the 
only means available to safeguard the threatened interest.1708 It is today generally found 
that military necessity is not an applicable defence in international criminal law, as the 
function of international humanitarian law and international criminal law is precisely to 
settle what is allowed to do in the name of gaining a military advantage. International 
humanitarian law and the corresponding international offence definitions do, however, 
at times connect the criminality of certain acts to the fact that they are not justified by 
military necessity.1709 
1706 Morse 1994, at 1611 (and 1605). 
1707 N. Hayashi, ‘Requirements of Military Necessity in International Humanitarian Law and International 
Criminal Law’, 28 Boston University International Law Journal (2010), at 43.   
1708 Hayashi 2010, at 58. Some scholars, however, discuss necessity and military necessity as one. See e.g., 
May 2007, at 199-210. 
1709 See further e.g., van Sliedregt 2003, at 296, David 2009(b), at 774, Hayashi 2010, at 42, and H. van der 
Wilt, ‘Justifications and Excuses in International Criminal Law: An Assessment of the Case-law of the 
ICTY’, in B. Swart et al. (eds.), The Legacy of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), at 286-288. E.g., the grave breach of “extensive destruction and 
appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly.” 
Article 2, ICTY Statute. The ICTY Appeals Chamber has, however, emphasized that there is “an absolute 
prohibition on the targeting of civilians in customary international law” and that military necessity never 
can be claimed to justify such attacks. Blaškić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 29 July 2004, para. 109. In its case 
law, the ICTY has, however, held that when war crime provisions explicitly require that military necessity 
is considered (such as in relation to the destruction of property and forcible evacuation of population), the 
corresponding crimes against humanity provisions may also implicitly demand such an evaluation when 
crimes against humanity are committed in war time. Blagojević & Jokić, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 17 January 
2005, paras 593, 598 and 615. 
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Also the law on belligerent reprisals is concerned with settling the line between lawful 
and unlawful acts in armed conflicts. Whereas reprisals against, for example, wounded 
and sick and prisoners of war clearly are forbidden under international humanitarian 
law, the customary law prohibition of reprisals against civilians divides the academics.1710 
In the Martić case, ICTY held that reprisals always are “drastic and exceptional measures” 
and hence subject strict conditions, such as that they are committed as a last resort and 
that they are proportional to the initial attack.1711 The Trial Chamber interpreted the 
proportionality requirement to demand that “reprisals must be exercised, to the extent 
possible, in keeping with the principle of the protection of the civilian population in 
armed conflict and the general prohibition of targeting civilians.”1712 In some cases, the 
ICTY has emphasized that reprisals against civilians are not legal.1713 Some scholars, 
however, interpret the lex lata of belligerent reprisals to allow certain acts that otherwise 
would be characterized as international crimes.1714 
While the possibility to claim reprisals as a valid defence has not completely been 
ruled out, it is today generally submitted that the argument of tu quoque (that is, the 
argument “whereby the fact that the adversary has also committed similar crimes offers a 
valid defence”1715) has lost its legal validity.1716 In contrast to situations of self-defence and 
reprisals, in tu quoque situations, the unlawful act is not a direct response to an unlawful 
act of another and the intention is not to hinder the attack of another respectively to 
force the other party to cease with its violation.1717 In the Kupreškić et al. case, the ICTY 
stressed that the law of armed conflict is not today anymore characterized by reciprocity, 
that is, “a narrow bilateral change of rights and obligations”, but that the law generally 
1710 See further e.g., Schabas 2010(a), at 497, and van Sliedregt 2003, at 293. 
1711 Martić, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 12 June 2007, paras 465-467. 
1712 Martić, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 12 June 2007, para. 467. This conclusion was not overruled in the Appeal 
Judgement, which only indirectly commented upon the Trial Chamber’s interpretation of the law on reprisals. 
Martić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 8 October 2008, paras 263-267.   
1713 Kupreškić et al., Judgement, TC, ICTY, 14 January 2000, paras 527-531. 
1714 C. J. Greenwood, ‘Belligerent Reprisals in the Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia’, in H. Fischer, C. Kreß & S. R. Lüder (eds.), International and National Prosecution 
of Crimes under International Law (Berlin: Berlin Verlag, 2001), at 540 (regarding the Kupreškić and Martić 
judgements ‘the assertion in both decisions that customary international law contains an absolute ban on 
reprisals against civilians is unfounded and was unnecessary for the decision in either case.’) See also Galić, 
Judgement, TC, ICTY, 5 December 2003, fn 77 (to para. 44). See also M. Bothe, ‘War Crimes’, in A. Cassese, 
P. Gaeta & J.R.W.D. Jones (eds.), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary, 
Volume I (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), at 387. 
1715 Kupreškić et al., Judgement, TC, ICTY, 14 January 2000, para. 515.
1716 E.g., Ambos 2011(b), at 328-329, Bantekas 2010, at 121, van Sliedregt 2003, at 295, and Werle 2009(b), 
at 226-227. 
1717 Osiel has in this regard noted that the tu quoque argument is not concerned with chronology in the 
same way as e.g., reprisals and that its main rationale is simply to “achieve fairness in the sense of common 
rules for all, regardless of whose breach came first.” M. Osiel, The End of Reciprocity – Terror, Torture, and 
the Law of War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 103. Others, however, also regard tu 
quoque arguments as connected to reactions to crimes of others. Harhoff, e.g., notes that tu quoque acts are 
“purely retaliatory”. In contrast to reprisals, they do hence not try to seek the adversary to act lawfully. F. 
Harhoff, ‘Tu Quoque Principle’, in A. Cassese (ed.), The Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), at 553. 
285
contains absolute prohibitions.1718 This approach is understandable in that it emphasizes 
the importance of the values protected by the criminalizations. At the same time, it, 
however, entails that the “law has virtually no place for “comparative fault”, no doctrinal 
device for mitigating the wrongdoing or culpability of the accused in light of that of the 
accuser.”1719
8.2.5.4.  Superior Orders
The defence of superior orders has its origin in the strict hierarchical relationships that are 
typical in military settings, that is, the same factual background as the doctrine of superior 
responsibility. The rationale of the defence is that subordinates in military hierarchies 
have an explicit duty to obey orders: Disobedience may lead to disciplinary measures or 
punishments. The punishment threat together with the military training emphasizing the 
duty to obey may make it be difficult for subordinates to resist criminal orders. Absolute 
military discipline is, however, often justified with the need to have structured actions 
in chaotic situations. Furthermore, it is sometimes suggested that military discipline 
increases the adherence to the law of war. The dilemma of superior orders is therefore 
that “telling soldiers that they face punishment unless they disobey illegal orders means 
telling them to think for themselves and question authority, yet directing them to do 
that risks undermining their training to follow orders, work as a cohesive whole, and 
subordinate their own desires and views to the collective enterprise.”1720 It has also been 
noted that it is morally problematic if the law punishes the subordinate no matter how 
he/she chooses to act, that is, either for disobeying the order or for committing a crime 
based on the order.1721 
In military law, the subordinate’s responsibility has traditionally been excluded or 
at least strongly restricted in situations where the subordinate’s criminal behaviour is 
ordered by a superior. The underlying idea is then that the responsibility should be born 
by the superior who has given the unlawful order. In international law, there were initially 
both those who thought that superior orders gave the subordinate a complete defence (the 
so-called respondeat superior principle) and those who argued that superior orders only 
exempted the subordinates from responsibility if the orders were manifestly unlawful.1722 
In 1945, the Nuremberg Charter, however, adopted a third approach and established that 
superior orders should not be regarded as a defence, but only as a factor that can mitigate 
the sentence.1723 This approach was for a long time the one favoured in international 
criminal law and, for example, the statutes of the international ad hoc tribunals only 
1718 Kupreškić et al., Judgement, TC, ICTY, 14 January 2000, para. 517. 
1719 Osiel 1995, at 553-554.
1720 Minow 2007, at 5.
1721 Lappi-Seppälä 1998, at 285. 
1722 See e.g., C. Garraway, ‘Superior Orders and the International Criminal Court: Justice Delivered or 
Justice Denied’, 81 International Review of the Red Cross (1999), at 786-787.  
1723 Article 8, Nuremberg Charter. McCoubrey has, however, argued that the Nuremberg Charter did not in 
fact change the legal state, as the Nuremberg Charter should be seen in its context, that is, as an instrument 
used only in the prosecution of senior officials. H. McCoubrey, ‘From Nuremberg to Rome: Restoring the 
Defence of Superior Orders’, 50 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2001), at 389-390. From a 
phenomenological perspective, it is interesting that this plea in the post-World War II trials of many trials 
were raised by people belonging to the leadership stratum of defendants. 
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recognize superior orders as a possible ground for mitigating the sentence.1724 In contrast 
to the ad hoc tribunals’ statutes, the ICC Statute, however, stipulates that superior orders, 
in certain limited situations, may relieve subordinates from criminal responsibility. 
Article 33 of the ICC Statute namely establishes that: 
1. The fact that a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has been committed by 
a person pursuant to an order of [...] a superior, whether military or civilian, shall 
not relieve that person of criminal responsibility unless: (a) The person was under a 
legal obligation to obey orders of [...] the superior in question; (b) The person did not 
know that the order was unlawful; and (c) The order was not manifestly unlawful. 
2. For the purposes of this article, orders to commit genocide or crimes against 
humanity are manifestly unlawful.
The ICC Statute can be said to follow one of the doctrines that was suggested before the 
Nuremberg trials, that is, the ought-to-know-doctrine which establishes that subordinates 
who follow orders that obviously are criminal cannot make use of the defence of superior 
orders.1725 This doctrine has been found to one of “partially shared responsibility”, that 
is, the doctrine “demands that the subordinate share responsibility with his superior 
only for the clearest, most obvious crimes.”1726 The ICC provision, however, departs from 
its historical predecessors in that it is also available in non-military hierarchies.1727 In 
this regard, the ICC Statute reflects the legal development of the doctrine of superior 
responsibility. To what extent the defence of superior orders will be available to non-
military subordinates remains, however, to be seen. Van Sliedregt has, in this regard, 
found that the superior-subordinate relationship “should be interpreted more strictly 
in the context of superior orders” due to the special military duty to obey, and that the 
doctrines of superior responsibility and the defence of superior orders should therefore 
not be regarded as two sides of the same coin.1728 According to her, civilian subordinates 
should hence not, as a rule, be exempted from responsibility due to orders.  
As regards the content of the manifestly unlawful standard, McCoubrey has noted 
that the ICC Statute contains the tripartite requirements of obligation, lack of knowledge 
of unlawfulness and non-apparent unlawfulness, and that the doctrine therefore is 
far from being a carte-blanche for the commission of war crimes under the shelter of 
orders.1729 Likewise Garraway stresses that the requirements that must be fulfilled for 
exemption of criminal responsibility in situations of superior order to commit war crimes 
are cumulative, which means that the defence “will be extremely limited in scope”.1730 
The “manifestly unlawful” requirement in the ICC Statute seems primarily to be 
an objective standard, which is reflected in the fact that the Statute in itself defines 
1724 Article 7(4), ICTY Statute, and Article 6(4), ICTR Statute. 
1725 McCoubrey 2001, at 386 and 389-390.
1726 Osiel 1999, at 58. 
1727 Cassese et al. 2011, at 471. 
1728 van Sliedregt 2003, at 323-324. 
1729 McCoubrey 2001, at 392. 
1730 Garraway 1999, at 791. Gaeta has, however, questioned how it is possible to argue that the ICC Statute 
deals with the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole at the same time 
as it is recognized that some of these crimes may not be manifestly unlawful. P. Gaeta, ‘The Defence of 
Superior Orders: The Statute of the International Criminal Court versus Customary International Law’, 10 
European Journal of International Law (1999), at 190-191.  
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certain acts as manifestly unlawful (that is, orders to commit genocide and crimes 
against humanity).1731 It has, however, been suggested that when considering whether 
an order was manifestly unlawful consideration should be given to the qualifications 
of the subordinate, so that more is expected from a “fully trained army lawyer” than 
from an inexperienced foot soldier.1732 Some consideration could hence be given 
to the individual circumstances of the subordinate and (maybe) his/her personal 
perception of the situation. To allow for personal considerations may, however, be 
problematic for the unity of the law. Smeulers and Werner have in this regard held 
that the “psychological reality in which perpetrators sometimes operate” is such that 
it does not have to be evident for perpetrators (subjectively) that even genocide and 
crimes against humanity are manifestly unlawful, as it is questionable whether one 
can “except normal perception in abnormal times”.1733 Similarly, Osiel finds that “the 
‘manifest illegality’ rule turns out to fail, in many situations, [...] because it relies on 
unrealistic assumptions about the strength and universality of ‘humanitarian’ moral 
sentiments.”1734 Furthermore, the law of armed conflicts is not logical in all respects. 
The law, for instance, forbids certain ways to kill one’s adversaries (for example, 
poison), but allows others similarly horrendous.1735 The manifest illegality test can 
also be problematic with regard to the criminalization technique used in international 
criminal law. Osiel has in this regard held that: “Any act the wrongfulness of which 
can be discerned only by a trip to the library, let us agree, is not manifestly illegal.”1736 
International criminalizations, however, sometimes deliberately contain crime elements 
requiring case specific assessments, such as “not justified by military necessity”, “as far 
as military requirements permit” and proportionality, and it may be difficult for foot 
soldiers to make these evaluations by themselves.1737 
An interesting question in relation to superior orders is to what extent the orders 
must result in a situation of compulsion, that is, to what extent the order must entail 
that the subordinate is acting against his/her own desires. In this regard, Triffterer has 
held that the ICC Statute only requires that the crime is committed pursuant to orders, 
that is, that there must be an intent to carry out the order. According to Triffterer, the 
1731 The present author therefore disagrees with Paust, who argues that the primary rationale of the superior 
order defence is to “spare soldiers from criminal prosecution in group action or chain action situations 
when the lower ranking soldier does not possess the requisite criminal mind or criminal culpability.” J. J. 
Paust, ‘Superior Orders and Command Responsibility’, in M. C. Bassiouni (ed.), International Criminal 
Law, Volume 1, 2nd ed. (Ardsley, New York: Transnational Publishers, 1999), at 225. The focus in the 
defence does not lie in investigating the mens rea of an individual soldier, but on settling in general what 
can be required from individuals in subordinate hierarchical position.  
1732 Cryer et al. 2010, at 419. Likewise e.g., L. C. Green, ‘Superior Orders and Command Responsibility’, 
175 Military Law Review (2003), at 339-340, and van Sliedregt 2003, at 325. 
1733 Smeulers & Werner 2010, at 41. The same view is expressed by e.g., A. Zahar, ‘Superior Orders’, in A. 
Cassese et al. (eds.), The Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2009), at 527.   
1734 Osiel 1999, at 25. 
1735 Osiel 1999, at 116-117. 
1736 Osiel 1999, at 91. 
1737 Osiel 1999, at 92-93. 
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motives of the subordinate are not of relevance.1738 Likewise, for example, Cassese et al. 
have argued that that the defence “does not concern coercion of any kind directed to 
the subordinate”.1739 The case law of ICTY on superior orders, however, indicates that 
the motives of the subordinate are relevant when evaluating whether there has been 
legally significant superior orders. For example, in the Bralo case, the Appeals Chamber 
noted that there was no evidence of Bralo trying to resist the unlawful orders, but rather 
evidence of his enthusiasm and willingness to commit the crimes.1740   
Finally, Lappi-Seppälä has pointed out that different legal systems emphasize 
different aspects in relation to superior orders. In some legal systems, the main focus 
is on the status of the order, that is, whether it is lawful/unlawful and binding/non-
binding. In other legal systems, the emphasis is rather on the balancing of interests, that 
is, the arguments for and against following the orders. Furthermore, systems differ in 
what relevance they give to the subordinate’s awareness regarding the unlawfulness of the 
order. A difference may also be given to the subordinate’s ability to resist the order.1741 In 
international criminal law, all these factors are considered, but with varying emphases. 
Due to the coexistence of the ICC and ad hoc tribunals’ approaches to superior orders, 
it is difficult to ascertain “the” lex lata of superior orders in international criminal 
law.1742
8.2.5.5.  Prescription of Law
It is also possible that enacted laws or other legally binding instruments create legal 
obligations to commit international crimes. In the same way as subordinates are 
expected to follow superior orders, are individuals expected to follow the laws of the 
land. In international criminal law, the same rules apply to prescription of law (or “orders 
by a Government”) as to superior orders. Before the ad hoc tribunal’s a prescription of 
law may hence mitigate the punishment,1743 whereas it before the ICC may function as a 
defence if it is not manifestly unlawful.1744 
8.2.5.6.  Duress 
Neither the statutes of the post-World War II tribunals nor the statutes of the modern 
ad hoc tribunals have regulated the defence of duress. Despite this, all tribunal have 
recognized its existence. For example, the Nuremberg Tribunal has held that: “The true 
1738 O. Triffterer, ‘Superior Orders and Prescription of Law’, in O. Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court – Observers’ Notes, Article by Article, 2nd ed. (München: C. H. 
Beck, 2008), at 925.  
1739 Cassese et al. 2011, at 464. 
1740 Bralo, Judgement (sentencing), AC, ICTY, 2 April 2007, para. 24.  
1741 Lappi-Seppälä 1998, at 293. 
1742 Likewise e.g., A. Zimmermann, ‘Superior Orders’, in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta & J. R. W. D. Jones (eds.), The 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary, Volume 1 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2002), at 965 and 972. It should be noted that there also are conflicting views on what the content 
of customary international law in relation to superior orders was before the establishment of the ICTY 
and the ICC. E.g., C. Fournet, ‘Judicial Development of the Law of Defences by the International Criminal 
Tribunals’, in S. Darcy & J. Powderly (eds.), Judicial Creativity at the International Criminal Tribunals 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), at 236 (incl. fn 35).  
1743 Article 7(4), ICTY Statute, and Article 6(4), ICTR Statute. 
1744 Article 33, ICC Statute. 
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test, which is found in varying degrees in the criminal law of most nations, is [...] whether 
moral choice was in fact possible.”1745
In the CCL trials, similar pronouncements were made. In the Flick case, the 
defendants had used slave labour in their factories, but the tribunal recognized that the 
Third Reich was a “reign of terror” and that some of the defendants acted under a “clear 
and present danger” as the defendants would probably have suffered harsh consequences 
if they would have refused to use slave labour.1746 
As regards the modern ad hoc tribunals, these tribunals have only in a few cases 
been asked to consider the defence of duress. Famously, in the Erdemović case, the ICTY 
was faced with a claim of life-threatening duress. In that case, Erdemović admitted that 
he had killed numerous individuals in the Srebrenica massacre. When he pleaded guilty, 
he, however, also made the following statement: 
Your Honour, I had to do this. If I had refused, I would have been killed together with 
the victims. When I refused, they told me: “If you’re sorry for them, stand up, line up 
with them and we will kill you too.” I am not sorry for myself but for my family, my 
wife and son who then had nine months, and I could not refuse because then they 
would have killed me.1747 
The Erdemović Trial Chamber made an inquiry into the post-World War II case law 
and argued that duress can constitute a complete defence in rare circumstances, but that 
it in most cases only constitutes a factor that can mitigate the punishment.1748 When 
evaluating the duress situation, the Trial Chamber found the following questions to be 
relevant: (1) Could the accused have avoided the situation in which he found himself?; 
(2) Was the accused confronted with an insurmountable order which he had no way to 
circumvent?; (3) Was the accused, or one of his immediate family members, placed in 
danger of immediate death or death shortly afterwards?; and (4) Did the accused possess 
the moral freedom to oppose the orders he had received? Had he possessed that freedom, 
would he have attempted to oppose the orders?1749 In the topical case, the Trial Chamber, 
however, found that it could not accept the plea of duress (or extreme necessity as it called 
it) because the defence team had not provided the Trial Chamber with any evidence 
corroborating the duress situation.1750 
The Erdemović Sentencing Judgement was appealed, and the Appeal Judgement that 
followed was extremely split. With a majority decision, the Appeals Chamber concluded 
that duress does not afford a complete defence to a soldier charged with a crime against 
humanity and/or a war crime involving the killing of innocent human beings.1751 Judges 
McDonald and Vohrah came to this conclusion based on the nature of the crimes (the 
“most heinous crimes known to humankind”) and the “obligation under the Statute to 
1745 Göring et al., Judgment, IMT, 1 October 1946, at 224 (emphasis added). 
1746 Flick, Judgment, CCL, 22 December 1947, at 1197-1198 and 1201-1202. See also e.g., I. G. Farben, 
Judgment, CCL, 30 July 1948, at 1179. 
1747 Erdemović, Judgement (sentencing), TC, ICTY, 29 November 1996, para. 10. 
1748 Erdemović, Judgement (sentencing), TC, ICTY, 29 November 1996, paras 18-19. 
1749 Erdemović, Judgement (sentencing), TC, ICTY, 29 November 1996, paras 18 and 89. 
1750 Erdemović, Judgement (sentencing), TC, ICTY, 29 November 1996, paras 20 and 91. 
1751 Erdemović, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 7 October 1997, para. 19 (Judges McDonald, Vohrah and Li in 
majority, and Judges Cassese and Stephen in minority).
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ensure that international humanitarian law, which is concerned with the protection of 
humankind, is not in any way undermined”.1752 Of the dissenting judges, Judge Cassese 
claimed that duress may be a complete defence if the following elements are fulfilled: 
(i) the act charged was done under an immediate threat of severe and irreparable harm 
to life or limb; (ii) there was no adequate means of averting such evil; (iii) the crime 
committed was not disproportionate to the evil threatened; and (iv) the situation leading 
to duress must not have been voluntarily brought about by the person coerced.1753 He 
noted that the criterion of proportionality will be difficult to satisfy in situations where 
the underlying offence involves the killing of innocents, but that consideration should 
be given to the fact whether the crime would have been committed in any case by a 
person other than the one acting under duress.1754 In the final sentencing judgement, it 
was accepted that Erdemović acted under a death threat and his duress was taken into 
consideration as a mitigating factor. He was sentenced to a prison sentence of five years 
for having killed approximately seventy persons.1755 The ICTY followed the Erdemović 
majority decision in its Kvočka et al. Trial Judgement, where the Trial Chamber observed 
that: 
Even if a knowing participant in a criminal enterprise was unwilling to resign 
because it would prejudice his career, or he feared he would be sent to the front lines, 
imprisoned, or punished, the Trial Chamber emphasizes that this is not an excuse or 
a defence to liability for participating in war crimes or crimes against humanity. It is 
well established in the jurisprudence of this Tribunal that duress is not a defence to 
committing war crimes or crimes against humanity.1756
All Erdemović judgements have been strongly criticized in academia. The majority appeal 
judgement has, for example, been criticized for creating an absolute rule prohibiting the 
shooting of civilians and for not recognizing that excusing is essentially about sympathy 
and compassion.1757 In other words, the judgement has been found to require “demanding 
heroism”.1758 It has also been put forward that the majority judgement wrongly treats 
duress as a justification.1759 Fichtelberg, on his part, challenges the methodology used by 
1752 Erdemović, Judgement (sep. op. of Judges McDonald and Vohrah), AC, ICTY, 7 October 1997, paras 
75 and 88. Judge Li, on his part, argued that: “Admission of duress as a complete defence or justification 
in the massacre of innocent persons is tantamount to both encouraging the subordinate under duress to 
kill such persons with impunity instead of deterring him from committing such a horrendous crime, and 
also helping the superior in his attempt to kill them. Such an anti-human policy of law the international 
community can never tolerate, and this International Tribunal can never adopt.” Erdemović, Judgement 
(sep. and diss. op. of Judge Li), AC, ICTY, 7 October 1997, para. 8.
1753 Erdemović, Judgement (sep. and diss. op. of Judge Cassese), AC, ICTY, 7 October 1997, paras 12 and 
16.
1754 Erdemović, Judgement (sep. and diss. op. of Judge Cassese), AC, ICTY, 7 October 1997, paras 42-43. 
See also Erdemović, Judgement (sep. and diss. op. of Judge Stephen), AC, ICTY, 7 October 1997, para. 68. 
1755 Erdemović, Judgement (sentencing), TC, ICTY, 5 March 1998, paras 14-15 and 17. 
1756 Kvočka et al., Judgement, TC, ICTY, 2 November 2001, para. 403.
1757 E.g., I. R. Wall, ‘Duress, International Criminal Law and Literature’, 4 Journal of International Criminal 
Justice (2006), at 741-742, and V. Epps, ‘The Soldier’s Obligation to Die When Ordered to Shoot Civilians 
or Face Death Himself ’, 37 New England Law Review (2003), at 1011.  
1758 Cf. Chiesa 2008, at 741 ff. 
1759 Chiesa 2008, at 742, and Janssen 2004, at 94. 
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the judges, that is, the fact that they essentially derived the conclusion that duress cannot 
be a complete defence in international criminal law from the purpose of international 
criminal law.1760 Judge Cassese’s dissent, on the other hand, has been criticized for 
disregarding the difference between justifications and excuses, as he suggested that the 
defence requires both a proportionality test (justification) and that the criminal act is a 
response to an overwhelming pressure (excuse).1761 It has also been noted that Erdemović 
needed to be punished both to honour the pain of the victims and, possibly, to restore his 
sense of himself as a moral person.1762   
Interestingly, when the ICC Statute was adopted in 1998, an approach similar 
to minority dissent in the Erdemović Appeal Judgement was chosen. Article 31(1)
(d) of the Rome Statute establishes that a person shall not be criminally responsible 
if, at the time of that person’s conduct, the conduct which is alleged to constitute a 
crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has been caused by duress resulting from a 
threat of imminent death or of continuing or imminent serious bodily harm against 
that person or another person, and the person acts necessarily and reasonably to avoid 
this threat, provided that the person does not intend to cause a greater harm than the 
one sought to be avoided. Such a threat may either be: (i) made by other persons; or 
(ii) constituted by other circumstances beyond that person’s control. Also the ICC 
Statute has been criticized for not distinguishing between justifying and excusing 
necessity.1763 
8.3.  Analysis
8.3.1.  The Relationship between the Defences and the Crimes 
It has been noted that there are essentially two different ways to mark the conceptual 
borders between war crimes and defences. One the one hand, it is possible that the 
practical demands of war are taken into consideration when the crime is defined and 
that the rule is then considered as more or less absolute. Alternatively, it is possible to 
set “boundaries of acceptable conduct in a much more demanding way”, but to allow 
a number of defences.1764 Also in relation to genocide and crimes against humanity it 
is possible to adopt offence definitions that are more or less open to exceptions. In the 
former case, the balancing of conflicting interests is primarily done ex ante in the law, 
1760 A. Fichtelberg, ‘Liberal Values in International Criminal Law: A Critique of Erdemović’, 6 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice (2008), at 11. 
1761 Chiesa 2008, at 750. 
1762 R. Ehrenreich Brooks, ‘Law in the Heart of Darkness: Atrocity & Duress’, 43 Virginia Journal of 
International Law (2003), at 885-886. 
1763 E.g., Ambos 2003, at 255, and Fletcher 2005, at 34.
1764 Osiel 1999, at 285-286. Thorburn has argued that one characteristic difference between crimes and 
justifications is that offence definitions generally stipulate what is prohibited conduct or means (e.g., 
killing), whereas justifications are defined in terms of preferred ends. M. Thorburn, ‘Justifications, Powers, 
and Authority’, 117 The Yale Law Journal (2008), at 1080. In international criminal law, there are, however, 
several specific intent crimes, in which the intended ends of the action are of central concern. As will be 
considered further below, it is, however, true that defences, in general, give motives a greater significance 
than the crime definitions.  
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whereas the balancing in the latter case largely is left to the judiciary. So which one of 
these two approaches has international criminal law chosen? 
As a whole, it is presumably correct to say that international criminal law has 
adopted the first approach. In armed conflicts much harmful behaviour occurs that does 
not rise to the level of international crimes. From this perspective, international crimes 
can be characterized as a sort of minimum standards, which under all circumstances 
should be obeyed. The general approach to defences in international criminal law has 
also been restrictive.1765 Interestingly, however, the restrictive approach has recently 
to some extent been challenged from two directions. On the one hand, criminal law 
scholars have argued for the applicability of ordinary domestic criminal law defences 
in international criminal law. This trend was most notably visible when the ICC Statute 
was negotiated. Secondly, moral panics caused by shocking atrocities have made people 
question the idea of absolute prohibitions. 
When the Rome Statute of the ICC was negotiated, the question of defences in 
international criminal law was for the first time was seriously and systematically debated. 
In these negotiations, it became evident that many criminal law scholars felt that the 
defences that were available in domestic criminal law also mutatis mutandis should be 
available in international criminal law. This was true especially in relation to excuses, 
but also in connection to some justifications. In the ICC Statute, self-defence can, for 
example, be claimed in connection to all crimes even though most scholars think that it 
is highly unlikely that anyone successfully could claim self-defence in relation to those 
genocide and crimes against humanity. Especially, in relation to specific intent crimes, 
such as genocide and persecution, it seems impossible to successfully argue self-defence. 
In self-defence, the primary reason for action shall namely be to avert an imminent 
threat against a protected interest.1766 Furthermore, most international crimes cannot be 
characterized as proportionate reactions. 
As regards the relationship between the offences and the defences, it should 
furthermore be noted that the rationale of certain criminalizations is more easily combined 
with the rationale of particular defences than others. It is, for example, foreseeable that 
a prisoner of war is killed in self-defence by a prison guard, whereas it seems impossible 
to imagine that a prisoner of war could be raped in self-defence. In most domestic legal 
systems, the available defences are, however, in theory, applicable to all (or at least most 
crimes), and whether they de facto can be applied depends on whether the defence 
1765 Here, the core crimes differ from terrorism, where the absolute nature of the criminalization has been 
one of the main questions of contention. In relation to that crime, Cassese has controversially claimed that 
there already lex lata exists an international crime of terrorism, but that “disagreement continue to exist on 
a possible exception to such a definition”, viz. most notable whether freedom fighters should be exempted 
from criminal responsibility. Cassese 2008, at 163. 
1766 It also seems impossible to successfully claim duress in relation to specific intent crimes, as the reason 
for action is also significant in relation to that defence. S. Yee, ‘The Erdemović Sentencing Judgement: A 
Questionable Milestone for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’, 26 Georgia 
Journal of International and Comparative Law (1997), at 295-302 (regarding genocide. Yee, however, makes 
the false claim that crimes against humanity, in general, would be specific intent crimes). 
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elements can be established.1767 This is essentially the situation in international criminal 
law too. There is, however, no obstacle to ex ante limit the applicability of defences to 
particular international crimes or underlying offences. In some domestic legal systems, 
duress cannot, for example, be claimed in relation to killing an innocent. In the Rome 
Statute of the ICC, the defence of superior orders has been explicitly excluded in relation 
to genocide and crimes against humanity. The question therefore arises whether this 
should be done to a greater extent? The present author thinks that all justificatory defences 
should be impossible to combine with genocide and crimes against humanity and most 
war crimes. The present author does namely not understand what those “extraordinary 
circumstances” could be that, for example, could justify the destruction of an ethnic 
group or systematic rapes.1768 In this regard, it should be remebered that in connection 
to justifications, those victimized in the justified attack do not have a right to defend 
themselves as the attack against them is regarded as lawful.1769 
Defence-type of considerations can be considered in connection to factors 
excluding criminal responsibility, but also “earlier” in the offence definitions. As was 
noted in the discussion on the prevailing law, some war offence definitions demand 
that the prosecutor establish the acts were not justified by military necessity. The 
crime definitions may hence require balancing of conflicting interests. The definitions 
can, however, also explicitly exclude certain defences1770 or, on the contrary, embrace 
them. Victim consent is, for example, excluded as a possible defence in connection 
to mutilation.1771 The crime element of aggression that the person must be one “in 
a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military 
action of a State”,1772 for example, indirectly entails an approval of a sort of superior 
order defence, that is, the criminal responsibility is borne by the superior alone. These 
kinds of crime-specific inclusions respectively exclusions of particular defences are 
important in that they may take special consideration to the nature of the crime in 
question and the criminalization policy desires in relation to that crime. At the same 
time, they open up the possibility for disharmony in the law. In this regard, Schabas has 
found that: “One of the anomalies in the codification of the crime of aggression is the 
idea that it is a ‘leadership crime’ [...]. Why this approach is acceptable to the crime of 
aggression, but not to the other three crimes, is not easy to understand.”1773 Fournet has 
also questioned why the Rome Statute of the ICC only explicitly outlaws the defence 
1767 Before the adoption of the Rome Statute of the ICC, the legal source of most defences was general 
principles of law, that is, principles commonly applied in domestic criminal law. This explains why the 
special nature of the criminality has been given little legal consideration in connection to defences. 
Domestic legal systems have traditionally rarely dealt with international crimes.
1768 Cf. Werle 2009(b), at 198 (‘In practice, the main area where grounds for excluding responsibility play a 
role is war crimes, with its broad range of offenses. In contrast, for genocide and crimes against humanity, 
exclusion from liability can be presumed only in extraordinary cases.’) 
1769 Eser 1987, at 31-32. 
1770 Cf. the war crime of mutilation in the ICC Elements of Crimes, where it in footnote 46 is explicitly stated 
that: “Consent is not a defence to this crime.” ICC Doc. ICC-ASP/1/3 (Part II-B).
1771 The reason for this can be found in Article 11(2), AP I. E. La Haye, ‘Article 8(2)(b)(x) – Mutilation and 
Medical or Scientific Experiments’, in R. S. Lee (ed.), The International Criminal Court – Elements of Crimes 
and Rules of Procedure and Evidence (Ardsley, Transnational Publishers, 2001), at 166.    
1772 ICC Doc. RC/Res.6. 
1773 Schabas 2010(a), at 513. 
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of superior orders in relation to genocide and war crimes. She notes that: “Article 33 
automatically implies that orders to commit crimes against peace and war crimes are 
not always manifestly unlawful and can therefore be validly invoked as a defence”; 
and that: “Considering the seriousness of all international crimes, the suggestion that 
orders to perpetrate either crimes against peace or war crimes could not be manifestly 
unlawful is difficult to comprehend.”1774 Offence-specific exclusions of defences can 
hence non-deliberately signal that other criminalizations are not absolute. 
As regards the absolute nature of the international criminalizations, it should be 
noted that tragic happenings in the world and changes in the political climate can affect 
what is considered right and wrong. In situations of moral panic, it is common to find 
arguments that one should be able to fight “the evil” effectively. For example, after the 11 
September 2001 terrorist attacks, people again started to question whether it is justified 
to torture terrorists, if this would safe innocent lives.1775 Before that, the prohibition of 
torture had for some time been considered as absolute in human rights law and it had 
been (more or less) politically incorrect to pose that kinds of questions. Criminalizations 
and defences are, however, policy decisions, which are “based on past, existing, or 
anticipated circumstances” and when the circumstances change “the perceived sufficiency 
of a particular balancing of military necessity and humanity may come into question.”1776 
When crime definitions have become established, deviations to them are often sought 
through the avenue of defences. As such, the uncertainty regarding the exact lex lata of 
many defences in international criminal law can open the door to undesired exceptions 
to the international criminalizations.1777 
Finally, it should be observed that international criminal law today (both as regards 
the crime definitions and the defences) sometimes reflect conflicting rationales. As noted 
by Osiel: 
Human rights and humanitarian law share a concern for preserving human dignity 
in political hard times. [...] Humanitarian law treaties have set increasingly limits on 
the scope of reciprocity [...] even if state practice has lagged well behind. But human 
rights law goes still much further in that direction, virtually abandoning reciprocity 
altogether. The result is that the particular portions of humanitarian law allowing 
1774 Fournet 2010, at 237. See also C. Fournet, ‘When the Child Surpasses the Father – Admissible Defences 
in International Criminal Law’, 8 International Criminal Law Review (2008), at 525-526. Likewise Schabas 
has argued that the exclusion of the defence of superior orders in relation to crimes against humanity 
and genocide “is one of the more incoherent examples of the process of compromise and negotiation that 
resulted in the Rome Statute.” Schabas 2010(a), at 513. 
1775 See e.g., J. A. Cohan, ‘Torture and the Necessity Doctrine’, 41 Valparaiso University Law Review (2007), 
at 1587 ff., and T. Meisels, ‘Torture and the Problem of Dirty Hands’, 21 Canadian Journal of Law and 
Jurisprudence (2008), at 149 ff. 
1776 M. N. Schmitt, ‘Military Necessity and Humanity in International Humanitarian Law: Preserving the 
Delicate Balance’, 50 Virginia Journal of International Law (2010), at 799.
1777 It should be noted that when the ICC Elements of Crimes (which have as their goal to clarify the 
elements of the crimes) were adopted, it was decided not to include the grounds for excluding criminal 
responsibility in the Elements. ICC Doc. ICC-ASP/1/3 (Part II-B), and e.g., M. Kelt & H. von Hebel, 
‘General Principles of Criminal Law and the Elements of Crimes’, in R. S. Lee (ed.), The International 
Criminal Court – Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence (Ardsley: Transnational 
Publishers, 2001), at 38. 
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reciprocity – such as the right of reprisal – are precisely those most likely to run afoul 
of human rights law.1778 
In relation to law on war crimes, the law has often found to reflect the balancing between 
military necessity and the needs of humanity. Human rights thinking, on the other 
hand, is often seen as the background of the genocide and crimes against humanity 
criminalizations. Whereas humanitarian law accepts more causing of harm and is 
therefore more open towards the idea of exceptions, human rights law is more inclined 
towards absolute prohibitions.1779 As the international core crimes often, however, are 
addressed as a whole, the balancing done between military necessity and the needs of 
humanity in connection to war crimes has, however, affected crimes against humanity 
and genocide too. This is, for instance, reflected in the ICTY case law that recognizes 
that certain crimes against humanity must be assessed from a military necessity 
perspective.1780 Furthermore, most defences a priori apply to all three crimes.1781 For 
crimes with a human rights background, the co-existence with crimes and defences 
with a different rationale may entail problematic pushes towards giving legal relevance 
to factors such as reciprocity.1782 A difficult question is, however, to what extent it is 
human rights law that has to adopt towards international humanitarian law, or whether 
rather international humanitarian law to a greater extent should adopt a human rights 
philosophy and recognize more absolute prohibitions.1783 
8.3.2.  The Relationship between the Defences and the Modes of Responsibility 
In the same way as the modes of responsibility, the defences may affect the distribution 
of responsibility between different participants in crime, and the demarcation between 
criminal and non-criminal behaviour. This is most evident in relation to the defence of 
superior orders, which has a clear connection to ordering. Also other similar connections 
have, however, been noted. For example, Lappi-Seppälä has argued that mistakes of law 
in relation to superior orders should be accepted more easily than other mistakes of law 
because: 
1778 Osiel 2009(a), at 112.
1779 Osiel has, however, stressed that international humanitarian law also contains some absolute norms. 
More specifically he argues that the law “enshrines two very different theories of morality”, viz. (1) 
“Kantianism, imposing strict side-constraints on violent conduct, applicable regardless of consequences”, 
and (2) utilitarianism (e.g., proportionality and military necessity.) Osiel 1999, at 101.
1780 Blagojević & Jokić, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 17 January 2005, paras 593, 598 and 615 (where the Trial 
Chamber considered whether the destruction of property could be considered an act of persecution). 
1781 An exception to this is Article 33, ICC Statute, which characterizes superior orders to commit genocide 
and crimes against humanity as manifestly unlawful. 
1782 It has been argued that the context of armed conflicts sometimes require that human rights are 
“reinterpreted” and that there also exist situations where “no interpretative method will be able to reconcile 
the prohibitions of human rights law with the allowances of humanitarian law (i.e., without subordinating 
one to the other.)” Osiel 2009(a), at 121. 
1783 It may also be questioned whether international criminal law should more often have a rationale of its 
own (or follow the example of domestic criminal law) due to that branch being concerned with individual 
responsibility. Gaeta has, e.g., in this regard discussed the conflict between approaches to necessity in 
human rights law and in international criminal law. Gaeta 2004, at 785-795. 
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Unlike a normal case of a mistake, the wrongfulness of the act would not remain 
unnoted by the acquittal of the defendant, as the superior would be held responsible 
anyhow − not only for a breach of his duty but as an instigator for the offence in 
question. In comparison with a normal case of mistake, the difference lies [...] in a 
reduced need for punishment.1784 
While the main question in relation to the modes of responsibility in international 
criminal law often has been how to connect the leaders to the crimes, the main 
question in relation to defences appears to be to what extent low-level actors should be 
excused. Both the modes of responsibility and the defences hence direct the criminal 
responsibility towards the more high-level actors. This approach has often been justified 
with criminological studies, such as the Milgram study, emphasizing the role played by 
leaders in international atrocities.1785 As noted in relation to the analysis of the modes 
of responsibility, the present author is, however, concerned that too much blame from 
a phenomenological/criminological perspective sometimes is put on the leaders. High-
level actors may also be pressured into criminality. It has, for instance, been noted that 
politicians may feel a strong political pressure to choose between two courses of action 
both of which would be wrong for to undertake and that a “particular act of government 
[...] may be exactly the right thing to do in utilitarian terms and yet leave the man who 
does it guilty of a moral wrong.”1786 Furthermore, the idea that “ordinary people” should 
not be blamed for international crimes as the criminality does not represent their “true 
character” is problematic.1787 
In the same way as the crimes and the modes of responsibility, the defences 
furthermore affect what “story” of the criminality is told through the law. In this regard, 
it may be asked to what extent the various stories told are reconcilable. In relation to 
modes of participation, the most popular responsibility form in recent years has been JCE 
responsibility that tells a story of high-level and low-level actors actively acting together. 
Many of the defences, on the other hand, tell stories about ignorant, drunk etc. low-level 
actors who completely are in the hands of their superiors. Many defences would therefore 
better suit responsibility modes, such as ordering and indirect co-perpetration, which 
portray the leaders as active and the subordinates as more passive. Some responsibility 
modes (such as acting through another person) and defences can furthermore be in 
harmony in the sense that they may both reflect the fact that in collective criminality not 
all persons involved in the criminality can necessary be blamed for the criminal outcome. 
In practice, the defences have, however, not played an important role in international 
criminal proceedings, and there has therefore not been significant fragmentation in case 
law caused by disharmony between modes of responsibility and the defences. 
1784 Lappi-Seppälä 1998, at 297. 
1785 See further Section 3.5.4. 
1786 M. Walzer, ‘Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands’, 2 Philosophy and Public Affairs (1973), at 
160-161. 
1787 Cf. “The general claim behind the character theory of excuse is that an excuse ought to be provided to 
the defendant insofar as the act that she has performed is not a manifestation of her character. The role of 
character in determining the ambit of excuses has been heavily criticised. One simple objection is that the 
criminal responsibility is about responsibility for acts. In attributing criminal responsibility, criminal acts 
are not properly seen merely as evidence of character of the agent.” Tadros 2005, at 294. 
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8.3.3.  Different Types of Participants in International Criminality and the 
Defences
Many of the defences accepted in international criminal law are hence such that they 
more often exculpate individuals in a subordinate position, even though superior 
orders is the only defence that explicitly requires a position of subordination. Regarding 
duress, Ambos has, in this regard, argued that top-level actors cannot benefit from the 
defence of duress as “people at the top [...] cannot be coerced.”1788 While the present 
author disagrees with the general submission that leaders cannot be coerced, she accepts 
the submission that the position of an individual may affect the scope of excuses, and 
that certain individuals may be excepted “tolerate greater dangers and higher risks”.1789 
Individuals in a guarantee position may be expected to adhere to the law to a greater 
degree than individuals not having such a position. Likewise, soldiers are persons who 
have been trained to manage battlefield situations, and it may be reasonable to demand 
more from them than from civilians.1790 As noted above, care should, however, be taken 
to ensure that not all blame is put on high-level actors when more low-level actors also 
deserve reprimand.
In relation to superior orders, it has, furthermore, been noted that if the defence 
would have been given a broad interpretation in connection to the Nazi atrocities, only 
the Führer could have been held criminally responsible.1791 This is not the interpretation 
given to the defence in international criminal law. As such, the law recognizes that also 
more low-level actors may take initiatives in relation to international criminality and 
participate willingly. 
8.3.4.  Armed Conflicts as the Typical Context of Action
Combat generally involves sustained exposure to “continuous fatigue, filth, hunger, sleep 
deprivation, cold, heat, anxiety, stress, and fear” and that the “capacity of the human 
mind to process complex information in situations of extreme adversity, such as those 
on the battlefield, is quite limited”.1792 For criminal law, the question arises to what extent 
liability should be reduced due to these types of cognitive constraints. Military law has 
traditionally responded to the battlefield reality by excusing classes of perpetrators (rather 
than focusing on individual states of mind).1793 In modern international criminal law, the 
stress caused by armed conflicts is, however, not really considered at the conviction stage. 
Mistakes of fact are, for example, rarely admitted. The focus is rather on to what extent 
the armed conflict creates situations of duress or other forms of coercion. 
When looking at the phenomenology of international crimes, it may be noted 
many compulsion situations do occur in armed conflicts and in totalitarian regimes. It 
has, for example, been observed that child soldiers often face extremely brutal initiation 
1788 Ambos 2011(b), at 314. 
1789 Ambos 2011(b), at 313. 
1790 Ambos 2011(b), at 313. 
1791 E.g., J. L. Bakker, ‘The Defense of Obedience to Superior Orders: The Mens Rea Requirement’, 17 
American Journal of Criminal Law (1989), at 63, and Minow 2007, at 4 (referring to McCoubrey). 
1792 Osiel 1999, at 53. 
1793 Osiel 1999, at 68. 
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ceremonies and severe threats and punishments in cases of disobedience.1794 Also 
adults can be governed with terror. In armed conflicts, kill-or-get-killed situations are 
more common than in peacetime. This being said, the phenomenology of international 
crimes does not support the claim that most international crimes would be committed 
in life-threatening duress. The crimes are rather committed under different forms of 
pressure.  
As regards situations of life-threatening compulsion, such as the duress situation 
in the Erdemović case, the present author agrees with those scholars who have pointed 
out that if duress is accepted as a defence, proportionality between the threat and the 
committed crime should not be the most central criterion.1795 International crimes are 
generally not crimes that based on a proportionality assessment can be justified. The 
approach chosen in the Erdemović appeal dissents and in the ICC Statute are hence 
problematic in that they emphasize the question of proportionality of the reaction to the 
duress situation. The focus in relation to duress should rather be on social expectations. 
Is heroism and personal sacrifice expected or should human frailty rather be legally 
recognized? For “requirements of heroism” speak the important values the international 
criminalizations protect and the connected need to uphold the provisions absolute 
nature. Against, on the other hand, the principle that criminal law should not demand the 
impossible from individuals.1796 In this regard, some authors have argued that heroism 
should not be required when the heroism does not entail any prevention of harm. As, 
for example, Erdemović could not have stopped the massacre, Chiesa has argued that 
“punishing Erdemović for not symbolically resisting the coercion is unnecessarily harsh” 
and that Erdemović for this reason should have been excused.1797 
As regards pressure not amounting to veritable compulsion, that is, for example, 
military obedience culture, the legitimating effect of State participation, propaganda and 
peer pressure, international criminal law only to some extent recognize the two first ones 
by in rare situations allowing the defences of superior orders and prescription of law. 
Furthermore, as noted by Olusanya: 
Another traditional requirement of the duress defense [...] is that the coercer must 
either expressly or by implication order the commission of the offense committed by 
the accused. A generalized fear of harm of death unconnected with any specific and 
clear demand to commit a crime will not excuse. Thus the reality is that, although 
some wartime offenders may commit their crimes in the shadow of indoctrination, 
1794 See e.g., H. Chatlani, ‘Uganda: A Nation in Crisis’, 37 California Western International Law Journal 
(2007), at 282-283 (regarding Uganda). 
1795 The present author agrees with Chiesa who argues that a central criterion in excusing is whether 
the society finds that the criminal behaviour has been understandable. Chiesa 2008, at 763. See also O. 
Olusanya, ‘Excuse and Mitigation under International Criminal Law: Redrawing Conceptual Boundaries’, 
13 New Criminal Law Review (2010), at 28-29 (‘In cases concerning the excuse theory, the critical issue is 
not the heinousness of the crime nor is it the role of the victims; instead it is whether, based on a unique set 
of facts, a reasonable person would have responded in the same way as the accused.’)
1796 Chiesa 2008, at 757.
1797 Chiesa 2008, at 772. A similar position is held by e.g. Ambos who stresses that the law must take into 
consideration human weakness. Ambos 2011(b), at 315. 
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increased brutality, obedience and group conformity, unless they can connect their 
crime to a clear demand, their claim of duress will likely fail.1798 
This reluctance to give legal relevance to pressure not amounting to severe compulsion 
is, however, not unique for international criminal law. Criminal law does not generally 
consider more indirect causes behind the criminality. 
8.3.5.  Defences and Different Time-Perspectives
Falk has observed that: 
As currently framed, much of criminal doctrine is premised on a fairly tight 
connection between the cause of the behavior and the resulting criminal conduct. [... 
Some sociological theories] suggest that the causal window should be expanded to 
include more longitudinal views of criminality. For example, in order to understand 
the impact of television violence on criminal behavior, the question should not be 
whether viewing one television program caused the defendant to kill. Rather, the 
inquiry should be whether the cumulative impact of watching ten years of violent 
television significantly contributed to the defendant’s mental state and his criminal 
behavior. A more expansive perspective is necessary to understand better effects that 
are impossible to detect in the short-run. In summary, if the criminal law restricts 
itself to the consideration of only short-term causal explanations for criminal 
behavior, it will miss the rich contribution these theories of defense can make by 
elucidating more diffuse and long-term pathogenic factors in criminal behavior.1799
Also international criminal law follows the traditional criminal law approach with 
limited time-frames in connection to defences. Article 31 of the ICC Statute on grounds 
for excluding criminal responsibility, for example, is only applicable to factors that 
temporally take place “at the time of that person’s conduct”. Eser has found that the 
temporal approach is “a rather narrow”. It even excludes “the time at which the statutory 
result of the conduct as irrelevant.”1800
The question of time-perspectives is especially interesting in connection to 
compulsion defences, where it may be asked to what extent it is relevant whether 
an individual himself/herself has contributed to the emergence of the compulsion 
situation.1801 In this regard, the Trial Chamber in the Erdemović case asked itself whether 
Erdemović could have avoided the situation in which he found himself.1802 Likewise, 
Cassese in his Erdemović Appeal Judgement dissent argues that one criterion for the 
duress defence is that the situation leading to duress must not have been voluntarily 
1798 Olusanya 2010, at 54-55.    
1799 Falk 1996, at 808-809. 
1800 Eser 2008, at 872. 
1801 A person may be blamed for his/her previous behaviour on two different types of grounds: (a) for his/
her unintentional behaviour as culpa in causa; and (b) for his/her intentional behaviour, dolus in causa. 
Van Sliedregt notes that: “In culpa in causa cases, the perpetrator can be blamed for having put himself in a 
situation in respect of which he should have known that he would lack the required capacity or knowledge. 
[...] Dolus in causa concerns the perpetrator who intentionally puts himself in a situation in respect of 
which he can rely on a defence exempting him from criminal liability.” van Sliedregt 2003, at 239.  
1802 Erdemović, Judgement (sentencing), TC, ICTY, 29 November 1996, paras 18 and 89. 
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brought about by the person coerced.1803 The question of the contributory fault of the 
individual in a situation of duress is especially interesting taking into consideration the 
phenomenology of the international crimes. In armed conflicts, almost anything can be 
expected. For example, Fichtelberg has here with reference to the Erdemović case put 
forward that: 
For an individual to assert that, only in the very limited circumstances of the killing 
that he was under duress, ignoring the choices that he made that led to this situation 
is bad faith at best, and is probably more explicable in terms of a last minute ‘loss of 
nerve’ on the part of the killer. For example, a person who joins a militia organization 
that he knows has been involved in atrocities in the past and may do so again, but 
shrinks back when a weapon is thrust into his hand accompanied by an order to 
murder innocent civilians (or join them in their death) cannot claim that these acts 
truly were committed under duress. Such an assertion would be a claim of criminal 
stupidity on the part of the defendant, or at a minimum a level of incompetence that 
precludes any responsibility [...].1804
While Fichtelberg’s argument has its merits, it should, however, be remembered that 
unemployment often is high under armed conflicts and that, for example, Erdemović 
himself indicated that he had joined the armed forces to put bread on his family’s 
table.1805 Erdemović clearly took a risky decision when he joined the armed group, but 
membership in armed groups is not by itself criminal. In this regard, the claim made 
by Katz (already cited in this study) that the “route to evil often takes the form of a 
sequence of seemingly small, innocuous incremental steps, in each of which one tries to 
solve a problem within one’s immediate situation”1806 and that a decision to commit an 
international crime often is preceded by many “insignificant” decisions is intriguing. The 
requirement that the accused person should not himself/herself have put himself/herself 
in the duress situation thus puts a longer time-perspective on the happening.1807 
The question of whether an individual can be blamed for himself/herself causing 
his/her duress, is also strongly connected to how the situation of coercion or duress 
is defined. As noted, in some CCL cases, the Nazi State was seen to cause a general 
situation of coercion through its terror. Obviously, if duress is defined in such broad 
terms (“coercive environment”), it is very few low- and mid-level actors who could be 
blamed for causing their own duress. If, however, the duress situation is given a more 
limited meaning (“coercive situation”), that is, for example, a concrete situation where an 
individual has been physically coerced, an individual can be blamed for taking various 
risky decisions. In this regard, Wilson has argued that many defences are limited to 
1803 Erdemović, Judgement (sep. and diss. op. of Judge Cassese), AC, ICTY, 7 October 1997, para. 16. 
1804 Fichtelberg 2008, at 15-16. Swaak-Goldman has argued that one of the main questions in the Erdemović 
Appeal Judgement, in fact, was whether combatants can claim that they did not voluntary bring about 
the situation of duress leading to the killing of civilians. O. Swaak-Goldman, ‘Prosecutor v. Erdemović, 
Judgement. Case No. IT-96-22-A. International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Appeals 
Chamber, October 7, 1997’, 92 American Journal of International Law (1998), at 287. 
1805 See e.g., Ehrenreich Brooks 2003, at 863-864. 
1806 Katz 1993, at 13.
1807 Ehrenreich Brooks has with regard to the Erdemović Appeal Judgement argued that whereas the 
minority saw the case as a narrative about inevitability and determinism, the majority had a longer time-
perspective and saw the case as a narrative about choice. Ehrenreich Brooks 2003, at 881.  
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situations of crisis, as we are expected to find alternative solutions to more enduring 
pushes to criminality.1808 At least in the context of international criminality, giving legal 
relevance to a coercive environment which has not developed into a more concrete 
coercive situation could have very far-reaching consequences for the scope of individual 
responsibility in societies, such as Nazi Germany or the genocidal Rwanda.  
8.3.6.  State Involvement in the Criminality and the Defences
As regards pressure to commit crimes, a difference may be made between pressure 
caused by public actors (such as public officials and the law) and pressure caused by 
private actors (such as peers and the family).1809 It is generally held that it especially 
difficult for “good soldiers” and law-abiding citizens to disobey orders and to reject laws 
that originate from public sources. Minow has, for example, regarding superior orders 
argued that the phenomena such as cognitive dissonance and adherence to authorities 
make it utmost difficult for ordinary soldiers to disobey explicit orders.1810 The “gist” of 
the defences of superior orders and prescription of law is hence that the accused persons 
in cases where these defences are raised thus at least from some perspective “live up to 
our expectations” regarding appropriate behaviour.1811 It is therefore not surprising that 
criminal law in general appears to be more inclined to give legal recognition to pressure 
caused by public actors. This is the situation also in international criminal law. For 
the individual person faced with the pressure, both types of pressure can, however, be 
overwhelming. Also public pressure must, however, entail concrete situations of coercion 
to exculpate individuals. Morse has also observed that a rotten society which makes it 
difficult for individuals to “fly straight” rarely is an excusing condition. According to 
him, it is rather a factor that affects society’s moral right to blame.1812 
Historically, a debated question has been whether State-affiliated criminality 
only should lead to State responsibility. Since the post-World War II-trials, individual 
criminal responsibility in connection to international criminality has, however, been 
firmly established. Article 7 of the Nuremberg Charter in this regard provided that: 
“The official position of defendants, whether as Heads of State or responsible officials in 
Government departments, shall not be considered as freeing them from responsibility or 
mitigating punishment.” The ICC Statute likewise provides that it “shall apply equally to 
all persons without any distinction based on official capacity” and that “official capacity 
as a Head of State or Government, a member of a Government or parliament, an elected 
representative or a government official shall in no case exempt a person from criminal 
responsibility”.1813 Eser has therefore characterized official capacity as an “explicitly 
rejected defence” in international criminal law.1814 It may, however, be noted that 
1808 Wilson 2005, at 110-111. 
1809 Cf. Jäger and the idea of a “legality bonus” is action sanctioned by the State. Jäger 1992, at 76.
1810 Minow 2007, at 25-35. The theory of cognitive dissonance argues that two simultaneous contradictory 
ideas (e.g., the absolute duty to follow orders and the obligation to disobey illegal orders) gives rise to 
stress, which an individual tries to reduce by rejecting one of the ideas. 
1811 Cf. J. Gardner, ‘The Gist of Excuses’, 1 Buffalo Criminal Law Review (1998), at 578.
1812 Morse 1994, at 1653. 
1813 Article 27, ICC Statute. See also Article 7(2), ICTY Statute, and Article 6(2), ICTR Statute. 
1814 Eser 2008, at 869. 
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international criminal law (in contrast to public international law in general) always has 
focused on holding high-level politicians and militaries responsible, and the contested 
legal question in that branch of law rather has been to what extent non-militaries and 
non-State actors also can be blamed. As such, the act of State doctrine has never been 
part of international criminal law. 
8.3.7.  Defences and Political or Ideological Violence
In addition to compulsion and pressure, various other types of “human weaknesses” may 
affect the behaviour of people. For example, feelings of hurt, anger, despair and fear are 
human emotions that may influence behaviour.1815 Criminal law is, however, generally 
not interested in giving these types of emotions legal relevance. In some domestic legal 
systems, provocation or “passion” is, however, accepted as a partial defence and so is 
excessive self-defence.1816 This is interesting from the point of view of the phenomenology 
of international criminality. Propaganda, indoctrination and hate speech, through which 
strong emotions and false perceptions of threats are created, are namely common in 
connection to that criminality. 
With this in mind, it is interesting to note that the applicability of the necessity 
defence has been debated in connection to political violence.1817 Individuals engaged in 
international criminality can namely perceive that they are averting a greater evil by their 
criminal behaviour, that is, essentially that they are doing the right thing. The political 
or ideological background of the criminality may also entail that the victims who legally 
are not legitimate targets by the perpetrator is perceived as non-innocent and hence as 
a legitimate target. Cohan has (in connection to terrorism) noted that what the general 
public view as innocent civilians may by the offender be regarded as guilty opponent 
accomplices.1818 The political/ideological nature of international criminality could hence 
also be seen as giving rise to the defences of (mistaken) self-defence and mistake of 
fact.1819 
Possible differences between the individual perpetrator’s perception of reality and 
the judging society’s perception of it results in a legitimacy problem à la Arendt: does 
the society have a right to punish individuals who do not have a “truly guilty mind” and 
who do not recognize that they are acting criminally? Despite its focus on individual 
guilt and individual mens rea, criminal law does not, however, support completely 
1815 Horder makes a distinction between explanatory reason and adopted reason. In relation to adopted 
reason a person positively chooses to act in a particular way, whereas in relation to explanatory reason 
the (sometimes intentional) acts of a person are not chosen. The behaviour of a person in reaction to 
provocation or in situations of excessive defence can according to Horder be explained with “the desire at 
the heart of the emotion” which “spontaneously eclipses or bypasses the restraining or moderating power 
of reason.” Horder 2007, at 10-11. Horder notes that intentional action based on explanatory reason does 
not have to be irrational, however. Ibid., at 11 (fn 16).
1816 Morse 1998, at 335. 
1817 Cf. J. A. Cohan, ‘Necessity, Political Violence and Terrorism’, 35 Stetson Law Review (2006), at 903 ff.  
1818 Cohan 2006, at 940 and 968. Cohan argues that terrorists in this regard apply a concept of collective 
guilt. 
1819 Olusanya e.g., asks the question: “Was Finta a racist, or did he genuinely mistakenly believe that Jewish 
people posed a threat?”. Olusanya 2010, at 74. 
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unreasonable perceptions of reality. In international criminal law, for example, it would 
be completely against the rationale of the criminalization of genocide if the belief that 
certain ethnic groups as such can pose a threat would seriously be considered as a 
possible “mistake of fact.” Many defences therefore include objective evaluations of 
reasonableness and proportionality.1820 Likewise, criminal law generally presumes that 
individuals know what is lawful and what is criminal, that is, mistakes of law are rarely 
accepted. 
It may, however, more generally be asked whether violence with political or 
ideological motives to a larger degree should be tolerated by society. In connection to 
this, it should be noted that in relation to terrorism a debated question is whether the fact 
that the person is a “criminal with a conviction” (German Gewissenstäter) should exclude 
criminal responsibility.1821 It is hence possible to define political or ideological motives 
as a defence. In relation to the international core crimes, it has, however, not seriously 
been suggested that political or ideological motives should exculpate the offenders. The 
whole idea of international criminal law can be said to settle boundaries for political and 
ideological strives. From a victim-perspective, it is furthermore problematic to exculpate 
ideological perpetrators causing serious harm. It should also be noted that genocide, 
crimes against humanity and war crimes are considered as jus cogens violations that at 
the State responsibility-level cannot be justified with ideological or political reasons.1822 
To give the individual political and ideological motives/reasons a justificatory function 
would therefore lead to a legal anomaly. Furthermore, as was noted in Chapter 2, the idea 
of politically or ideologically motivated offenders is phenomenologically problematic. 
Not all individuals who engage in criminality with political or ideological purposes are 
necessarily individually motivated by corresponding motives. 
8.4.  Concluding Evaluative Remarks 
8.4.1.  The International Defences and the Basic Tenets of Criminal Law 
It has sometimes been put forward that the defences in international criminal law do not 
to a sufficient degree reflect the nature of that criminality. For example, Olusanya has 
criticized the fact that a person cannot claim the defence of State propaganda, because 
such a defence does not exist in international criminal law, but instead has to “mold 
the truth into the framework of [the law]” and claim, for example, diminished mental 
responsibility.1823 International criminal law indeed largely follows traditional domestic 
criminal law approaches to defences, even though superior orders and prescription 
of law are defences that reflect the special nature of the criminality. In this regard, the 
1820 Cf. Cohan 2006, at 942-944. 
1821 K. Ambos, ‘Amicus Curiae Brief Submitted to the Appeals Chamber of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon 
on the Question of the Applicable Terrorism Offence with a Particular Focus on “Special” Special Intent 
and/or a Special Motive as Additional Subjective Requirements’, 22 Criminal Law Forum (2011), at 395. 
1822 Cf. e.g., the draft articles on state responsibility that do not foresee exceptions to peremptory norms. 
See UN Doc. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries, 
2001 (United Nations, 2008), at 84-85.  
1823 Olusanya 2010, at 35-36. 
304
defences differ from the crime definitions that have been adopted as a response to the 
societal problem international criminality represents. 
That the law does not give legal relevance to all factors that explain the criminality 
is, however, not unique for international criminal law. Domestic criminal law has, for 
example, been challenged for making individuals take “full responsibility” for their 
behaviour and by doing this disregarding all criminological and psychological research 
that indicates that parents, schools, communities and so forth also could be blamed.1824 
To this, Morse has, however, found that “[d]iscovering a cause for behavior, whether it is 
biological, psychological or social, does not mean that the agent is not responsible” since 
“[a]ll behavior has causes”. According to him, the causes should only exclude criminal 
behaviour when they severely diminish an individual’s capacity for rationality.1825 In a 
similar vein, Kadish has observed that taking into consideration factors, such as the 
social background of the perpetrator, would make affect law’s deterrent effect, and, once 
recognized, it would be hard to justify punishing anyone, for even evil has its causal 
roots somewhere.1826 The problem with criminal law is, however, that it sometimes gives 
legal relevance to the causes behind the criminality, but not always. In relation to duress 
Norrie has, for example, found that the “determinist may quite legitimately argue that 
there is no distinction in principle between a gun pointed at the head, and an intolerable 
socio-economic background.”1827 More generally he finds that “lawyers and legal theorists 
seek to isolate certain aspects of human conduct from the social context in which it 
occurs” and that they are selective in giving legal significance to various elements of the 
criminality.1828 By being selective, the criminal law reflects societal sentiments about what 
is and should be considered relevant for criminal responsibility.1829 A central distinction 
is, for example, generally considered to be the one between compulsion and causes (for 
example, beliefs and desires, environmental influences and character traits),1830 so that 
compulsion is generally considered legally relevant whereas causes are not. 
1824 Maruna & Copes 2005, at 287-288. 
1825 Morse 2007, at 2569. He has also noted that: “Having criminogenic beliefs, desires, and values 
acquired through no fault of one’s own could be said to be true of most criminal offenders from almost 
any background.” S. J. Morse, ‘Severe Environmental Deprivation (aka RSB): A Tragedy, Not a Defense’, 
Alabama Civil Rights & Civil Liberties Law Review (2011), at 161. Furthermore, he points out that: 
“Causation and determinism and lack of contra-causal, libertarian free will are not criteria for or excusing 
conditions in the criminal law. Most scientifically informed people believe that all events in the universe, 
including human action, are fully caused. Moreover, most accept the truth of some form of determinism 
as a working hypothesis. Thus, if causation or determinism per se were an excuse, no one would ever be 
responsible for any behavior. Some people welcome such a conclusion, but it would be a radical change in 
American law. Further, causation and determinism are not the underlying rationales for the positive law of 
excuses. Even if the universe is causal and determined, some people lack rational capacity or are compelled, 
and most people have substantial rational capacity and do not lack control capacity or otherwise act under 
compulsion.” Ibid., at 149.
1826 Kadish 1987, at 284. 
1827 Norrie 1991, at 157.     
1828 Norrie 1991, at 163.
1829 Moore has noted that there are certain causes behind criminality that people intuitively feel that should 
be recognized as excuses (“unhappy causes of crimes”), but that all causes do not attract sympathy. M. S. 
Moore, ‘Causation and the Excuses’, 73 California Law Review, at 1146-1147.
1830 Moore 1985, at 1129-1130 (including references to e.g. Schlick).
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The selective approach regarding exculpating factors opens up the door for criticism 
and challenges regarding the moral foundation of the law. In relation to international 
criminality Slone has noted that extreme circumstances make it easier to recognize 
individuals are affected by their surroundings.1831 It is therefore not surprising that 
international criminal law to such an extent has been criticized for not giving sufficient 
legal relevance to the special nature of the criminality. At the same time Sloan, however, 
asks why the pressure created by circumstances of war, mass violence and collective 
psychology should be qualitatively more problematic than, for example, extreme 
socioeconomic deprivation.1832 From the point of view of equality between offenders, 
it would indeed seem unfair that individual’s pushed into criminality by war would be 
exempted from responsibility whereas individuals pushed into criminality by other types 
of factors would not. 
As regards legally relevant and legally irrelevant facts, it should also be noted that 
international criminal law does not always give legal relevance to what the defendant de 
facto knew or intended even though these a priori are central criminal law considerations 
As noted, for instance, in relation to voluntary intoxication, there is a presumption of 
mens rea and the degree to which this presumption adheres to reality is generally not 
considered. Or to put it another way, in relation to certain defences, legal relevance 
is given to objective standards (for example, reasonableness) rather than to subjective 
ones.1833 Also in this regard, international criminal law follows the example of domestic 
criminal law. In domestic contexts, criticism has been raised against this, by noting 
that there is a conflict between the “logic” of excusing defences and the “infiltration of 
objective requirements.”1834 The present author, however, agrees with Ashworth who 
points out that criminal law is not merely about individual autonomy, choice and control. 
Criminal law by its nature also entail that members of a legal community have certain 
responsibilities.1835 More specifically Ashworth argues that: “[o]ne such duty might be 
to show reasonable steadfastness in the face of pressure, and to avoid uncontrollable 
behaviour that might lead to harm to others.”1836 In criminal law, there is therefore a 
1831 R. D. Sloane, ‘The Expressive Capacity of International Punishment: The Limits of the National Law 
Analogy and the Potential of International Criminal Law’, 43 Stanford Journal of International Law (2007), 
at 62-63. 
1832 Sloane 2007(a), at 62-63. 
1833 Heller makes a distinction between four different interpretations of the reasonableness standard: (1) 
the objective standard; (2) a purely subjective standard (which according to Heller in effect is not anymore 
a real reasonableness standard); (3) a standard that asks the court to assess the objective reasonableness of 
the defendant’s act under the circumstances as he believed them to be; and (4) the particularizing standard, 
which requires the court to take into account one or more of the defendant’s personal characteristics 
when assessing the objective reasonableness of his/her act. K. J. Heller, ‘Beyond the Reasonable Man? A 
Sympathetic but Critical Assessment of the Use of Subjective Standards of Reasonableness in Self-Defense 
and Provocation Cases’, 26 American Journal of Criminal Law (1998), at 5. Heller’s account emphasis 
that objective standards may to some extent recognize individual circumstances by, e.g., having different 
object standards to different categories of individuals. In international criminal law, e.g., more is generally 
demanded from persons in high-level positions. 
1834 Ashworth 2006, at 244. 
1835 Ashworth 2006, at 244. 
1836 Ashworth 2006, a 244. 
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tension between giving consideration to the individual offender and being a system of 
“generally accepted standard of conduct”.1837 
8.4.2.  Fair Labelling and the Defences in International Criminal Law
It has been noted that: “If punishment tells the members of a community what it 
considers wrong, the absence of punishment must tell them what it does not consider 
wrong.”1838 While this statement to some extent oversimplifies reality (not all harmful 
and disapproved behaviour can or should be regulated with criminal law), it is important 
to recognize that also factors excluding criminal responsibility send signals about 
societal evaluations. This is the case especially with justifications which so-to-say ex 
ante characterize something as lawful and expected behaviour. Excuses, on the other 
hand, are evaluated ex post facto in relation to concrete situations.1839 This being said, 
accepting something as an excuse also sends signals about what society considers as 
understandable behaviour. For this reason, the present author feels that excuses should 
be scarcely accepted in international criminal law, if one wants to uphold the idea of 
international criminalizations as absolute prohibitions. 
Osiel has argued that the manifest illegality doctrine in relation to the defence of 
superior orders portrays the modern soldier as “a spirited, free-thinking conscience, 
quick to perceive evil in his superiors and to intercede against it” and that this is a fiction 
which “departs too radically from the reality of industrialized mass slaughter for it to 
remain coherent, intelligible, or morally defensible.”1840 Comments such as these give rise 
to the interesting question when does international criminal law depart too far from the 
reality? And who are those who really deserve punishment? As has been noted above, 
the present author is sceptical to accounts of international criminality that put all blame 
on the leaders. The phenomenology and criminology of international criminality rather 
supports the view that many different types of participants take part in international 
criminality with the leaders playing an important role. The reality of international 
criminality is complex and international criminal law’s approach to defences refuses to 
exonerate classes of participants in international atrocities. 
An important reason for the scarce legal recognition of the typical features of 
international criminality in the law on defences is that most typical features of international 
criminality can be characterized as pushes towards criminality and which hence raise 
questions of diminished responsibility for individuals. Causes behind criminality are, 
however, not generally considered as legally relevant (which can be regarded as morally 
problematic). To give legal significance to all the factors that cause the criminality 
would make it almost impossible anybody for the criminality. Also criminal leaders are 
namely affected by their environment. The outcome of this restrictive attitude is that the 
prohibitions of the crimes have become absolute, which protects the important values 
protected by international criminalizations. 
1837 Heller 1998, at 4.  
1838 J. Q. Wilson & R. J. Herrnstein, Crime and Human Nature (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1985), 495. 
1839 E.g., K. Ambos, ‘May a State Torture Suspects to Save the Life of Innocents?’, 6 Journal of International 
Criminal Justice (2008), at 286-287 (regarding torture).
1840 Osiel 1999, at 142. 
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9.  SENTENCING
9.1.  Introduction 
The legal systems in the world vary in how clearly they procedurally distinguish the 
conviction stage from the sentencing stage. In some jurisdictions, the two phases are 
completely separated. The rationale for such a separation is that it from the point of view 
of the presumption of innocence is problematic if evidence only relevant for sentencing 
(for example, evidence regarding previous convictions) is considered before conviction. 
In other legal systems, the two phases are integrated and the judges are expected to be 
able to hear sentencing evidence without this affecting their evaluation about the guilt 
of the accused person.1841 Also in international criminal procedure, the two procedural 
models can be found. What is relevant for this study is, however, that it in both types 
of procedural models is recognized that the legally relevant factors at sentencing partly 
depart from those at the conviction stage. 
Sentencing has received relatively little attention by international criminal law 
scholars.1842 If sentencing at all has been considered, the focus has usually been on: (1) 
what the possible penalties are and what penalties individuals de facto have received;1843 
or (2) the philosophical foundation of international sentencing.1844 Both these questions 
are beyond the scope of this study. With reference to Tonry, it may, however, be noted 
1841 Simplifying, it may be argued that common law jurisdictions clearly separate the conviction phase 
from the sentencing phase, whereas civil law jurisdictions often have a combined trial where both factors 
relevant for conviction and sentencing are considered. See e.g., M. S. - A. Wattad, ‘Is Terrorism a Crime or 
an Aggravating Factor in Sentencing?’, 4 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2006), at 1018. 
1842 This is interesting as the penalty phase may be regarded as the culmination of the criminal process. 
E.g., Schabas 2007, at 312. For many (including generally the convicted person and the general public), the 
sentence handed down at the end of the process is hence the most important thing in the whole process. 
E.g., M. B. Harmon & F. Gaynor, ‘Ordinary Sentences for Extraordinary Crimes’, 5 Journal of International 
Criminal Justice (2007), at 707, and  S. Dana, ‘Revisiting the Blaškić Sentence: Some Reflections on the 
Sentencing Jurisprudence of the ICTY’, 4 International Criminal Law Review (2004), at 323. 
1843 E.g., B. Holà, A. Smeulers & C. Bijleveld, ‘Is ICTY Sentencing Predictable? Empirical Analysis of 
ICTY Sentencing Practice’, 22 Leiden Journal of International Law (2009), at 79-97, B. Hola, C. Bijleveld 
& A. Smeulers, ‘Punishment for Genocide – Exploratory Analysis of ICTR Sentencing,’ 11 International 
Criminal Law Review (2011), at 745-773, and M. R. Bassett, ‘Defending International Sentencing: Past 
Criticism to the Promise of the ICC’, 16 Human Rights Brief (2009), at 22-28.    
1844 E.g., R. Haveman, ‘Supranational Expectations of a Punitive Approach’, in R. Haveman & O. Olusanya 
(eds.), Sentencing and Sanctioning in Supranational Criminal Law (Antwerp: Intersentia, 2006), at 145-
160, R. Henman, ‘The Philosophical Foundations of International Sentencing’, 1 Journal of International 
Criminal Justice (2003), at 64-85, R. Henman, ‘Some Issues for Sentencing in the International Criminal 
Court’, 52 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2003), at 81-114, R. Henman, ‘Evaluating 
Sentencing as a Force for Achieving Justice in International Criminal Trials’, in R. Henman & M. Findlay 
(eds.), Exploring the Boundaries of International Criminal Justice (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2011), at 
227-251, and F. P. King & A.-M. La Rosa, ‘Penalties under the ICC Statute’, in F. Lattanzi & W. A. Schabas 
(eds.), Essays on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Volume 1 (Ripa Fagnano Alto: il 
Sirente, 1999), at 329-332. See also Ewald, whose article combines both approaches U. Ewald, ‘‘Predictable 
Irrational’ – International Sentencing and Its Discourse against the Backdrop of Preliminary Empirical 
Findings on ICTY Sentencing Practices’, 10 International Criminal Law Review (2010), at 365-402. 
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that the possible functions of sanctions are many and include normative functions (such 
as the retributive function of punishment), distributive functions (such as consistency 
and even-handedness), preventive functions (such as minimizing crime), management 
functions (such as cost-effectiveness and resource management) and communicative 
functions (such as denunciation of wrongful behaviour).1845 These rationales or functions 
are to varying degrees reflected in the sentencing law as sentencing determinants (or 
criteria). The sentencing determinants are the factors that must or may be considered by 
those deciding upon the sentence.1846 In this study, the focus will be on these determinants. 
Or to put it another way, the approach chosen in relation to sentencing is substantive. A 
difference may namely be made between a procedural approach to sentencing, which sees 
sentencing as the final act of the process of judging individuals requiring a certain form 
and appropriate motivation, and a substantive approach to sentencing, which focuses 
on the identification of the factors contributing to the determination of the content of 
the sentence and on their respective weight for calculating penalties.1847 No attempt to 
statistically analyze the sentencing practice of the international criminal tribunals will, 
however, be made here. Instead, attention is given to what the tribunals themselves 
characterize as significant in relation to sentencing.
There are many different types of sentencing determinants and in this regard Lappi-
Seppälä has made a distinction between sentencing factors connected to the offence, 
sentencing factors connected to the offender and external sentencing factors, such as 
mercy.1848 A similar distinction is made by von Hirsch and Ashworth who distinguish 
between desert-based and instrumental sentencing factors.1849 Also in international 
sentencing many different types of sentencing determinants can be found and in that 
context D’Ascoli has distinguished between general influential factors (such as, the 
rationales of punishment and the sentencing practices in the country where the crime 
was committed), case-related factors (most notably the gravity of the offence and the 
individual circumstances of the accused), and proceeding-related factors (such as, 
voluntary surrender, guilty plea, comportment in detention and disrespectful court 
1845 M. Tonry, ‘The Functions of Sentencing and Sentencing Reform’, 58 Stanford Law Review (2005), at 
44-45. 
1846 The connection between the functions of punishment and sentencing factors is, e.g., illustrated by 
Sloane who distinguishes mitigating factors that are: (i) pragmatic (voluntary surrender, guilty pleas and 
cooperation with the court); (ii) moral or rehabilitative (remorse, sympathy for the victims, rehabilitative 
potential, good character or prior acts); and based on (iii) clemency (old age and health problems). He 
notes that the pragmatic factors have a direct connection to resource constraints, whereas moral and 
clemency considerations are connected to judgments about the propriety or utility of punishment. Sloane 
2007(b), at 729.
1847 A. Carcano, ‘Sentencing and the Gravity of Offence in International Criminal Law’, 51 International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly (2002), at 588.   
1848 T. Lappi-Seppälä, ‘Penal Policy and Sentencing Theory in Finland’, R. Lahti, K. Nuotio & P. Minkkinen 
(eds.), Criminal Policy and Sentencing in Transition: Finnish and Comparative Perspectives (Helsinki: 
University of Helsinki, 1992), at 11-22.
1849 Cf. A. von Hirsch & A. Ashworth, Proportionate Sentencing – Exploring the Principles (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), 4. Desert-based aggravating and mitigating factors relate to reduced or increased 
culpability or harm. A. von Hirsch, ‘A Principled View of English Sentencing Law [book review]’, 4 
Criminal Law Forum (1993), at 397 (referring to Ashworth).
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behaviour).1850 In this chapter, the focus will be on the case-related sentencing factors, 
which often are desert-based in nature. It is namely in connection to these types of 
sentencing determinants that it can be considered to what extent the nature of the 
criminality is reflected in the law. Relevant question here are therefore, for example: 
What significance is at sentencing given to State involvement in the criminality? Or to 
superior orders to commit crimes? 
In this Chapter, two questions are given special attention. Firstly, it is asked to what 
extent it at the sentencing stage is possible to give legal relevance to factors that at the 
conviction stage are disregarded. In this regard, Sloane has found that in international 
sentencing it is possible to “accommodate the factors relevant to appraising culpability 
in contexts that often differ dramatically from those presumed by national criminal 
justice systems.”1851 To what extent this, in practice, is done is hence something that 
will be explored. Secondly, most case-related sentencing factors are also factors that are 
legally relevant at the conviction stage. The other central object of inquiry is therefore 
the relationship between the conviction and sentencing determinants in international 
criminal law. 
9.2.  Sentencing in International Criminal Law 
9.2.1.  Introduction 
What punishments fit international crimes has been found to be one of the most difficult 
questions facing international criminal law. Debated issues have been both the ordinal 
scaling of punishments (that is, the question of how the blameworthiness of different 
international crimes and modes of participation should be evaluated in relation to 
each other) and the cardinal scaling of punishments (that is, the question of the overall 
levels of punishment in international criminal law).1852 These difficulties of international 
sentencing do not, however, “release judges from their duty to impose one.”1853
From a normative perspective, it is interesting that sentencing has not been regulated 
in great detail in international criminal law. The statutes of the various international 
criminal tribunals usually only settle what penalties the tribunals can hand down. 
Provisions on how the penalty de facto should be determined have generally been scarce. 
For example, the Nuremberg Charter only shortly established that the punishments 
were to be “just” and that official status of the defendant was not to be considered as a 
mitigating factor. The Charter also stipulated that the fact that the defendant had acted 
pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior could be considered in mitigation 
of punishment, if the Tribunal determined that justice so required.1854 In practice, it has 
been noted that the Nuremberg Tribunal and the other post-World War II courts had an 
1850 S. D’Ascoli, Sentencing in International Criminal Law – The UN Ad Hoc Tribunals and Future Perspectives 
for the ICC (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011) 135, 145 and 174. 
1851 Sloane 2007(a), at 42. 
1852 Regarding the concepts of ordinal and cardinal scaling of punishment, see Von Hirsch & Ashworth 
2005, at 138.
1853 Marston Danner 2001, at 418. 
1854 Articles 7-8 and 27, Nuremberg Charter.
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“extremely wide degree of discretion” in relation to settling the penalties1855 and that the 
tribunals did not in their judgements elaborate on why particular sentences were handed 
down.1856 It has been found that, in practice, the approach of the Nuremberg Tribunal 
was that in the absence of mitigating factors, the penalty was to be death penalty.1857
Also the statutes and RPE of the ICTY and the ICTR contain very few provisions on 
sentencing. The statutes establish that: “In imposing the sentences, the Trial Chambers 
should take into account such factors as the gravity of the offence and the individual 
circumstances of the convicted person.”1858 In the same way as the Nuremberg Charter, 
the statutes of the ICTY and the ICTR furthermore stipulate that the official position of 
an accused person shall not relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate 
punishment, but that the fact that an accused person acted pursuant to an order of a 
Government or of a superior may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the 
tribunals determine that justice so requires.1859 The statutes also require the tribunals to 
pay attention to the sentencing practice in the former Yugoslavia respectively Rwanda.1860 
In the RPE, Rules 101 establish that the tribunals shall take into account any aggravating 
circumstances and any mitigating circumstances when determining the sentence.1861 The 
only explicitly mentioned mitigating factor in the RPE is substantial cooperation with 
the prosecutor by the convicted person before or after conviction.1862 
In their case law, the ad hoc tribunals have identified numerous aggravating and 
mitigating factors. In the Blaškić Appeal Judgement, the ICTY, for example, mentioned 
as possible aggravating factors: 
(1) the position of the accused, that is, his position of leadership, his level in the 
command structure, or his role in the broader context of the conflict of the former 
Yugoslavia; 
(2) the discriminatory intent or the discriminatory state of mind for crimes for which 
such a state of mind is not an element or ingredient of the crime; 
1855 R. E. Fife, ‘Article 77 – Applicable Penalties’, in O. Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court: Observers’ Notes, Article by Article, 2nd ed. (München: C. H. Beck, 2008), 
at 1421. 
1856 See further e.g., Marston Danner 2001, at 418 and 435-436, and F. N. M. Mumba, ‘Topics within the 
Sphere of Sentencing in International Criminal Law’, in L. C. Vohrah et al. (eds.), Man’s Inhumanity to 
Man  – Essays on International Law in Honour of Antonio Cassese (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 
2003), at 587. In the post-World War II Hostages case, it was argued that the punishment can be mitigated 
due to various considerations (such as the age and experience of the accused person), but that that the 
mitigation should not be seen as a factor that would “reduce the degree of the crime”, but as a matter of 
grace. Hostages, Judgment, CCL, 19 February 1948, at 1317.
1857 W. A. Schabas, ‘International Sentencing: From Leipzig (1923) to Arusha (1996)’, in M. C. Bassiouni 
(ed.), International Criminal Law, Volume III, International Enforcement, 3rd ed. (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2008), at 622. 
1858 Article 24(2), ICTY Statute, and Article 23(2), ICTR Statute.
1859 Article 7, ICTY Statute, and Article 6, ICTR Statute. 
1860 Article 24(1), ICTY Statute, and Article 23(1), ICTR Statute. See also Rule 101, ICTY RPE, and Rule 101, 
ICTR RPE. In practice, the influence of domestic law in international sentencing has, however, not been that 
significant. See further e.g., D’Ascoli 2011, at 115-123, and 141-143.
1861 Rule 101, ICTY RPE, and Rule 101, ICTR RPE.   
1862 Rule 101, ICTY RPE, and Rule 101, ICTR RPE.  
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(3) the length of time during which the crime continued; 
(4) active and direct criminal participation, if linked to a high-rank position of 
command, the accused’s role as fellow perpetrator, and the active participation of a 
superior in the criminal acts of subordinates; 
(5) the informed, willing or enthusiastic participation in crime; 
(6) premeditation and motive; 
(7) the sexual, violent, and humiliating nature of the acts and the vulnerability of the 
victims; 
(8) the status of the victims, their youthful age and number, and the effect of the 
crimes on them; 
(9) civilian detainees; 
(10) the character of the accused; and 
(11) the circumstances of the offences generally.1863 
In some cases, the ICTY has held that only circumstances directly related to the 
commission of an offence can be viewed as aggravating.1864 The Blaškić Appeal Judgement 
also enumerated possible mitigating factors: 
(1) co-operation with the Prosecution; 
(2) the admission of guilt or a guilty plea; 
(3) an expression of remorse; 
(4) voluntary surrender; 
(5) good character with no prior criminal convictions; 
(6) comportment in detention; 
(7) personal and family circumstances; 
(8) the character of the accused subsequent to the conflict; 
(9) duress and indirect participation; 
(10) diminished mental responsibility; 
(11) age;  
(12) assistance to detainees or victims; and
(13) exceptionally, poor health.1865 
1863 Blaškić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 29 July 2004, para. 686 (with minor stylistic changes).
1864 E.g., Orić, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 30 June 2006, para. 731, and Stakić, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 31 July 
2003, para. 911.
1865 Blaškić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 29 July 2004, para. 696 (with minor stylistic changes).
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Sometimes aggravating and mitigating factors can be connected to the same fact. For 
example, character can function as an aggravating factor if it is poor and as a mitigating 
factor if it is good. The ICTY has, however, emphasized that the absence of a mitigating 
factor does not itself constitute an aggravating factor.1866 As regards the de facto application 
of the various sentencing determinants, the practice of the tribunals strongly stresses the 
discretion of the trial chambers. Only if a trial chamber has committed a discernible 
error will the sentence be altered by the appeals chamber.1867 In practice, sentences have, 
however, every now and then been revised, especially by the ICTY Appeals Chamber.1868 
In most cases where the Appeals Chamber has revised sentences, it has, however, not 
found that the Trial Chamber has committed a discernible error in sentencing. Rather 
the new sentence has been due to revisions regarding convictions, acquittals and/or the 
applicable modes of responsibility.1869 
The tradition of scarce regulation regarding sentencing is also followed by the Rome 
Statute of the ICC. The Statute only stipulates that the Court shall take into account such 
factors as the gravity of the crime and the individual circumstances of the convicted 
person.1870 Like its predecessors, the ICC Statute also lays down that official capacity 
shall not in and of itself constitute a ground for reduction of sentence.1871 In contrast to 
the ad hoc tribunals, the ICC RPE, however, contain a specific rule on aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances, namely Rule 145 which stipulates that the Court shall take 
into account, as appropriate: 
(a) Mitigating circumstances such as: 
(i) The circumstances falling short of constituting grounds for exclusion of 
criminal responsibility, such as substantially diminished mental capacity or 
duress; 
(ii) The convicted person’s conduct after the act, including any efforts by the 
person to compensate the victims and any cooperation with the Court; 
(b) As aggravating circumstances: 
(i) Any relevant prior criminal convictions for crimes under the jurisdiction of 
the Court or of a similar nature; 
(ii) Abuse of power or official capacity; 
1866 E.g., Blaškić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 29 July 2004, para. 687, and Plavšić, Judgement (sentencing), TC, 
ICTY, 27 February 2003, para. 64.
1867 E.g., Vasilijević, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 25 February 2004, para. 9. 
1868 S. M. Sayers, ‘Defence Perspectives on Sentencing Practice in the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia’, 16 Leiden Journal of International Law (2003), at 753 (‘Despite an ostensibly 
narrow and challenging standard of appellate review, sentencing judgements in the ICTY have been 
revised or reversed with surprising frequency. Sentencing appeals in the ICTR, by contrast, have been 
almost uniformly unsuccessful.’) 
1869 See further J. J. Clark, ‘Zero to Life: Sentencing Appeals at the International Criminal Tribunals for the 
Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda’, 96 The Georgetown Law Journal (2008), at 1685-1718. 
1870 Article 78(1), ICC Statute.
1871 Article 27(1), ICC Statute.
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(iii) Commission of the crime where the victim is particularly defenceless; 
(iv) Commission of the crime with particular cruelty or where there were multiple 
victims; 
(v) Commission of the crime for any motive involving discrimination [...]; 
(vi) Other circumstances which, although not enumerated above, by virtue of 
their nature are similar to those mentioned.1872
All in all, the aggravating and mitigating factors that are recognized by the ad hoc 
tribunals and the ICC are very similar. 
9.2.2.  The Gravity of the Crime for which a Conviction Has Been Entered
The gravity of the offence for which a conviction has been entered is hence in international 
criminal law the most important sentencing determinant. The ad hoc tribunals have in 
their case law acknowledged this by noting that the gravity of the offence is “the litmus 
test for the appropriate sentence” and that it is essential that the sentence reflects “the 
inherent gravity of the criminal conduct of the accused”.1873 As such, international 
criminal law follows the idea that punishments should be proportionate to the committed 
wrongdoing. 
In domestic legal systems, the gravity of the offence is generally evaluated both 
at the law-making (in abstracto) and law-application (in concreto) stages.1874 Gravity in 
abstracto “is based on an analysis, in terms of criminal law of the subjective and objective 
elements of the crime” whereas the in concreto gravity “depends on the harm done and 
on the degree of culpability of the offender.”1875 As regards the law-making stage, in most 
domestic legal systems, the criminal statutes establish both the minimum and maximum 
sentences for each crime individually. This approach is not followed in international 
criminal law, where the possible penalties for all crimes and all modes of responsibility 
are the same. In practice, this entails that in international sentencing, the judges have to 
consider both factors that relate to in abstracto and in concreto gravity. 
There are two traditional parameters in gravity assessments: harm and culpability.1876 
In connection to both parameters difficult legal choices have to be made. In relation 
1872 On the drafting of this rule, see R. E. Fife, ‘Penalties’, in R. S. Lee (ed.), The International Criminal 
Court – Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence (Ardsley: Transnational Publishers, 2001), 
at 557-565.  
1873 E.g., Delalić et al., Judgement, AC, ICTY, 20 February 2001, para. 731, and Delalić et al., Judgement, 
TC, ICTY, 16 November 1998, para. 1225. The Čelebići Appeals Chamber furthermore established that 
“the overarching goal in sentencing must be to ensure that the final or aggregate sentence reflects the 
totality of the criminal conduct and overall culpability of the offender.” Delalić et al., Judgement, AC, ICTY, 
20 February 2001, para. 430.
1874 A similar distinction is that between “legislative determination of penalties” and “judicial determination 
of penalties” that is made by Olásolo. H. Olásolo, ‘Complementarity Analysis of National Sentencing’, in 
R. Haveman & O. Olusanya (eds.), Sentencing and Sanctioning in Supranational Criminal Law (Antwerp: 
Intersentia, 2006), at 42.
1875 Carcano 2002, at 609. 
1876 von Hirsch 1993, at 396. See also e.g., R. A. Duff, ‘Guidance and Guidelines’, 105 Columbia Law Review 
(2005), at 1178.
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to harm, one must first determine which harms are recognized as legally relevant and 
secondly agree on how the harm should be measured.1877 Some harms are universally 
recognized as serious (such as violations of the right to life), but the fact remains that it 
is difficult to “develop criteria for measuring harm [...] that are more illuminating than 
simple intuition.”1878 The problem is especially evident in international criminal law 
where all crimes are so to say inherently grave.1879 
In the literature pertaining to international crimes, a debated question has been 
whether there is or should be an in abstracto gravity hierarchy between the various 
international crimes. The ad hoc tribunals have, however, in their case law established 
that there is in law no distinction between the seriousness of the various international 
crimes. In the Stakić case, the ICTY Appeals Chamber, for example, argued that “there 
is no hierarchy of the crimes within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal and that [...] the 
sentence of life imprisonment can be imposed in cases other than genocide.”1880 In 
the Kayishema and Ruzindana Appeal Judgement, Kayishema alleged that the Trial 
Chamber erred in finding that genocide is the “crime of crimes” because there is no such 
hierarchical gradation of crimes. The ICTR Appeals Chamber responded to this claim by 
remarking that there is no hierarchy of crimes under the statute and that all of the crimes 
specified therein are “serious violations of international humanitarian law” capable of 
attracting the same sentence and that the Trial Chamber’s description of genocide as 
the “crime of crimes” was at the level of general appreciation and did not impact on the 
1877 Harmfulness is namely generally perceived as the central criterion when evaluating the seriousness of 
crimes. E.g., von Hirsch and Jareborg have in their typology on crime seriousness evaluated the interests 
violated or threatened, and the degree to which the living standard of a victim typically is affected by the 
crime. A. von Hirsch & N. Jareborg, ‘Gauging Criminal Harm: A Living-Standard Analysis’, 11 Oxford Journal 
of Legal Studies (1991)), at 1-38. Also Robinson and Darley observe that in domestic legal systems, empirical 
studies have indicated that besides the actor’s conduct and culpable state of mind, the resulting criminal harm 
affects clearly how people morally evaluate an incident. Robinson & Darley 1998, at 1130.  
1878 A. von Hirsch, ‘Proportionality in the Philosophy of Punishment: From “Why Punish?” to “How 
Much?”’, 1 Criminal Law Forum (1990), at 288 (fn 85). 
1879 Haveman has pointed out that all the crimes that are prosecuted by international criminal tribunals fall 
“within the category of extremely grave cases” if one takes as the point of reference cases tried by ordinary 
domestic courts. He therefore submits that the cardinal scaling of punishments in international criminal 
law must be different than in domestic legal systems. (He speaks of “a new hierarchy”). R. Haveman, 
‘Sentencing and Sanctioning in Supranational Criminal Law’, in R. Haveman & O. Olusanya (eds.), 
Sentencing and Sanctioning in Supranational Criminal Law (Antwerp: Intersentia, 2006), at 5. At the same 
time, Ohlin has, however, claimed that reserving the harshest penalties to the very top-level international 
criminals may entail that the punishments handed down to the low-level actors become too lenient. J. D. 
Ohlin, ‘Proportional Sentences at the ICTY’, in B. Swart, A. Zahar & G. Sluiter (eds.), The Legacy of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), at 322 
ff.     
1880 Stakić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 22 March 2006, para. 375. See also e.g., Tadić, Judgement (sentencing), 
AC, ICTY, 26 January 2000, para. 69, and Furundžija, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 21 July 2000, para. 243. There 
is, however, some case law/individual opinions suggesting that some crimes more serious than others. E.g., 
Furundžija, Judgement (decl. of Judge Lal Chand Vohrah), AC, ICTY, 21 July 2000, para. 2, Tadić, Judgement 
(sentencing, sep. op. of Judge Cassese), AC, ICTY, 26 January 2000, and Perišić, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 6 
September 2011, para. 1799. (‘Moreover, while there is no codified hierarchy, it is reasonable to conclude that 
some crimes are of a more grievous nature than others. Because of their inherently discriminatory character, 
crimes of genocide and targeted persecutions may thus warrant enhanced scrutiny.’).
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sentence it imposed.1881 Even though the ad hoc tribunals have not wanted to establish a 
hierarchy in their case law, the sentencing practice of the tribunals, however, implies that 
there is one. The harshest penalties have generally been handed down in connection to 
genocide followed by crimes against humanity and war crimes.1882 The fact that a number 
of factors influence sentencing, however, entails that one should approach this type of 
statistics carefully. To begin with, all international crimes can be committed through 
alternative underlying offences. In most genocide cases the underlying offence has been 
killing members of the protected group, whereas the underlying offences in connection 
to crimes against humanity and war crimes have varied more. Secondly, there may have 
been case-specific in concreto gravity factors which have affected the sentence handed 
down, such as the number of victims.1883  
The Rome Statute of the ICC also characterizes the gravity of the crime as one of the 
two central sentencing determinants.1884 No in abstracto hierarchy between the various 
crimes is established in the Statute, that is, the possible maximum penalty for all crimes 
is the same. 
9.2.3.  The Modes of Responsibility and Blameworthiness 
When offence gravity is evaluated, it is not only the crime per se that is considered, but 
also the mode of responsibility for which the individual is convicted. The culpability of 
offenders may differ, as well as the degree to which they may be held responsible for 
the harm caused. Ashworth has in this vein noted that “the internal architecture of the 
criminal law consists, to a significant extent, of distinctions according to the degree of 
fault”.1885 A central sentencing factor is therefore the “degree of participation and intent 
of the convicted person”.1886 The ICTR Appeals Chamber has in this regard held that the 
“modes of liability may either augment [...] or lessen [...] the gravity of the crime.”1887
In international criminal law, the modes of responsibility have not been explicitly 
been put in a hierarchy in the founding documents of the courts, even though some legal 
scholars find that Article 25(3) of the ICC Statute contains a hierarchy.1888 In international 
case law, it has, however, been established that some responsibility forms are more 
blameworthy than others. In short, it has been found that perpetrator responsibility is 
the most blameworthy form of responsibility. Perpetrator responsibility clearly includes 
1881 Kayishema & Ruzindana, Judgement, AC, ICTR, 1 June 2001, para. 367.
1882 J. Meernik & K. King, ‘The Sentencing Determinants of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia: An Empirical and Doctrinal Analysis’, 16 Leiden Journal of International Law (2003), at 
735-736 (who have statistically investigated the sentencing practices of the ICTY trial chambers). 
1883 Milutinović et al., Judgement, TC, ICTY, 26 February 2009, vol. 3, para. 1147. Cf. In Rwanda, genocide 
and mass killings have been connected. In other cases (such as Cambodia), mass killings have instead been 
connected to political persecution (that is, crimes against humanity).  
1884 Article 78(1), ICC Statute. See also Lubanga, Decision (sentencing), TC, ICC, 10 July 2012, paras 36-44.
1885 Ashworth 2008, at 411. 
1886 Cf. Lubanga, Decision (sentencing), TC, ICC, 10 July 2012, at 20. See also e.g. Kupreškić et al., 
Judgement, TC, ICTY, 14 January 2000, para. 852 (‘The determination of the gravity of the crime requires a 
consideration of [...] the form and degree of the participation of the accused in the crime.’), and Aleksovski, 
Judgement, AC, ICTY, 24 March 2000, paras 182-183.
1887 Ndindabahizi, Judgement, AC, ICTR, 16 January 2007, para. 122. 
1888 See further Sections 7.2.2 and 7.2.4.6. 
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committing a crime and participation in a JCE.1889 Aiding and abetting, on the other hand, 
has been found to be “a mode of participation that illustrates secondary responsibility 
and a rather low degree of individual guilt for the crime.”1890 The placement of ordering 
and instigating in “the hierarchy” is not as evident and not as settled.1891 In some cases, 
the ad hoc tribunals have, however, treated ordering as a form of direct responsibility 
comparable to perpetration.1892 It has even been suggested that ordering should be viewed 
as one of the most serious forms of participation in the crimes, as well as planning. The 
Trial Chamber in the Ndindabahizi case, for example, held that “the highest penalties are 
to be imposed upon those who planned or ordered atrocities, or those who committed 
crimes with particular zeal or sadism.”1893 In this regard, the case law of the ad hoc 
tribunals seems to differ from the hierarchy indicated in the Rome Statute, where orders, 
solicits and induces have been placed between perpetration and aiding and abetting 
in Article 25(3). According to Osiel the (low) hierarchical position of ordering in the 
Rome Statute has affected prosecutorial choices, so that the ICC Prosecutor has avoided 
prosecuting individuals for ordering crimes:
Ordering atrocity bears a superficial resemblance to “suggesting” or recommending 
it, insofar as both entail speech acts. Yet the two are profoundly different in social 
meaning, even were their wording identical. To effectively order another person 
to do one’s murderous bidding requires an organizatorial machinery that stands 
behind the speaker; otherwise, the statement is just instigation, a form of complicity, 
with punishment diminished accordingly. It is no accident that, in the ICC Statute, 
the word “orders” is paired in the same clause with “solicits” and “induces,” verbs 
associated with liability as a mere accessory. The ICC Prosecutor hence prefers to 
avoid invoking this mode of participation, even when there is plenty indication, as in 
Katanga, of a [defendant] [...] having ordered people about.1894
1889 See further Section 7.2.4. and the subsections on commission responsibility. 
1890 Werle 2007, at 970. See also e.g., Krstić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 19 April 2004, para. 268, Ntagerura et 
al., Judgement, TC, ICTR, 25 February 2004, para. 813, and Semanza, Judgement, AC, ICTR, 20 May 2005, 
para. 388.
1891 See further e.g., Goy 2012, at 11, Olásolo 2010, at 534-535, and H. Satō, ‘International Criminal 
Responsibility Concerning ‘Control over an Organization’ and Command Responsibility Lato Sensu’, 12 
International Criminal Law Review (2012), at 295-300. The placement of ordering and instigating in a hierarchy 
is furthermore complicated by the fact that the ordering or instigation in certain cases can found the basis for 
commission responsibility. Munyakazi, Judgement (sep. op. of Judge Liu), AC, ICTR, 28 September 2011, para. 
3 (‘In effect, the newly expanded form of commission has subsumed various modes of individual criminal 
responsibility enumerated in the Statute. Specifically, ordering, instigating, and aiding and abetting appear 
to have been amalgamated into this mode of liability, to a large extent rendering redundant the distinctions 
envisaged by Article 6(1) of the Statute. Whether instances of ordering, instigating, and aiding and abetting 
may be classified as “committing” is ostensibly a question of nature and degree, requiring judicial scrutiny to 
determine whether the overall conduct of the accused should be “elevated” to commission. Inevitably, the 
conflation of these various forms of liability creates considerable ambiguity as to the scope of a convicted 
person’s criminal responsibility.’)
1892 E.g., Mrkšić & Šljivančanin, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 5 May 2009, para. 407, and Ntawukulilyayo, 
Judgement, AC, ICTR, 14 December 2011, para. 244.
1893 Ndindabahizi, Judgement, TC, ICTR, 15 July 2004, para. 500. See also e.g., Kalimanzira, Judgement, 
TC, ICTR, 22 June 2009, para. 744, Kanyarukiga, Judgement, AC, ICTR, 8 May 2012, para. 280, and 
Ntawukulilyayo, Judgement, TC, ICTR, 3 August 2010, para. 469.
1894 Osiel 2010, at 110.
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Finally, superior responsibility has by the ad hoc tribunals sometimes been identified as 
a form of responsibility that warrants a lower sentence.1895 This has been found to be the 
case especially when the accused has only been charged with post facto knowledge of the 
crimes. For example, in the Rugambarara case, the ICTR noted that: “Saving lives was 
therefore not at stake, which makes the crime less serious than if it were otherwise.”1896 
At the same time, there is also appeals chamber case law, in which it is stressed that as a 
matter of law superior responsibility is not less grave and that the fact that the offender 
only has been convicted for superior responsibility should therefore not automatically be 
considered as a factor that mitigates the punishment. For example, in the Milošević case, 
the Appeals Chamber held that: 
The Appeals Chamber acknowledges that in appropriate cases, a conviction under 
Article 7(3) of the Statute may result in a lesser sentence as compared to that imposed 
in the context of an Article 7(1) conviction. However, in this particular case, the 
Appeal Chamber finds that its conclusions with respect to the form of Milošević’s 
responsibility for the crimes at stake do not in any way diminish his active and central 
role in the commission of the crimes.1897 
In this regard, it is noteworthy that the doctrine of superior responsibility can be used 
in very different types of cases. Firstly, the doctrine “has not specified the degree of 
liability for each level of command down the chain” and it is hence not restricted to 
“finding of responsibility to a commander of a certain level”.1898 Secondly, the doctrine of 
superior responsibility can be applied both in cases of actual knowledge and in cases of 
constructive knowledge. A knowing failure is generally more blameworthy than wilful 
blindness. And thirdly, in superior responsibility, it is not only the superior’s conduct in 
failing to prevent or punish the subordinate’s offence that is evaluated when the gravity 
of the offence is considered. Also the gravity of the subordinate’s offence is a relevant 
sentencing determinant.1899 In the Rome Statute of the ICC, superior responsibility has 
been placed in a different article than the other modes of responsibility and the question 
of what level of blameworthiness superior responsibility represents has not yet been 
settled in the case law. In the same way as before the ad hoc tribunals, it, however, also 
appears that the ICC only considers responsibility based on Article 28 in situations where 
Article 25(3) responsibility cannot be established.1900 
The suggested in abstracto hierarchy between the various modes of responsibility 
has, in practice, not always had a clear significance on the sentence handed down. 
Individuals found to have taken part in a JCE can, for example, receive very different 
sentences even though they all are regarded as perpetrators and as persons with 
1895 E.g., Delić, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 15 September 2008, para. 562. 
1896 Rugambarara, Judgement (sentencing), TC, ICTR, 16 November 2007, para. 20.
1897 Milošević, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 12 November 2009, para. 334. See also Bagosora & Nsengiyumva, 
Judgement, AC, ICTR, 14 December 2011, para. 740, Delalić et al., Judgement, AC, ICTY, 20 February 
2001, para. 735, and Ntabakuze, Judgement, AC, ICTR, 8 May 2012, paras 282, 299 and 303.
1898 Jia 2004, at 40-41. 
1899 E.g., Delalić et al., Judgement, AC, ICTY, 20 February 2001, para. 732, and Hadžihasanović & Kubura, 
Judgement, AC, ICTY, 22 April 2008, para. 313. 
1900 See e.g., Bemba, Decision (confirmation of charges), PTC, ICC, 15 June 2009, paras 342 and 402.
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“equal culpability”.1901 And while persons convicted based on the doctrine of superior 
responsibility generally have received light sentences before the ad hoc tribunals, there 
are at least some notable exceptions.1902 This raises the question of whether there are 
other aspects in the participation that more strongly affect gravity evaluations. 
What, in fact, to a great extent appears to affect sentences are certain factors 
connected to the “form and degree of participation”1903 that sometimes are considered 
when assessing offence gravity and sometimes as aggravating factors, namely the 
leadership role of the accused and zeal in the commission of the crimes. Also the question 
of whether the participation has been direct (“dirty hands”) or indirect (“clean hands”) 
has sometimes been found to be relevant.1904 D’Ascoli has in her empirical analysis of 
the ad hoc tribunals’ sentencing practice observed that “while for ICTY Chambers there 
is no direct or automatic link between harsher penalties and perpetrators with ‘dirty 
hands,’ conversely ICTR Chambers have sentenced direct perpetrators more severely 
than indirect ones.”1905 In connection to high-level actors, the ad hoc tribunals have also 
explicitly found that the fact that the convicted persons have not personally committed 
any acts of violence does not necessarily entail that the persons should be entitled to a 
lesser sentence.1906 
More generally, it has been held that when individual culpability is assessed in 
connection to mass atrocities, it is also central to evaluate the role played by the actor 
in the actual historical events or the “criminal context.” In the Krstić case, the ICTY 
Appeals Chamber, for example, noted that the Trial Chamber “was entitled to consider 
the conduct of Krstić in the proper context, which includes the conduct of any alleged 
co-perpetrators.” More specifically, the Appeals Chamber held that: “A comprehensive 
1901 The JCE doctrine establishes equal perpetrator culpability at the conviction stage. This has been 
criticized in the doctrine. E.g., Ohlin has held that: “Relative culpability is not simply a matter of serving 
the appropriate time in a penal facility. It goes deeper to the very heart of the criminal offence. The minor 
participant and the chief conspirator are not simply deserving of different sentences. Their guilt is different 
and it is this central truth that the current version of joint criminal enterprise obscures.” Ohlin 2007(b), 
at 88.
1902 Schabas 2010(a), at 455 (referring to the Nahimana et al. (30 years) and Bagosora et al. (life 
imprisonment) cases before the ICTR). 
1903 E.g., Karemera & Ngirumpatse, Judgement, TC, ICTR, 2 February 2012, para. 1721, and Nyiramasuhuko 
et al., Judgement, TC, ICTR, 24 June 2011, para.  6189.
1904 E.g., Mrkšić & Šljivančanin, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 5 May 2009, para. 407 (‘The Appeals Chamber 
agrees with Šljivančanin that the fact that an accused did not physically commit a crime is relevant to the 
determination of the appropriate sentence.’) 
1905 D’Ascoli 2011, at 232 (see also 238-239). 
1906 Stakić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 22 March 2006, para. 380 (‘The Appeals Chamber wishes to clarify that 
[...] the fact that an accused is found guilty as an “indirect co-perpetrator” does not in itself entitle him to 
a lower sentence. [...] Moreover, the Appeals Chamber notes that the role of the “indirect co perpetrators” 
can be very significant, particularly in cases of large scale crimes which could not be committed without 
the help of the indirect co-perpetrators in such ways as planning, instigating, co-ordinating or organising. 
[...]’). Like in connection to abuse of superior position, the directness of the participation may alternatively 
be considered as an aggravating factor (or in connection to indirect participation as a mitigating factor). 
See also e.g., Krajišnik, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 17 March 2009, para. 739, and Nahimana et al., Judgement, 
AC, ICTR, 28 November 2007, para. 1054, and Gotovina et al., Judgement, TC, ICTY, 15 April 2011, para. 
2602 (‘The fact that neither of them acted as principal perpetrator does not reduce their responsibility in 
any way.’) 
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understanding of the facts of a particular case not only permits a consideration of the 
culpability of other actors; indeed, it requires it in order to accurately comprehend the 
events in question and to impose the appropriate sentence.”1907 In the Tadić case, the ICTY 
in a similar vein noted that: “Although the criminal conduct underlying the charges of 
which the Appellant now stands convicted was incontestably heinous, his level in the 
command structure, when compared to that of his superiors, i.e. commanders, or the 
very architects of the strategy of ethnic cleansing, was low.”1908 Both ad hoc tribunals have, 
however, stressed that this does not entail that only the architects behind international 
atrocities can receive the harshest penalties. In certain cases, the criminal behaviour of 
low-level actors is so heinous that also they deserve the maximum penalty.1909 
9.2.4.  Aggravating Factors  
9.2.4.1.  Introduction
In domestic legal systems, the factors that courts can take into account in aggravation 
of the sentence are often explicitly enumerated in law through special provisions on 
aggravating factors or as part of the crime definitions (when there exists aggravated forms 
of the crimes). Such written provisions are often found necessary due to the principle of 
legality.1910 In international criminal law, the existence of aggravating factors has not been 
as evident due to the lack of explicit provisions and/or the nature of the criminality. In 
connection to the post-World War II trials Schabas, for example, notes that “the various 
national military tribunals did not as a rule address themselves to aggravating factors” 
and that “[g]iven the horror of the crimes over which such tribunals had jurisdiction, 
discussion of aggravating factors must have seemed completely superfluous.”1911 Likewise, 
Sloane has pointed out that “[i]t is difficult to identify an act of genocide or a crime 
against humanity that is not ‘heinous’.”1912 Early ICTY case law also seemed to exclude 
the idea of aggravating circumstances in connection to international crimes. In the 
Erdemović case, the Trial Chamber namely held that “when crimes against humanity are 
involved, the issue of the existence of any aggravating circumstances does not warrant 
consideration.”1913 Later ICTY and ICTR case law has, however, clearly confirmed the 
existence of aggravating factors in international criminal law.1914 This case law is in line 
1907 Krstić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 19 April 2004, para. 254.
1908 Tadić, Judgement (sentencing), AC, ICTY, 26 January 2000, para. 56.
1909 In the Čelebići Appeal Judgement, ICTY emphasized that the Tadić Sentencing Appeal Judgement 
should not be read to require that “in every case before it, an accused’s level in the overall hierarchy in 
the conflict in the former Yugoslavia should be compared with those at the highest level, such that if the 
accused’s place was by comparison low, a low sentence should automatically be imposed.” Also low-level 
actors can hence receive a severe penalty, if their criminal behaviour merits that. Delalić et al., Judgement, 
AC, ICTY, 20 February 2001, para. 847. See also e.g., Muhimana, Judgement, AC, ICTR, 21 May 2007, 
para. 233.
1910 See e.g., the Achour case before the ECtHR, where it in connection to ECHR Article 7 was considered 
whether it was foreseeable to the accused that his recidivism would be considered as an aggravating factor. 
Achour v. France, Judgment, GC, ECtHR, 29 March 2006.  
1911 Schabas 2008(b), at 622. 
1912 Sloane 2007(b), at 728. 
1913 Erdemović, Judgement (sentencing), TC, ICTY, 29 November 1996, para. 45. 
1914 See e.g., Blaškić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 29 July 2004, para. 686.
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with the tribunals’ RPE, which stipulate that the tribunals shall consider “any aggravating 
circumstances” at sentencing.1915 
The ICC follows the approach of the ad hoc tribunals, however, so that the RPE explicitly 
enumerate some aggravating factors. More specifically, ICC Rule 145(2)(b) mentions 
relevant prior criminal convictions, abuse of power or official capacity, commission of the 
crime where the victim is particularly defenceless, commission of the crime with particular 
cruelty or where there were multiple victims, and commission of the crime for any motive 
involving discrimination. The list in the RPE is, however, non-exhaustive in that the Court 
can also consider other circumstances which, although not enumerated “by virtue of their 
nature are similar to those mentioned.” Such similar factors could, for example, be the long 
duration of the crime and the sexual, violent, and humiliating nature of the acts, which the 
ad hoc tribunals in their case law have identified as aggravating.1916 
The aggravating factors can be categorized based on whether they are backwards 
looking (relating to the guilt) or forward-looking (relating to dangerousness, for example, 
recidivism).1917 In this study, the focus will be on backwards-looking aggravating factors, 
which are connected to the situation in which the crime was committed. In this regard, 
it is noteworthy that recent ICTY case law has stressed that “[o]nly those circumstances 
directly related to the commission of the offence charged and to the offender himself 
when he committed the offence [...] may be considered in aggravation.”1918 These 
aggravating factors are generally justified with the increased culpability of the actor 
or the special harm caused. Sometimes both types of justifications for aggravation are 
raised. The special blameworthiness of bias crimes has, for example, been explained both 
by enhanced culpability1919 and by greater harm caused.1920
9.2.4.2.  Aggravating Factors Relating to the Offence
The magnitude of the crime, discrimination against the victims, the special trauma, 
suffering or humiliation caused to the victims, the special vulnerability of the victims, 
and special cruelty or sadism shown in the execution of the crime are factors that often 
in international criminal jurisprudence have been considered in aggravation.1921 Many 
of these are also recognized as aggravating factors in domestic legal systems. Their use 
1915 Rule 101, ICTY RPE, and Rule 101, ICTR RPE. 
1916 E.g., Blaškić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 29 July 2004, para. 686.
1917 Wattad 2006, at 1020, and M. S.-A. Wattad, ‘The Meaning of Guilt: Rethinking Apprendi’, 33 New 
England Journal of Criminal and Civil Confinement (2007), at 547-548. Most of the persons who have been 
convicted by international criminal tribunals have, however, been first time offenders and have in the 
prisons behaved well. This indicates that traditional criminal law parameters for evaluating dangerousness 
do not necessarily function well in relation to international criminality. Regarding the role of rehabilitation 
in international sentencing, see e.g., Harmon & Gaynor 2007, at 693-694.
1918 E.g., Milutinović et al., Judgement, TC, ICTY, 26 February 2009, vol. 3, para. 1149.
1919 Carcano has e.g., found that bias crimes entail that “the offender disregards principles of international 
law based on the equality of all human beings”. Carcano 2002, at 603. See also Wattad 2007, at 547.
1920 Marston Danner notes that: “First, bias crimes are more likely to be committed by groups of people. 
Second, bias crimes inflict greater harm on the immediate victim. Third, bias crimes have many secondary 
victims − notably, the other members of the group against whom the defendant acted.” Marston Danner 
2001, at 466 (referring to Lawrence).
1921 D’Ascoli 2011, at 209. See also e.g., Milutinović et al., Judgement, TC, ICTY, 26 February 2009, vol. 3, 
para. 1151. 
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in the international context is, however, not as self-evident.1922 Many of the aggravating 
factors are namely typical features of international criminality. International crimes are 
generally brutal, discriminatory and so forth, and some of the aggravating features are 
therefore included in the crime definitions. Genocide, for example, has discriminatory 
animus as a crime element and extermination (as a crime against humanity) mass 
victimization.1923 
International jurisprudence establishes that if a certain factor already has 
been taken into account when the offence gravity has been considered, it cannot be 
considered again as an aggravating circumstance.1924 Genocide and persecution, which 
have a discriminatory intent as a crime element, cannot hence be aggravated due to 
discrimination, but they may be aggravated by the especially brutal way of committing 
the crimes.1925 The war crime of torture, on the other hand, is generally1926 not aggravated 
by the fact that crime is committed in a heinous way, but may be aggravated if the 
offender has acted with discriminatory intent.1927 War crimes can also, for example, be 
aggravated if they are committed in a systematic manner or as part of an organisational 
framework.1928 The aggravating circumstances can hence entail that factors that are crime 
elements in connection to particular crimes become legally relevant in connection to all 
crimes, and as such diminish the differences between offences. The difference between 
genocide with numerous victims and extermination committed with discriminatory 
intent is, for example, not that great with regard to the legally relevant factors that affect 
the outcome in the case. It should be noted that the prohibition of double-counting does 
not prevent the consideration of a factor when the factor is present in a manner that 
“exceeds” the requirements for a conviction. For example, the huge number of victims 
has in certain extermination cases been considered in aggravation.1929 Likewise, the 
1922 E.g., Sloane 2007(b), at 722-723, and Dana 2004, at 343.
1923 Regarding extermination, see e.g., Semanza, Judgement, TC, ICTR, 15 May 2003, para. 571. In 
connection to the crime of detention, the fact that the victims are vulnerable and at the detention holder’s 
mercy is likewise inherent to the crime. The Appeals Chamber in the Limaj et al. case therefore found 
that the Trial Chamber had not erred when it did not consider the vulnerability of the detainees as an 
aggravating factor. It instead considered it when assessing the gravity of the crime. Limaj et al., Judgement, 
AC, ICTY, 27 September 2007, para. 142.
1924 E.g. Vasiljević, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 25 February 2004, paras 172-173, Ntakirutimana & Ntakirutimana, 
Judgement, TC, ICTR, 21 February 2003, para. 893, and Lubanga, Decision (sentencing), TC, ICC, 10 July 
2012, para. 78. 
1925 E.g., Kayishema & Ruzindana, Judgement, AC, ICTR, 1 June 2001, para. 350 (where the way in which 
the victim was killed in a genocide case was considered in aggravation).
1926 To what extent a factor de facto is considered as a crime element is not always clear. In the Vasiljević 
Appeal Judgement, the Appeals Chamber, e.g., found that even though the mental suffering of the victims 
is an element of the crime of inhumane acts, a trial chamber is allowed to consider the “long term effect 
of the trauma” as an aggravating factor, if it considers it suitable. Vasiljević, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 25 
February 2004, paras 163 and 167.
1927 On discriminatory intent as an aggravating factor, see e.g., Vasiljević, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 25 
February 2004, para. 173. Likewise, humiliation suffered by the victims cannot generally be considered 
in aggravation when the underlying offences are “humiliating and degrading treatment”. Češić, Judgement 
(sentencing), TC, ICTY, 11 March 2004, para. 53. 
1928 Hadžihasanović & Kubura, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 22 April 2008, para. 352. 
1929 E.g., Ndindabahizi, Judgement, AC, ICTR, 16 January 2007, para. 135, and Nyiramasuhuko et al., 
Judgement, TC, ICTR, 24 June 2011, para.  6195. 
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long-term effect of trauma can aggravate inhumane acts, where mental suffering is a 
prerequisite for conviction.1930 It should also be emphasized that the prohibition against 
double-counting may pose special challenges in cumulatively charged cases. In the Češić 
case, the Trial Chamber, in this regard, made the following analysis:
[T]he Appeals Chamber has recently deemed that, when the same criminal conduct 
is cumulatively charged under two separate counts, a factor taken into account as 
an element of the crime under one count does not prevent its being considered as 
an aggravating factor under the other count for the determination of the sentence. 
In the present case, humiliation is clearly an element of the crime of humiliating 
and degrading treatment, as a violation of the laws or customs of war, while it is not 
explicitly an element of the crime of rape. However, it is uncontested that rape is 
an inherently humiliating offence and that humiliation is always taken into account 
when appreciating the inherent gravity of this crime. The distinction between the 
crimes thus lies in the emphasis placed on this particular aspect of the offence. 
The crime of humiliating and degrading treatment clearly places emphasis on the 
humiliation caused to the victims. Consequently, the Trial Chamber would not 
normally treat very serious humiliation as an aggravating circumstance in the context 
of this particular crime but would rather consider it in appreciating the gravity of 
the crime. By contrast, the crime of rape, although inherently humiliating, places 
emphasis on the violation of the physical and moral integrity of the victim. Under 
these circumstances, exacerbated humiliation may be considered in aggravation of 
this crime. [...] Applied to this case, the Trial Chamber finds that the humiliation 
suffered by the victims was exacerbated both because they were brothers and because 
guards were present, watching and laughing. [...] However, it should be kept in mind 
that there is no fixed standard in evaluating the totality of an accused’s criminal 
conduct. While determining the appropriate sentence in this particular case, the Trial 
Chamber will not consider exacerbated humiliation twice, i.e. once as an element of 
a violation of the laws or customs of war and once as an aggravating factor in the 
context of the conviction for a crime against humanity. Rather, it will only impose 
one single sentence and eventually consider the degree of humiliation only once in 
the final evaluation.1931
The analysis of the Trial Chamber stresses that what distinguishes international crimes 
from each other sometimes is where the emphasis is put, rather than what is legally 
relevant (either as a conviction or sentencing factor).  
In the case law of the ad hoc tribunals, there have furthermore been some additional, 
occasionally accepted aggravating factors. In the Gatete case, it was, for example, found 
that the fact that the crimes were committed in places that are “universally recognised [...] 
as sanctuaries”, such as parishes, could be considered in aggravation.1932 This aggravating 
factor reflects the fact that in armed conflicts even the most sacrosanct places can be 
attacked. In the Ndindiliyimana et al. case, on the other hand, it was found legally relevant 
who the victims were. More specifically, the Trial Chamber held that: “The killings 
of the Prime Minister, a figurehead of the Rwandan government, and the UNAMIR 
peacekeepers, international representatives ensuring adherence to the Arusha Accords, 
1930 Vasilijević, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 25 February 2004, para. 167.
1931 Češić, Judgement (sentencing), TC, ICTY, 11 March 2004, paras 53-54.
1932 Gatete, Judgement, TC, ICTR, 31 March 2011, para. 679.
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carried particular symbolic weight and removed impediments to the genocide and other 
crimes that ultimately occurred.”1933 The Trial Chamber also found it aggravating that the 
peacekeepers had been “sent to Rwanda by the UN Security Council under its Chapter 
VI peacekeeping authority.1934 In the Vasilijević case, the Appeals Chamber held that it 
lies within the discretion of the Trial Chamber to regard verbal abuse in connection to 
the execution of the crimes as an aggravating factor.1935 
In some cases the chambers have, however, not clearly ruled on the aggravating 
effect of particular facts. For example, in the Stakić case the question was at the appeal 
stage raised whether the fact that a crime is a white collar crime should aggravate 
the sentence. No ruling was made on this, as the Appeals Chamber found that the 
Trial Chamber had not made this argument.1936 It has also been asked whether State 
involvement in the criminality should be considered in aggravation. In the Gacumbitsi 
case, the prosecutor, for example, argued that the fact that Gacumbitsi had used “the 
police, armed, uniformed, and responsible for public security” to launch attacks should 
have been regarded as “extremely aggravating.” The Appeals Chamber did, however, not 
find a discernible error as the Trial Chamber had taken into account Gacumbitsi’s “abuse 
of his powers as bourgmestre, of which his use of the police was merely a part.”1937 In fact, 
it appears that State involvement in the criminality in international sentencing generally 
has been taken into account as an aggravating factor relating to the offender, that is, by 
regarding abuse of power as an aggravating factor. The collective nature of international 
criminality has similarly been considered indirectly, that is, by taking into account at 
sentencing the hierarchical position of the individual in the collective. A controversial 
question has been whether the effects of the crimes on indirect victims may be taken into 
consideration at sentencing.1938  
The ICC has not yet developed a significant case law on aggravating factors. In the 
Lubanga case, it was, however, put forward that crimes not charged by the prosecutor 
could affect the sentence: (a) if the Trial Chamber was satisfied beyond reasonable 
doubt that the crimes had taken place; and (b) if the crimes where attributable to the 
1933 Ndindiliyimana et al., Judgement, TC, ICTR, 17 May 2011, para. 2257 [UNAMIR = United Nations 
Assistance Mission for Rwanda].
1934 Ndindiliyimana et al., Judgement, TC, ICTR, 17 May 2011, para. 2257.
1935 Vasilijević, Judgement, AC, ICTY, ICTY, 25 February 2004, para. 161. In the Vasilijević case, the Trial 
Chamber furthermore considered in aggravation the fact that one of the victimized individuals was well 
known to the accused. Vasiljević, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 29 November 2002, para. 279.
1936 Stakić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 22 March 2006, para. 426.
1937 Gacumbitsi, Judgement, AC, ICTR, 7 July 2006, paras 189-191. 
1938 Krnojelac, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 17 September 2003, para. 260 (‘the case-law of some domestic courts 
shows that a trial chamber may still take into account the impact of a crime on a victim’s relatives when 
determining the appropriate punishment. The Appeals Chamber considers that, even where no blood 
relationships have been established, a trier of fact would be right to presume that the accused knew that his 
victim did not live cut off from the world but had established bonds with others.’). Cf. however, Kunarac 
et al., Judgement, TC, ICTY, 22 February 2001, para. 852 (‘The Trial Chamber is unable to accept that 
a so-called in personam evaluation of the gravity of the crime could or should also concern the effect 
of that crime on third persons [...]. Such effects are irrelevant to the culpability of the offender, and it 
would be unfair to consider such effects in determining the sentence to be imposed. Consideration of the 
consequences of a crime upon the victim who is directly injured by it is, however, always relevant to the 
sentencing of the offender.’)
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convicted person.1939 The majority of the Trial Chamber, however, held that the in this 
way suggested sexual violence against the children could not be attributed to Lubanga 
“in a way that reflects his culpability.”1940 
9.2.4.3.  Aggravating Factors Relating to the Offender 
Sloane has in his analysis of the ICTR sentencing practice found that because more 
or less all crimes that the tribunal has prosecuted has been so extremely serious, the 
“adjustments to and individualization of the sentence virtually all take place at the level 
of ‘individual circumstances’.”1941 Individual circumstances are considered both: (a) in 
connection to the gravity of the offence; and (b) in relation to aggravating and mitigating 
factors. If a particular factor has been considered when assessing offence gravity, it 
cannot be considered again as an aggravating or mitigating factor.1942
The elements of the mode of responsibility are conviction determinants and they 
are as such factors that should be evaluated when the gravity of the offence is assessed. 
In connection to modes of responsibility, it is, however, noteworthy that the ad hoc 
tribunals have found that modes of participation for which a person not is convicted 
for may aggravate the offence (for example, planning and ordering when the person is 
convicted for having committed the crime, or superior responsibility when the person 
is convicted based on Articles 7(1) ICTY respectively 6(1) ICTR). The rationale for 
this is according to the ICTY Appeals Chamber both the contribution to the crime the 
additional modes of participation entail as well as the enhanced moral culpability of 
the offender.1943  
The most significant aggravating factor relating to the offender has, in international 
case law, been abuse of superior, prominent and/or official position.1944 The position of 
power does not have to be a superior-subordinate relationship as in connection to 
superior responsibility. Mere influence/authority may entail a position of power or 
trust, in which abuse can be considered at sentencing.1945 The type of position, however, 
1939 Lubanga, Decision (sentencing), TC, ICC, 10 July 2012, paras 67-69.
1940 Lubanga, Decision (sentencing), TC, ICC, 10 July 2012, para. 74. See also the dissenting opinion of 
Judge Odio Benito. Lubanga, Decision (sentencing, diss. op. of Judge Odio Benito), TC, ICC, 10 July 2012, 
paras 21-22. 
1941 Sloane 2007(b), at 722. 
1942 E.g., Stakić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 22 March 2006, para. 413.
1943 Stakić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 22 March 2006, para. 413. See also e.g., Ndindiliyimana et al., Judgement, 
TC, ICTR, 17 May 2011, para. 2253. In connection to this it is, however, significant that general procedural 
requirements for aggravating facts are that they have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Delalić 
et al., Judgement, AC, ICTY, 20 February 2001, para. 763, and Kajelijeli, Judgement, AC, ICTR, 23 May 
2005, para. 294. Some ICTR case law also suggests that aggravating factors should have been pleaded in 
the indictment. Nyiramasuhuko et al., Judgement, TC, ICTR, 24 June 2011, para.  6193. ICTY appears to 
have chosen another approach in some cases. E.g., Kupreškić et al., Judgement, AC, ICTY, 23 October 2001, 
para. 376, and Stakić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 22 March 2006, para. 423. 
1944 E.g., Aleksovski, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 24 March 2000, para. 183, and Blaškić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 
29 July 2004, para. 686. 
1945 E.g., Ntawukulilyayo, Judgement, TC, ICTR, 3 August 2010, para. 472, and Rukundu, Judgement, AC, 
ICTR, 20 October 2010, para. 250. 
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affects what can be expected and required from the person in question.1946 The abuse of 
power may consist of acts (active) or omissions (passive).1947 In the Stakić case, it was, for 
example, considered as aggravating that “the Appellant was unwilling to help individuals 
in need notwithstanding the fact that he had the power to do so”1948 Furthermore, abuse 
of previous positions of authority may constitute an aggravating factor if the person uses 
the “influence he derived from such a position to lend encouragement and approval to 
the commission of crimes.”1949 In the case law, it has been stressed that it is the abuse 
of power and not the position per se which may aggravate sentences.1950 This has been 
found to entail that aggravation due to abuse of authority is also possible in connection 
to modes of responsibility where superior position is a prerequisite (ordering, superior 
responsibility).1951 In those cases, for example, the high-level superior position of an 
individual may be taken into account.1952 Furthermore, active and direct participation in 
combination with a superior position may function in aggravation.1953 
Authority may attach to certain public functions. As noted by the ICTY in the Mrđa 
Sentencing Judgement: 
The Trial Chamber deems that committing a crime while exercising a public 
function – such as that of a policeman – may be considered as an aggravating factor. 
A policeman is vested with authority and a duty to uphold law and order. Civilians 
subjected to his authority are entitled to expect that a person of his role will abide 
by this duty. If the policeman commits a crime in the exercise of his function, the 
1946 E.g., in the Milošević case, the Trial Chamber observed that: “the Accused was the Commander of the 
SRK [= Sarajevo Romanija Corps], the corps that conducted a protracted campaign of sniping and shelling of 
civilians, civilian areas and the civilian population of Sarajevo. [...] The Accused had a special responsibility 
to uphold the standards of international humanitarian law. The Trial Chamber considers that the Accused’s 
position as commander of the SRK obligated him to prevent the commission of crimes and to ensure that the 
troops under his command conducted themselves with respect for international humanitarian law. However, 
the evidence presented to the Trial Chamber shows that the Accused abused his position and that he, through 
his orders, planned and ordered gross and systematic violations of international humanitarian law.” Milošević, 
Judgement, TC, ICTY, 12 December 2007, para. 999.
1947 Aggravation due to lack of action to prevent crimes, e.g., Musema, Judgement, TC, ICTR, 27 January 2000, 
para. 1003. See, however, the Ndindabahizi case, where the Appeals Chamber noted that: “The Appellant has 
not demonstrated that the first two aggravating circumstances identified by the Trial Chamber are in fact the 
same aggravating circumstance. [...] the important element in the first aggravating circumstance is the abuse 
of trust. This differs from the second aggravating circumstance, in which the Trial Chamber considered [...] 
the fact that, instead of promoting peace and reconciliation as would be the duty of a Minister, the Appellant 
supported and advocated a policy of genocide [...].” Ndindabahizi, Judgement, AC, ICTR, 16 January 2007, 
para. 134. Lack of preventive action may also evidence abuse of position. 
1948 Stakić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 22 March 2006, para. 420.
1949 Haradinaj et al., Judgement, AC, ICTY, 19 July 2010, para. 327. 
1950 E.g., Babić, Judgement (sentencing), AC, ICTY, 18 July 2005, para. 80. 
1951 E.g., Kayishema & Ruzindana, Judgement, AC, ICTR, 1 June 2001, para. 358, and Milošević, Judgement, 
AC, ICTY, 12 November 2009, paras 302-303. Judge Liu, however, dissented in the Milošević case as he 
found that “abuse of a position of authority is inherent to the mode of liability of ordering.” Milošević, 
Judgement (partly diss. op. of Judge Liu), AC, ICTY, 12 November 2009, para. 30.
1952 Galić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 30 November 2006, para. 412 (‘While the mode of liability of ordering necessarily 
entails that the person giving the order has a position of authority, the level of authority may still play a role in 
sentencing as it is not an element of the mode of liability of “ordering” that an accused is high in the chain of 
command and thus wields a high level of authority. [...]’).
1953 E.g., Blaškić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 29 July 2004, para. 686. 
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breach of public duty and legitimate expectations attaching to his function should be 
considered as an aggravating factor.1954
More generally, the ICTY has, however, held that professions (for example, priest or doctor) 
per se should not be considered in aggravation.1955 In some ICTR cases, it has, however, 
been found that occupation can be relevant at sentencing.1956 There is, furthermore, some 
case law suggesting that character in general may be considered in aggravation,1957 and 
more specifically intelligence and good education. In some cases, it has namely been 
put forward that it is especially egregious that highly educated, intelligent people who 
previously have been respectable citizens have engaged in the criminality.1958 Likewise 
the ICC in the Lubanga case held that Mr. Lubanga’s intelligence and high education 
entailed that he had a “marked level of awareness”, which it considered relevant at 
sentencing.1959 That “certain people” engage in criminality has hence been found to be 
especially blameworthy. The approach of the ad hoc tribunals regarding character at 
sentencing is, however, inconsistent. D’Ascoli has observed that while good character in 
the sense “innate character of the accused” often has been viewed as a mitigating factor, 
character in the more objective sense (educational and professional background) has 
sometimes been considered in aggravation.1960  
Taken into consideration that many international crimes are committed by members 
of collectives, an interesting question is to what extent membership in an organization 
may aggravate the sentence. For example in Finland, the commission of an offence as 
“member of a group organised for serious offences” is a possible ground to increase the 
1954 Mrđa, Judgement (sentencing), TC, ICTY, 31 March 2004, para. 51. Mrđa was, however, a low-
ranking police officer and as such the Trial Chamber only gave his public function a limited weight as an 
aggravating factor. Ibid., paras 53-54.
1955 See further e.g., Simić et al., Judgement, AC, ICTY, 28 November 2006, para. 274, and Stakić, Judgement, 
AC, ICTY, 22 March 2006, para. 416. See also Simić et al., Judgement, TC, ICTY, 17 October 2003, para 
1084 (‘The Trial Chamber agrees with the Prosecution that the fact that Blagoje Simić is intelligent, 
educated and a member of the medical profession constitute an aggravating circumstance.’) This finding 
was not upheld at appeals. Simić et al., Judgement, AC, ICTY, 28 November 2006, paras 270-274.
1956 In connection to G. Ntakirutimana, the Trial Chamber, e.g., held that: “It is particularly egregious that, 
as a medical doctor, he took lives instead of saving them.” Ntakirutimana & Ntakirutimana, Judgement, 
TC, ICTR, 21 February 2003, para. 910. In the Seromba case, the Trial Chamber noted that Seromba’s 
“training as a priest and his experience within the church should have enabled him to understand the 
reprehensible nature of his conduct during the events.” Seromba, Judgement, TC, ICTR, 13 December 
2006, para. 385. 
1957 E.g., Blaškić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 29 July 2004, para. 686.
1958 E.g., Brđanin, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 1 September 2004, para. 1114, and Hategekimana, Judgement, TC, 
ICTR, 6 December 2010, para. 744. See further D’Ascoli 2011, at 159-162. Intelligence and good education 
can, however, also be considered in mitigation (as factors that indicate potential for rehabilitation). E.g., 
Hadžihasanović & Kubura, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 22 April 2008, paras 325 and 328.
1959 Lubanga, Decision (sentencing), TC, ICC, 10 July 2012, paras 55-56. 
1960 D’Ascoli 2011, at 190. A factor that should be considered is, e.g., what is understood by character. Also 
the connection to related concepts, such as reputation, should be clarified. (Brennan has made a distinction 
between character and reputation. According to him, character refers to a “generalized description of a person’s 
disposition or a general trait of that person’s disposition” whereas reputation is a “community’s [collective] 
estimation of a person’s character.” L. C. Brennan, ‘Admissibility of Character Evidence in Illinois Criminal Cases’, 
DCBA Brief (2010), at 38.)
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punishment.1961 The rationale behind this provision is the society’s need to protect itself 
against organized crime.1962 Even though membership in a criminal group/organization 
could be a rational ground to aggravate punishments in international criminal law, such 
membership has not been considered. To have such an aggravating factor could namely 
be problematic in situations where the offender has participated in the criminal activities 
of the group due to peer pressure and/or group discipline.1963 This emphasizes that the 
typical features of international criminality and the corresponding sentencing factors 
may have a double nature: they can speak for both aggravation and mitigation. 
Besides aggravating factors that relate to the offender’s societal position, there are 
aggravating factors that are connected to the offender’s state of mind. Two important 
such ones are discriminatory intent and premeditation.1964 For example, in the Stakić case, 
it was found that a long phase of planning and preparation (indication premeditation) 
is a possible aggravating factor.1965 Premeditation has been found to increase culpability 
in that it reflects an especially intense criminal will.1966 Aggravating factors relating to 
the offender’s state of mind are, however, not limited to blameworthy intentions. In 
culpability evaluations, consideration can be given to the actor’s freedom of choice (for 
example, duress), to what extent the actor has been the one who has initiated the criminal 
behaviour (for example, superior orders), and to what extent the actor has desired to 
commit the crime. Also reprehensible motives may hence be considered in aggravation. 
An actor who has acted with zeal/enthusiasm, in revenge or with biased motives 
may hence receive a harsher sentence.1967 When sentencing Hazim Delić, an ICTY 
Trial Chamber, for example, considered in aggravation that he had “a general sadistic 
motivation” and “was driven by feelings of revenge against people of Serb ethnicity”.1968 
9.2.5.  Mitigating Factors
9.2.5.1.  Introduction
Buchanan notes that the Latin verb mitigare refers to making gentler and that there in 
criminal law are two reasons to mitigate sanctions. The punishment can be mitigated 
1961 Criminal Code of Finland, Chapter 6, Section 5. 
1962 Governmental Bill No. 44/2002 (Finland), at 191-192. In the Governmental Bills preceding the 
regulation some criteria for applying the provision are identified. It is put forward that the group should 
be tightly organized and be characterized by a division of tasks and superior-subordinate relationships. 
Groups engaged in human trafficking and money laundering are mentioned as examples. It is explicitly 
noted that youth groups engaged in, e.g., stealing and vandalism are not organized in the sense required 
by the law. There must also be a connection between the activities of the organized group and the crime in 
question. Ibid. See also Governmental Bill No. 125/1975 II (Finland).
1963 Governmental Bill No. 44/2002 (Finland), at 192. 
1964 E.g., Blaškić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 29 July 2004, para. 686.  
1965 Stakić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 22 March 2006, para. 423. To its nature, this is an aggravating factor 
similar to premeditation.
1966 Governmental Bill No. 44/2002 (Finland), at 191.
1967 E.g., Blaškić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 29 July 2004, para. 686. See also D’Ascoli 2011, at 150-151. In the 
Popović et al. case, the Trial Chamber, however, found that if one with willingness understands voluntariness 
it is not an aggravating factor, but a necessary component of the crimes. Popović et al., Judgement, TC, 
ICTY, 10 June 2010, para. 2154. 
1968 Delalić et al., Judgement, TC, ICTY, 16 November 1998, para. 1269.
328
because the law is seen as too severe and/or to obtain a “better fit between the punishment 
on the on hand, and the individual and the circumstances of his offence on the other.”1969 
Some mitigating factors directly relate to the crime that has been committed (for example, 
superior orders). Many mitigating factors, however, are connected to the accused person’s 
behaviour after the crime has been committed (for example, voluntary surrender, guilty 
plea and remorse)1970 or to the offender as a person (for example, age, diminished mental 
capacity and family situation).1971 Through the various mitigating factors it is possible to 
show mercy or compassion, and to give recognition to human frailty. Mitigation may, 
however, also be justified with reduced culpability. Furthermore, mitigating factors may 
have more practical rationales, such as to save the resources of the judiciary.1972 In this 
study, only mitigating factors that have direct connection to the committed crimes will 
be considered. 
9.2.5.2.  Mitigating Factors Relating to the Offence
Duress, superior orders, just cause underlying the criminal behaviour, indirect 
participation and chaotic context of crime commission are examples of factors relating 
to the offence that have been suggested to constitute mitigating factors in international 
criminal law. Of these, duress is relevant for culpability evaluations in that it indicates 
that the offender has not desired to commit the crime for which he/she is responsible. As 
noted in the previous Chapter, it is disputed whether duress can function as a complete 
defence in international criminal law. Uncontested is, however, that duress can be 
considered in mitigation of punishment. In the Erdemović case, the ICTY, for example, 
denied the exculpating effect of duress, but accepted duress as a mitigating factor and 
sentenced Erdemović to a five year imprisonment sentence for having killed 70-100 
people.1973 This judgement indicates that duress is a mitigating factor that can have a 
significant impact on the sentence. 
The statutes of the ad hoc tribunals also explicitly establish that the “fact that an 
accused person acted pursuant to an order of a government or of a superior [...] may be 
considered in mitigation of punishment if [...] justice so requires.”1974 In the Limaj et al. 
case, the fact that Bala “was acting under orders from a higher authority” was therefore 
1969 A. Buchanan, Psychiatric Aspects of Justification, Excuse and Mitigation in Anglo-American Criminal 
Law (London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 2000), 43. 
1970 “Two groups of considerations relate to the offender himself. The first concerns his character. In 
some instances, the courts take into account those aspects of this character which can be inferred from 
the circumstances surrounding his being apprehended and tried. [...] The other group of considerations 
relating to the offender concerns the likely effects of a sentence upon him.” Buchanan 2000, at 48.
1971 It should, however, be noted that it in an empirical study on sentencing has been observed that 
the most commonly applied mitigating factors before ICTY has been surrender, good conduct during 
detention/proceedings, family status. As other often applied mitigating factors are mentioned first-time 
offending, remorse, co-operation with the office of the prosecutor. D’Ascoli 2011, at 251. Many of the 
popular mitigating factors are hence procedural in nature.  
1972 This is the case with, e.g., substantial cooperation with the prosecutor.
1973 Erdemović, Judgement (sentencing), TC, ICTY, 5 March 1998. See also Rutaganira, Judgement, TC, 
ICTR, 14 March 2005, paras 161 and 162.
1974 Article 7(4), ICTY Statute, and Article 6(4), ICTR Statute. 
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considered.1975 In practice, superior orders and duress can coincide, and for superior 
orders to have a significant mitigating effect some level of compulsion appears to be 
necessary. In the Bagosora et al. case, the Trial Chamber did not, for example, grant 
mitigation even though it recognized that Nsengiyumva and Ntabakuze “were at times 
following superior orders”. Instead, the Trial Chamber found that their own senior status, 
the repeated execution of the crimes, and the manifestly unlawful nature of the orders 
rather reflected acquiescence in committing the crimes.1976 
In some case law, it has, furthermore, been considered whether the fact that the 
accused person has not himself/herself initiated the criminal behaviour or/and has 
participated reluctantly is legally relevant. The Krstić Trial Chamber, for example, found 
this distinction relevant.1977 Likewise, the Delalić et al. Trial Chamber considered that 
“if the accused is found to have committed the offence charged reluctantly and under 
the influence of group pressure and, in addition, demonstrated compassion towards 
the victim or the group to which the victim belongs, these are certainly mitigating 
factors which the Trial Chamber will take into consideration in the determination of 
the appropriate sentence.”1978 As will be elaborated to a greater extent below, societal or 
peer pressure to engage in criminality has, however, not generally been considered in 
mitigation in international criminal law.1979
It is interesting that while non-desire to commit the crimes sometimes has been 
considered as legally relevant, it has also been asked whether a particular desire to commit 
the crimes could function in mitigation. More specifically, it has been suggested that 
political or ideological motives behind the criminality could (justify or)1980 mitigate it. In 
the Kordić & Čerkez case, the ICTY when discussing the role of affirmative prevention at 
sentencing, however, emphasized that “people have to understand that international law 
is applicable to everybody, in particular during times of war” and that it is unfortunate 
that “many perpetrators believe that violations of binding international norms can be 
lawfully committed, because they are fighting for a “just cause”.”1981 The SCSL case law 
has not generally been considered in this study, but in relation to just cause arguments 
at sentencing the Appeals Chamber of the SCSL has made an interesting finding. In 
the Fofana and Kondewa case, a majority of the Appeals Chamber namely held that to 
take into account political motives behind the action would undermine the bedrock 
principle of international humanitarian law (that is, that the applicability of the jus in 
bello is not connected to the jus ad bellum) and be inconsistent with sentencing purposes 
1975 Limaj et al., Judgement, TC, ICTY, 30 November 2005, para. 727 (however, when assessing the gravity 
of the offence). See also Limaj et al., Judgement, AC, ICTY, 27 September 2007, para. 133. 
1976 Bagosora et al., Judgement, TC, ICTR, 18 December 2008, para. 2274.
1977 Krstić, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 2 August 2001, para. 711. 
1978 Delalić et al., Judgement, TC, ICTY, 16 November 1998, para. 1235. See also High Command, Judgment, 
CCL, 27 October 1948, at 563 (‘We believe that there is much to be said for the defendant von Leeb by 
way of mitigation. He was not a friend or follower of the Nazi Party or its ideology. [...] It is not without 
significance that no criminal order has been introduced in evidence which bears his signature or the stamp 
of his approval.’) 
1979 E.g., Bralo, Judgement (sentencing), AC, ICTY, 2 April 2007, para. 13. 
1980 See further Section 8.3.7. 
1981 Kordić & Čerkez, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 17 December 2004, para. 1082. 
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(such as prevention).1982 This SCSL ruling was adopted as a response to a Trial Chamber 
judgement, in which it was found that the fact that the two convicted persons had acted 
“in defence of constitutionality” was a mitigating factor.1983 While the ICTY and the 
SCSL case law hence indicates that political or ideological motives behind action is not 
to be considered in mitigation, the ICTR case law on the topic is more ambiguous. In the 
Simba case, the Appeals Chamber namely found that the Trial Chamber had not made 
a finding that “motive was itself a separate mitigating factor”, but that Prosecution had 
“not demonstrated that the Trial Chamber erroneously considered in mitigation that the 
Appellant ‘might have acted out of patriotism and government allegiance rather than 
extremism or ethnic hatred.’”1984 Likewise in the Ntawukulilyayo case, a Trial Chamber 
found it legally significant that Ntawukulilyayo’s “participation in the killings may have 
resulted from external pressures to demonstrate his allegiance to the government rather 
than from extremism or ethnic hatred.”1985
An interesting question in connection to international criminal law is also to what 
extent the situation in which the crime is committed can be considered in mitigation. In 
some domestic legal systems, provocation, for example, is recognized as a mitigating 
factor.1986 As noted in connection to defences, self-defence can function as a justification, 
whereas tu quoque arguments have not been accepted in modern international criminal 
law. Also at the sentencing stage, the approach of international criminal law is negative 
towards tu quoque arguments.1987 In legal systems where provocation is accepted in 
mitigation, a difference is sometimes made between immediate reactions to acts by 
others (provocation) and prolonged reactions to acts by others (revenge), and whereas 
provocation can mitigate punishment revenge can aggravate it.1988 Also in international 
criminal law, it has sometimes been suggested that the fact that a person is acting in 
revenge can aggravate the sentence.1989 More often, it has, however, been put forward that 
the societal contexts in which international crimes occur are characterized by high levels 
of animosity between individuals and groups, and that these criminogenic environments 
could be considered in mitigation. In the post-World War II Hostages Case, it was, in 
this regard, suggested that provocation could be considered in mitigation as a “matter 
of grace.”1990
International criminal law, there has been some cases where the chambers have 
given legal relevance to the contexts in which the crimes have occurred. For example, 
when evaluating the criminal behaviour of Mr. Mucić, the Trial Chamber found 
1982 Fofana & Kondewa, Judgement, AC, SCSL, 28 May 2008, paras 530-534. 
1983 Fofana & Kondewa, Judgement (sentencing), TC, SCSL, 9 October 2007, paras 78-80 and 86. 
1984 Simba, Judgement, AC, ICTR, 27 November 2007, para. 330.
1985 Ntawukulilyayo, Judgement, TC, ICTR, 3 August 2010, para. 474.
1986 E.g., in Finland where the Criminal Code of Finland, Chapter 6, Section 6 stipulates: “The following are 
grounds for reducing the punishment: [...] (2) [...] an exceptional and sudden temptation that has led to the 
offence, the exceptionally great contribution of the injured party or a corresponding circumstance that has 
been conducive to decreasing the capability of the perpetrator to conform to the law [...]”. 
1987 E.g., Galić, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 5 December 2003, para. 765 (‘The behaviour of the other party, 
however is not an excuse for the deliberate targeting of civilians and, as such, does not alleviate the 
responsibility of the Accused.’)
1988 Governmental Bill 44/2002 (Finland), at 196. 
1989 Delalić et al., Judgement, TC, ICTY, 16 November 1998, para. 1269.
1990 Hostage, Judgment, CCL, 19 February 1948, at 1317. 
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that: “It is relevant, and crucial, to take into account the circumstances in which the 
events occurred as well as the social pressures and hostile environment within which 
the accused was operating.”1991 The same Trial Chamber also found in relation to Mr. 
Landžo that “the harsh environment of the armed conflict as a whole, and the events 
in the Konjic municipality in particular must also be considered.”1992 This being said, 
the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY has, however, not found it appropriate to consider 
the context of war in mitigation. In the Blaškić case, the Appeals Chamber, for example, 
argued that it “sees neither merit nor logic in recognising the mere context of war itself 
as a factor to be considered in the mitigation of the criminal conduct of its participants” 
and that a “finding that a “chaotic” context might be considered as a mitigating factor in 
circumstances of combat operations risks mitigating the criminal conduct of all personnel 
in a war zone.”1993 Likewise in the Bralo case, an ICTY Trial Chamber found that even 
though there had been “enormous pressures” and justifiable fears due to breakdown of 
community relations, the contexts per se do not mitigate the crimes committed. The 
Trial Chamber noted that “[l]arge sections of the population of Vitez municipality, and 
indeed of many parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, were subjected to the same or similar 
pressures, and yet did not respond in the same manner as Bralo.”1994 The Trial Chamber 
in the Krajišnik case gave a very limited weight in mitigation to “the history of the conflict 
and [...] the growing inter-ethnic tensions preceding it”, but the Appeals Chamber did 
not support this finding.1995 
Besides various reasons behind the criminality, it has been put forward that the 
type of participation also could be considered in mitigation. The question of limited/
indirect/insignificant participation is, however, generally considered when the gravity 
of the offence is assessed. It has, however, also sometimes been taken into account as a 
mitigating factor.1996 For example, in the Krstić case, the Appeals Chamber noted that 
the accused was “was present in and around the Potočari compound [...] for at most two 
hours, a period which, the Appeals Chamber finds, is sufficiently brief so as to justify a 
1991 Delalić et al., Judgement, TC, ICTY, 16 November 1998, para. 1248 (see also para. 1245).
1992 Delalić et al., Judgement, TC, ICTY, 16 November 1998, paras 1283-1284. See also e.g., Rugambarara, 
Judgement (sentencing), TC, ICTR, 16 November 2007, para. 47, and Kayishema & Ruzindana, Sentence, 
TC, ICTR, 21 May 1999, paras 21-22. 
1993 Blaškić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 29 July 2004, para. 711. See also Blaškić, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 3 March 
2000, para. 770 (‘Nonetheless, the Trial Chamber brings out the explanations given by Tihomir Blaškić 
whilst testifying to the disorganisation of the armed forces due, essentially, to the lack of experienced troops 
and the want of proper training and suitable materiel. It also observes the crimes allegedly committed by 
the other party and the difficulty of controlling the spontaneous reactions of some Croats. Nonetheless, 
even were they verified, these allegations are still not such as to constitute an excuse for a commander such 
as Tihomir Blaškić – a fortiori once it has been established as in this instance that the accused acted in 
accordance with a discriminatory policy which he deliberately implemented. The Trial Chamber finds the 
accused guilty of crimes against humanity and thereby excludes the possibility of disorder ensuing from 
an armed conflict constituting a mitigating circumstance.’)
1994 Bralo, Judgement (sentencing), TC, ICTY, 7 December 2005, paras 51-52. See also Bralo, Judgement 
(sentencing), AC, ICTY, 2 April 2007, paras 13-14.
1995 Krajišnik, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 27 September 2006, paras 1167-1168, and Krajišnik, Judgement, AC, 
ICTY, 17 March 2009, paras 794-795 and 816. 
1996 See further e.g., Babić, Judgement (sentencing), AC, ICTY, 18 July 2005, para. 39. 
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mitigation of sentence.”1997 Likewise in the Ruggiu case, the Trial Chamber found it to be a 
mitigating factor that Ruggiu had not personally participated in the genocidal killings.1998 
In the Strugar case, the Appeals Chamber, however, held that indirect participation 
should not be regarded as a mitigating factor in relation to superior responsibility, as the 
failure to act in that responsibility form is the relevant culpable conduct.1999
9.2.5.3.  Mitigating Factors Relating to the Offender
Possible mitigating factors relating to the offender include young age, inexperience 
and good character.2000 In the Delalić et al. case, an ICTY Trial Chamber noted that 
the convicted person’s “immature and impressionable state of mind” especially in the 
combination with abnormal societal situations can be taken into consideration. In 
that case, the casualties of the armed conflict included persons close to the convicted 
person.2001 Likewise, in the Ruggiu case, the ICTR noted that the accused was “a 
European with a moderate level of education” and that “the accused was not sufficiently 
knowledgeable to be able to make informed assessments of the situation” when he was 
“indoctrinated by a biased picture of the socio-political situation in Rwanda.”2002 These 
pronouncements indicate that even though abnormal societal situations do not per 
se constitute mitigating factors, they can do so in combination with personal factors. 
Some individuals can hence be considered as “victims of the chaos of war” due to 
their personal characteristics. To be a victim of the chaos of war, however, also seems 
to demand that the participation in itself does not indicate enthusiasm. In the Lukić 
and Lukić case, Milan Lukić stressed that he had no previous criminal record and 
referred to the chaotic circumstances of war, but the Trial Chamber found that the 
“circumstances of the crimes he committed and the attitude with which he carried out 
these crimes show that [..., he] was not a victim of the “chaos” of war, as [... he] submits, 
but rather an opportunist who took advantage of an environment in which he could 
commit crimes against Muslims with impunity.”2003
Mitigating factors relating to the offender are also previous good character and 
efforts to help victims (in relation to other crime incidents). Both of these mitigating 
factors have been considered in a number of ICTY and ICTR cases.2004 The mitigating 
1997 Krstić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 19 April 2004, para. 273. In the Gacumbitsi case, the Prosecutor 
challenged the argument that the short duration of active involvement in crimes should be taken into 
account as a mitigating factor. In that case, the Trial Chamber had, however, not considered duration in 
mitigation. Gacumbitsi, Judgement, AC, ICTR, 7 July 2006, para. 199.
1998 Ruggiu, Judgement, TC, ICTR, 1 June 2000, paras 77-79. 
1999 Strugar, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 17 July 2008, para. 381. 
2000 E.g., Blaškić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 29 July 2004, para. 696, and Hadžihasanović & Kubura, Judgement, 
AC, ICTY, 22 April 2008, para. 332 (regarding lack of training for a particular position). 
2001 Delalić et al., Judgement, TC, ICTY, 16 November 1998, para. 1284.
2002 Ruggiu, Judgement, TC, ICTR, 1 June 2000, paras 62-63. 
2003 Lukić & Lukić, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 20 July 2009, para. 1076. 
2004 See further J. Galbraith, ‘The Good Deeds of International Criminal Defendants’, 25 Leiden Journal 
of International Law (2012), at 799-813. See also M. Drumbl, ‘LJIL Symposium Vol 25-3: Good Deeds 
of International Defendants: Grace, Goodness, Greed: Saving While Killing’, Opinio Juris [blog], 10 
October 2012, and M. deGuzman, ‘LJIL Symposium Vol 25-3: Good Deeds of International Defendants: A 
Comment by Margaret deGuzman’, Opinio Juris [blog], 10 October 2012.
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effect of previous good moral character has, however, generally been low.2005 As regards 
efforts to help victims or hindering others from committing crimes, for example, in the 
Sikirica et al. case, the Trial Chamber at sentencing took into account that the accused 
persons had tried to ease the situation of the detainees at the Keraterm camp.2006 In 
Blagojević and Jokić case, the Appeals Chamber, however, noted that “[m]ere compliance 
with the law is not ordinarily a factor in assessing an accused’s good character” but 
that “a Trial Chamber, in the exercise of its discretion, may credit an accused for [...] 
preventing the commission of crimes.”2007 From the point of view of the phenomenology 
of international crimes this ruling is significant. To prevent others from committing 
crimes may namely require special courage. 
Finally, subordinate position may be considered in mitigation. However, if the 
insignificant role played by the convicted person has been taken into account when 
assessing the gravity of the crime disallowed double-counting may occur.2008 This 
mitigating factor can be connected to that of following orders. For example, in the Boškoski 
and Tarčulovski case, Tarčulovski argued that he just was carrying out directives by the 
Government of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The Appeals Chamber held 
that the Trial Chamber had not disregarded this, as it had considered his junior role.2009 
If the offender’s intoxication is not accepted as a defence, it is theoretically possible 
to consider it as a mitigating factor, especially if the offender has been forced or pushed 
into intoxication or addiction.2010 The present author is, however, not aware of any 
international case law where intoxication would have been successfully claimed as a 
mitigating factor.  
9.3.  Analysis
9.3.1.  Sentencing Factors and Their Relationship to the Crime Definitions, the 
Modes of Participation and Defences 
It is generally submitted that the crime definitions and modes of responsibility should 
settle the general framework for what is criminal behaviour, whereas defences and 
sentencing factors should allow for exceptions to the main rules and adaptation to 
individual situations. This being said, the question of where a particular factor should 
be legally considered is not always evident. As noted in the previous Chapter regarding 
the relationship between offences and defences, it is, for example, possible to either: (a) 
define crimes strictly and to allow very few exceptions; or (b) to establish broad crime 
2005 E.g., Nahimana et al., Judgement, AC, ICTR, 28 November 2007, para. 1069. In certain cases, one may 
identify a contradiction between the crimes committed by the individuals and the characterizations given 
by the chambers of them. E.g., Sagahutu was by a ICTR Trial Chamber characterized as a “disciplined 
officer who was one of the best commanders in the Army and was brave, valiant, trustworthy, courageous, 
respectful, kind and not prejudiced” at the same time as it convicted him to a 20 years’ imprisonment 
sentence for serious crimes. Ndindiliyimana et al., Judgement, TC, ICTR, 17 May 2011, para. 2260.
2006 Sikirica et al., Judgement (sentencing), TC, ICTY, 13 November 2001, paras 195 and 229.
2007 Blagojević & Jokić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 9 May 2007, para. 342.
2008 Limaj et al., Judgement, AC, ICTY, 27 September 2007, para. 143. 
2009 Boškoski & Tarčulovski, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 19 May 2010, paras 214 and 216. 
2010 Cf. Schabas 2008(b), at 623-624. 
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definitions and to allow numerous exceptions. Many different types of legal solutions 
are therefore often possible within the paradigm of criminal law. The legal systems of 
the world also vary in the extent to which evaluations of blameworthiness are made at 
the conviction respectively sentencing stage. In some legal systems, a difference is at 
the conviction stage between aggravated, ordinary and petty war crimes, which entails 
that already at the conviction stage must rather specific evaluation of blameworthiness 
be made.2011 In international criminal law, in contrast, blameworthiness evaluations are 
mostly left to sentencing stage, as the minimum and maximum penalties for all crimes 
and all modes of participation are the same in law. The restrictive attitude to justifications 
and excuses in international criminal law has further enhanced the need to make 
blameworthiness evaluations at the sentencing stage.2012
The wide range of factors that can be considered in mitigation raises the question 
of how these sentencing factors affect the censuring function of criminal law. Some find 
that they do not, as mitigation “only relates to sentencing”.2013 Some mitigating factors, 
however, have an excusatory nature and a clear connection to excuses.2014 It is, for 
example, a central sentencing question whether war crimes are “just ‘inevitable’ or in 
some way ‘excusable’ as the necessary cost of a war”?2015 In the same way as excuses, 
mitigating factors can reflect societal perceptions of what behaviour is considered as 
such that should be met with mercy and/or understanding. The lenient punishment in 
the Erdemović duress case, for example, sent strong signals of mercy and understanding. 
In a similar way, aggravating factors can express societal disapproval. As such, legal 
evaluations about blameworthiness done at the sentencing stage should not be 
disregarded as irrelevant from a censuring perspective.
The possibility to at the sentencing stage give legal relevance to factors that at the 
conviction stage have been disregarded raises the question of whether this, in fact, is 
done. As noted in Chapter 6, State involvement in the criminality and the existence 
of a policy behind the criminality are examples of factors that have been found to be 
phenomenologically typical for international crimes, but which have not found their 
way to the customary international law criminalizations of war crimes, crimes against 
humanity and genocide.2016 In connection to these typical features of the criminality, 
the sentencing stage, in fact, makes it possible to give them legal relevance. In many 
cases, the typical features are, however, already to some extent considered at conviction. 
Due to the fact that the sentencing-factors are not crime-specific they may, however, 
2011 E.g., The Criminal Code of Finland, Chapter 11, Sections 5-7.  
2012 A very lenient punishment for a very serious crime is, however, not completely equivalent to an 
acquittal, most notably due to the stigmatizing effect of a conviction.
2013 E.g., Kambanda, Judgement, TC, ICTR, 4 September 1998, para. 56 (‘The Trial Chamber holds the view 
that a finding of mitigating circumstances relates to assessment of sentence and in no way derogates from 
the gravity of the crime. It mitigates punishment, not the crime.’) 
2014 Rule 145, ICC RPE in this regard, refers to “circumstances falling short of constituting grounds for 
exclusion of criminal responsibility.”
2015 F. Harhoff, ‘Sense and Sensibility in Sentencing – Taking Stock of International Criminal Punishment,’ 
in O. Engdahl & P. Wrange (eds.), Law at War: The Law as It Was and the Law as It Should Be (Leiden: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008), at 133. 
2016 The question of the policy elements legal status is, however, contested in connection to genocide and 
crimes against humanity. See further Chapter 6. 
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broaden the legal relevance of certain typical features. Discriminatory intent is, for 
example, not merely relevant in connection to genocide and persecution, but becomes 
relevant in connection to all international crimes. It is also important to note that at 
the sentencing stage the strict distinction between specific intentions and motives 
disappears. At sentencing, both discriminatory intent and discriminatory motives may 
be legally relevant. 
As regards the relationship between defences and sentencing factors, it is possible 
to identify different types of relationships. Sometimes the law on defences and the law on 
mitigating factors both clearly reject particular claims as legally irrelevant (for example 
tu quoque arguments). Other times, on the other hand, what is rejected as a defence may 
be utmost significant at sentencing (for example, duress).2017 In these latter situations, 
sentencing law is used to “complement” the law relevant for conviction. 
The legal choice made when placing a factor as a conviction determinant or as a 
sentencing determinant is significant in that different positionings send different signals. 
In criminal law, the focus is on the conviction determinants and there the labelling 
effect of the law is the strongest. In international criminal law, a central consideration 
has been to establish absolute minimum standards for behaviour, and there has been a 
reluctance to allow exceptions to the rules. At the conviction level, international criminal 
law has therefore been unwilling to show mercy. The reality of international criminality 
is, however, complex, and this is to a greater extent recognized at the sentencing stage. 
At that stage, it is, for example, possible to differentiate between those who eagerly take 
part in the crimes and those whose participation is characterized by reluctance. At the 
sentencing stage, international criminal law also makes many important distinctions 
between different types of actors in collective criminality.  
In addition to the differences as regards the censuring force, the placing of a factor 
merely as a sentencing factor has practical implications. Firstly, it may have consequences 
for the evidentiary standards and the onus of proof.2018 Secondly, the sentencing stage 
is a trial phase that in many jurisdictions is characterized by the fact that judges have 
considerable discretion.2019 If a certain factor is a crime element or a requirement to 
establish a certain mode of participation, this is something that the judges must take 
into consideration in their legal assessments. At the sentencing stage, the legally relevant 
factors are, however, generally so many more that the use of discretion becomes possible. 
Due to the number of available sentencing determinants Norrie has, in fact, argued 
2017 The close relationship between excuses and mitigation factors is sometimes explicitly recognized in 
the law. In the ICC RPE, it is referred to “circumstances falling short of constituting grounds for exclusion 
of criminal responsibility” as mitigating factors (Rule 145). The Criminal Code of Finland, on its part, 
stipulates that the sentence should be “determined in accordance with a mitigated penal latitude if [...] the 
offence has been committed in circumstances that closely resemble those that lead to the application of 
grounds for exemption from liability [...].” Criminal Code of Finland, Chapter 6, Section 8(1). 
2018 E.g., Cryer et al. 2010, at 500 (noting that the Prosecutor must establish aggravating factors beyond 
a reasonable doubt, whereas it is enough that the defence proves mitigating factors on a balance of 
probabilities).
2019 The legal systems in the world vary to what extent sentencing criteria are discretionary or regulated. 
When the sentencing criteria are regulated and become factors that the judges must take into account, the 
discretion of the individual judges diminishes. Even with specific sentencing guidelines, some discretion 
is, however, often left to the judges.   
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that “when we come to the sentencing stage of the criminal process, [...] the rules and 
principles of the criminal law largely evaporate and the system becomes much more 
discretionary and less regulated by law.”2020
At the sentencing stage, the judges must take into account both offence gravity 
and factors in aggravation and mitigation. The difference between the different types of 
factors should, in principle, be clear,2021 but in practice it appears that the chambers have 
often made overall assessments of blameworthiness and the different types of sentencing 
factors have not been distinguished from each other. Certain factors have hence been 
placed in some judgements as factors that affect gravity of the offence and in others 
as aggravating/mitigating factors. The Appeals Chambers of the ad hoc tribunals have 
generally not found the different placings to be problematic.2022 The central consideration 
has been that the same fact is not double-counted by giving it legal relevance at multiple 
stages. The majority in the ICTR Simba Appeal Judgement, however, criticized the 
Trial Chamber for evaluating whether the convicted person had acted with zeal and 
sadism when considering offence gravity mainly because zeal and sadism were not 
crime elements of genocide.2023 Motives should hence generally be taken into account as 
aggravating or as mitigating factors.2024  
It should also be noted that it, in practice, sometimes has turned out to be difficult to 
determine whether a certain fact already has been accounted for. A question where case 
law has been inconsistent is most notably abuse of superior position as an aggravating 
factor and modes of responsibility that prerequisite a superior position (superior 
responsibility and ordering) and where a conviction hence already indicates abuse of 
power. In some cases, it has been suggested that abuse of superior position may not 
be considered as an aggravating factor in these cases,2025 but in other cases the special 
aggravating effect of abuse of power has been accepted.2026 It may hence be difficult to 
define the “facts” which double-counting should be avoided. In the Milošević case, the 
prosecutor furthermore argued that it is allowed to rely on different aspects of the same 
fact at sentencing, but the Appeals Chamber did not accept this argument.2027
In summary, it may be concluded that in international criminal law many central 
blameworthiness evaluations are made at the sentencing stage and that the legal regulation 
2020 Norrie 2001, at 200.
2021 Cf. Vasiljević, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 25 February 2004, para. 157 (‘The Appeals Chamber notes that 
the method and circumstances surrounding a killing are factors which normally would be taken into 
account in a Trial Chamber’s consideration of the “inherent gravity” of the offence.’)
2022 E.g., Vasiljević, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 25 February 2004, para. 157, Deronjić, Judgement (sentencing), 
AC, ICTY, 20 July 2005, paras 106-107, Simba, Judgement (partly diss. op. of Judge Liu), AC, ICTR, 27 
November 2007, and Krajišnik, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 17 March 2009, paras 751 and 787 (‘The Appeals 
Chamber is of the view that, while a Trial Chamber should strive to distinguish between the gravity of the 
criminal conduct and the aggravating circumstances, it might be difficult or artificial to separate the two 
in some cases.’) 
2023 Simba, Judgement, AC, ICTR, 27 November 2007, para. 320. 
2024 E.g., Blaškić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 29 July 2004, para. 694.  
2025 E.g., Naletilić & Martinović, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 3 May 2006, paras 613 and 626, Hadžihasanović & 
Kubura, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 22 April 2008, para. 320, and Milošević, Judgement (partly diss. op. of Judge 
Liu), AC, ICTY, 12 November 2009, para. 30.  
2026 Milošević, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 12 November 2009, paras 302-303. 
2027 Milošević, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 12 November 2009, para. 309. 
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of the procedural stage is much more relax than the regulation of the conviction stage. 
This raises the question of whether blameworthiness evaluations in international criminal 
law to a higher degree should be done in the law regulating convictions, for example, by 
creating a hierarchy between the crimes or by adopting aggravated respectively petty 
forms of the crimes. 
9.3.2.  Should There Be a Hierarchy Between the International Crimes? 
The question of whether there is or should be a hierarchy between the various international 
crimes has been much debated. Many legal scholars have also suggested rankings. In these 
rankings, genocide is often found to be the most serious crime, followed by crimes against 
humanity and war crimes.2028 The focus in then often put on the chapeau elements, such 
as genocidal intent (genocide)2029 or the fact that the crime is characterized by collective 
victimization and group criminality (crimes against humanity).2030 Sloane has, however, 
noted that while international crimes have elements that enhance culpability, they also 
have characteristics that diminish culpability. More specifically, he points out that the 
international crimes, such as genocide, which “resemble bias crimes under national law 
and produce comparable secondary harms that render the same act more culpable” at 
the same time have a “collective character and authority of the perpetrator” which diffuse 
moral responsibility and accordingly culpability.2031 Some other scholars have therefore 
found that the focus is gravity assessments should be put on the underlying offence or the 
harm de facto caused. Harmon and Gaynor have, for example, held that: “Common sense 
would dictate that a person who has murdered 200 victims should spend much longer in 
prison than a person who has murdered two victims, regardless of whether the murders 
are characterized as crimes against humanity, genocide or war crimes.”2032 In attempts to 
rank underlying offences, it is, however, not only the harm de facto caused that has been 
central. Persecution has, for example, often been regarded as a particularly serious crime 
due to its requirement of discriminatory intent.2033
On a general level, it has been put forward that when the in abstracto blameworthiness 
of different crimes is considered there are two central considerations: the harmfulness 
of the crime and its dangerousness.2034 It has also been stressed that the harmfulness 
and dangerousness should be estimated in relationship to the interests one aims at 
2028 The position given to the crime of aggression varies, but e.g., the Nuremberg Tribunal categorized 
crimes against peace as the “supreme international crime” containing “within itself the accumulated evil of 
the whole.” Göring et al., Judgment, IMT, 1 October 1946, at 186. 
2029 Cassese has in this regard found that the “viciousness” of the international crimes go “far beyond 
the underlying offence”. A. Cassese, ‘Crimes against Humanity’, in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta & J.R.W.D. Jones 
(eds.), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary, Volume I (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002), at 363. 
2030 Marston Danner 2001, at 474.
2031 Sloane 2007(a), at 59. Marston Danner, on her part, stresses the collective perpetration as a factor that 
generally entails more large-scale victimization. Marston Danner 2001, at 470-471.
2032 Harmon & Gaynor 2007, at 696-697. 
2033 E.g., Todorović, Judgement (sentencing), TC, ICTY, 31 July 2001, paras 32 and 57, Blaškić, Judgement, 
TC, ICTY, 3 March 2000, para. 785, and Stakić, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 31 July 2003, para. 907. 
2034 Governmental Bill 44/2002 (Finland), at 187.
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protecting.2035 Taking into account the criminalization technique used in relation to the 
international crimes (that is, the fact that all international crimes can be committed in 
various different ways and hence protect many different types of interests), it is, however, 
extremely difficult to rank the crimes in abstracto.2036 How should one, for example, 
evaluate the comparative harmfulness of the genocidal murder of 50 persons and the 
war crime of raping of 1,500 women?2037 This being said, there are, however, situations 
where the criminal behaviour of an accused person and hence the factual situation 
(for example, the killing of 1,000 persons) fulfils the crime elements of several crimes 
simultaneously. In these situations, the question of whether there is an in abstracto 
hierarchy between the various international crimes is more relevant. It is, in fact, in 
these situations that most scholars would say that genocide is the most serious crime 
(due to the genocidal intent requirement) followed by crimes against humanity (due 
to the requirement that the crimes form part of an attack against a civilian population) 
and war crimes.2038 Before the ICC, where there is a jurisdictional requirement that the 
Court should focus on war crimes as part of a plan or policy or in the context of a large-
scale, the hierarchical relationship between crimes against humanity and war crimes is, 
however, not as evident. 2039
While a hierarchy between the international crimes to some extent could clarify 
international evaluations of blameworthiness, a strict hierarchy between the crimes may, 
however, be problematic from a labelling perspective. As has been noted earlier in this 
study, it is common in connection to international criminality that the same factual events 
allow alternative convictions. The current system of a non-hierarchy makes it possible 
for the prosecutor to freely charge the offender with the crime label that according to 
him/her best describes the criminal behaviour (and for the judge to judge). If the crimes 
would be in a strict hierarchy, the prosecutor could be tempted to (or pushed towards) 
prosecuting the crimes as the crime with the harshest in abstracto gravity. Already today 
– without an established hierarchy – have there been pushes towards using crime labels 
that are perceived to have a high stigmatizing effect. Feminist scholars have, for example, 
emphasized the need to prosecute sexual violence as “jus cogens violations” (such as 
2035 Governmental Bill 44/2002 (Finland), at 187.
2036 Cf. Tadić, Judgement (sentencing, sep. op. of Judge Cassese), AC, ICTY, 26 January 2000, para. 3 
(‘Firstly, international criminal rules, being still at a rudimentary stage of development, do not provide for 
offences that are specific and well-defined. They do not describe in detail an individual class of conduct 
(say, murder, or the destruction of private property, or rape). Rather, they contemplate broad categories of 
disparate offences. In effect, they normally envisage a cluster of prohibited offences that are diverse both 
in nature and gravity. [...]’)
2037 In the Furundžija case, it was suggested that crimes resulting in loss of life should be punished more 
severely. The Appeals Chamber, however, refused to make categorizations of the underlying offences in the 
abstract. Furundžija, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 21 July 2000, paras 244 and 249-250. 
2038 Marston Danner has found that the “judges sentencing defendants convicted of violations of 
international law should consider the elements of the chapeau in evaluating the harm caused by the 
defendants’ acts.” Marston Danner 2001, at 420. While it is true that the ad hoc tribunals have not wanted 
to establish a formal hierarchy between the crimes, it is, however, not true that the tribunals have not 
considered the chapeau elements at all in sentencing.
2039 M. M. El Zeidy, ‘The Gravity Threshold under the Statute of the International Criminal Court’, 19 
Criminal Law Forum (2008), at 39 and 41. 
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torture and genocide) to stress the serious nature of sexual violence.2040 In the al-Bashir 
case before the ICC, one can question whether not the genocide charges were primarily 
put forward for communicative purposes.2041      
9.3.3.  The Hierarchy Established in Connection to the Various Modes of 
Responsibility and Pushes towards Using Particular Responsibility Forms 
In domestic criminal law, it is generally the individual who physically and intentionally 
produces harm who is found to be the most blameworthy. As has been noted before in 
this study, the nature of international criminality challenges this ab initio presumption. 
A distant negligent leader who omits to fulfil his/her duties (or who tolerates crimes by 
his/her subordinates)2042 can de facto cause much more harm than his/her intentionally 
acting subordinate. Or as Werle has put it, “the degree of criminal responsibility does 
not diminish as distance from the actual act increases”.2043 From this perspective, it is 
interesting that international criminal law has adopted a rather conventional hierarchy 
as regards the modes of responsibility. In the same way as in most domestic legal systems, 
perpetrator responsibility reflects the highest degree of responsibility, and aiding and 
abetting responsibility indicates a lower degree of responsibility. International criminal 
law has, however, to some extent defined perpetrator responsibility differently than is 
usual in domestic legal systems.2044 
2040 E.g., K. D. Askin, ‘Prosecuting Wartime Rape and Other Gender-Related Crimes under International 
Law: Extraordinary Advances, Enduring Obstacles’, 21 Berkeley Journal of International Law (2003), at 
346-349. 
2041 In this regard, it is noteworthy that the ICC Prosecutor has not chosen to charge Al Bashir’s special 
representative in Darfur with genocide. W. A. Schabas, ‘Has the Prosecutor Changed His Mind About 
Genocide in Darfur?’, PhD Studies in Human Rights [blog], 4 March 2012 (‘Why isn’t Bashir’s Special 
Representative also charged with genocide? The Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court 
require that the acts constituting genocide take place ‘in the context of a manifest pattern of similar conduct 
directed against that group or was conduct that could itself effect such destruction’. Does it make sense that 
Bashir’s acts occurred ‘in the context of a manifest pattern of similar conduct directed against that group 
or was conduct that could itself effect such destruction’ but that those of his deputy did not? If Hussein was 
in on the ‘common plan’, does this mean that the Prosecutor does not think there was a common plan to 
perpetrate genocide, and that this was some private, individual obsession of President Bashir that he did 
not share with his henchmen. The inconsistency in the Prosecutor’s approach is difficult to understand.’)
2042 See Triffterer who stresses the difference between tolerating the commission of international crimes and 
superior responsibility by noting that tolerating can be given a broad interpretation including responsibility 
for mere omissions and negligence. Triffterer 2002, at 183. Triffterer makes his arguments in relation to 
the 1968 Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations for War Crimes and Crimes against 
Humanity, Article II, which stipulates that statutory limitations should not apply to State authorities who 
tolerate the commission of the crimes. More specifically, Article II provides that: “If any of the crimes 
mentioned in article I is committed, the provisions of this Convention shall apply to representatives of the 
State authority and private individuals who, as principals or accomplices, participate in or who directly 
incite others to the commission of any of those crimes, or who conspire to commit them, irrespective of 
the degree of completion, and to representatives of the State authority who tolerate their commission.”
2043 Werle 2009(b), at 166. 
2044 See further Section 7.2.4. 
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When analyzing the “semi-hierarchy” established between the various modes of 
responsibility in international criminal law,2045 it is noteworthy that categorization of 
blameworthiness in international criminal law is logical or “traditional” as regards how 
demanding the subjective elements are, that is, it follows the differentiation between 
intentional, reckless and negligent behaviour that is common in domestic legal systems. 
The only exception in this regard is JCE III responsibility as a form of perpetrator 
responsibility. As regards the objective side (viz. the connection to the harm produced 
and the degree of participation),  it can, however, not be said that the demands are 
the greatest regarding perpetrator responsibility, intermediate regarding aiding and 
abetting responsibility and least demanding regarding superior responsibility.2046 In 
relation to JCE responsibility, for example, no requirement of substantial participation 
has been accepted.2047 This has been found contradictory in that the main rationale 
for characterizing all forms of JCE as perpetrator responsibility is that an individual 
through his/her participation in a criminal plan “contributes to the creation of a wider 
criminogenic factor with a specific dynamic [...].”2048 Ambos has, in connection to this, 
found that it is odd that it is enough that the enterprise perpetrator performs acts that 
in some way are directed to further the common purpose, whereas the aider and abettor 
must perform substantial acts that are specifically directed to assist the perpetration 
of the crime. According to Ambos this “turns the traditional distinction between co-
perpetration and aiding and abetting (the distinction as to the weight of the contribution, 
which must be more substantial in the case of co-perpetration) on its head.”2049 The ad 
hoc tribunals have neither accepted the idea that direct participation always should be 
regarded as more blameworthy than indirect participation.2050 In relation to this, Dana 
has noted that while “terms such as “direct participation” are sufficient in ordinary 
criminal proceedings at the domestic level, they are somewhat bankrupt in international 
criminal law when seeking to substantiate and justify punishment [...].”2051
The characterization of perpetrator responsibility as the most blameworthy form 
of responsibility has, in practice, entailed that there in international criminal law is a 
push towards finding the leaders responsible as perpetrators. The semi-hierarchy, in 
combination with the fact that similar hierarchies exist in many domestic legal systems, 
namely entails that it would send wrong signals to convict the leaders as “mere” aiders 
and abettors. This push towards perpetrator responsibility has especially concerned 
the most high-level actors.2052 Judge Liu has criticized this broadening of perpetrator 
responsibility by noting that when ordering, instigating, and aiding and abetting may be 
2045 See further Section 9.2.3.
2046 Cf. Haan 2005, at 194-197. In relation to superior responsibility, the objective requirement of effective 
control has, however, been construed strictly. This has prompted Osiel to argue that the ICTY has made it 
too hard to find people liable under superior responsibility and too easy to hold them liable as enterprise 
participants. Osiel 2005(b), at 793-794.
2047 See further Section 7.2.4.3. 
2048 Chouliaras 2010, at 575. 
2049 Ambos 2007(a), at 171. 
2050 E.g., Stakić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 22 March 2006, para. 380. 
2051 Dana 2004, at 339. 
2052 Cf. some mid-level leaders who have been convicted for the superior responsibility and who have 
received rather light penalties. Harhoff 2008, at 136. 
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classified as “committing” the distinctions envisaged by Article 6(1) in the ICTR Statute 
become redundant, and the question “whether the overall conduct of the accused should 
be “elevated” to commission” becomes unfortunately central.2053 From a fair labelling 
perspective, it is indeed problematic if a particular form of responsibility is used merely 
to ensure that the person is punished severely enough and not because this responsibility 
form best describes the criminal behaviour of the person. 
It is also worth noting that the mode of responsibility and sentencing law may 
mismatch from another perspective. Some legal scholars have namely found that there 
has been a tension between judgements regarding guilt (portraying the role of the 
convicted person as purely accessorial) and sentencing judgements (portraying the role 
of the sentenced person as central) in some recent cases which have resulted in long 
prison sentences.2054 For example, Heller has, regarding the Charles Taylor conviction 
(by the SCSL) held that: 
I should add, for the record, that my problems with the sentence are unrelated to 
my personal view of Taylor’s culpability. Having followed the trial relatively closely 
for the past few years, I think the Trial Chamber’s judgment understates − perhaps 
seriously − Taylor’s responsibility for the AFRC [=Armed Forces Revolutionary 
Council] and RUF’s [=Revolutionary United Front] crimes. In particular, although 
I agree with the Trial Chamber’s rejection of ordering and command responsibility, 
I would have had no problem convicting Taylor for many of the charged crimes via 
JCE. My problem with the sentence is that, although the Trial Chamber refused to 
convict Taylor on the basis of JCE or ordering, it has imposed a sentence that seems 
to require viewing Taylor as much more than an aider and abettor.2055 
The accurate portrayal of the participation of high-level actors in international crimes 
can indeed be difficult. The harsh sentences handed down to some aiders and abettors 
before international criminal tribunals indicate that the mode of responsibility is not 
always a crucial sentencing factor in international sentencing. 
Finally, it is interesting that a mode of participation for which a person is not 
convicted may function in aggravation at the sentencing stage (for example, planning 
or ordering when the person is convicted for having committed the crime).2056 From a 
labelling perspective this is significant, as it gives the possibility to legally recognize the 
multiple ways an individual has participated in a crime. In practice, it is likely that it 
will be more high-level offenders’ criminal conduct that is aggravated in this way, as it is 
usually these offenders who play multiple roles in the crimes. 
9.3.4.  The Especially Blameworthy High-Level Leaders 
The ICTR Appeals Chamber has recently held that it is a “well-established principle 
of gradation in sentencing” that “leaders and planners should bear heavier criminal 
2053 Munyakazi, Judgement (sep. op. of Judge Liu), AC, ICTR, 28 September 2011, para. 3.
2054 J. D. Ohlin, ‘Sentencing at the Top’, Lieber Code [blog], 5 June 2012, discussing the Charles Taylor 
sentencing judgement by the SCSL (50 years imprisonment) and the Hosni Mubarak conviction (life 
imprisonment).  
2055 K. J. Heller, ‘Taylor Sentenced to 50 Years Imprisonment’, Opinio Juris [blog], 30 May 2012. 
2056 E.g., Stakić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 22 March 2006, para. 413. 
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responsibility than those further down the scale, subject to the proviso that the gravity of 
the offence is the primary consideration [...] in imposing a sentence.”2057 In international 
criminal law, there are indeed many different types of mechanisms geared towards 
emphasizing the role played by superiors in connection to that criminality: prosecutorial 
policies focusing on leaders, responsibility modes such as perpetration through control 
over a hierarchical apparatus of power, etc. At the sentencing stage, it is especially the 
tendency to prosecute and convict leaders as perpetrators, the aggravation of punishment 
due to abuse of power, and the stressing of the role played by leaders when assessing the 
gravity of the offence that entail that leaders often are punished harsher than followers. 
Furthermore, when different sentencing factors are balanced with each other, the high-
level position of the accused is often regarded as one of the most significant sentencing 
factor. In the Blaškić case, the Trial Chamber, for example, held that “command position 
is more of an aggravating circumstance than direct participation.”2058 The focus on the 
leaders is also increased by the possibility to take into account the insignificant role 
played by low-level offenders as a mitigating factor.
This approach to leaders respectively followers prompts the question exactly what 
it is that justifies the harsher penalties to the leaders and the more lenient sentences to 
the followers. Firstly, regarding harm, leaders can generally as individuals cause more 
harm than the rank-and-file participants.2059 In this regard, ICTY has held that the 
“consequences of a person’s acts are necessarily more serious if he is at the apex of a 
military or political hierarchy and uses his position to commit crimes.”2060 High-level 
actors may have the resources of a full-fledged army or an entire nation to carry out 
their criminal efforts.2061 Secondly, the criminal behaviour of leaders usually causes more 
danger than the criminal behaviour of low-level actors. Through control over societal 
institutions and mass media they may exercise propaganda, order crimes, etc. High-level 
actors may even be responsible for creating the criminogenic environment (for example, 
the violent military culture or the totalitarian regime) in which the crimes occur. Thirdly, 
it can also be argued that due to the leaders’ powers, it makes sense to require more 
law-abiding and prudent behaviour from them, that is, to evaluate blameworthiness 
differently. Leaders may hence have “particular responsibilities” towards certain people 
or even an entire population.2062 Fourthly, and most controversially, it may be asked 
whether leaders generally act with greater culpability than their followers. In this regard, 
it is sometimes submitted that whereas leaders often act non-coerced and with knowledge 
of the “overall situation”, low-level actors often are pushed into the criminality and lack 
knowledge of the “big picture”. 
The present author is not aware of any detailed analysis of the “lesser culpability of 
followers” argument in connection to international criminality. In connection to juvenile 
offenders, these types of arguments have, however, been considered. Lesser culpability 
claims often come in two different forms: “(1) a cognitive claim, that juveniles have less 
2057 Kanyarukiga, Judgement, AC, ICTR, 8 May 2012, para. 280. 
2058 Blaškić, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 3 March 2000, paras 790-791. 
2059 Sloane 2007(a), at 60. 
2060 Krstić, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 2 August 2001, para. 709.
2061 Krstić, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 2 August 2001, para. 708.
2062 Simić et al., Judgement, TC, ICTY, 17 October 2003, para. 1082.
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capacity to assess and appreciate the harmful consequences of their criminal actions”; 
and “(2) a claim concerning volitional controls, that they have had less opportunity to 
develop impulse control and resist peer pressure to offend.”2063 Theories suggesting lesser 
understanding can, however, often be criticized with reference to numerous examples 
suggesting that the juvenile offenders for sure have understood what they have done (at 
least with regard to elderly juveniles).  Also in connection to international criminality, 
theories suggesting that low-level offenders cannot reckon the criminal nature of the 
behaviour can generally be questioned. A more relevant question is therefore whether 
it can be made volitional arguments about difficulties to resist pressure to offend. Von 
Hirsh and Ashworth have in this regard found that: “To make a case that an offender 
is less culpable for his crime would seem to require that almost anyone in his situation 
would find it extraordinarily difficult to desist – that compliance would be a matter of 
heroism or something akin to it.”2064 In connection to juvenile offenders, von Hirsch 
and Ashworth therefore suggest compassion or tolerance as grounds for scaling down 
punishments for juveniles.2065 Also in connection to international criminality, compliance 
with the law does not generally require heroism, even though situations of real duress 
occur in connection to that criminality. As the present author sees it, lesser punishments 
for low-level actors should therefore generally be based on the lesser harm and danger 
they cause. Also the idea that leaders should have special responsibilities in high-crime-
risk contexts (such as armed conflicts) is supported by the present author, as long as it 
is clearly settled what these special responsibilities are. At the sentencing stage, there is 
more room to focus on the idea of dangerous individuals than at the conviction stage that 
primarily focuses on deviant acts.2066 The claim that high-level actors generally would act 
with greater culpability is, however, questionable. 
Not all, however, think that high-level actors automatically should receive harsh 
sentences. Podgor has, for example, suggested that there in criminal law in general is a 
lack of sympathy for white collar criminals, which is reflected in very severe penalties for 
that type of offenders.2067 In connection to international sentencing, there is indeed also 
a risk that too much blame is put on the leaders due to the multiple mechanisms geared 
towards emphasizing the role played by them. The criminological research indicating 
that people have a tendency to obey authorities has in this regard been highly influential, 
and has reinforced the idea that the leaders are those who should receive the harshest 
penalties. As noted in connection to the criminology of international crimes, very little 
research has, however, been conducted on factors that might explain why high-level 
actors engage in international criminality. There might therefore exist factors that could 
be considered in mitigation at sentencing (such as, peer pressure and the chaotic context 
of war). The image of the leaders conveyed by international criminal law is generally that 
2063 von Hirsch & Ashworth 2005, at 36. 
2064 von Hirsch & Ashworth 2005, at 68.
2065 von Hirsch & Ashworth 2005, at 45. 
2066 Cf. “The major alternative to character theories of punishment are act-based theories. Instead of 
premising punishment on underlying character – on who the criminal is – act theory instead focuses 
on the criminal action – what the offender does.” E. N. Yankah, ‘Good Guys and Bad Guys: Punishing 
Character, Equality and the Irrelevance of Moral Character to Criminal Punishment,’ 25 Cardozo Law 
Review (2004), at 1053-1054. 
2067 Podgor 2007, at 732-733 and 740. 
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they are smart calculating people who master their environment. The idea of careless and 
ignorant high-level actors seems to be strange for international criminal law. The same 
is true for high-level actors who follow orders. The ICTR has, however, been faced with 
this scenario and addressed it by noting that: 
The Chamber is aware that Nsengiyumva and Ntabakuze were at times following 
superior orders in executing their crimes, which is a mitigating factor under [...] the 
Statute. However, given their own senior status and stature in the Rwandan army, the 
Chamber is convinced that their repeated execution of these crimes as well as the 
manifestly unlawful nature of any orders they received to perpetrate them reflects 
their acquiescence in committing them. No mitigation is therefore warranted on this 
ground.2068
The leaders’ criminal behaviour is simply too harmful and too dangerous to be met with 
understanding and mercy.2069 A similar restrictive attitude towards accepting mitigating 
factors in connection to leaders was expressed by ICTY in the Krajišnik case: 
Good conduct contemporaneous to the crimes may serve as a mitigating factor when 
the convicted person had taken steps to save lives or alleviate the suffering of the 
victims. The Chamber may mitigate a sentence where the convicted person provided 
selective assistance to the victims or persons of the same ethnicity as the victims, 
even though his or her actions had little practical effect. The mitigating effect is less, 
however, where the convicted person is shown to have been in a position to take steps 
to control or prevent all acts of violence. In such case, sporadic benevolent acts or 
ineffective assistance may be disregarded.2070
From a more empirical perspective, it may be noted that high-level actors de facto generally 
have received harsh sentences by the ad hoc tribunals.2071 Mid-level actors, on the other 
hand, have often been sentenced more leniently.2072 From the empirical perspective, 
it is furthermore noteworthy that many low-level actors have been convicted to long 
prison sentences. This has been explained by prosecutorial decisions, that is, the fact that 
those low-level actors who have been prosecuted often have been those who have shown 
special cruelty and sadism in their criminality.2073 While the cases that are prosecuted 
and which eventually lead to convictions are affected by prosecutorial decisions and does 
not necessarily reflect international criminality as a whole, it is from a phenomenological 
perspective still interesting that international case law  appears to reinforce the idea 
that there are three common types of international criminals: (1) vicious political and 
military leaders who mastermind the international crimes; (2) passive/bureaucratic mid-
level actors who fail to hinder their criminal subordinates from committing crimes; and 
(3) sadistic and cruel low-level actors. 
2068 Bagosora et al., Judgement, TC, ICTR, 18 December 2008, para. 2274.
2069 Cf. “A parent repeatedly batters an infant child because the child cries. We see from where the impetus 
to batter arises, but we simply cannot grant any sympathetic validity to the act arising out of the impetus.” 
Darley 1992, at 201. 
2070 Krajišnik, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 27 September 2006, para. 1162.
2071 D’Ascoli 2011, at 235-237. 
2072 As noted above, many mid-level superiors have received rather lenient punishments by the ad hoc 
tribunals. E.g., Harhoff 2008, at 135, and Hola, Bijleveld & Smeulers 2011, at 753.  
2073 Harhoff 2008, at 136. 
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9.3.5.  Criminogenic Crime Commission Contexts and Sentencing 
That individuals in position of authority may prompt other individuals to engage in 
international criminality is hence clearly recognized at international sentencing. This 
raises the question to what extent the push to engage in the criminality that peer pressure 
(or collective criminality) entails also is recognized in the law. Or more generally, 
the context of action that in connection to international criminality often is highly 
criminogenic. In this regard, it has been put forward that ethically speaking erroneous 
belief resulting from the lies of others should be given a considerable mitigating effect 
when considering blameworthiness.2074 Fletcher, on his part, asks how an individual can 
be blamed for violence his/her “culture” said was right.2075 
Some legal scholars have pointed out that it at the sentencing stage is possible 
to give legal recognition to criminogenic crime commission contexts, and that the 
sentencing stage in this regard differs from the conviction stage. For example, Norrie 
has held that: 
For conviction, the individual is regarded as a free, juridical individual, unhindered 
by his or her personal or social conditions. In relation to the sentence, however, 
considerations of background are admitted as a means of mitigating punishment, 
and these normally take the form of analysis of the accused’s circumstances and 
consideration of his or her motives.2076 
In relation to international crimes, some scholars have even found that it would be 
especially important to consider the crime commission context at sentencing. For 
example, Fletcher has put forward that he is “very much drawn to the idea that the guilt 
of the German nation as a whole should mitigate the guilt of particular criminals like 
Eichmann, who is guilty to be sure, but guilty like so many others of a collective crime.”2077 
In connection to collective mass atrocities, Fletcher argues for a humanistic approach to 
collective guilt that would lead to mitigation of punishment.2078 
Criminogenic environments can be found to justify the mitigation of punishment 
in many different ways. Firstly, it has been put forward that mitigation is justified because 
the environment has reduced the offender’s incentives for compliance with the law.2079 
Secondly, it has been suggested that social failure justifies sentence reductions if it is 
the State’s and the larger society’s fault that the societal condition has been permitted to 
exist.2080 The fault hence “weakens the state’s moral authority to condemn and hence to 
2074 Kamber 1999, at 254. 
2075 See Fletcher’s account on romanticism and the problem of “guiltless sincerity”. Fletcher 2002(b), at 
1544 and 1553-1554.
2076 Norrie 1991, at 160.
2077 Fletcher 2002(b), at 1539. 
2078 Fletcher 2002(b), at 1542-1543. Chifflet and Boas ask to what extent it should at sentencing be 
considered that a crime has been committed in the context of war respectively in a time of peace. P. 
Chifflet & G. Boas, ‘Sentencing Coherence in International Criminal Law: The Cases of Biljana Plavšić and 
Miroslav Bralo’, 23 Criminal Law Forum (2012), at 136. It should, however, be noted that also international 
crimes committed in times of peace often are committed in criminogenic environments.
2079 Cf. von Hirsch & Ashworth 2005, at 66-67. 
2080 Cf. von Hirsch & Ashworth 2005, at 66 and 69.
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punish offences”.2081 Von Hirsch has, however, noted that this suggestion is puzzling in 
that what matters then is not the degree of social failure itself, but the degree to which 
that failure is the fault of the State. This means that there does not have to be a direct 
link between degree of social failure and the mitigation of punishment.2082 Thirdly, the 
context of action may be found to give rise to pressure to commit crimes, however, not 
necessarily arising to the level of real compulsion.2083 Fourthly, propaganda and State 
involvement in the criminality may affect individual’s perceptions of what is right and 
wrong, and their beliefs of what the reality is.  Finally, it has in connection to mass 
criminality been argued that the many hands involved in the criminality attenuate the 
individual responsibility.2084 
All in all, there seems to be two major types of arguments regarding the possible 
legal relevance of contexts of action. Firstly, criminogenic contexts of action are found 
to challenge the State’s right to punish individuals. The question of whether individual 
States or the international community has a right to punish State-supported criminality, 
however, lies beyond the scope of this study.2085 The more relevant question here is rather 
whether the criminogenic context of action entails that compassion should be shown to 
individuals who engage in the criminality. Secondly, criminogenic contexts of action are 
sometimes found to affect culpability by influencing the offender’s knowledge and will.2086 
In domestic criminal law, most seem to suggest mitigation based on compassion 
rather than diminished culpability with regard to crimes committed in criminogenic 
environments, if they at all support mitigation of punishment.2087 This may be explained 
by the evidentiary difficulties to establish causal connections between criminogenic 
2081 von Hirsch & Ashworth 2005, at 69. Von Hirsch and Ashworth refer in this connection to Duff, who, 
however, elaborates on the State’s right to punish at all (and hence not sentence reduction). See further 
R. A. Duff, Punishment, Communication, and Community (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 183. 
2082 A. von Hirsch, ‘Proportionate Punishment and Social Deprivation’, in Flores juris et legum – festskrift 
till Nils Jareborg (Uppsala: Iustus förlag, 2002), at 327.
2083 Cf. The Finnish Criminal Code recognizes as a possible ground for reducing the punishment that there 
has been a “significant pressure” to commit the crime. The Criminal Code of Finland, Chapter 6, Section 6. 
2084 “As more people participate in a criminal act, we tend to hold each of them less responsible. Robert 
Nozick describes this defense in the following terms: Responsibility is contained in something like a 
bucket, and as more people share what is in the bucket, less is attributable to each person. Nozick rejects 
this defense and asserts that the fact that many people are responsible for a deed should not necessarily 
diminish the responsibility each one bears. This is correct, but it is also true that in some cases the 
intervention of many people imply an attenuation of responsibility.” Nino 1996, at 166. 
2085 See further Chapter 1. 
2086 See e.g., A. Ashworth, Sentencing and Criminal Justice, 5th ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2010), 150-151 (who notes that it sometimes is unclear whether social deprivation should be regarded as a 
factor reducing culpability or as a personal mitigating factor). 
2087 In many domestic legal systems, the general background of offences/offenders – e.g., that the offender is 
a member of a youth gang or comes from a dysfunctional family − is not considered at sentencing. Modern 
criminal law is hence generally act-oriented and not actor-oriented. Von Hirsch has in connection to 
deprived social status noted that: “[Focusing on the offender’s background ...] would call for fundamental 
alterations in existing paradigms of responsibility and culpability in the criminal law – ones that would 
result in the law’s focussing much less on the circumstances of the particular criminal act, and more on 
the offender’s generalised social position.” He suggests that the question should not be considered as one 
of diminished culpability, but rather as one of compassion. von Hirsch 2002, at 322. See also von Hirsch 
& Ashworth 2005, at 69.
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environments and individual behaviour. Many individuals namely remain law-abiding 
in the most criminogenic environments.2088 The criminological research indicating 
a correlation between certain background factors and criminality do therefore not in 
individual cases establish diminished culpability. It has also been stressed that whereas 
reduced culpability entails an evaluation that the criminal behaviour has been less 
reprehensible, compassion does not per se signal lesser reprehensibility.2089 Horder has, 
for example, in connection to deprived upbringing referred to it as a “morally, purely 
passive factor underlying the crime’s commission not amounting, as such, to a denial 
of responsibility”.2090 To say that compassionate mitigating factors never would reflect 
evaluations of responsibility is, however, simplistic. This point is made by von Hirsch 
and Ashworth who note that mitigating factors based on compassion may imply an altered 
valuation of the conduct if many offenders receive a reduced sentence based on them.2091 
They emphasize that the majority of offenders cannot benefit from mitigating factors 
if one wants to maintain the distinction between the norm (punishment according 
to the offence’s degree of seriousness) and the exception (punishment reduced on 
compassionate grounds).2092 
Taking into account that most international crimes are committed in criminogenic 
environments, allowing the context to be a mitigating factor in connection to these 
crimes would entail a significant revaluation of the reprehensibility of the criminality. 
From this perspective, it is not surprising that international criminal law has 
generally been unwilling to consider crime commission contexts in mitigation even 
though criminological research indicates that mitigation could be justified based on 
compassionate grounds.2093 In some cases, limited consideration has, however, been 
given to factors such as propaganda. For example, in the early Tadić case, the ICTY held 
that: 
the Trial Chamber does not accept that Duško Tadić’s actions were anything but 
criminal, constituting offences against individuals, and indeed, against all mankind. 
To condone Duško Tadić’s actions is to give effect to a base view of morality and 
invite anarchy. However, the virulent propaganda that stoked the passions of the 
citizenry in opština Prijedor was endemic and contributed to the crimes committed 
in the conflict and, as such, has been taken into account in the sentences imposed on 
Duško Tadić.2094
Likewise, the ICTR recognized that Ntawukulilyayo seemed to act out of character, 
which it held to imply that “his participation in the killings may have resulted from 
external pressures to demonstrate his allegiance to the government rather than from 
extremism or ethnic hatred.”2095 In the Čelebići case, an ICTY Trial Chamber suggested 
2088 von Hirsch & Ashworth 2005, at 68.
2089 Cf. von Hirsch & Ashworth 2005, at 71. 
2090 Horder 2007, at 14. 
2091 von Hirsch & Ashworth 2005, at 71. 
2092 Societal deprivation is not exceptional in the same sense as, e.g., illness of the offender. von Hirsch & 
Ashworth 2005, at 70, and von Hirsch 2002, at 328. 
2093 See further Chapter 3. 
2094 Tadić, Judgement (sentencing), TC, ICTY, 14 July 1997, para.  72.
2095 Ntawukulilyayo, Judgement, TC, ICTR, 3 August 2010, para. 474.
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that group pressure could be considered in mitigation,2096 but this has not become a 
much employed mitigating factor in international criminal law. In fact, international 
criminal law has rather opted for the opposite approach, that is, to regard the context 
of action as something that aggravates the individual criminal conduct. Drumbl in 
this regard observes that: “Paradoxically, persons with a weakened sense of individual 
responsibility and independence commit crimes that international criminal justice 
institutions call more serious than ordinary domestic crimes.”2097 The contexts of the 
individual acts namely often constitute chapeau elements of the international crimes, 
which generally are found to aggravate the underlying offences. This being said (and 
as also noted by Drumbl), international criminal tribunals have not handed down 
harsher sentences than domestic criminal courts in connection to serious ordinary 
criminality.2098
9.3.6.  Why Are the Crimes Committed? The Role of Motives in International 
Sentencing 
The motives underlying criminal acts are generally not considered legally relevant at the 
conviction stage.2099 At the sentencing stage, they can, however, be very significant. Byrne 
Hessick in this regard notes that: 
[A]n actor’s actus reus and mens rea are not always the best indicators of her 
culpability. Sometimes her motive may provide information that many would believe 
is more important to determining the appropriate amount of punishment. The classic 
example of this phenomenon is the mercy killer who ends a loved one’s life in order to 
end her suffering. Even motive’s critics appear to acknowledge that this individual is 
not as blameworthy as – and thus does not deserve the same punishment as – those 
individuals who purposefully kill out of malice. But the example proves even more. 
The mercy killer appears to deserve less punishment not only than purposeful killers 
with other motives, but she also appears less blameworthy than the actor whose 
reckless decision to drive at an excessive speed results in the death of a pedestrian. 
The mercy killer’s motives also appear to provide more information about her 
blameworthiness than her illegal act. If asked to assign punishment to different 
actors, it is doubtful that many individuals would impose as much punishment on 
the mercy killer as they would impose on a kidnapper or a drug dealer, even though 
murder is usually perceived as the crime deserving the most punishment.2100
This being said, it has also been put forward that “criminal law should not be used to 
moralize, but to protect central societal and individual interests.”2101 Even though a 
crime has been committed for a reason that is not sympathetic (for example, envy, greed, 
egoism and jealousy), it is not self-evident that the punishment should be aggravated due 
2096 Delalić et al., Judgement, TC, ICTY, 16 November 1998, para. 1235. 
2097 Drumbl 2005(a), at 571.
2098 Drumbl 2005(a), at 572.
2099 See further Section 6.3.5.2.
2100 C. Byrne Hessick, ‘Motive’s Role in Criminal Punishment’, 80 Southern California Law Review (2006), 
at 111.
2101 Governmental Bill 44/2002, at 188 (Finland) [originally in Finnish, translated to English by the present 
author]. 
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to this.2102  When motives are considered at sentencing, some therefore feel that there 
should be a special reason to consider them, such as increased dangerousness.2103 In this 
regard, it has been questioned why crimes committed with specific discriminatory intent 
or racist motives deserve enhanced punishment. Fletcher, for example, asks why the law 
regards genocide as worse as simple murder, and why, for example, the hate crime statutes 
do not include idiosyncratic hatreds (such as, hatred of bald people) that might be just 
as virulent as racial hatred. For him, the answer is that crimes such as genocide reflect 
collective conflict and that these crimes as such bear the dangers of collective action.2104 
Minow, on her part, stresses the additional harm bias criminality causes members of 
targeted group, who have to live in a state of terror and degradation.2105 Also Marston 
Danner notes that the most widely accepted justification for the penalty enhancement in 
relation to bias crime derives from evidence that these crimes potentially engender more 
harm than ordinary crimes do. The personal culpability of the individuals who commit 
bias crimes is correspondingly enhanced by their individual decision to harm individuals 
who are members of groups that experience discrimination in the community.2106 
It may also be argued that the bias crimes are more blameworthy in that they offend 
important societal norms. In this regard, it has been argued that enhancing punishment 
for discriminatory intent is particularly appropriate in an international forum, as the 
“commitment to equality constitutes one of the foundational principles of the United 
Nations.”2107
It has also been put forward that it may be justified to consider motives at sentencing 
“when that motive materially differs from the motive for which the offense ordinarily 
would have been committed.”2108 For example, in connection to economic criminality, 
it is typical that the offender aims at improving his/her economic situation, whereas 
jealousy may be regarded as a characteristic background factor to domestic violence.2109 
More generally, it has been suggested that criminal law assumes that the offender is a 
person who aims at hurting other people and making individual profit, and that when this 
assumption does not hold true – that is, when, for example, a violent crime is committed 
for non-selfish motives – there may be a reason to consider that at sentencing.2110 At least 
in connection to mitigation, the question of whether the offender’s motives have been 
significantly “better” than normally associated with the offence in question, has been 
found central. It, is, however, more difficult to distinguish between the “ordinarily bad” 
and “worse” motives in connection to aggravation. In this regard, the central question 
2102 Governmental Bill 44/2002 (Finland), at 188. 
2103 Governmental Bill 44/2002 (Finland), at 188. 
2104 Fletcher 2002(b), at 1523-1424.
2105 Minow 2000(b), at 1269. 
2106 Marston Danner 2002, at 391-392. 
2107 Marston Danner 2001, at 480. 
2108 Byrne Hessick 2006, at 129-130. 
2109 It should be noted that the identification of this kind of connections can be based on prejudice. In 
connection to sexual violence, the motive behind the act does not need to be to gain sexual gratification, 
but may rather be the desire to have power over another individual. In his regard, it has been pointed 
out that sexual violence is more common in hierarchical societies with traditional gender roles. E.g., S. 
Pohjonen, ‘Kvinnor, våld och straffrätt’, in G. Nordborg (ed.), 13 kvinnoperspektiv på rätten (Uppsala: 
Iustus förlag, 1995), at 200-201. 
2110 Governmental Bill 44/2002 (Finland), at 188. 
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rather appears to be which motives the society views as especially reprehensible.2111 
Sadism and racism are examples of motives that in many legal systems are considered as 
especially wicked.  
In connection to international crimes, the discussion above raises the question of what 
the ordinary motives behind international crimes are. This question is not easy to answer, 
as the criminological research into international criminality so far only to a limited extent 
has considered the question. One can, however, find logical links between certain motives 
and crimes, for example, between sadism and torture, and zeal and mass extermination. 
From this perspective, it, in fact, appears to be inherent to many international crimes that 
they are committed with reprehensible underlying motives. It should, however, be born in 
mind what earlier has been noted, that is, that the most abhorrent acts are not necessarily 
brought about by wicked motives.2112 Not all international criminals are hence sadists 
or racists, even though the nature of the criminality could suggest that. As was noted in 
connection to the phenomenology of international crimes, it has also been suggested that 
international crimes are characterized by the fact that political and ideological motives 
often lie behind them.2113 For example, Harhoff has suggested that whereas ordinary crimes 
often are committed for personal advantage and “personal emotions or petty greed”, the 
background of international crimes is generally collective pressure and “nationalist, 
ideological or religious motives”.2114 Also here, it may, however, be questioned whether the 
crimes really have such underlying individual motives.  
This, firstly, raises the question to what extent it in international sentencing is 
possible to find out the true reasons behind the criminality. Byrne Hessick notes that 
the literature discussing motives in criminal punishment has identified three practical 
problems with taking into account motives at sentencing: “first, that the evidence 
necessary to prove motive may be difficult to locate; second, that a defendant may have 
many different “levels” of motive; and third, that a defendant may act with “mixed 
motives.””2115 How should one therefore, for example, find out whether a person really 
has acted with racist motives and whether this has been his/her primary motive? Most 
perpetrators do namely not spell out their reasons for action and even if they do, how 
can one know whether the perpetrator is telling the truth? While it theoretically hence 
is possible to distinguish between the criminal behaviour of the accused, the outcome 
the person desires with his/her behaviour (specific intent) and the background reasons 
that prompt the person to act (motives), in practice, this can be difficult. If one wants 
to give motives legal relevance, one must therefore accept that the same evidence may 
be used both to identify crime elements, intent and motives. International sentencing 
law recognizes this interconnectedness by considering it to be impermissible double-
counting if crimes that have specific discriminatory intent as a crime element (genocide 
and persecution) are aggravated by racist motives.2116
2111 Cf. “The classification and determination of the relative culpability of motives may prove challenging, 
as there is no easy theory to explain why some motives are perceived as more blameworthy than others.” 
Byrne Hessick 2006, at 141. 
2112 See further Section 2.7. 
2113 See further Section 2.7. 
2114 Harhoff 2008, at 123-124. 
2115 Byrne Hessick 2006, at 144. 
2116 See further Section 9.2.4.2. 
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Secondly, if one gives motives legal relevance, one has to decide whether the 
motives should be considered in aggravation or mitigation. Are, for example, crimes 
against humanity committed “purely for personal reasons” less or more severe than 
crimes against humanity committed for political reasons?2117 As regards the motives 
that have been given legal relevance, international criminal law has generally 
followed a very traditional approach. Racist motives, sadism and premeditation have 
been considered in aggravation, and compassion towards the victims in mitigation. 
In this regard, international criminal law reflects widespread moral distinctions 
about the blameworthiness of different types of motives. In one important regard, 
international criminal law does not, however, always mirror societal sentiments: 
while politically or ideologically motivated violence sometimes morally is met with 
understanding, international criminal law does not legally accept this as a mitigating 
factor.2118 This approach has been found to be necessary if the law wants to maintain 
the jus ad bellum and jus in bello dualism of international law.2119 In jus ad bellum the 
reasons behind the acts are central, but not in jus in bello. More importantly, showing 
understanding to politically/ideologically motivated criminality would divert the 
attention away from the serious harm that the criminality causes and the plight of 
the victims.
On a more principled level, Sloane has asked whether international criminal law 
always should follow traditional criminal law approaches to aggravating motives. More 
specifically, he notes that “it is worth bearing in mind that zeal is not always, or even in 
most instances, more culpable than emotionless orchestration of the crimes of conviction 
by elites, who at times may well prefer to remain aloof from the actual atrocities.”2120 For 
Sloane, the special features of international criminality thus challenge the idea that the 
most eager participants always should be regarded as the most blameworthy. In a similar 
vein, D’Ascoli has questioned whether reluctant participation or “unwillingness” should 
be considered at sentencing in cases where it has been established that the offender 
has had the required mens rea.2121 As the present author sees it, zeal und unwillingness 
are, however, factors that generally are considered when criminal behaviour is morally 
evaluated, and as such it is understandable that they also legally are considered in 
international sentencing. 
9.3.7.  The Harm Caused and Sentencing 
The harm caused is one of the most central sentencing determinants in international 
criminal law. It can either be considered when assessing the gravity of the offence (most 
2117 In the Tadić case, it was considered whether it was a crime element of crimes against humanity that 
they were not committed for purely personal reasons. Tadić, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 15 July 1999, paras 
269-270. D’Ascoli has suggested that it could be regarded as an aggravating factor that an international 
crime has been committed for “personal gain”. D’Ascoli 2011, at 309. The present author is not convinced 
that such a legal development would be positive.
2118 See further Section 9.2.5.2. 
2119 See further R. D. Sloane, ‘The Cost of Conflation: Preserving the Dualism of Jus ad Bellum and Jus in 
Bello in the Contemporary Law of War’, 34 Yale Journal of International Law (2009), at 48-49.
2120 Sloane 2007(b), at 727. 
2121 D’Ascoli 2011, at 313.
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notably, if it is a crime element)2122 or as an aggravating circumstance (for example, 
degree of suffering and humiliation inflicted, and creation of an atmosphere of terror). 
Despite this, international sentencing is often criticized for not adequately reflecting the 
gravity of the crimes that has been committed.2123 For example, Harmon and Gaynor 
have criticized the ad hoc tribunals, and especially the ICTY, for handing down ordinary 
sentences for extraordinary crimes.2124 In their critical article, they suggest that the 
leniency probably is due to the fact that the international judges give too much weight to 
various mitigating factors.2125 
The impossibility of finding a punishment that perfectly fits the horror of many 
international crimes is, however, eloquently expressed by the Krajišnik Trial Chamber 
when it notes that: 
There is no need to retell here the countless stories of brutality, violence, and 
depravation that were brought to the Chamber’s attention. But hidden amidst the 
cold statistics on the number of people killed and forced away from their homes, lies 
a multitude of individual stories of suffering and ordeal – psychological violence, 
mutilation, outrages upon personal dignity, rape, suffering for loved ones, despair, 
death. A sentence, however harsh, will never be able to rectify the wrongs, and will 
be able to soothe only to a limited extent the suffering of the victims, their feelings of 
deprivation, anguish, and hopelessness.2126
Similarly, D’Ascoli has stressed that “it is not possible to apply at the international level 
the same scale of penalties used at the national level within domestic jurisdictions” as 
if the same scale of gravity was used “one could argue that [...] all international crimes 
are already characterised by ‘extreme gravity,’ therefore they should all fall into the 
‘extreme gravity’ category and all attract life imprisonment.”2127 There is no easy answer 
to the question of how offence gravity should be assessed in connection to the type of 
criminality international criminality represents.  
Interesting for this study is also that it at the sentencing stage is possible to give legal 
recognition to types of harm that are not considered as crime elements. For example, 
in the Milošević case, the Appeals Chamber held that it was acceptable that the Trial 
Chamber had considered as an aggravating fact the fact that Milošević had introduced 
and supported the use of indiscriminate weapons, as the use of such weapons was 
not “an element of the crimes of terror, murder, or inhumane acts” for which he was 
convicted.2128 In the Vasiljević case, the fact that the crimes had resulted in long-term 
2122 Kunarac et al., Judgement, TC, ICTY, 22 February 2001, para. 852 (‘Consideration of the consequences 
of a crime upon the victim who is directly injured by it is, however, always relevant to the sentencing of the 
offender. Where such consequences are part and parcel of the definition of the offence, though, care should 
be taken to avoid considering them separately in imposing sentence. For example, the fact that an offender 
took someone’s life cannot be considered as a separate sentencing circumstance when imposing a sentence 
for a murder conviction – it is part and parcel of the crime charged.’)
2123 Cf. Meernik & King 2003, at 726.  
2124 Harmon & Gaynor 2007, at 683 ff. 
2125 Harmon & Gaynor 2007, at 688-689. 
2126 Krajišnik, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 27 September 2006, para. 1146.
2127 D’Ascoli 2011, at 50. 
2128 Milošević, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 12 November 2009, para. 305. 
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trauma was considered legally relevant as an aggravating factor.2129 In many cases, the 
special vulnerability of the victims has been taken into account in aggravation. Children, 
elderly, the disabled and wounded as well as individuals in confinement are examples of 
such especially vulnerable victims.2130 There have furthermore been some occasionally 
accepted victim-related aggravating factors, such as the fact that the victims have been 
international peacekeepers.2131
9.3.8.  Sentencing and the Unusual Enforcement Mechanisms of International 
Criminal Law 
As was noted in connection to the special features of international criminal law, it is not 
uncommon that only certain individuals who have participated in crimes are chosen for 
prosecution, and that only some of the crimes these individuals have participated in find 
their way to the indictments. From this perspective, it is interesting that the prosecutor 
in the Lubanga case suggested that the non-charged sexual violence should affect the 
sentence (concerning child soldier crimes) as an aggravating factor.2132 In this regard, the 
majority of the Trial Chamber held: 
The prosecution’s failure to charge Mr Lubanga with rape and other forms of sexual 
violence as separate crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court is not determinative 
of the question of whether that activity is a relevant factor in the determination of 
the sentence. The Chamber is entitled to consider sexual violence under Rule 145(1)
(c) of the Rules as part of: (i) the harm suffered by the victims; (ii) the nature of the 
unlawful behaviour; and (iii) the circumstances of manner in which the crime was 
committed; additionally, this can be considered under Rule 145(2)(b)(iv) as showing 
the crime was committed with particular cruelty.2133
Even though the present author finds it important that the victimization of the victims 
of sexual violence would have been legally recognized, the legal solution adopted in 
the Lubanga case is clearly problematic. The sentencing stage is a too late procedural 
stage to take on new offences. Rape and other forms of sexual violence namely are 
crimes under the ICC Statute, and if one wanted the Court to give these acts legal 
relevance, they should have been properly prosecuted and judicially investigated at 
the conviction stage.2134 The idea that certain crimes are natural consequences of 
other crimes can in the context of international criminal law have very far-reaching 
consequences.  
2129 Vasiljević, Judgement, AC, ICTY, 25 February 2004, para. 167. See also e.g., Perišić, Judgement, TC, 
ICTY, 6 September 2011, para. 1824.  
2130 Krajišnik, Judgement, TC, ICTY, 27 September 2006, para. 1149.
2131 Ndindiliyimana et al., Judgement, TC, ICTR, 17 May 2011, para. 2257.
2132 Lubanga, Decision (sentencing), TC, ICC, 10 July 2012, paras 61-62. 
2133 Lubanga, Decision (sentencing), TC, ICC, 10 July 2012, para. 67. Also the dissenting Judge held that the 
sexual violence could (and should) have been considered at sentencing. Lubanga, Decision (sentencing, 
diss. op. of Judge Odio Benito), TC, ICC, 10 July 2012.
2134 The Lubanga decision could, in this regard, also be considered in Section 9.3.1. on the relationship 
between offences and sentencing factors. 
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9.4.  Concluding Remarks
9.4.1.  Sentencing and Human Rights/Fairness Considerations
In connection to substantive criminal law, there has in recent years been a growing 
tendency to consider what criteria criminalizations should fulfil to be considered as lawful 
and good criminalizations.2135 In sentencing, on the other hand, the discussion has often 
focused on the goals of sentencing and less attention has been given to elaborating on 
which factors are appropriate sentencing factors and which not. In human rights law, the 
issues discussed have primarily centred around the acceptability of particular sentence 
types (most notably death penalty and life imprisonment), the prohibition of retroactive 
application of sentences, and juvenile justice,2136 and as such, sentencing factors have 
not really been considered there either. The question of what all factors appropriately 
can be considered at sentencing has neither received much attention from criminal law 
scholars, even though there is a considerable consensus that at least certain factors are 
central at sentencing: the harm done and the culpability of the offender. In this regard, 
at least at the level of law, international criminal law follows established approaches to 
sentencing. The de facto application of the proportionality principle is more debated, but 
Meernik and King have held that: “despite the ad hoc examples of unequal treatment 
towards some defendants, such as Tadić and Plavšić, there is a fair degree of consistency 
in the sentences conferred on the guilty.”2137
Schabas has in connection to international criminal law argued that the law “has rarely 
accorded more than summary consideration to the issue of sentencing”.2138 Also in many 
domestic criminal justice systems the focus lies on the criminal law affecting convictions. 
Also the interplay between conviction criteria and sentencing criteria has received little 
attention, which is surprising taken into consideration how closely the two trial phases are 
connected. As noted by Byrne Hessic: “Criminal liability is essentially a binary inquiry: is 
the defendant guilty or not guilty? Finer distinctions about a defendant’s culpability – not 
issues of guilt, but issues of relative guilt – are usually made [...] at sentencing.”2139 One may 
indeed ask exactly what the logic is to strictly separate “substantive criminal law from other 
dimensions of criminal justice”, and most notably sentencing.2140  
From the point of view of this study, the wide discretion granted to the judges in 
deciding upon aggravating factors is interesting in that it opens up an avenue for taking 
legally into consideration additional typical features of international crimes, that is, the 
phenomenology and criminology of international atrocities. For example, factors such 
that political killings may trigger additional violence.2141 From a legality perspective, it 
2135 E.g., Lernestedt 2003, and R. A. Duff et al. (eds.), The Boundaries of the Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010). 
2136 See e.g., S. - R. Kwon et al., Cruel and Unusual - U.S. Sentencing Practices in a Global Context (San 
Francisco: School of Law, University of San Francisco, 2012). See also e.g. Articles 6-7, ICCPR.  
2137 Meernik & King 2003, at 718. 
2138 Schabas 2008(b), at 613. 
2139 Byrne Hessick 2006, at 92. 
2140 Cf. R. A. Duff et al., ‘Introduction – The Structures of the Criminal Law’, in R. A. Duff et al. (eds.), The 
Structures of the Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), at 7.    
2141 Ndindiliyimana et al., Judgement, TC, ICTR, 17 May 2011, para. 2257.
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is, however, troublesome that the law on aggravating factors is so flexible. The idea that 
non-prosecuted crimes could function in aggravation is especially problematic. 
The openness characterizing international sentencing raises the fair trial question 
of whether the accused individuals always have received a fair warning that a particular 
factor will be considered at sentencing. From a fair trial perspective, more established 
approaches to aggravating and mitigating factors would therefore be preferable.2142 
One could also consider whether more blameworthiness evaluations in international 
criminal law should be made at the conviction stage that is more regulated. In this regard, 
Morse has similarly questioned the approach in certain legal systems to relegate “crucial 
responsibility determinations [...] explicitly or implicitly [...] to the sentencing process 
rather than incorporated into the doctrines of liability that are adjudicated at trial.”2143 
9.4.2.  Sentencing and Fair Labelling 
From a labelling perspective, the sentencing criteria are utmost interesting in that they 
allow many typical features of international criminality to be legally recognized. Some 
typical features are both conviction criteria and sentencing factors, and that a feature 
is considered at both stages indicates its centrality. The sentencing stage is also a stage 
at which factors that have not been considered legally relevant at conviction suddenly 
can become legally relevant. This is interesting especially from the point of view of the 
criminology of international crimes: the underlying reasons behind the criminality are 
generally not considered at conviction, but they may be relevant at sentencing. The scant 
attention given to sentencing factors by, inter alia, legal scholars, however, affects their 
labelling. The type of sentence handed down for sure sends strong legal signals, but the 
criteria based on which it is decided not that much. 
This being said, according to the present author, international sentencing, however, 
sends some signals worth noting: International sentencing – in the same way as the law 
affecting convictions − stresses the role played by leaders in connection to the criminality 
and the special reprehensibility of discriminatory motives. Trough some mitigating factors 
(most notably duress and superior orders) international criminal law gives recognition 
to human frailty, but, all in all, international sentencing does not support the idea that 
the collective crime commission context dilutes responsibility. From a criminological 
perspective, it may therefore be submitted that international sentencing gives some 
acknowledgement to theories à la Milgram stressing individuals’ inclination to adhere 
to authorities, but not that much to other factors that often can be found behind the 
criminality (peer pressure, the brutalization that often takes place in armed conflicts, etc.).
2142 A distinction is sometimes made between rights and privileges (e.g. parole). According to Judges 
Zupančič and Maruste: “Rights, especially in criminal law, require restrictive substantive criteria (lex 
certa, lex clara, principle of legality, etc.) and strict procedural formalism – whereas privileges (clemency, 
rewards, awards, prizes, honours, etc.) do not. Rights and duties lend themselves to legal remedies and 
regulation, whereas privileges do not.” Case of Ezeh and Connors v. The United Kingdom, Judgment (diss. 
op. of Judges Zupančič and Maruste), GC, ECtHR, 9 October 2003, para. 13. In this regard, it is sometimes 
suggested that mitigating factors based on mercy do not need to be regulated to the same degree as, e.g., 
aggravating factors. At the same time, the present author, however, feels that the principle of equality 
before the law demands that the application of mercy is not completely random.  
2143 Morse 1998, at 337. 
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10.  CONCLUDING ANALYSIS 
10.1.  Recapitulation of the Goal of the Study 
The starting-point of the study is that there is a real-life phenomenon that can be 
characterized as international criminality. The features of this criminality were investigated 
in Chapters 2 and 3 by making use of sociological, historical, and criminological research. 
The main goal of the study has been to high-light to what extent and how the typical 
features of this criminality have been reflected in the existing international criminal law 
(Chapters 6-9). Important questions in the study have therefore been: (a) what is legally 
relevant in international criminal law and what is not; and (b) at what stages and how are 
different dimensions of international criminality considered in international criminal 
law. A goal of the study has, however, not been to suggest “the best” legal solutions. Most 
solutions namely have both their pros and cons. The aim of the study has therefore been 
more modest, that is, to increase the understanding of the international criminal law 
that de facto is used by international criminal tribunals to prosecute individuals. An 
underlying assumption has been that the fundamental structures of international criminal 
law hitherto have not received sufficient attention.  
More specifically, an impetus to this study has been pronouncements, such as 
the one by Osiel, that international criminal law has “largely [been] content to rely on 
fictions remote from the empirical reality of mass atrocity discerned by historians and 
social scientists.”2144 For the present author, these kinds of statements have triggered an 
urge to investigate exactly what “the empirical reality” is that sometimes is put forward 
to criticize the lex lata. To find out “the truth” or “the reality” is, however, always to 
some extent a mission impossible. The systematic survey into sociological, historical, and 
criminological accounts of international atrocities conducted here has nevertheless shed 
some light on the empirical reality of international atrocities. All in all, the investigation 
emphasizes that while international criminality has some special features of its own 
(Chapter 2), it is not, from a criminological perspective (Chapter 3) a completely 
unprecedented societal phenomenon. As such, the present author does not accept the 
idea of international crimes as completely incomprehensible or as phenomena beyond 
moral scrutiny.2145 
Secondly, Osiel’s argument raises questions about the inadequacy or 
inappropriateness of the legal responses to international criminality.2146 For some, the 
solution to the problem is to abandon criminal law altogether. In this study, it is, however, 
not suggested that the criminal law should be replaced with alternative mechanisms, 
such as truth commissions. In modern society, criminal law is often the conventional 
2144 Osiel 2005(a), at 1752. Cf. also “If criminal law sometimes seems so inadequate in grappling with mass 
atrocity, is this because the law rests on assumptions simply inapplicable to such events?” Ibid., at 1755.
2145 Cf. e.g., “Massive human rights violations involve what Kant deemed “radical evil” – offenses against 
human dignity so widespread, persistent, and organized that normal moral assessment seems inappropriate. 
If someone had confronted Adolf Hitler and told him that his acts were wrong, it would have sounded 
almost laughable. “Wrong” is too weak an adjective to describe actions that knowingly caused deaths of 
more than twenty million people and the unimaginable suffering of millions more.” Nino 1996, at vii-viii. 
2146 Cf. Arendt and her idea about Nazi crimes exploding the limits of the law. H. Arendt (letter dated 17 
August 1946) in Hannah Arendt Karl Jaspers Correspondence 1926-1969, at 54. 
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way to address the intentional infliction of serious harm to others. The question here has 
rather been how one with the “international criminal law instrument” (Chapters 4-5) has 
been able to address the societal reality of international criminality. 
An underlying assumption in the study is that the fact that international criminal 
law is criminal law entails certain limitations. Or to phrase this another way, the law has 
some in-built ideas about what is relevant/irrelevant and what kind of regulation is good. 
In this regard, it is noteworthy that the phenomenology of international crimes often has 
been found to stretch the boundaries of acceptable criminal law. This being said, criminal 
law as an instrument is not static, but subject to change. When new types of criminal 
regulation emerge one must consider whether the new type of regulation breaks with 
the tenets of the law or rather changes/develops them. While, for example, corporate 
criminal law at some point was a legal anomaly, this type of criminal responsibility is 
today accepted in many criminal justice systems. That international criminal law does 
not exactly follow the model of domestic criminal law does hence not per se mean that 
the law violates the basic tenets of criminal law. One must rather, from a human rights 
perspective, consider whether the regulation is foreseeable to individuals and adheres to 
the principle that criminal responsibility should be personal and be based on individual 
guilt. As the present author sees it, international criminal law does not today in any 
significant way violate the basic tenets of criminal law, even though the certainty and 
specificity of the regulation in certain areas clearly could be improved. 
Finally, a central perspective in the study has been the labelling perspective, that is, 
a central question has been what signals the law sends. Signals can both be sent with the 
law’s norms and with its lacunas and silences. 
10.2.  The Multitude of Possible Legal Choices: Different Types of Crime 
Structures and Legal Reasoning 
That legally relevant factors often can be considered in alternative ways in the law is 
emphasized both by comparative criminal law and legal philosophy. There are, for 
example, different conceptions of how the structure of crimes should be understood. In 
common law jurisdictions, a central distinction is generally that between actus reus (the 
external side of the conduct) and mens rea (the internal side of the conduct).2147 When 
deciding on criminal responsibility, the distinction between offence elements (actus 
reus + mens rea) and defences is central. In other legal systems (for example, German, 
Spanish and Nordic), tripartite structures of crimes are popular.2148 In these systems, a 
distinction is done between the elements of the offence (German Tatbestandmäßigkeit), 
wrongfulness (German Rechtswidrigkeit) and culpability (German Schuld). All these 
three affirmative dimensions of the crime can be negated (by denials of the elements of 
the definition, justifications and excuses respectively).2149 
2147 E.g., Fletcher 2007(a), at 43-44.
2148 See e.g., K. Ambos, ‘Toward a Universal System of Crime: Comments on George Fletcher’s Grammar 
of Criminal Law’, 28 Cardozo Law Review (2007), at 2650-2651, Fletcher 2007(a), at 49-55, and Jareborg 
1988, at 12.
2149 E.g., Fletcher 2007(a), at 50-51. 
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The structures of the crimes are relevant in that they can make one see on exactly 
what the criminal responsibility is based. It has, for example, been noted that the three-
step perspectives distinguishing between wrongfulness and culpability make it possible 
to excuse a person by denying culpability, but still maintaining that the act has been 
wrongful.2150 As such, the distinction between excuses and justifications becomes more 
evident in three-tired structures of crimes. Two-step thinking focusing on inculpating 
and exculpating factors, however, probably to a greater extent adheres to how people 
generally think about responsibility: what speaks for criminal responsibility and what 
against? In this regard, it is noteworthy that in some legal systems where tripartite 
thinking about the structure of crime has been common, some legal scholars have 
recently started to consider the usefulness of bipartite models.2151 Furthermore, it is 
significant to observe that even though one accepts a tripartite perspective, it is not 
always clear as what a particular factor shall be considered. Subjective elements, such 
as general and specific intent, have, for example, to varying degrees been considered as 
matters of culpability or as offence elements. According to the finalist understanding of 
the structure of the crime, the psychological aspects of culpability (acting with a certain 
required state of mind) are part of the offence definition, whereas the more normative 
assessment of blameworthiness is a question of culpability.2152 
The existence of different types of conceptions about the structure of the crime 
raises the question of how international criminal law has approached this more doctrinal 
question. In this regard, Burghart has held that: 
To determine the accused’s individual criminal responsibility, the ad hoc tribunals 
apply a two-tiered test: First, the conduct of the accused must be a kind that he can 
be held accountable for the crime, i.e. his conduct must qualify as one of the modes 
of participation, and second, the accused must not be exempted from individual 
criminal responsibility by means of a defence or − with the words of the ICCSt – 
‘grounds for excluding responsibility’. [...] At first glance this concept of crimes under 
international law may seem self-evident. However, it differs significantly from its 
national equivalent in both civil and common law traditions. Indeed, the concept of 
crimes in international law corresponds neither with the German three-tiered test of 
criminal liability, distinguishing between ‘Tatbestandsmäßigkeit’, ‘Rechtswidrigkeit’ 
2150 E.g., Hörnle 2008, at 16-18. 
2151 E.g., in Finland. See further Melander 2010, at 88. 
2152 Ambos 2007(b), at 2652 (‘the change brought about by finalist doctrine was twofold: on the one hand, 
the psychological elements of culpability (dolus and specific intentions, equivalent to descriptive mens 
rea) were “moved up” from (psychological) culpability to the Tatbestand; on the other hand, the finalist 
doctrine confirms or reinforces the normativization of the free standing culpability [...]. Thus, culpa is no 
longer (only) understood psychologically, i.e., as the (psychological) intent to cause a certain result (this 
intent is now—as Vorsatz—part of the Tatbestand), but as the (moral) blameworthiness of the perpetrator’s 
conduct, i.e., in the sense of a normative concept of culpability.’). See also Fletcher 2001, at 272 (‘While it is 
fairly clear where most issues fall, there was considerable debate in the post-war German literature about 
the proper classification of intention and negligence. The traditional, harm-oriented school treated these 
factors as bearing exclusively on culpability, which implied that accidentally causing the death of another, 
without any culpability at all, was still considered unlawful behavior. A more subjective school, calling 
itself “finalist” or teleological, insisted that intention be treated as part of the definition of the offense.’) 
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and ‘Schuld’, nor with the dichotomy of offence and defence in common law 
systems.2153
He therefore finds that international criminal law has an own approach to the structure 
of crimes. The present author, however, feels that the approach adopted in international 
criminal law should be characterized as “rather common law”. The central distinction in 
international criminal law is namely that between inculpating and exculpating factors. 
This has been criticized by both Ambos and Fletcher, who note that this has made it 
impossible for international criminal law to, for example, make a clear difference between 
justifications and excuses,2154 and wrongdoing and culpability.2155 Ambos has, however, 
held that the ICC Statute is open to interpretations that make the system more “civil 
law”, that is, that the drafters of the ICC Statute have not as such conclusively adopted a 
particular structure of crime.2156 
Besides different perceptions about the structure of the crime, the legal systems 
of the world may also differ in their legal reasoning “style”. Fletcher has, in this regard, 
differentiated between structured legal discourse (exemplified by German criminal law) 
and flat legal discourse (exemplified by American criminal law). According to him, 
structured legal discourse is characterized by absolute norms (absolute rights) and 
qualifications (for example, the idea of abuse of rights), whereas flat legal discourse 
contains qualified norms only (for example, by modifiers such as substantial and 
reasonable).2157 Hence, the legal systems of the world differ in how the criminal law is 
framed. Despite differences in legal style, there are, however, many factors that all legal 
systems consider albeit in different manners.2158 To exemplify this, one may mention the 
concept of a “reasonable man”, which is an important legal concept in many common law 
jurisdictions. The structured legal system of Germany does not contain the concept, but 
instead recognizes societal expectations in other ways.2159 
The point in this study is, however, not to make a “diagnosis of fundamental 
differences” between various legal systems,2160 but to investigate the structures of 
2153 Burghardt 2010, at 85-86. 
2154 Ambos 2007(b), at 2667-2668. 
2155 Fletcher 2007(a), at 107 and 324. 
2156 Ambos 2007(b), at 2672 (‘All this confirms that the Rome Statute does not decide the question of the 
“system”.’)
2157 G. P. Fletcher, ‘The Right and the Reasonable’, 98 Harvard Law Review (1985), at 951-953 (‘Flat legal 
discourse proceeds in a single stage, marked by the application of a legal norm that invokes all of the criteria 
relevant to the resolution of a dispute. Structured legal discourse proceeds in two stages: first, an absolute 
norm is asserted; and second, qualifications enter to restrict the scope of the supposedly dispositive norm.’)
2158 Cf. “Criminal responsibility, which is concerned with offences, is seen as a prior logical ‘stage’ to 
that of criminal liability (Duff [...]); and that the effect of defences is characterised as that of ‘blocking 
the transition’ from the first ‘stage’ to the second. This contention is, I think, mistaken. [...] Hence we 
need first to be able to grasp and explain the distinction between offences and defences in order to fully 
understand the conditions under which a decision to prosecute count as correctly made, and thus before 
(and independently) of any answer that the person actually charged may successfully come to offer in 
her defence. Defeaters, in other words, operate already at the first ‘stage’ of criminal liability.” L. Duarte 
d’Almeida, ‘O Call Me Not to Justify the Wrong’: Criminal Answerability and the Offence/Defence 
Distinction’, 6 Criminal Law and Philosophy (2012), at 230 and 232. 
2159 Hörnle 2008, at 1-3.
2160 Cf. Hörnle 2008, at 2. 
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international criminal law. In this context, the differences between the domestic legal 
systems serve as a background factor that helps one acknowledge that different legal 
solutions send different messages. The force of the legal signal sent may depend on the 
specificity of the legal system in question. A justification, for example, sends a completely 
different message than an excuse in legal systems where a strict distinction is made 
between the two. The legal solutions adopted are hence significant from a labelling 
perspective. 
In this study, the investigation has not been divided into chapters investigating 
offence elements, wrongfulness, and culpability, and as such the focus has not been on 
to what extent international criminal law recognizes these differentiations.2161 Instead, 
the relevant division has been that between: (1) elements of crimes; (2) elements of 
modes of responsibility; (3) exculpatory factors; and (4) sentencing determinants, which 
hereinafter are referred to as the various responsibility-determining stages. 
Regarding the structures of crimes, Fletcher has noted that it is “fairly clear 
where most issues fall”, that is whether particular facts should be considered as offence 
elements, justifications, excuses, etc.2162 The offence elements, for example, contain the 
requirements regarding the act, result and causation.2163 In connection to the typical 
features of international crimes, it may, however, be noted that their placement in the 
various responsibility-determining stages is frequently not self-evident. It is often felt that 
the placement is primarily a question of what one wants to emphasize, rather than 
certain placements being right or wrong. In this regard, it is interesting that Haque has 
recently criticized the ICC Statute for ignoring or misapplying the fundamental criminal 
law distinction between offences and defences.2164 More specifically, he argues that: 
The final structural defect embedded in the definitions of Attacking Civilians 
and Excessive Incidental Death under the Rome Statute stems from the failure of 
the drafters to distinguish between the inculpatory function of distinction and 
discrimination and the exculpatory function of proportionality and necessity. [...] 
The formal distinction between offenses and defenses is how the criminal law marks 
the substantive difference between defendants who have nothing to answer for and 
defendants who must answer for what they have done. International criminal law 
should use the same distinction to mark the same difference. Every combatant who 
kills civilians has done something that requires justification; only combatants who kill 
civilians incidentally, unavoidably, and proportionately act with such a justification. 
[...]. The Rome Statute declares that Attacking Civilians is presumptively wrongful 
and that no additional elements are required to inculpate an offender. However, 
by defining Excessive Incidental Death as it does, the Rome Statute declares that 
incidental killing of civilians is presumptively permissible and legitimate unless 
the additional inculpatory element of clear excessiveness is introduced. These two 
prohibitions deliver two vastly different moral messages.2165
2161 Furthermore, the approach of international criminal law in general to mental elements, such as intent 
and knowledge, has been left outside the study. 
2162 Fletcher 2001, at 272.
2163 E.g., Ambos 2007(b), at 2651. 
2164 A. A. Haque, ‘Protecting and Respecting Civilians: Correcting the Substantive and Structural Defects 
of the Rome Statute’, 14 New Criminal Law Review (2011), at 519. 
2165 Haque 2011(b), at 556-558.
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Haque’s critique can essentially be reduced to the question of whether international 
criminal law, as a reflection of international humanitarian law or human rights law, 
only should contain absolute prohibitions (which only can be rightfully violated if there 
is a justification at hand) or whether the law also can contain qualified prohibitions 
(for example, requiring assessments of proportionality at the offence stage). As was 
elaborated in Chapter 8, there are different opinions on how the relationship between 
offences and defences should be framed.2166 The different viewpoints are reflected both 
in the extent to which the scholars accept justifications and excuses, and in how they 
feel that the offences should be defined. Partly, the question is also one of legal style, that 
is, whether one prefers structured or flat legal reasoning. Moreover, procedural aspects 
may affect viewpoints in this regard, that is, whether one feels that the prosecutor or the 
defence should bear the burden of proof.2167 Haque is, however, completely right that the 
distinction between offences and defences is not merely an “empty formalism”, but an 
important avenue for the law to express its underlying moral values.2168 Both offences and 
defences hence carry labels.2169 
What, however, may generally be said about the various responsibility-determining 
stages, and what should be included in the various stages is that it is often held that the 
offence definitions and modes of responsibility should establish the rules, which should 
guide individual behaviour, whereas the factors excluding criminal responsibility should 
represent exceptions.2170 As noted by Haque regarding justifications: 
A defendant who commits no offense has not infringed a value that the law protects. 
By contrast, a defendant who commits an offense but is justified in doing so has 
infringed a protected value but has done so in the service of another value the law 
respects. [...] But by declaring that the defendant has committed an offense that 
requires justification, the criminal law affirms the importance of the value infringed 
and demonstrates the law’s commitment to its protection and vindication.2171
Offence definitions that settle all central parameters for responsibility are therefore 
problematic in that they “suppress the distinction between the ordinary and the 
extraordinary.”2172 It is also often held that central blameworthiness evaluations should 
be made at the conviction stage, and that the sentencing stage should be a stage where 
the blameworthiness evaluation is fine-tuned.
2166 Fletcher, in this regard, makes a distinction between comprehensive rules (which do not admit defences 
and which only can be met with denying that the elements have been established) and defeasible rules 
(which can be met with a defence). Fletcher 1998, at 96.
2167 See in this regard e.g., Fletcher 1998, at 94 ff. 
2168 Haque 2011(b), at 522.
2169 Fletcher 1998, at 93. 
2170 E.g., Osiel 1999, at 150-151. In relation to mitigating sentencing factors and exculpatory excuses, it 
is also sometimes submitted that these primarily should be regarded as decision-rules (directed to the 
judges) and not as conduct rules (aimed at affecting the behaviour of potential offenders). Regarding 
conduct/decision rules and criminal law, see further M. Dan-Cohen, ‘Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: 
On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law’, 97 Harvard Law Review (1984), at 625 ff. See also Gardner 
1998(a), at 596-598. 
2171 Haque 2011(b), at 558. 
2172 Fletcher 1998, at 97. 
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10.3. The Legal Choices Made in International Criminal Law 
10.3.1. The Crimes
The crime definitions make up the special part of criminal law, and as such it is the 
responsibility-determining stage in which it is most likely that the “societal reality” or 
the phenomenology of international crimes is reflected. As was noted in Chapter 6, the 
crime definitions indeed recognize many typical features of international criminality: 
the discriminatory animus of the violence, the abnormal contexts of action, the 
collective nature of the criminality, etc. The typical features of international criminality 
can be reflected both in the chapeau elements and in the underlying offences. It is in 
particular the underlying offences of the international crimes that emphasize that the 
criminality can result in many different types of harm. There are some typical features 
in international criminality that, however, have not been significantly acknowledged in 
the crime definitions: the frequent State-involvement in the criminality and the fact that 
the crimes often have different types of participants. This has been criticized by some 
legal scholars, who have suggested State policy requirements respectively that the crimes 
should be defined differently depending on the type of participant. 
The reflection of the typical features of international criminality in the crime 
definitions raises the question of exactly what values or interests the crimes aim at 
protecting. For example, it is often submitted that the goal of genocide is to protect the 
physical existence of groups, but this being said, the actus reus of the crime does not 
demand large-scale destruction of the group. In this regard, it may be asked whether 
it primarily is the chapeau or the list of underlying crimes that should contain “the” 
essential crime element of the offence in question. While the crime definitions of the 
international crimes of course must be viewed as a whole, the present author is inclined 
to emphasize the special role of the chapeau elements in connection to the international 
crimes. The existence of many corresponding ordinary domestic crimes suggests that 
the function of international crimes is to protect values that go beyond purely individual 
interests.2173 This is the case especially in connection to genocide with its specific intent 
element2174 and crimes against humanity with its collective crime commission context 
element. What values the chapeau element of war crimes protects is more difficult to 
discern. War crimes simply violate the agreed laws of war. In this regard, it is noteworthy 
that the German Völkerstrafgesetzbuch (2002) addresses genocide and crimes against 
humanity in singular paragraphs (§ 6 and § 7 respectively), while the criminalization 
of war crimes is divided into many paragraphs to indicate that the various war crimes 
attack different interests: war crimes against persons (§ 8), war crimes against property 
and other rights (§ 9), war crimes against humanitarian operations and emblems (§ 10), 
war crimes consisting of prohibited methods of war (§ 11), and war crimes of prohibited 
means of warfare (§ 12). The distinction could be even more specific in that, for example, 
2173 See further Section 6.3.1. 
2174 Cf. Regarding specific intent elements that distinguish hate crimes from corresponding ordinary 
crimes, it has been noted that there is an “increasing acceptance of the idea that criminal conduct is 
somehow different when it involves an act motivated by bigotry and manifest as discrimination”. Jenness 
2001, at 282 (emphasis added).
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the war crimes against persons many violate many different types of interests (right to 
life, right to sexual integrity, etc).  
From a labelling perspective, it is significant that a conviction for an international 
crime sends different signals than a conviction for an ordinary domestic crime, 
and that many feel that international atrocities therefore should be addressed with 
international crime labels.2175 The question is what are these signals? That the offender 
is not an “ordinary criminal”,2176 but an offender who has taken part in an especially 
dangerous type of collective criminality or in criminality that threatens international 
peace and security is an answer international criminal law scholars are likely to give. 
In the eyes of the general public, what most characterizes international criminality is 
presumably the often large-scale and severe harm that it causes. Also the ethnic and/
or political violence aspect of the criminality appears significant in this regard. It is 
noteworthy that there are also some scholars who think that the international crime 
definitions do not enough stress the amount of harm the criminality causes. The focus 
on the individual intent in connection to genocide has been especially criticized for 
being overly individualistic.2177 Furthermore, Haque has criticized the international war 
crime definition for being defined as a conduct offence (prohibiting certain behaviour 
irrespective of its consequences) rather than as a result offence (prohibiting the causing of 
certain consequences irrespective of the behaviour that causes them) with regard to war 
crimes causing civilian casualties.2178 As being defined today, some international crimes 
(most notably genocide) indeed have the dangerousness of the criminality as the primary 
source of wrongfulness, rather than the harm actually caused. International criminality 
is as a societal phenomenon characterized by both significant dangerousness and severe 
victimization.
Regarding legal labels, it has been noted that atrocities “never became a legal term of 
art, however, with a settled meaning distinct from ordinary Latin. It no longer occupies 
any place within the formal language of international military law. It was first replaced by 
the term ‘manifest illegality,’ then ‘war crimes,’ later the subset of war crimes constituting 
‘grave breaches’ of the Geneva Conventions, and finally ‘exceptionally serious war 
crimes.’”2179 Legal terms and ordinary language can change over time and the two are 
not necessarily in full concordance. This is not necessarily a problem. However, when a 
certain type of criminality in everyday speech frequently starts to be referred to with a 
certain term that does not exist in the law, one should consider whether there is a legal 
2175 Cf. “The famous trial of the Auschwitz guards that began in Frankfurt in 1963 provided a particularly 
vivid, if not egregious, example of this problem, as the atrocities committed at Auschwitz had to be 
pigeonholed into the legal concept of simple “murder,” the most serious offense that the guards could be 
charged with under available German law at the time. This had the regrettable consequence of transforming 
the everyday horrors of Auschwitz into the “normal,” against which the particularly savage and murderous 
conduct of certain guards or functionaries could be measured.” L. Douglas, ‘The Holocaust, History and 
Legal Memory’, in S. R. Ratner & J. L. Bischoff (eds.), International War Crimes Trials: Making a Difference? 
(Austin, Texas: The University of Texas at Austin School of Law, 2004, at 110.
2176  Cf. Fletcher 2006, at 899 (‘Terrorists are not ordinary criminals but they nonetheless constitute a threat 
of violent activity of the same sort engaged in by criminals. They are criminals who are also enemies.’)
2177 See further Section 6.3.5.3. 
2178 Haque 2011(b), at 550-551. 
2179 Osiel 1999, at 45. 
364
lacuna or whether the legal categorizations are inapt. In this regard, one may mention 
the phenomenon of “ethnic cleansing”. Legally speaking, this phenomenon is covered by 
persecution as a crime against humanity, but it may be asked whether the international 
criminalization of discriminatory violence is meaningfully organized. The relationship 
between genocide and persecution as a crime against humanity is unclear for many. 
More generally, it may be noted that the difference between the three international core 
crimes often is obscure for the general public, as is some concepts that the can be found 
in the crime definitions (such as, non-international armed conflict and grave breaches). 
From a labelling perspective this is problematic, but as the crimes already legally are so 
settled, it is impossible to start from scratch and to mould the law so that it to a greater 
degree would adhere to everyday language and understanding about the atrocities. 
The international criminalization process has largely consisted of reactions to specific 
historical atrocities and it has been surrounded by the Westphalian State-centred system 
and political compromises, which has influenced the content of the law. Ratner, Abrams 
and Bischoff have in this regard characterized international criminal law as a “product 
of an ad hoc process of prescription”.2180 This being said, the legal development of the 
branch of law has entailed that some “seemingly arbitrary schisms”2181 in the law have lost 
in importance, such as the difference between war crimes committed in international 
and non-international armed conflicts. One significant dilemma, however, remains: 
The international crimes have their background in both the law of war (allowing a lot 
of violence normally criminal) and human rights law (emphasizing the inviolability of 
many interests) and the relationship between these two sometimes conflicting rationales 
is not completely settled. 
With regard to the international crime definitions, it should finally be noted that 
even though they are complex, they do not contain detailed blameworthiness evaluations. 
In domestic legal systems, it is common to find crimes of different blameworthiness 
level protecting the same legal interests.2182 In international criminal law, all crimes are 
serious, but it is still possible to grade the offences, as is shown in connection to domestic 
criminalizations of these crimes.2183 In practice, the approach taken in international 
criminal law has entailed that the role of the sentencing stage has become especially 
significant in blameworthiness evaluations. 
10.3.2. The Modes of Responsibility
In domestic legal systems, the doctrines of attribution generally form part of the general 
part of criminal law, and as such those doctrines are a priori applicability to all different 
types of crimes. As international criminal law, however, only consists of a few crimes, 
it would be possible to adapt the attribution doctrines to the special features of the 
2180 Ratner, Abrams & Bischoff 2009, at 365 (italics added). 
2181 Ratner, Abrams & Bischoff 2009, at 368. 
2182 Cf. e.g., the difference between coercion into a sexual act, rape and aggravated rape in Finland. The 
Criminal Code of Finland, Chapter 20. 
2183 E.g., Finland where a difference is done between petty, ordinary and aggravated war crimes, and ordinary 
and aggravated crimes against humanity (The Criminal Code of Finland, Chapter 11) and Germany where 
the different underlying offences to crimes against humanity and war crimes have different sentencing 
ranges (Völkerstrafgesetzbuch, 2002). 
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criminality.2184 By and large, international criminal law has, however, followed domestic 
models in attribution, which is interesting from the point of view that international 
criminality breaks with some central attribution assumptions. The physical perpetrators 
are, for example, not usually the main villains in connection to international crimes. 
There are only a few (albeit important) attribution doctrines not in frequent use in 
domestic criminal law that have been endorsed in international criminal law: JCE 
responsibility, superior responsibility and responsibility based on control of the act by 
virtue of a hierarchical organization.2185 These doctrines to varying degrees reflect the 
special features of international criminality. As regards the different attribution schools 
used in domestic legal systems (that is, unitary perpetrator model, the equivalence theory 
and the differential participation model), international criminal law applies a mixture 
of these schools using different labels to describe the criminal conduct of the offender, 
however, leaving much of the blameworthiness evaluation to the sentencing stage. 
From a labelling perspective, it is interesting that among legal scholars there exist 
very different opinions about the degree to which one at attribution must specify the 
role played by the offender. Ohlin has, in this regard, recently in a blog entry criticized 
some legal scholars for not recognizing the need to label the type of participation with 
precision: 
The great objection to this early notion of JCE was that it ignored differentiation 
between different levels of culpability, especially as between principal perpetrators 
and foot soldiers best described as accomplices. All of them could be described as 
participants in a JCE. I pressed this point several times with Cassese, and his answer 
was always the same: let the Trial Chamber sort out these distinctions at sentencing. I 
take Stewart to be saying roughly the same thing. To the extent that his unitary model 
fails to make these distinctions, let the sentencing reflect them. So why doesn’t this 
solve the problem, either for Cassese or Stewart? First of all, it proves too much. There’s 
something significant about the criminal law’s need to classify perpetrators and codify 
their relative culpability with different labels. Moreover, this function needs to take 
place on the side of the substantive doctrine, not the side of sentencing. Otherwise, as 
I have said before, we could eliminate the crimes themselves and replace them with a 
global crime called “Felony” (or in ICL [= international criminal law]“Atrocity”) and 
let all other matters relevant to culpability get decided in sentencing. Of course, this 
would violate the principle of legality.2186
In essence, Ohlin points out that legal scholars generally accept that the modes of 
responsibility are less specific than the crimes. This is interesting in that the attribution 
doctrines to such a great extent determine the scope of criminal responsibility. 
Of the typical features of international criminality, the attribution doctrines 
especially address the criminality’s collective nature and the different roles played by 
different types of actors in the criminality. As was noted in Chapter 7, a central question has 
been whether one in attribution desires to emphasize vertical or horizontal relationships 
2184 Cf.  “Rather than trying to curb the reality in order to fit our legal concepts, we might instead search 
for alternative modes of criminal responsibility.” van der Wilt 2007, at 91. 
2185 The question of whether terrorism is an international crime is controversial. Cf. in this regard the 
question of whether responsibility for terrorism can be combined with “uniquely international forms of 
criminal responsibility” (that is, JCE and superior responsibility). Milanović 2007, at 1139 ff.
2186 J. D. Ohlin, ‘LJIL Symposium: Names, Labels, and Roses’, Opinio Juris [blog], 23 March 2012. 
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between individuals. The phenomenology of international crimes indicates that both 
types of relationships frequently exist in connection to international criminality, and 
it is partly a question of what one wants to stress that determines which viewpoint one 
finds more appropriate. Many of the attribution alternatives emphasize the role played by 
leaders in international criminality. 
From the point of view of the phenomenology of international criminality, it 
is noteworthy that many other typical features of international criminality are not 
considered at attribution. It is, for example, not an element of any responsibility mode 
that the offender must be a State or public official. Even though the ICC applies different 
standards for military leaders and other leaders regarding superior responsibility, the 
general approach in attribution has been that it does not matter in attribution whether 
the offender is a military or not, and whether the action takes place in an armed conflict 
or in times of peace. 
In connection to international crimes, it was noted that a controversial question has 
been to what extent the law should focus on actual causation of harm respectively the 
causing of danger. In attribution, this question has also been debated. More specifically, 
in connection to the high-level actors, it can be difficult to prove intentional infliction 
of harm and in these situations it has been asked whether the leaders could rather be 
held responsible for failure to act, that is, for allowing harm and danger to occur by 
not acting according to societal expectations. The doctrine of superior responsibility in 
this regard constitutes regulatory criminal law, that is, criminal law that applies only 
to people having particular societal roles.2187 The doctrine does not, however, establish 
negligence responsibility proper,2188 but rather omission responsibility in situations of an 
obligation to act. Also JCE III responsibility is a doctrine, which has as its basis the idea 
that individuals who decide to engage in dangerous activities can be held responsible 
for consequences that spring from that decision. JCE III convictions have, however, not 
been many in international criminal law, and as such the causing of harm has been the 
primary basis for responsibility in international criminal law and not the willingness to 
take unjustified risks. 
The phenomenology/criminology of international criminality indicates that 
bystander approval of the criminality is essential for its occurrence, but in line with 
traditional criminal law thinking, the waves of punishability have not been broadened 
to cover mere bystanders. Criminal responsibility for inactivity demands an obligation 
to act.
10.3.3. Grounds for Excluding Responsibility 
On the paper there exist a number of exculpating factors (mostly excuses) in international 
criminal law. In practice, justifications and excuses have, however, not played a significant 
role in international criminal jurisprudence. This can to some extent be explained by 
the fact that international criminal tribunals only prosecute a limited number of cases, 
and cases in which exculpation appears possible are likely not chosen for prosecution. 
More significantly, justifications would, however, send the signal that the prosecuted 
2187 Gardner 1998(a), at 593 (on the concept of ‘regulatory criminal law’).
2188 See further Section 7.2.5.6.
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behaviour has been lawful and right, which in connection to international atrocities is a 
problematic signal. 
As was noted in Chapter 8, the relationship between offences and defences can 
be construed in different ways. One may choose to adopt strictly construed absolute 
prohibitions and allow very few defences. Or one may rather define the offences broadly 
and allow a number of defences. In general, it may be submitted that international criminal 
law has opted for the first alternative. The international criminalizations should generally 
be viewed as absolute prohibitions. Military necessity and political/ideological reasons 
are examples of justificatory claims sometimes advanced in connection to international 
criminality, which are not (anymore) in law accepted as justifications. As the present 
author sees it, it is, however, surprising that international criminal law has not opted for an 
even more absolute approach, that is, to declare all justifications (including most notably 
self-defence) as inapplicable in connection to genocide and crimes against humanity, 
and in relation to most war crimes. In practice, the requirement of proportionality in 
connection to justificatory claims will generally entail that they become inapplicable in 
connection to international crimes, but as a matter of legal style and from a labelling 
perspective an explicit rejection of justificatory claims would be merited. 
In connection to excuses that do not deny wrongdoing but culpability, consideration 
must, however, be given to human frailty. People with serious mental defects should, for 
example, not be held criminally responsible. Serious mental defects are, however, rare in 
connection to international crimes in the same way as they are rare in relation to ordinary 
criminality. Individuals who follow orders are more common in connection to international 
crimes, and it is international criminal law’s approach to this types of exculpatory claims 
that significantly can affect the distribution of responsibility for international crimes. As 
was noted regarding the phenomenology of international criminality, State participation 
in the criminality and prescription of the law/superior orders can entail that people loose 
grip of what is right and wrong and feel a strong pressure to engage in the criminality. 
In armed conflicts, the context of action is often criminogenic and may even amount to 
legally recognized situations of duress. The use of alcohol and drugs is common in armed 
conflicts. How should hence international criminal law address these pushes towards 
criminality that the phenomenology and criminology of international crimes indicate that 
often – or at least regularly – exist in connection to international crimes? If typical features 
of international criminality are recognized as possible excuses, they do not merely entail an 
occasional showing of mercy in an individual case, but a significant demarcation of societal 
expectations in relation to international crimes.
As was noted in Chapter 8, the ad hoc tribunals have generally adopted a very 
restrictive approach to defences, and superior orders, duress, intoxication, etc. have not 
been accepted as defences before ICTY and ICTR. The ICC Statute, on the other hand, 
does not as categorically exclude the exculpatory effect of these kinds of claims. The 
approach of the ICC, in practice, entails a directing of the responsibility to those who 
issue orders, cause situations of duress, allow and prompt people to fight intoxicated 
rather than those who act based on the orders, in duress or as intoxicated respectively. 
As such, the more accepting approach of the ICC to excuses is likely to emphasize the 
role played by leaders. It is important to note, however, that international criminal law 
has not in the law limited the applicability of particular defences to individuals holding 
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particular positions only (with the exception that a person following superior orders 
must be a person in a subordinate position).2189  
While the ICC seems to be a bit more allowing than the ad hoc tribunals regarding 
exculpatory claims, it must be submitted that international criminal law generally has 
adopted a restrictive approach to accepting excuses. Criminological explanations to 
why individuals participate in international crimes are hence usually not legally relevant 
at the conviction stage. In this regard, international criminal law follows the model of 
domestic criminal law, where individuals generally are viewed as rational actors who 
themselves decide how to act and not as victims of their environment.  
10.3.4. Sentencing Factors
The sentencing stage is the least regulated responsibility-determining stage, which means 
that a lot of different types of factors theoretically can be considered there. One could, for 
example, at that stage recognize the reasons behind (or the criminology of) the crimes. 
International criminal law’s restrictive attitude to justifications and excuses has indeed 
entailed a special pressure to consider some of these criminological factors as mitigating 
factors at sentencing. As was noted in Chapter 9, many criminologically relevant factors 
(such as peer pressure, and criminogenic environments) are, however, not given much 
attention at sentencing either. International sentencing rather emphasizes the same 
typical features of the criminality as the law at the conviction stage: the role played by 
leaders and the special reprehensibility of bias violence. As a whole, the sentencing stage 
therefore entails a fine-tuning of the legal choices made in international criminal law, 
rather than being a responsibility-determining stage that would contradict the “story” 
told at the conviction stage.   
10.4. The Emphases of International Criminal Law 
How an issue is framed can make a significant difference in the moral and legal responses 
it gets. This is exemplified by Osiel who notes that:  
2189 Cf. “A large and ever growing body of criminal law today is what academic commentators call 
“regulatory” criminal law, criminal law that applies to us only in our roles as shopkeepers, householders, 
social security claimants, witnesses, motorists, parents, waste-disposal contractors, and so forth, and 
purports to judge our actions, inter alia, by standards of character specifically befitting these roles. But the 
law of homicide is not part of the regulatory criminal law in this sense. Like the law of theft and the law of 
assault, it applies to us all, whatever furrows we may plough in life. So shouldn’t the standards of character 
applicable to it, including those which govern the availability of excuses in it, be uniform? And if so, the 
question remains, what exactly should they be? My own view is that there is no fundamental objection to 
making excusatory standards vary, even in the law of homicide, according to the standards applicable to 
roles which the defendant occupies when he kills. If he kills while on duty and armed as a police officer, 
then there is no fundamental objection to judging him by the standards of courage, level-headedness and 
self-restraint applicable specifically to police officers. But I agree that the problem is more difficult when 
we are dealing with people who kill while occupying a role (such as that of robber or slave) the internal 
standards of which should not be supported by law because the role should not exist, or a role (such as 
that of lover or friend) the internal standards of which should be supported by law but do not include any 
relevant standards (for example, they have nothing specifically to say about level-headedness or courage).” 
Gardner 1998(a), at 593.
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If Calley’s acts were described as ‘intentionally shooting civilian women and children,’ 
he was guilty of murder. [...] But if his acts were described as ‘following superior 
orders unreasonably believed to be lawful,’ then he was guilty only of negligent 
manslaughter [...]. Both accounts can be accurate in the sense of ‘consistent with 
known facts.’2190 
Of course, the facts of a case set some limits for how the situation legally can be addressed, 
but it is not uncommon in international criminal law that a certain criminal behaviour 
can fulfil the crime elements of many different crimes or modes of responsibility. In 
these situations, alternative stories can be told about the same historical event.2191 This 
recognition has made some legal scholars put forward suggestions how the historical 
records best should be framed. For example, Osiel has criticized international criminal 
tribunals for not “providing any clear criteria − logically coherent or morally sound” how 
they choose between JCE responsibility and superior responsibility, and he has argued 
that the “law of superior responsibility has proven to best serve national purposes of 
reconciliation after civil war and democratic transition.”2192 The present author agrees 
that the prosecutorial/judicial labelling choices in international criminal law sometimes 
appear to be arbitrary, but is not persuaded that superior responsibility always is the 
responsibility mode that sends the most appropriate signal. 
As a whole, it is submitted that criminological research à la Milgram emphasizing the 
pivotal role of leaders in connection to international criminality has been very influential 
in international criminal law. The law provides many alternatives to emphasize the role 
played by high-level actors, and these alternatives are often employed. Some other typical 
features of international criminality, on the other hand, have received surprisingly little 
attention in the law. For example, State involvement in the criminality has hardly been 
legally recognized at the conviction stage. Studies indicating the relevance of peer pressure 
have not influenced the law, and at sentencing suggestions regarding the legal relevance of 
a criminogenic environment have generally not been approved. The strong focus on the 
leaders entails a risk that too much blame is put on them. In this regard, one should note 
the point made by Osiel that “what makes men risk death in combat is not bureaucratic 
discipline, but small group loyalties.”2193 He continues by observing that “atrocity can also 
result from orders from above, anomic discipline from below, connivance, or brutalization” 
and that the “law must deal with all these sources at once.”2194 
The present author is not questioning the idea that leaders play a central role in 
connection to international crimes, but rather wants to emphasize that there are also 
other processes and phenomena that lie behind the criminal outcomes. The law should 
2190 Osiel 1999, at 125-126. 
2191 The author is not suggesting that the primary function of criminal law is or should be to produce a 
historical record, but in connection to international criminal law it easily becomes an important byproduct 
of the proceedings. Cf. also Osiel who argues that the post-World War II trials for a long time affected the 
historians’ interpretation of World War II. He argues that by focusing on the acts and intensions of the 
very top elites, the courts both missed the “macro-picture”, that is, the story of mass collaboration and 
institutional support for administrative brutality, and the “micro-picture”, that is, the story of the victims. 
Osiel 1997, at 100-103.
2192 Osiel 2009(b), at 13-14 and 156. 
2193 Osiel 1999, at 227. 
2194 Osiel 1999, at 230. 
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be careful not to portray all more-low-level actors as dehumanized cogs in machineries 
geared only by a few individuals. This point is made also by Ohlin regarding the former 
Yugoslavia, when he notes that: “There were only a few architects of the tragedy in 
the former Yugoslavia, but there were hundreds of mid-range perpetrators whose 
contributions to the criminality produced the majority of the outrages upon human 
dignity. In the end, the bulk of the criminality – in the aggregate – was located in 
these offenders, not in the highest-level offenders.”2195 It is also morally problematic if 
the international cases focusing on leaders portray the low-level actors as passive and 
ignorant, at the same time as domestic cases concerning the same low-level actors 
portray them as active and malevolent. The risk of overemphasizing the role played by 
leaders is especially significant before the international criminal tribunals that based on 
their statutes or prosecutorial policies only shall focus on high-level actors. 
At present, most provisions in international criminal law apply to high-level actors 
and low-level actors alike, which can be seen as something positive if one wants to see 
the criminality as a singular phenomenon in which many different types of individuals 
participate. There are, however, one crime that demand a leadership position (crime of 
aggression), some responsibility modes that directly or indirectly demand high-level 
position (superior responsibility, responsibility based on control of the act by virtue of 
a hierarchical organization, and ordering) and one defences that indirectly demands a 
subordinate position (superior orders, prescription of law). At sentencing, the hierarchical 
position of an individual may be taken into account both in aggravation (abuse of high-
level position) and in mitigation (low-level position). These provisions make it possible 
to stress that individuals may play different roles in connection to the criminality. In 
this regard, it is interesting that some scholars feel that the hierarchical position of an 
individual should be given an even stronger legal relevance. Ambos, for example, has 
suggested that the genocidal intent requirement should be defined differently depending 
of type of actor.2196 In a similar vein, Osiel has suggested that the contextual elements 
should be approached differently depending on the type of offender:  
The contextual requirement in core international crimes serves quite different 
purposes in trials of high-ranking versus lower-echelon defendants. For “big fish” 
like Milosevic or Charles Taylor, the pertinent context consists in facts establishing 
the defendant’s abuse of the powers attendant upon sovereignty. [...] Through their 
attendant control of the state (and its appendages, e.g., paramilitaries, death squads), 
these people effectively create or make the very legal and political context that makes 
possible the sort of wide-ranging harm of greatest concern to the international 
community. For smaller fry, the relevant features of sociopolitical context are quite 
distinct, but no less inculpatory. These defendants do not make the larger context, 
but rather take it, that is, accept it too readily and unquestioningly. They resign 
themselves to their immediate normative environment without sufficiently critical 
reflection [...]. Theirs are “crimes of conformity,” i.e., to prevailing norms and societal 
expectations. Their evil is banal, not radical, for these people do not seek to engineer 
any transvaluation of national values, employing high public office to disseminate an 
oppressive ideology and implement it as a political program.2197
2195 Ohlin 2011(b), at 340.
2196 See further Section 6.3.4.3. 
2197 M. Osiel, ‘Why the “Contextual Element” in All ICC Crimes?’, Opinio Juris [blog], 7 September 2009.
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The underlying assumption of these kinds of suggestions is that leaders generally know 
more and want more with their criminality than their subordinates. The present author, 
however, feels that these kinds of assumptions are dangerous. Schabas has, for example, 
correctly noted that leaders are not necessarily experts in international law, and that it 
may also be difficult for them to correctly asses what use of force is lawful.2198 Low-level 
actors are not always unaware about the political context in which their action takes 
place.2199 Investigations about knowledge, intent and motives should therefore always be 
made in casu. It is, however, another thing that the criminality of leaders is usually more 
dangerous and that it for that reason may be reasonable to demand more from individuals 
in high-level positions. A clear legal distinction must hence be made between: (a) in-built 
legal assumptions about reality; and (b) societal expectations expressed in the law.2200 
The picture portrayed by international criminal tribunals about the history is 
partial also from another perspective: As criminal law does not cover the behaviour of 
bystanders, the way in which bystanders are portrayed in judgements may send signals 
about collective innocence, if their role at all is considered. In an analysis of the Simić 
trial before the ICTY, Fletcher notes that: 
The Trial Chamber largely considers bystanders [...] as passive objects of the events 
orchestrated by defendants and a small group of leaders. Only in the separate opinion 
of Judge Lindholm do bystanders play a critical, if subsidiary role. [...] We read 
the names of the accused and others who are involved in carrying out the acts of 
persecution, but with few exceptions, we are left to imagine how those not actively 
taking part in persecution reacted or related to the unfolding events.2201 
According to Fletcher, bystanders are thus primarily used in judgements as a “neutral 
tool to illustrate the war crimes individuals committed.”2202 Fletcher has argued that 
it could be useful for national reconciliation, if the judicial proceedings would try to 
recognize that there in international crimes often are both “good bystanders”, who have 
not approved the crimes and whose behaviour in that sense has been exemplary, and 
“complicit bystanders”, who have not behaved criminally but whose behaviour still 
should be disapproved, although she emphasizes how difficult it is to do this within 
the parameters set by the basic criminal law principles.2203 As the behaviour of mere 
bystanders is not regulated in the law, it seems impossible to demand the courts to do 
these kinds of determinations.
2198 Schabas 2010 (a), at 514. 
2199 The present author therefore has problems with accounts of low-level actors that portray them as 
persons who cannot make any reasonable judgements about their surrounding. Cf. “the manifest illegality 
rule implicitly portrays him [= a soldier] as a spirited, free-thinking conscience, quick to perceive evil in 
his superiors and to intercede against it. This fiction departs too radically from the reality of industrialized 
mass slaughter for it to remain coherent, intelligible, or morally defensible.” Osiel 1999, at 142. 
2200 Cf. Osiel, who considers them both in one question: “What does the law of war crimes assume about 
how much of what kind of information, technical and ethical, fighters at all levels know or can be expected 
to acquire?” M. Osiel, ‘Rethinking the Law of War Crimes: “Collateral Damage” and “Distinction”’, Opinio 
Juris [blog, guest-post], 23 February 2010.
2201 L. E. Fletcher, ‘From Indifference to Engagement: Bystanders and International Criminal Justice’, 26 
Michigan Journal of International Law (2005), at 1062-1063. 
2202 Fletcher 2005, at 1064 (discussing the Simić Trial Judgement).
2203 Fletcher 2005, at 1073-1074 and 1083.  
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Regarding the crimes, it is sometimes difficult to exactly see where international 
criminal law has put its emphases, as the crime definitions are so complex and often protect 
many different types of interests. Genocide and crimes against humanity, however, both 
clearly indicate that the victims of international crimes often are targeted because of group-
belonging, and such the collective victimization aspect of the criminality. This aspect of the 
criminality is also emphasized at sentencing where discriminatory motive is recognized as 
a significant aggravating factor. That the perpetrator often belongs to a group or is State-
affiliated is, however, not generally recognized at the crime level (an exception to this is 
the ICC requirement regarding crimes against humanity that the crime is committed in 
furtherance of a state or organizatorial policy).2204 The collective perpetration is rather 
considered at the mode of responsibility stage, where some responsibility modes emphasize 
the collective animus of the violence. From a blameworthiness perspective, it is noteworthy 
that the various collective dimensions of international crimes (collective action/collective 
victims) can be seen to pull into different directions with regard to culpability. Collective 
victimization may be seen to enhance culpability, whereas collective action can be seen to 
spread out and diminish culpability.2205 Or to phrase this another way: The phenomenology 
and criminology of the crimes can speak for opposite legal solutions: collective participation 
increases the criminality’s dangerousness and speaks for aggravation, but from the point of 
view of the individual it entails peer pressure which speaks for mitigation. By emphasizing 
the danger of collective action, the approach of international criminal law has been 
that also the collective action enhances the culpability. All in all, international criminal 
law has been unwilling to accept defences and mitigating factors that would exculpate 
numerous individuals or express diminished culpability.2206 The lesser culpability of certain 
individuals is primarily recognized indirectly by portraying others as especially culpable or 
by sentencing individuals leniently.   
From a legal emphases perspective, it may be noted that many typical features of 
international criminality can be legally considered at multiple stages and that this sends a 
signal that that factor is found to be of special importance when considering the question 
of responsibility. As noted above, the hierarchical position of an individual is an example 
of such a variable. In this regard, it is interesting that it has been asked to what extent it 
is useful or even acceptable that the same factor is considered at multiple responsibility-
determining stages. More specifically, Osiel has questioned the need to have contextual 
crime elements taken into consideration that there are collective modes of responsibility: 
There’s a common intuition that, for all these crimes, no defendant’s acts or intentions 
could be properly understood and hence legally assessed in isolation from those of 
other people acting in some relevant relation to him − often kindred spirits, engaged 
in similarly reprehensible conduct. [...] This explanation for the law’s requirement 
of context is not entirely convincing, however, because the same intuition about 
shared responsibility already finds ample expression in the doctrinal requirements 
for modes of participation, e.g., joint criminal enterprise, command responsibility, 
etc… These rules too seek to capture the ways in which responsibility for certain, 
large-scale harm is shared with others, and that the defendant’s conduct is otherwise 
2204 Osiel 2009(b), at 6.
2205 Sloane 2007(a), at 58-59. 
2206 See further e.g., Chapter 8. 
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not adequately intelligible. Why, then, require that the fact of shared responsibility be 
show both in the definition of offenses and in the rules by which the acts of some are 
then attributed to others?”2207
The present author does not generally see that it is problematic that a particular factor is 
considered at multiple stages, if it is different aspects of the same factor that are considered. 
The multiple consideration of a factor may, however, lead to very strong emphases and 
it must then be considered whether these are merited. In this regard, Jacobs has asked 
whether the suffering of victims should be considered again at sentencing as an aggravating 
factor as it is “the whole rationale behind the creation of international tribunals is to address 
crimes which have these consequences.”2208 There is a point in Jacobs’ argument, but at the 
same time it should be remembered that there may be significant differences between cases 
as regards the amount and type of harm caused. As such, it may be important to consider 
the harm caused more specifically at the sentencing stage. 
The placement of a particular factor in a particular responsibility-determining stage 
is not neutral from a labelling perspective, even though all responsibility-determining 
stages affect the final outcome in a case. The legal choice to make the crime of aggression 
a leadership crime by, in the crime definition, limiting the applicability of the crime to 
persons “in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or 
military action of a State”, for example, sends strong signals about who should be blamed 
for aggression.2209 Factors that only are sentencing factors have a lesser labelling effect. 
From this perspective, it is interesting that many significant blameworthiness evaluations 
in international criminal law are made at the sentencing stage. Due to this, international 
criminal law scholars should give the sentencing stage more attention.       
10.5.  Epilogue 
In a preface, Professor George P. Fletcher notes that one of his books has raised as many 
questions as it has resolved and that he hopes to make “greater intellectual progress” 
in a forthcoming book.2210 The present author also feels that there still is much to say 
about the legal choices made in international criminal law, and their relationship to the 
phenomenology and criminology of international crimes. At the same time, there is not 
always one right answer to every question. In this study, the attempt has hence not been 
to say what “the” right legal solutions would have been. The goal has instead been to 
highlight the legal choices made and to investigate the signals the law sends. Without this 
type of consideration, the adopted solutions easily become self-evident and it is stopped 
asking questions about their appropriateness and about alternatives to them. As such, 
the author hopes that her thesis will inspire other scholars to continue investigating the 
nature of international criminality and to critically assess the legal choices made. 
2207  Osiel 2009 [blog]. 
2208 D. Jacobs, ‘Guest Post: Suffering Victims and Collective Crimes: The Limits of International Criminal 
Law’, Opinio Juris [blog], 11 June 2012. 
2209 ICC Doc. RC/Res.6. 
2210 Fletcher 2007(a), at xx.
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SVENSKT SAMMANDRAG 
Väpnade konflikter och totalitära regimer karaktäriseras allmänt av utbredd användning 
av våld och av omfattande kränkningar av mänskliga rättigheter. Traditionellt har brott 
som begåtts i dessa onormala samhälleliga förhållanden inte lagförts. Under och efter 
krig/diktaturer saknas ofta både politisk vilja och ekonomiska resurser för rättsliga 
åtgärder. 
År 1993 beslöt FN:s säkerhetsråd att det skulle grundas en internationell 
krigsförbrytartribunal för att lagföra brott som hade begåtts under Balkankriget. 
Jugoslavientribunalen innebar en vändpunkt för internationella straffrätten, som 
under de två senaste årtiondena har utvecklats till en etablerad och sofistikerad del 
av folkrätten. I dag är utgångspunkten att de som begår krigsförbrytelser, brott mot 
mänskligheten och folkmord skall åtalas och dömas för sina brott. 
Avhandlingens målsättning är att belysa de internationella brottens särdrag samt 
att analysera de rättsliga lösningar som har antagits inom rättsområdet “internationell 
straffrätt”. Avhandlingens inleds med en fenomenologisk och kriminologisk analys 
av brotten med syftet att identifiera typiska karaktäristika för dem. En central fråga i 
dessa kapitel är om man kan säga att internationella brott skiljer sig från “vanliga” 
brott som begås under fredstid, och, ifall svaret är jakande, hur. I kapitlet om brottens 
fenomenologi dras slutsatsen att de internationella brotten har särdrag som påverkar 
deras lagföring: brottsligheten har till exempel ofta en stark koppling till staten/
myndigheter, brotten är ofta kollektiva både när det gäller gärningsmän och brottsoffer, 
och de flesta internationella brott begås under onormala och ofta våldsamma 
samhälleliga omständigheter. Kriminologiskt har de internationella brotten däremot 
mycket gemensamt med vanliga brott, d.v.s. samma typ av faktorer verkar förklara båda 
typer av brottslighet, men de internationella brottens fenomenologi gör att vissa sociala 
processer (till exempel grupptryck) blir särskilt betydelsefulla i anslutning till just dem. 
De internationella brottens särdrag har fått många att ifrågasätta möjligheten att med 
hjälp av straffrätten fördöma och motverka internationell brottslighet. 
För att förstå varför det är problematiskt att använda straffrätt i anslutning till 
internationell brottslighet diskuteras det även i avhandlingen vad det innebär att ett 
samhälleligt problem angrips med hjälp av straffrätten. Mer specifikt argumenteras det 
i avhandlingen att straffrätten har vissa inbyggda antaganden och utgångspunkter och 
när dessa inte uppfylls blir användningen av straffrätt problematisk. Straffrätten utgår till 
exempel från principen om individuellt ansvar, medan de internationella brotten har en 
kollektiv karaktär. 
I avhandlingens tredje del diskuteras det mer konkret hur den internationella 
straffrätten har strukturerats och var och på vilket sätt juridiken tar i beaktande de 
internationella brottens särdrag. Vilka karaktäristika lyfts fram som rättsligt särskilt 
relevanta och vilka ges föga eller ingen rättslig relevans? Vilka signaler sänder den 
internationella straffrätten om vem som bör bära ansvaret för brotten? I avhandlingen 
diskuterar separat brottsdefinitionerna (kapitel 6), tillskrivande av ansvar (kapitel 7), 
rättfärdigande och ursäktande grunder (kapitel 8) samt straffmätning (kapitel 9). Syftet 
med denna indelning är att belysa i vilket skede och hur de olika särdragen beaktas. 
Avhandlingens slutsats är att vissa karaktäristika betonas i många olika skeden (särskilt de 
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överordnades ansvar), medan andra har fått en undanskymd roll om de överhuvudtaget 
har ansetts vara rättsligt relevanta (till exempel motiven bakom brotten). I många fall 
följer den internationella straffrätten den modell som den nationella rätten ger om vad 
som är rättsligt relevant. Avhandlingen visar emellertid också att det i många fall är 
möjligt att godta alternativa rättsliga lösningar. Trots att den internationella straffrätten 
idag karaktäriseras av etablering är det därför viktigt att fortsätta diskutera och analysera 
rättens struktur. 
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